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Abstract 
This dissertation is a grounded theoretical analysis of the REDD-plus programme, 
the multi-level system of forest governance that is being developed since 2007 under 
the international legal regime on climate change. It examines REDD-SOXV¶ main 
elements, seeks to preliminarily assess its likely impact and suggests measures to 
improve its design. The focus is on effectiveness, intended as the ability to address 
the causes of forest loss in developing countries. The research is divided in two parts. 
The first part concentrates on REDD-plus at the international level. It explores the 
SURJUDPPH¶V LQQRYDWLYH but VWLOO IUDJPHQWHG DQG FRQWUDGLFWRU\ XVH RI µSROLF\
DSSURDFKHV¶DQG µSRVLWLYH LQFHQWLYHV¶and assesses its strengths and weaknesses in 
the context of the broader trend towards WKH µQHR-OLEHUDOLVDWLRQ¶ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO
environmental policy. The second part examines REDD-plus at the national and sub-
national levels. It uses sustainable landscape governance as the overarching 
conceptual and physical framework for the effective implementation of REDD-plus 
activities and suggests three areas of public policy that should be prioritised by 
participant countries: tenure, spatial planning and financial intermediation. The 
dissertation examines each policy area in detail and provides specific 
recommendations on the measures available to overcome current problems. It argues 
that WKHSURJUDPPH¶Veffectiveness would be magnified by combining public policy 
and market instruments in such a way as to facilitate the negotiation of trade-offs 
between multiple environmental and development objectives and between diverse 
stakeholders. Building on this analysis, the conclusions advance some considerations 
on the possible significance of REDD-plus for the development of international 
environmental law. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Background to the research: climate change and forests  
There is overwhelming scientific consensus that anthropogenic emissions of 
µJUHHQKRXVH JDVHV¶1 are rapidly warming the atmosphere and changing the global 
climate.2 Although the exact consequences of such warming are still uncertain, 
climate change is considered one of the greatest environmental problems humans 
have ever faced. A United Nations report has raised the alarm over five climate-
induced threats: to territorial integrity from rising sea levels; to human well-being 
due to reduced water and food availability; to economic development due to the 
impact of extreme weather events on agricultural production and infrastructures; to 
peace and security due to the increasing inter-state tensions caused by climate-
related stress; and to international cooperation in managing scarcer shared 
resources.3  In order to prevent the most extreme impacts, scientists suggested that 
global emissions will have to decline by 25-40 percent by 2020 and by 80-90 percent 
by 2050 in developed countries, while developing countries must achieve a 
                                                 
1
 Greenhouse gases are: water vapour (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), methane 
(CH4), and ozone (O3). Additionally, synthetic gases used in industrial production (such as 
chlorofluorocarbons CFCs and hydrofluorocarbons HFCs) also contribute to the greenhouse effect, 
albeit to a more limited extent. Greenhouse gas emissions are commonly, albeit incorrectly, dubbed 
µFDUERQHPLVVLRQV¶WRLQGLFDWHWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWRIZDUPLQJJDVHVFDUERQGLR[LGH This thesis will 
adopt this lexicon despite its lack of scientific rigour. 
2
 Since the start of the industrial era in 1750, the global average concentration of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere has increased by forty-one percent, while that of methane and nitrous oxide by one-
hundred-sixty percent and twenty percent respectively :02 µGreenhouse Gas Concentrations in 
Atmosphere Reach New Record¶ WMO Media Centre (Geneva, 6 November 2013) 
<www.wmo.int/pages/mediacentre/press_releases/pr_980_en.html> Accessed 7 February 2014. 
3
 Report of the Secretary-General µ&OLPDWH&KDQJHDQGLWVSRVVLEOHVHFXULW\LPSOLFDWLRQV¶ (2009) UN 
Doc A/64/350. 
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µVXEVWDQWLDO GHYLDWLRQ¶ Irom their baseline emissions.4 Given the transboundary 
nature of the problem, it was felt that a coordinated international response was 
needed to spur and regulate the unprecedented changes needed in virtually all sectors 
of economic activity. 
Scientific understanding of global warming emerged as early as the 1970s,5 and the 
1980s saw a number of international conferences organised to discuss the political 
implications of the problem and set the stage for a coordinated international 
response.6 In 1988 the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the 
World Meteorological Organisations (WMO) established the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to lead scientific assessments on climate change 
and its impacts, with a view to formulating response strategies.7 In 1992, 165 
countries signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
81)&&&DOVR µWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶, a multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) 
aimed at ³>VWDELOL]LQJ] greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangeURXVDQWKURSRJHQLFLQWHUIHUHQFHZLWKWKHFOLPDWHV\VWHP´8 
The Convention commits Parties to take action to reduce or limit the increase of their 
emissions, DOEHLW ³taking into account their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and their specific national and regional development priorities, 
objectives and circumstances´9  
                                                 
4
 These figures are associated with a temperature increase of around two degrees Celsius (2C), which 
LVFRQVLGHUHGµVDIH¶IPCC, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (CUP 2007) 776. 
5
 WMO, Declaration of the World Climate Conference (1979) UN Doc ICO/SAB-IV/INF.3 
6
 :02µReport of the International Conference on the Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide 
and of Other Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and Associated Impacts¶ (Villach, Austria, 9-15 
October 1985) WMO No.661; World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for 
Global Security (Toronto, 27±30 June 1988)µNoordwijk Ministerial Conference on Climate Change¶
(Noordwijk, The Netherlands, 6-7 November 1989). 
7
 The mandate of the new body was outlined in UNGA Res 43/53 (6 December 1988) UN Doc 
A/RES/43/53. 
8
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted in Rio de Janeiro on 9 May 
1992, entered into force 31 March 1994) 1771 UNTS I-30822, article 2. 
9
 Ibid article 4(1), and article 3(1). This provision creates differential obligations between developing 
and developed countries, the latter being recognised as having historical responsibility for climate 
change as well as more capability to reduce its impact. 
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Among the various sources of emissions, deforestation is the second largest 
contributor after fossil fuel combustion.10 This thesis looks at the emerging legal 
framework to reduce forest emissions in the context of climate change mitigation. 
Forests contain 652 billion tons of carbon11 which, if cut, would release the 
equivalent of 500 years of emissions at current levels.12 During the 1980s and 1990s, 
16 million hectares of forests were lost annually, of which over 15 million were in 
developing countries.13 Forest loss decreased to 13 million hectares per year in the 
2000s (an area roughly the size of England),14 contributing an estimated 12-18 
percent to global emissions.15 16 Despite the little space given to forest emissions in 
international discussions,17 the UNFCCC called on Parties to promote the 
³VXVWDLQDEOHPDQDJHPHQWFRQVHUYDWLRQDQGHQKDQFHPHQWRIVLQNVDQGUHVHUYRLUVRI
                                                 
10
 )RUHVWVDFWDV µVLQNV¶ LH WKH\UHPRYHFDUERQGLR[LGH IURPWKHDWPRVSKHUHDQG WUDQVIRUPLW LQWR
sugars through photosynthesis. By contrasts, when forests are felled or burned, much of the carbon 
trapped in their biomass is released back to the atmosphere in the form of carbon dioxide. The IPCC 
concluded that in some cases the sustainable management of forests, based on the selective removal of 
grown trees and the retention of the carbon they contain in durable timber products, could keep forest 
growing at a higher rate, thus sequestering more carbon from the atmosphere than unmanaged forests 
and achieving a net mitigation benefit. However, this is not the case with conventional forest 
management, in which only a fraction of the removed biomass ends up in durable forest products 
while the rest is burned or ends up in products with a short life-cycle (such as paper). IPCC (n 4) 551. 
11
 This includes the carbon stored in biomass, dead wood and soil; FAO, Global Forest Resource 
Assessment 2010 (FAO 2010) 45. The atomic weight of the solid element carbon (C) is 12 atomic 
mass units, while the weight of the gas carbon dioxide (CO2) is 44, because it includes two oxygen 
atoms that each weighs 16. Therefore the conversion rate of C to CO2 is 3.67 (44/12 = 11/3 = 3.67). 
12
 Global forest loss would release almost 2.4 trillion tons of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. 
Current levels are estimated to be just above forty-six billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent 
W&2HSHU\HDU µ&$,7EHWD:5,¶V FOLPDWH GDWD H[SORUHU¶ :5,http://cait2.wri.org> 
Accessed on 11 November 2013. 
13
 FAO, Forest Resource Assessment 1990, Global Synthesis (FAO 1995); FAO (n 11).  
14
 FAO (n 11) 3-4. 
15
 The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report uses an estimate of around 20 percent of total GHG 
emissions, whereas a previous report commissioned by the UK government used a figure of 18 
percent. A more recent study lowered the amount to 12 percent or 15 percent including peat 
degradation. See Stern, Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (CUP 2007); IPCC (n 4); 
Van der Werf et al, µ&2HPLVVLRQVIURPIRUHVWORVV¶) 2 Nature Geoscience 737-8; Baccini et 
DO µEstimated carbon dioxide emissions from tropical deforestation improved by carbon-density 
maps¶1DWXUH&OLPDWH&KDQJH 
16
 The above estimates do not include the carbon dioxide removed from the atmosphere, which could 
be twice as much as that released by deforestation; EPA, Advancing the Science of Climate Change 
(National Academies Press 2010). 
17
 The issue was only brought into the discussion at the 1989 Noordwijk Conference, when 
participating ministers stated their ambition to achieve global net forest growth of 12 million hectares 
per year, but it was side-lined in the negotiations leading the adoption of the UNFCCC. 
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DOOJUHHQKRXVHJDVHV LQFOXGLQJELRPDVV>DQG@ IRUHVWV´18 However, the Convention 
lacked legally binding obligations to reduce emissions by a specified amount and 
was therefore largely ineffective in this particular respect.19  
This shortcoming was partly remedied five years later when the third meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention (COP 3)20 adopted the Kyoto Protocol 
µWKH 3URWRFRO¶21 The Protocol set quantified emission limitation and reduction 
targets to be achieved by 2012, but the agreed cap on emissions was not in line with 
scientific requirements:22 Not only were emission reduction targets too low, but key 
polluters were not obliged to make specific emission reductions: the United States 
did not ratify the treaty23 and developing countries (including emerging economies 
such as China, Brazil and India) were exempted from timetabled reduction 
commitments.24 Targets could be met by DFFRXQWLQJ IRU WKH ³QHW FKDQJHV LQ
HPLVVLRQV UHVXOWLQJ IURP DIIRUHVWDWLRQ UHIRUHVWDWLRQ DQG GHIRUHVWDWLRQ DFWLYLWLHV´,25 
                                                 
18
 UNFCCC (n 8) article 4(1)(d). 
19
 Ibid DUWLFOH E GHYHORSHG FRXQWULHV PHUHO\ ³aim of returning individually or jointly to their 
1990 levels RIHPLVVLRQV´ZKLFKLVDµWRRWKOHVV¶REOLJDWLRQ 
20
 Pursuing to UNFCCC article 7, the COP was established as the supreme body of the Convention 
with the main objectives of reviewing implementation and further adopting the decisions and 
instruments necessary to promote effective implementation.  
21
 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 11 
December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) 37 ILM 22. 
22
 Ibid, article 3(1). The Kyoto Protocol requires the Parties listed in Annex I to reduce their national 
emissions by the amount listed in Annex B. These Parties include the EU, Eastern Europe and Russia, 
Canada, Australia, Japan and New Zealand. Annex I Parties had to collectively reduce their emissions 
E\³DWOHDVWSHUFHQWEHORZOHYHOVLQWKHFRPPLWPHQWSHULRGWR´7KLVLVQRWLQOLQH
with the current IPCC requirements; IPCC (n 4). 
23
 The US, then the largest global polluter, was a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol but did not ratify it 
because of competitiveness concerns.  
24
 This was decided pursuing the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities enunciated in article 3(1). Such principle recognises that developing nations are 
least responsible for climate change and least able to reduce their emissions without unduly impairing 
their development process. It is thus concerned with an equitable distribution of burdens across the 
international community and provides the legal justification for the adoption of asymmetric 
obligations between developing and developed countries. 
25
 Kyoto Protocol (n 21) article 3(3). 
5 
 
but the exclusion of developing countries meant that no real action to stem global 
forest loss was required.26 
After completing the regulatory framework for the operationalization of the Kyoto 
Protocol (COP 7, Marrakech, 2001), UNFCCC Parties began discussing a new 
protocol that would contain stringent caps and involve developing countries. In this 
context, observers recommended the inclusion of a mechanism to provide financial 
compensation to developing countries for reducing their deforestation emissions in 
the new treaty (COP 9, Milan, 2003).27 The idea was well received by both 
developing and developed countries and at COP 11 (Montreal, 2005) an agenda item 
on reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries was officially 
introduced.28  
At COP 13 (Bali, 2007), Parties launched a roadmap for the conclusion of a post-
Kyoto instrument at COP 15 (Copenhagen, 2009).29 One of the elements of this new 
instrument was a programme to reduce emissions from deforestation in developing 
countries,30 which became known as REDD-plus.31 The programme combines two 
HOHPHQWVµSRVLWLYHLQFHQWLYHV¶WRHQFRXUDJHYROXQWDU\UHGXFWLRQVRIIRUHVWHPLVVLRQV
DQG µSROLF\ DSSURDFKHV¶ WRDGGUHVV WKHFRPSOH[VRFLR-economic consequences that 
this entails.32 
                                                 
26
 For instance, aggregate data are of emissions from fossil fuels and land-use change shows that in 
2000 Brazil and Indonesia were the 4th and 5th global emitters of GHG due to their high deforestation 
rates; WRI (n 11). 
27
 Santilli et alµ7URSLFDOGHIRUHVWDWLRQDQG.\RWR3URWRFRO¶&OLPDWLF&KDQJH 
28
 Submission from the Governments of Costa Rica and PNG, Reducing emissions from deforestation 
in developing countries: approaches to stimulate action (2005) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1. 
29
 UNFCCC COP Decision 1/CP.13 (2007) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1. 
30
 Ibid paragraph 1(b)(iii). 
31
 At COP 11 discussions focused only on µUHGXFLQJ HPLVVLRQV IURP GHIRUHVWDWLRQ5('¶ :KHQ DW
COP 13 the Parties realised that forest degradation was an important source of emissions, the second 
µ'¶ ZDV DGGHG WR µ5(''¶ ,W ZDV WKHQ UHFRJQLVHG WKDW FOLPDWH EHQHILWV DOVR DULVH IURP HQKDQFLQJ
positiYH FKDQJHV DQG VR WKH µSOXV¶ RU µ¶ ZDV DGGHG DW &23 WR LQGLFDWH IRUHVW FRQVHUYDWLRQ
sustainable management and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.  
32
 The complete name of REDD-plus is ³SROLF\DSSURDFKHVDQGSRVLWLYHLQFHQWLYHVRQLVVXHVUHODWLQJ
to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role 
of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in 
GHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV´. 
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While negotiations on REDD-plus proceeded relatively speedily, disagreements 
about the new emission reduction targets and the contribution of emerging 
economies proved insurmountable. No new treaty was adopted at the Copenhagen 
COP, and a complete breakdown of the negotiations was only avoided with a last 
minute agreement betZHHQDVXEVHWRISURPLQHQWFRXQWULHVFDOOHGWKHµ&RSHQKDJHQ
$FFRUG¶33 Negotiations continued the following year in Cancun, Mexico, where the 
Parties reaffirmed most provisions of the Copenhagen Accord and set out the basic 
building blocks for REDD-plus.34  
The following COP meeting (Durban, 2011) added further details to the emerging 
REDD-plus legal framework and introduced a new roadmap for the conclusion of an 
µLQVWUXPHQW ZLWK OHJDO IRUFH¶ E\  ZKLFK VKRXOG HQWHU LQWR IRUFH E\  WKH
µ'XUEDQ 3ODWIRUP¶35 After a year with little progress (Doha, 2012), at COP 19 
(Warsaw, 2013) UNFCCC Parties adopted seven decisions on REDD-plus36 which, 
according to some observers, complete the EDVLF µUXOHERRN¶ IRU the programme.37 
REDD-plus is therefore on track for adoption by 2015 under the post-Kyoto legal 
instrument.  
                                                 
33
 The Copenhagen Accord was concluded by the United States and the BASIC countries (Brazil, 
South Africa, India and China); UNFCCC Draft Decision -/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord (2009) UN 
Doc FCCC/CP/2009/L.7; the Copenhagen Accord was RQO\ µQRWHG¶E\ WKH Parties: UNFCCC COP 
Decision 2/CP.15 (2009) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1.  
34
 UNFCCC COP Decision 1/CP.16 (2010) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, paragraph 70.  
35
 UNFCCC COP Decision 1/CP.17 (2011) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1. 
36
 7KLV VHW RI GHFLVLRQV KDV EHHQ GXEEHG WKH µ:DUVDZ )UDPHZRUN IRU 5(''-plus ActLRQ¶ µEU 
welcomes progress on international climate action at Warsaw conference¶European Commission (23 
November 2013) EC MEMO/13/1044.  
37
 =ZLFNµUnpacking Warsaw, Part One: The Institutional Arrangements¶)RUHVW&DUERQ3RUWDO
November 2013) <www.forestcarbonportal.com/news/unpacking-warsaw-part-one-the-institutional-
arrangements> Accessed 7 February 2014; Lodge, Opinion: COP 19 delivers Warsaw Framework for 
REDD+ Action (CDKN, 29 November 2013) <http://cdkn.org/2013/11/cop19-delivers-warsaw-
framework-for-redd-action> Accessed 07 February 2014. 
7 
 
1.2. Objectives, methods and relevance of the research 
1.2.1. Research objectives  
The plurality of viewpoints that emerged in the development of REDD-plus, its 
innovative approach and the urgency with which it has been discussed have 
generated considerable confusion. Against a backdrop of persisting legal 
indeterminacy, the thesis first addresses the causes of forest loss before exploring the 
key international elements of the programme. It then provides a preliminary 
assessment of its likely effectiveness, that is, its ability to meet the mitigation 
objective (consistent with article 2 UNFCCC) and other relevant social and 
environmental goals.38 Consideration is DOVRJLYHQWRWKHSURJUDPPH¶VHfficiency (i.e. 
its costs in absolute and comparative terms) and equity,39 but only in relation to their 
impact on effectiveness.40 In addition, it attempts to identify domestic measures to 
improve effectiveness in implementation, looking at the contribution of State and 
non-State actors, prescriptive regulations, soft policy approaches and positive 
economic incentives.  
The discussion will be approached using the lenses of governance analysis, 
governance being intended in a positivistic sense as the formal and informal rules, 
processes and institutions that determine how authority is exercised in a particular 
context. REDD-plus exhibits three essential characteristics of a multi-level 
governance framework41 in the making:42 (i) a vertical (yet non-hierarchical) relation 
                                                 
38
 UNFCCC (n 8). 
39
 Equity is intended substantially (i.e. the distribution of REDD-plus costs and benefits between 
stakeholders) and procedurally (i.e. the degree of participation and influence of all stakeholders in 
decisions concerning access to and use of land and natural resources). 
40
 Effectiveness is strictly connected to efficiency for the feasibility of the programme is dependent on 
the price of emission reductions and removal increases; effectiveness and efficiency are also linked to 
equity for the unfair distribution of benefits or stakeholder exclusion from decisions will hamper 
efforts to protect forest carbon, or will greatly increase its cost. 
41
 Multi-level governance is a variedly defined concept. Definitions tend to focus on institutions, 
politics and stakeholder interactions, and the concept is often associated with overlapping ideas of 
nested governance, polycentric governance, networked governance, multi-perspective governance and 
others. See, e.J 1HZLJ )ULWVFK µ(QYLURQPHQWDO *RYHUQDQFH 3DUWLFLSDWRU\ 0XOWL-Level ± and 
(IIHFWLYH"¶(QY3RO*RY+RRKKH0DUNVµ8QUDYHOLQJWKH&HQWUDO6WDWH- but How?: 
Types of Multi-OHYHO *RYHUQDQFH¶   $PHULFDQ 3ROLWLFDO 6FLHQFH 5HYLew 234; 
-DFKWHQIXFKV µ7KHRUHWLFDO SHUVSHFWLYHV RQ (XURSHDQ JRYHUQDQFH¶   (XURSHDQ /DZ -RXUQDO
115
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between actors operating at different scales; (ii) a decentred mode of social 
coordination as opposed to the centralised control of the State;43 and (iii) the 
contextual involvement of non-State actors operating at supranational as well as 
subnational levels.44 These characteristics distinguish REDD-plus from international 
environmental instruments that are distinctively hierarchical and State-centred. They 
also mean that the conditions for its effective implementation differ from those of 
other treaties: the stringency and precision of legal obligations, compliance regime 
and enforcement measures are less important than the technical, human and material 
capacity to reduce deforestation in a cooperative fashion. The research considers 
whether this emphasis on voluntary cooperation and economic incentives fits within 
the trend towards State marginalisation observed in the context of public 
administration reforms45 or whether, instead, a redefinition of the role of the State in 
land and natural resource administration is simultaneously more likely and more 
desirable. 
The analysis will be divided in two parts. Part I focuses on REDD-SOXV¶LQWHUQDWLRQDO
legal framework, where the basic elements and principles of the programme are 
developed. Part II focuses on the domestic (i.e. national and subnational) levels of 
governance, since it is in this domain that REDD-plus strategies and regulatory 
choices are mostly made.46 This multi-level focus permits examination of the 
interaction between governance levels. Rather than considering what domestic 
regulatory frameworks are needed to implement international obligations, it asks 
what governance arrangements are most effective at the domestic level and how the 
international legal framework can support their development.  
                                                                                                                                          
42
 Skutsch, Van Laake, µREDD as multi-level governance in-the-PDNLQJ¶   (QHUJ\ 	
Environment 831. 
43
 .HPS3DUWR*LEVRQ µ*RYHUQDQFHIRUVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWPRYLQJIURPWKHRU\WRSUDFWLFH¶
(2005) 8(1-2) Int. J. Sustainable Development 12, at 17. 
44
 3DSDGRSRXORV µ3UREOHPV RI GHPRFUDWLF DFFRXQWDELOLW\ LQ QHWZRUN DQG PXOWLOHYHO JRYHUQDQFH¶
(2007) 13(4) European Law Journal 469, at 469. 
45
 RhRGHVµ7KH+ROORZLQJ2XWRIWKH6WDWH¶ 65 Political Quarterly 138. 
46
 Brockhaus, Di Gregorio, MardiahµGoverning the design of national REDD+: An analysis of the 
power of agency¶  )RU 3RO 	 (FR LQ SUHVV DW  '2,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2013.07.003>. 
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Text box 1.1 summarises the three main objectives of inquiry of this thesis in the 
form of research questions set out in logical succession.  
Box 1.1: Research objectives and research questions  
Objective 1: Critically analyse the distinctive elements of REDD-plus as a multi-level 
governance framework. 
1a) What are the characteristics of REDD-plus vis-á-vis previous international efforts to halt 
deforestation? Why has the programme developed in such way?  
1b) How does this approach configure relationships across levels of governance and between 
stakeholders? 
Objective 2: Identify and systematise the regulatory and institutional conditions that are 
most likely to ensure the effective implementation of the programme at various governance 
levels. 
2a) What are the necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) conditions to achieve a substantial 
reduction in forest emissions and other social and environmental benefits?  
2b) What area(s) of domestic policy, if any, should REDD-plus prioritise in this phase of its 
development? 
Objective 3: Gain insight on the role of State and markets in multi-level environmental 
governance. 
3a) What should the role of the State be vis-á-vis supranational and subnational actors to 
improve the effectiveness of multi-level systems of environmental governance?  
3b) How, if at all, can prescriptive and market-based regulatory instruments be best 
combined in such systems? 
1.2.2. Analytical approach and methodology  
The research adopts an institutionalist perspective which focuses on the formal 
regulatory and institutional elements of environmental governance as opposed to 
sociological aspects such as discourses, actors and power relationships. Regulations 
and institutions create the structural conditions for REDD-plus implementation. By 
contrast, actors, power relationships and cultural factors ± i.e. the social context 
within which the programme operates - are considered only for their influence on the 
establishment and operation of formal structures.47 The rationale is that REDD-plus 
directly affects only institutions, regulations and decision-making processes 
                                                 
47
 For a recent analysis of these governance dimensions in the domestic REDD-plus context see the 
paper by Brokhaus et al (n 46). 
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(domestic and international) which in turn influence power distribution across 
society and, to a lesser extent, social and cultural norms. 
Secondly, the research uses a positivist conception of the law as a social construct: it 
thus separates the inquiry into the law and legal systems from that into the moral 
appropriateness of such law. Instead of using broad moral categories, regulatory 
instruments are assessed according to the internal parameters defined by the legal 
regime in which REDD-plus operates. This is reflected in the choice, of utilitarian 
inspiration, to privilege effectiveness over equity considerations.  
Finally, with regards to international law, the thesis uses a liberal interpretation of 
regime theory which assumes (a) that international legal regimes can affect the 
behaviour of States and non-State actors, and (b) that cooperation is driven by a 
convergence of expectations and interests by States and, secondarily, by non-State 
actors.48 
A multidisciplinary approach is used to deal with the inherent complexity of land use 
and forest management issues, drawing on disciplines such as law, economics, 
governance studies and land use planning. This is necessary to gain a holistic 
understanding of the regulatory and organisational measures that are most likely to 
meet the effectiveness objective as defined in section 1.2.1. A reductionist approach 
that confines the investigation to within the boundaries of a discrete discipline is 
unlikely to generate such understanding. As made clear in chapter 2, in fact, reducing 
forest loss and related emissions is a management problem whose solution builds on 
the redefinition of development goals and practices and on the contextual 
establishment of regulatory and institutional structures that are fit for purpose. 
Identifying effective approaches (e.g. in the form of best practices) must therefore 
take a multidisciplinary perspective that sheds light on the economic, social and 
organisational implications of discrete policy and regulatory choices.  
                                                 
48
 However, the thesis departs from regime theory on one fundamental point: States are concerned not 
only with the absolute gains derived from cooperation but also, to a large extent, with comparative 
gains and losses. This is abundantly clear in the contraposition between the US and China over the 
respective contributions to climate change mitigation and the American discourse over comparative 
loss of economic competitiveness; G.W. Bush, Letter to Members of the Senate on the Kyoto 
3URWRFRORQ&OLPDWH&KDQJH:HHNO\&RPS3UHV'RF0DUFKFLWHGLQ.DKQµ7KH
Fate of the Kyoto Protocol under WKH %XVK $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶   Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 548, at 551. 
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The methodology chosen to answer the research questions is µJURXQGHGWKHRU\¶. The 
theoretical reasoning is informed by a meta-analysis of (mostly empirical) data 
gathered from the various disciplines considered, including: field studies (e.g. on 
stakeholder participation, local governance mechanisms, drivers of forest loss, costs 
of REDD-plus implementation and so forth), scientific analysis and models (e.g. data 
on climate change, deforestation etc.), economic analysis (e.g. economic modelling, 
financial projections of REDD-plus revenues, financial instruments), statistical 
studies (e.g. on tenure distribution, planning capacity, crime) and questionnaire-
based or desk-based assessments of governance (e.g. planning techniques, qualitative 
analysis of illegality and corruption, multi-level and multi-sector analysis and so on). 
From June to August 2010 the author undertook empirical research on forest 
governance, participation and illegality in North-West Ecuador.49 Anonymous 
interviews and observational research provided data on illegal logging, law 
enforcement and corruption, the factors influencing compliance with environmental 
regulation,50 governance processes and dynamics at community and landscape level 
and problems affecting participation and sustainability in natural resource 
management. The information gathered has informed the research but the choice to 
maintain the focus on higher levels of governance led to the decision not to present 
the field data as a separate case-study. At this level of discussion, therefore, 
empirical evidence gathered first-hand is treated no differently from empirical 
evidence derived from the literature. 
A structural analytical approach is used to separate the complex study of multi-level 
governance into the constituent elements of a simpler solution and the theory is 
advanced using inductive reasoning. As results achieved via inductive reasoning 
cannot be proven beyond doubt, the research does not aim to provide conclusive 
proofs but rather plausible explanations, likely conclusions and logical 
recommendations. Theoretical insights are gained from the data and their logical 
inductive development.  
                                                 
49
 The author was awarded the University of Nottingham BEST Scholarship in January 2010. The 
scholarship aims to broaden WKH UHFLSLHQW¶VZRUNexperience and network of contacts by giving the 
opportunity to undertake a fully funded collaboration with a reputable organisation, which in this case 
was IUCN.  
50
 Particularly command-and-FRQWUROPHDVXUHVVXFKDVWKHFUHDWLRQRISURWHFWHGDUHDVµ/RV&HGURV¶
DQGµ<DVXQt¶1DWLRQDl Park) and large-VFDOHLQFHQWLYHPHDVXUHVµ6RFLR%RVTXH¶3URJUDPPH 
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The choice of employing grounded theory methodology is based on the following 
considerations. On the one hand, theoretical reasoning on regulatory instruments and 
governance must be considered in context and based on evidence if it is to be of any 
assistance to policy-making. Abstract treatment of these subjects is important in 
academic debate and increases analytical understanding, but it is not directly 
applicable to particular cases. On the other hand, empirical research often lacks the 
comprehensiveness necessary to inform policy making; it is, so to speak, 
insufficiently theoretical to be applicable across contexts. Grounded theory provides 
a synthesis between these two approaches which makes the research relevant for 
decision-making. 
The thesis uses a comparative method to assess the social context underpinning 
REDD-plus implementation in developing countries and the early activities 
advanced by the programme (chapters 2 and 4). This is however not followed by a 
critical comparative analysis. Comparative studies are common in REDD-plus 
literature but they either focus on narrow institutional aspects (e.g. legislation, 
drivers, power structures and political economies) or they consider a limited number 
of cases.51 To identify patterns of governance problems and suggest responses for 
international policy-makers, detailed comparative analysis should be carried out 
among a large number of countries, possibly grouped in categories (e.g. emerging 
economies vs least developing countries, high vs low-deforestation countries, 
democracies vs authoritarian regimes and so forth). Plainly, such analysis is 
incompatible with the time, work and capacity constraints of this research. The 
recent multi-year and multi-disciplinary comparative study on REDD-plus 
undertaken by the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) shows the 
ambition and complexity of such an undertaking.52 For the purpose of this 
discussion, conceptual research based on critical analysis of evidence-based 
literature is therefore more appropriate. 
                                                 
51
 See, e.g., Brockhaus et al (n 46); Costenbader (ed.), Legal frameworks for REDD: Design and 
Implementation at the national level (IUCN 2009). 
52
 The study is still underway and no results have been published so far. CIFOR, The Global 
Comparative REDD Study Background Paper for the First Research Design Meeting (Bonn, 11-13 
June 2009) <ftp://ftp.cgiar.org/cifor/BONN/CIFOR%20REDD%20WS%20-
%20background%20paper.pdf> Accessed 7 February 2014; CIFOR, &,)25¶V *OREDO &RPSDUDWLYH
Study on REDD+, Factsheets on research findings and goals 
<www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/factsheet/4259-factsheet.pdf> Accessed 7 February 2014. 
13 
 
Finally, it is important to remark that the author took care to avoid a common 
µDQDO\WLFVLQ¶WREHJLQWKHLQYHVWLJDWLRQZLWKDVROXWLRQLQPLQGDQG thereby to fail 
consider alternatives fully.53 The thesis set out to prove that the neoliberal approach 
vigorously advanced in early REDD-plus discussions was ineffective, inefficient and 
inequitable. In order to address ideological bias, rigour was applied in the selection 
and analysis of the evidence inducing theoretical reasoning and an open-minded 
review and critical analysis of the available material caused a remarkable change of 
heart in many respects. 
1.2.3. Theoretical contribution and relevance 
This thesis is relevant in two respects. The first is its potential contribution to policy-
making. It advances a framework for understanding the recent legal developments 
(up until December 2013), their implications and their likely impact; it then puts 
forward some concrete recommendations for the further elaboration of policies and 
measures to reduce forest loss consistent with such framework. Although, as stated 
above, the 2013 Warsaw COP decisions are widely claimed to have completed 
REDD-SOXV¶basic rulebook, they really only set broad guidance which allows actors 
operating at lower levels of governance to work out what regulations, institutions 
and processes could be used in implementation. There is therefore considerable 
space, within the agreed framework, to incorporate recommendations.  
The second contribution of this thesis is theoretical. It stems from the abstraction of 
certain elements of REDD-SOXV¶ multi-level governance framework that are 
applicable to other MEAs. It has long been a preoccupation of scholars and 
practitioners alike to understand at what level decisions regarding natural resource 
management should be taken: discourses about centralised versus decentralised 
governance, and top-down versus bottom-up regulation offer fertile theoretical 
background. In this context, attention will be dedicated to the role of the State (i.e. 
the national government and its administrative apparatus) vis-á-vis both 
supranational actors and the subnational actors who rose to prominence with the use 
                                                 
53
 Jones, 7KH7KLQNHU¶V7RRONLW)RXUWHHQ3RZHUIXOWHFKQLTXHVIRU3URblem Solving (Revised edition, 
Crown Business 1998) xiii. 
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RILQFHQWLYHLQVWUXPHQWV,QSDUWLFXODU5KRGHV¶WKHVLVWKDWmulti-level market-based 
governance hollows out the State will be tested in this particular context.54  
This theoretical contribution should hopefully make the thesis less vulnerable to 
obsolescence if, as it is desirable, future meetings of the Parties will further develop 
the programme and advance its implementation. The rapid and often erratic 
development of REDD-plus has indeed made this research difficult. For instance, 
when the research started in 2010, the majority of observers and practitioners still 
discussed REDD-plus as essentially a carbon-market mechanism, and many still saw 
LW DV D FROOHFWLRQ RI IRUHVW SURMHFWV µQHVWHG¶ LQWR D QDWLonal or subnational 
jurisdiction.55 Three years later, the focus has shifted onto programmes, public-
private partnerships, multiple funding sources, and landscape approaches. Suffice to 
say that the first meaningful legal text on REDD-plus was only agreed three months 
after the beginning of this research. Back then, very few of the technical, 
methodological or social aspects of the programme had been decided upon and 
µZRUNLQJDVVXPSWLRQV¶were used in this thesis only to be, in many cases, disavowed 
by subsequent legal developments. The research questions have evolved alongside 
such developments, but so had the attention of scholars and practitioners as 
substantial funding was made available to investigate topics under discussion in the 
frantic REDD-plus negotiations. Despite the abundance of legal and policy material 
now published in this area, however, this research provides an original contribution 
to the ongoing debate on such topical and important area of international law. 
                                                 
54
 Rhodes (n 45). 
55
 The nested approach will be explained in chapter 3 section 2.2. 
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Part I 
Uprooting deforestation: the two-track approach of 
international REDD-plus 
 
 
The first part of this thesis looks at REDD-SOXV¶ LQWHUQDWLRQDO OHJDO IUDPHZRUN
exploring its key elements and approach, highlighting its historical evolution and 
assessing its strengths and weaknesses. Chapter 2 shows that forest loss is caused by 
economic activities that are inherent to the current development paradigm, but that 
their environmental impact is also determined by policy choices and by the quality of 
governance. Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the international legal response to the problem. 
The economic relevance of the activities driving forest loss frustrated the emergence 
of a global forest regime and prompted a different approach under REDD-plus. 
Rather than trying to negotiate legally binding provisions, the programme establishes 
D IUDPHZRUN IRU YROXQWDU\ FRRSHUDWLRQ EDVHG RQ D WKH SURYLVLRQ RI µSRVLWLYH
LQFHQWLYHV¶ WKDW FKDOOHQJH WKH HFRQRPLF UDWLRQDOH RI GHIRUHVWDWLRQ DQG E
PXOWLODWHUDO DVVLVWDQFH IRU WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI µSROLF\ DSSURDFKHV¶ WKDW DGGUHVV WKH
governance aspects of the problem.  
This two-track approach follows a trend towards the use of multi-level governance 
systems based on economic incentives and market principles that had already made 
headway in both the forest sector and the climate change regime. Initially, efforts 
focused on building legal rules for the operation of incentive markets (the µpositive 
LQFHQWLYHV¶DQDO\VHGLQFKDSWHU6XFKHPHUJLQJV\VWHPRIPXOWL-level governance 
conformed to 5KRGHV¶V WKHRU\ RI WKH µhollowed-out¶ State. However, the lack of 
adequate funding capacity and the need to build a comprehensive regime of forest 
governance led to the gradual re-HYDOXDWLRQ RI WKH UROH RI WKH 6WDWH WKH µSROLF\
DSSURDFKHV¶GLVFXVVHG LQ FKDSWHU5(''-plus tries to establish best practices in 
domestic governance by using international guidelines and targeted assistance. 
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2 
Economic causes of forest loss and domestic responses 
 
$GHWDLOHGDQDO\VLVRIWKHFDXVHVRIHQYLURQPHQWDOGHJUDGDWLRQLVD³SUHUHTXLVLWHIRU 
WKH VHOHFWLRQ RI WKH DSSURSULDWH PHDVXUH WR VWRS RU UHYHUVH >LW@´1 In other words, 
REDD-plus cannot prescind from the thorough understanding of the actors, 
mechanisms and dynamics leading to deforestation and forest degradation. Section 
3.1 explores how deforestation and forest degradation are driven by the endogenous 
(domestic) and exogenous (international) demand for timber and agricultural 
commodities. Section 3.2 argues that the actual impact of the economic drivers is 
influenced by domestic reactions to endogenous and exogenous pressures, and it 
shows that GHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV¶performance is poor in this respect.2  
2.1. The economic drivers of forest loss 
Humans have been systematically clearing forests since the introduction of settled 
agriculture, and forest loss represented the main source of greenhouse gas emissions 
until the onset of the industrial revolution. Long considered inhospitable and 
dangerous places, throughout human history forests were cut for timber to provide 
construction material and energy, and to make space for new agricultural or grazing 
land. Deforestation both intensified and expanded in the colonial era, moving 
increasingly towards remote tropical regions under the pressure to supply products 
for a growing population and the new markets created by the industrial revolution. 
The end of colonialism did not put an end to the unequal trade relation between 
developing and developed countries. The exploitation of the newly independent 
                                                 
1
 CBD, Proposals for the Design and Implementation of Incentive Measures (Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity 2004) 3.  
2
 Obviously, international policy also has a major direct impact on the drivers. For example, free trade 
agreements that open the market to international demand for agricultural and timber commodities can 
increase pressure on forests. Non-environmental international policies will not be considered in this 
research. 
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VWDWHV¶ ODQG DQG UHVRXUFHV ZDV SHUSHWXDWHG E\ WKHVH FRXQWULHV¶ JRYHUQPHQWal elites 
often to the benefits of developed countries. With the expansion of agricultural 
commodity markets that followed from globalisation, the scale of land-use change 
accelerated dramatically, leaving forest exploitation an important activity in the rural 
economies of the developing world. This section explores the proximate (or direct) 
and the underlying (or indirect) economic dynamics of forest loss. 
2.1.1. Proximate economic causes of deforestation  
Deforestation is defined by the IPCC as both an activity - µWKHFRQYHUVLRQRIIRUHVW
land to non-IRUHVW ODQG¶ - and a state - µD GHFUHDVH LQ WKH FDQRS\ FRYHU RU FDUERQ
GHQVLW\ E\ D JLYHQ DPRXQW RU FURVVLQJ RQH RI D VHTXHQFH RI WKUHVKROGV¶3 The 
economic drivers of deforestation are qualitatively well known, but much less 
information is available on their relative impact. REDD-plus treats forest loss as an 
economic externality caused by the inability of markets to appropriately price the 
loss of goods and services provided by forest ecosystems.4 More precisely, 
deforestation is driven by economic and social forces operating simultaneously 
across scales and sectors, and characterised by high geographical mobility and strong 
periodic fluctuations (usually in response to market signals or policy changes).  
A recent empirical study on the impact of drivers5 identifies five root causes of 
deforestation: commercial agriculture, subsistence agriculture, mining, infrastructure 
and urbanisation. Agricultural colonisation is the main driver, accounting for 73 
percent of global deforestation.6 It is estimated that between 1990 and 2007, 
cultivated land expanded by 1.9 million hectares per year and almost entirely in 
developing nations.7 Cropland expansion is concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Latin America, and Southeast Asia, where forests have an agricultural conversion 
                                                 
3
 IPCC, Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (CUP 2000) 6. 
4
 See chapter 3 section 3. 
5
 +RVRQXPD HW DO µ$Q DVVHVVPHQW RI GHIRUHVWDWLRQ DQG IRUHVW GHJUDGDWLRQ GULYHUV LQ developing 
FRXQWULHV¶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rate three times higher than all other natural landscapes together.8 Between 1980 and 
2000, over 55 percent of new cropland in tropical regions came at the expense of 
primary forests,9 while another 28 percent replaced secondary forests.10 
Traditionally, forest land use change has been associated with small-scale 
subsistence agriculture by domestic migrants, which was actively encouraged by the 
central governments. For instance, agrarian laws in countries across the tropics 
JUDQWHGSURSHUW\ ULJKWVRYHUSUHYLRXVO\ ³XQSURGXFWLYH´ ODQG WR WKRVHZKRSXW LW WR
use.11 Although most agrarian laws were reformed in the 1990s and 2000s, small-
scale agriculture is still the main vehicle of colonisation in tropical forest nations, 
particularly where a higher population density is combined with relatively small 
forests, such as in East and West Africa and Central America12. Around 33 percent 
of deforestation is caused by subsistence agriculture.13 
Following a global trend towards urbanisation and increasing concentration of 
capital, agricultural activity in developing nations is rapidly shifting from labour-
intensive farming to industrial-scale production for urban populations.14 In 
particular, the recent liberalisation of land markets has inaugurated the expansion of 
industrial agriculture in developing countries, which has rapidly become a major 
cause of forest conversion and is poised to further replace traditional forms of 
farming across the developed world.15 Today, it is estimated that over 40 percent of 
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deforestation is caused by commercial agriculture16 and, with commodity prices on 
the rise, farmland is becoming an increasingly attractive asset for international 
investors.17 Commercial agriculture is more prominent in Latin America and South 
East Asia than in Africa, but the increased flow of foreign agricultural investments, 
urbanisation, access to markets and economic growth suggest that commercial 
agriculture may soon replace subsistence activities across rural Africa. 
Ranching uses about 70 percent of global agricultural land, or 3.4 out of 4.9 billion 
hectares,18 while approximately 33 SHUFHQWRI WKHZRUOG¶VFURSODQGLVXVHGWRJURZ
animal feed.19 Although the majority of global beef production comes from 
rangelands, ranching is the main cause of deforestation in the Amazon and accounts 
for about two-thirds of forest loss in Latin America.20 It is estimated that pastures 
have expanded by about 2.5 million hectares per year between 1990 and 2007;21 17 
million hectares of forest were lost to pasture in Brazil over the 2000s, 3.4 million 
hectares in Colombia and 1.5 million hectares each in Bolivia and Peru.22 Cattle need 
vast amounts of land, water and feed to generate a relatively small quantity of food 
and dairy produce.23 Moreover, the sustainability of this extensive land use is 
lowered by rapid pasture degradation, which maintains the process of expansion. 
Although extensive pasture is not particularly lucrative, the limited labour required, 
the economic flexibility and the low financial risks of investing in highly mobile 
non-perishable capital make it an appealing land use alternative in regions with 
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abundant cheap land and unclear tenure rights.24 It also means that it can be easily 
displaced by more lucrative activities, as shown in box 2.1. 
Box 2.1: Example of the interplay of agriculture and cattle ranching in Brazil 
Soy consumption has greatly increased in the last decades. A source of high quality protein, 
most soya produce ends up in animal feed since its consumption greatly increases the growth 
of cattle. In South America, cultivation began in the second half of the 20th century, but it 
only spread in the Amazon from the late 1980s, when farmers adapted their practices to the 
poor soils of the region. The cultivated area grew from 9.7 million hectares in 1990 to 24.2 
billion in 2010, contributing to a massive spike in deforestation (e.g. deforestation rates in 
the Amazon followed the swings in global soy prices, with rapid deforestation in years such 
as 2003 and 2004 when prices were high).25 The thriving industry attracted investments in 
transport infrastructure which opened up access to more areas and made other agricultural 
and logging businesses profitable.26  
In 2006, the increasing pressure of environmental groups won the collaboration of two major 
associations of soybean processors to declare a moratorium on soybean produced on 
Amazon farmland.27 The soy industry continued to grow outside the Amazon rainforest as 
producers expanded southward to the drier Brazilian cerrado - an extremely biodiverse 
savannah-like ecosystem covering roughly twenty percent of central Brazil. Yet with a 
perverse domino effect, the return of highly profitable investments in soy plantations in the 
cerrado displaced cattle ranching back to the North. With improved infrastructure, better 
access to new forest lands, cheaper land prices and increasing demand from international 
markets, ranching ± which occupies 85 percent of the agricultural land in the legal Amazon28 
± has become even more profitable and is continuing its expansion into the forest.29 
New agricultural commodities are expanding dramatically in tropical regions and 
compete for arable land with traditional food crops. In the last two decades, palm oil 
production has doubled,30 while in Indonesia the areas used by plantations increased 
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from 5.5 to almost 17 million hectares between 1997 and 2007.31 This expansion 
happened mostly at the expenses of forests,32 generating a disproportionately large 
carbon footprint because plantations are often located on carbon-dense peat forests.33  
Over the last decade biofuels have emerged as a major commodity thanks to 
regulatory aid in the US and EU.34 Biofuels are renewable liquid or gaseous fuels 
derived from plant or animal material (biomass) used in the transport sector, for heat 
production and for electricity generation. Allegedly, they would be a buffer against 
the volatility of fossil fuels prices (biofuels are not imported from politically 
unstable regions), energy insecurity (biomass is a renewable energy) and climate 
change (emits less greenhouse gases through combustion than fossil fuels).35 Recent 
research questions the climate benefits of first generation biofuels made from 
conventional harvested products of food crops,36 whose cultivation generates 
additional land requirements of between 0.5 and 1.1 million hectares annually.37 
Despite efforts to locate production on degraded, marginal or abandoned lands, 
biofuels compete for space with farming, displacing food production, raising land 
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prices, causing indirect land use change emissions from forests and other carbon 
sinks,38 and potentially threatening global food security.39  
The other drivers have far less impact. The mining of gems and metal ores (gold, 
silver, copper, nickel and iron) causes about seven percent of global deforestation, 
with hotspots in Africa and South East Asia.40 Infrastructures and urbanisation cause 
10 percent of deforestation each. Urbanisation is a major factor in Indonesia, while 
energy infrastructures are most prominent in South America. For instance, in energy-
hungry Brazil, most hydroelectric power plants are located in the Amazon, where 
just four of the planned 79 dams have flooded over half million hectares.41 Although 
these drivers are important at national level, and cause substantial social and 
environmental damage at landscape scale,42 a case can be made for concentrating 
                                                 
38
 Gawela, LudwigµThe iLUC dilemma: How to deal with indirect land use changes when governing 
energy crops?¶(2011) 28 Land Use Policy 846; )DUJLRQHHWDOµLand Clearing and the Biofuel Carbon 
Debt¶ (2008) 319(5867) Science 1235; European Environment Agency Scientific Committee, Opinion 
of the EEA Scientific Committee on Greenhouse Gas Accounting in Relation to Bioenergy (15 
September 2011) <www.eea.europa.eu/about-us/governance/scientific-committee/sc-
opinions/opinions-on-scientific-issues/sc-opinion-on-greenhouse-gas/view> Accessed 8 February 
2014; Kim, Dale, µIndirect land use change for biofuels: Testing predictions and improving analytical 
PHWKRGRORJLHV¶ (2011) 35 Biomass and Bioenergy 3235; Arima et al, µStatistical confirmation of 
indirect land use change in the Brazilian Amazon¶ (2011) 6 Env. Res. Letters; Mendonca, 
µMonocropping for Agrofuels: The case of Brazil¶  54(1) Development 98; Franco et al, 
µAssumptions in the European Union biofuels policy: frictions with experiences in Germany, Brazil 
and Mozambique¶ (2010) 39(4) The Journal of Peasant Studies 661. 
39
 Gallagher (ed.), The Gallagher review of the indirect effects of biofuels production (Renewable 
Fuels Agency 2008) 12; Fischer et al, Biofuels and Food Security: Implications of an accelerated 
biofuels production (IIASA 2009); Eid, The Right to Food and the Impact  of Liquid Biofuels (FAO 
2008); FAO, Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture: Crop 
Prospects and Food Situation No. 2 (FAO 2009). 
40
 Hosonuma et al (n 5) 8; see also Shearman et al, µ)RUHVW&RQYHUVLRQDQG'HJUDGDWLRQLQ3DSXD1HZ
Guinea 1972±¶, (2009) 41(3) Biotropica  379; Swenson et al, µGold Mining in the Peruvian 
Amazon: Global Prices, Deforestation, and Mercury Imports¶ (2011) 6(4) PLoS ONE; Fearnside, 
µThe roles and movements of actors in the deforestation of Brazilian Amazonia¶(2008) 13(1) Ecology 
and Society 23. 
41
 )HDUQVLGHµHydroelectric Dams in the Brazilian Amazon as Sources of 'Greenhouse' Gases¶1995) 
22(1) Env. Cons. 7, at 11; see also the projected environmental of the Belo Monte dam in Fearnside, 
µ'DPV LQ WKH $PD]RQ %HOR 0RQWH DQG %UD]LO¶V +\droelectric Development of the Xingu River 
Basin¶(2006) 38(1) Env. Manag. 16. 
42
 For instance, mining contaminates freshwater with devastating impacts on local users and aquatic 
biodiversity and it scars landscapes at very big scales making restorations complex and expensive; 
Veiga, Maxson, Hylander, µOrigin and Consumption of Mercury in Small-Scale Gold Mining¶
14 Journal of Cleaner Production 436; '-7RQJZD\-$/XGZLJµ5HVWRULQJ0LQHG/DQGVFDSHV¶LQ
Tongway, Ludwig, Restoring Disturbed Landscapes: Putting principles into practice (Island Press 
2011). Similarly, energy Infrastructure often causes the displacement of local peoples, loss of 
biodiversity and substantial emissions at local level; Fearnside, µGreenhouse gas emissions from 
hydroelecWULFGDPV&RQWURYHUVLHVSURYLGHDVSULQJERDUGIRUUHWKLQNLQJDVXSSRVHGO\³FOHDQ´HQHUJ\
24 
 
efforts on the major drivers. The reasons are both economic and political: first, 
infrastructure development, urban expansion and mining are highly remunerative 
activities whose profitability would be hardly affected by REDD-plus; secondly, 
agriculture has more geographical flexibility than the other drivers and can thus be 
more easily relocated on low-carbon lands. This is not to say that the programme 
must ignore non-agricultural drivers, but priority should be given to the agricultural 
sector where REDD-plus can have a greater impact.  
2.1.2. Proximate economic causes of forest degradation 
Although the IPCC has provided five definitions of forest degradation,43 none of 
these has yet been adopted by the UNFCCC COP, leaving considerable 
uncertainty.44 All IPCC definitions refer to those human-induced long-term 
reductions of forest biomass and carbon capacity below a certain threshold which do 
not entail a change in land use destination. Hosonuma et al list four categories of 
forest degradation activities: logging, uncontrolled fires, livestock grazing and 
woodfuel collection.45 Uncontrolled fire and livestock grazing are minor drivers, 
accounting for nine and seven percent of forest degradation respectively.46 By 
contrast, logging and timber extraction are related to about 52 percent of global 
forest degradation (over 70 percent in Latin America and Asia), while firewood 
collection and charcoal production account for around 31 percent of the total.47  
Logging has many uses. Unprocessed wood is used as fuel, while processed wood 
becomes timber (used as building materials, furniture, utensils and so forth) or pulp 
(which is used to make writing paper and derivatives). Between 1983 and 2005, the 
total value of forest products traded in the international market increased from 
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US$60 billion to US$257 billion. Of these, almost US$ 110 billion comes from the 
pulp and paper sector, roughly US$80 billion from primary wood products and 
US$60 billion from processed wood products.48 These figures represent only a 
fraction of the total value of wood products given that international trade only 
involves a mere 3.5 percent of the global roundwood production, the rest of which is 
absorbed by domestic markets. Moreover, these figures do not include illegal 
logging, which some estimates place at around 40 percent of all harvested timber in 
the tropics49 (albeit with significant national differences).50  
Because wood is renewable, sustainability depends on the extraction rate. 
Sustainable forest management allows sufficient time for tree regeneration and has a 
limited impact on biodiversity and carbon emissions. By contrast, conventional 
ORJJLQJ¶V VXVWDLQHG IRUHVW H[SORLWDWLRQ OHDGV WR GHJUDGDWLRQ ZKLFK JHQHUDWHV
considerable emissions51 and has a severe impact on biodiversity.52 The degradation 
process usually begins with the removal of a few valuable species, called selective 
logging, but can destroy over 80 percent of trees in the process.53 In some regions the 
abundance of commercial species makes direct clear-cutting of natural forests and 
their replacement with plantations (timber or other crops) more convenient.  
Logging often leads to deforestation. First, by providing access to previously 
inaccessible forest areas: loggers build roads that are used to transport the logs and 
install electricity and other services in remote areas which are thus open to 
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colonisation once the extraction is complete.54 Second, logging decreases ecosystem 
resilience, making forests more vulnerable to fire and subsequent conversion to 
farmland or pasture.55 Thirdly, by providing capital: wood extraction requires a 
relatively small capital (from just a few chainsaws to a few bulldozers and minimum 
extra infrastructure) but it generates revenues which are then reinvested in 
agricultural enterprises, as in the case of palm oil in Indonesia or small-scale cattle 
ranching and agriculture in Ecuador (box 2.2).56   
Box 2.2: Illegal logging and deforestation in North-West Ecuador57 
In the first decade of the century, a remote area of the Imbabura region in North West 
Ecuador was opened to colonisation thanks to the construction of a road. Migrants poured 
into the area, previously inhabited by a few subsistence farmers. At the same time, increased 
access meant that locally harvested timber could be sold more easily in the nearby cities and 
in 10 years the local economy changed from subsistence agriculture to one based on illegal 
logging. The timber is logged by underpaid local labour and smuggled ± often in collusion 
with the police and government officials - to the city markets. Most of the profits remain 
with the transporters and truck owners, while locals reinvest their gains in other forest-
consuming activities (cattle and agriculture). 
This cycle caused the loss of over 100,000 hectares of forests in the region because, in the 
majority of cases, it is swiftly followed by deforestation.  Chainsaw operators open up the 
road to remote forest areas to log the most valuable tree species. They then log all other 
usable trees. Once not much useful timber is left in the forest, the remaining vegetation is 
burnt and, to establish land rights, crops or pastures are planted. However, the poor quality 
of soils and steep topography cause rapid nutrient runoff, which impairs land productivity 
and forces the occupier to seek more land leaving behind highly degraded landscape. 
Degradation affects the watershed, and costly forest restorations have become necessary to 
ensure the regular supply of water to communities downriver. 
Across the tropics, around 1.4 billion cubic meters of firewood are used each year 
and around 40 million metric tons of charcoal is produced.58 Charcoal is a fuel 
obtained by slow pyrolysis of vegetation; it is used for cooking as well as industrial 
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production, and its main difference from other kinds of woodfuels such as firewood 
is that it is mostly sold in domestic markets rather than used locally.59 Although the 
majority of wood from tropical countries is used as fuel, most of it comes from dead 
material or from woodlands outside forests and is considered sustainable.60 In Sub-
Saharan Africa, where small-scale firewood production accounts for over 50 percent 
of forest degradation, wood is self-collected or purchased from local dealers and 
consumed by farmers and households.61 Local collection rarely causes serious 
degradation, but it can worsen degradation in areas hit by commercial logging.62 
Table 1 summarises the activities causing the majority of forest emissions, their 
economic source and profitability. It also hints at some possible responses which will 
be further discussed in the following chapters. 
Table 1: Summary of the main causes of forest emissions  
Direct driver Opportunity cost63 Source of demand Possible responses 
Industrial agriculture Mid to High International/National Spatial relocation of 
activities 
Commercial ranching Low to Mid International/National Cattle intensification  
Subsistence farming Low Local Improved agricultural 
practices 
Commercial logging Mid to High International Sustainable forest 
management 
Firewood/Charcoal Low Local /National Alternative fuels/fuel 
efficiency 
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2.1.3. The indirect drivers of forest loss 
Experts conventionally distinguish the human activities that directly cause forest loss 
at the local level from the social, economic, political, technological and 
demographical factors that influence them (underlying or indirect drivers).64 These 
factors follow global trends and their impact is relatively consistent across the 
developing world.65 
An influential study published almost 40 years ago by Paul Ehrlich and John 
Holdren describes the human impact on the environment as the product of three 
variables: the number of people, per capita consumption (as a measure of affluence) 
and the disruptiveness of technologies that produce the goods consumed.66 This 
FRUUHODWLRQ ZDV H[SUHVVHG LQ D VLPSOH HTXDWLRQ NQRZQ DV WKH µ(KrOLFK IRUPXOD¶
which measures environmental impact (I) as the product of population (P) times 
affluence or income level (A) times the intensity of disruptive technologies (T). 
I = 3[$[7 
Despite the criticisms levied,67 the equation has the merit of representing in simple 
terms the connection between the underlying drivers and environmental 
degradation.68 For instance, under a business-as-usual scenario pressure on forests is 
bound to increase alongside the expected growth in population and affluence over 
the next decade. On 31 2FWREHUWKHZRUOG¶VSRSXODWLRQUHDFKHGseven billion, a 
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dramatic increase from the 2.5 billion people of 1950. Projections indicate that by 
2050 there will be a further 2.6 billion people demanding food, water, wood, 
minerals and energy, and generally taking up more physical space.69 Demographic 
distribution in many tropical countries will also change drastically as urban 
population doubles while rural inhabitants decrease.70 Economic growth is expected 
to continue71 until it hits its environmental limits.72 Despite the economic crisis, 
global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has almost doubled in 10 years, from US$32 
trillion in 2000 to US$63 trillion in 2010.73 This growth was driven by emerging 
economies and especially China, which is rapidly becoming the main trading partner 
for tropical nations.  
The population boom and the spread of consumerism to emerging economies are 
driving up demand for natural resources which has caused enormous strains on the 
earth ecosystems and species, and put humanity outside itVµVDIHRSHUDWLQJVSDFH¶74 
These trends will continue to reinforce the direct drivers of forest loss and change 
their relative importance.75 Forest conversion to farmland will be pushed primarily 
by demand for food, which it is estimated to increase between 70 and 100 percent by 
205076 (that is, if we are to feed some of the estimated 925 million suffering from 
hunger77 while also satisfying the more resource-intensive dietary habits of wealthier 
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emerging countries),78 and for biofuels, if the current regulatory incentives are not 
discontinued.79 As a result, the cultivated area is projected to expand in forest-rich 
developing countries by at least six million hectares each year until 2030.80 
Urbanisation will decrease the importance of small-scale agriculture and economic 
growth should reduce the environmental impact of charcoal and firewood as rural 
population access alternative heating methods.81 
Growing population and increasing affluence will also drive wood extraction up. 
Under a conservative scenario, wood and wood products traded in the international 
market will reach US$250-450 billion by the year 2020, 40 percent of which are 
secondary (i.e. processed) wood products. Countries and companies wishing to 
maintain their share in the international market will have to double exports in the 
next 10±15 years.82 A greater share of wood production will come from plantations 
(which are expected to occupy 450 million hectares across the tropics by 2020),83 yet 
these are unlikely to satisfy demand and there are doubts over their sustainability.84 
Quite obviously, global environmental change is ultimately caused by a higher 
number of complex variables, such as ecosystem resilience and feedback loops (i.e. a 
sequence of events or interactions that loops back to change the very conditions that 
started the process of environmental degradation). Such technical analysis goes 
beyond the purpose of this thesis and will not be discussed. However, the ecological 
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reactions to human-induced change are by no means trivial in determining the final 
environmental impact of human activities and should be considered at least as a 
warning of the unpredictable consequences of large-scale environmental damage. 
Box 2.3 briefly summarises some of the potential impacts of climate change on the 
global health of forests. 
Box 2.3: Feedback loops between climate change and forest loss 
Forest loss causes climate change yet the opposite is also true. Theoretically, higher CO2 
density in the atmosphere enhances plant growth, hence with increasing concentration both 
the global uptake of atmospheric carbon and the terrestrial primary production increase.85 
Yet terrestrial primary production declined in the 2000s mainly due to decreasing rainfall,86 
calling for a comprehensive evaluation of coupled carbon-climate cycle analysis.87  
At the same time, climate variability can greatly increase the vulnerability of forests to 
pests88 and fires.89 Climate-induced forest loss would release more carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere thus worsening climate change and thus creating a positive feedback loop. 
Finally, climate change may also have an indirect impact on forests through the disruption of 
food production at various scales;90 this too could result in a vicious cycle with higher food 
and land prices increasing land use change rates, which in turn cause more climate change 
and reduce adaptation capacity and so forth.  
 7KH µSROLF\ HOHPHQW¶ RI IRUHVW ORVV SRRU JRYHUQDQFH LQ 
developing countries 
The drivers of forest loss are so ingrained in the global economic system that it is no 
hazard to say that the sustained (and increasingly unsustainable) use of forests is 
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intrinsic to the current development paradigm.91 Reducing forest emissions must thus 
be understood in the context of sustainable development, as stated by the 1992 
Convention92 and reaffirmed by REDD-plus.93  
6XVWDLQDEOH GHYHORSPHQW KDV EHHQ PRVW IDPRXVO\ GHILQHG DV ³development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
JHQHUDWLRQVWRPHHWWKHLURZQQHHGV´94 It has become an international law principle 
as well as a distinct area of international law, guiding a plethora of instruments.95 
Achieving sustainable development in the REDD-plus context requires addressing 
the drivers of forest loss without compromising the economic activity that meets the 
needs of the present generation. To realise that, it is submitted that political will 
(such as that enshrined in international environmental agreements) is insufficient: 
economic activities must be guided by an effective governance system. Such system 
must possess three characteristics: the ability to operate at various scales (multi-
level); the capacity to influence different economic sectors (multi-sector); and the 
disposition to involve various groups of stakeholders operating at different levels 
(multi-stakeholder).96  
Developing countries have traditionally rested on centralised forms of forest 
governance, in some cases more akin to the definition of government control 
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provided in chapter 1, and resist decentralisation.97 Governments faced the challenge 
of limiting environmental degradation while also governing a rapid transition 
towards industrialisation, messy economic growth, lingering social problems, 
growing demography and rapid urbanisation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they have been 
unable or unwilling to realise effective sustainable development policies. Indeed, 
these countries are also inherently ill-equipped to develop and implement such 
policies due to deep-rooted problems. Rather than mitigating the environmental 
impact of economic drivers, poorly designed, illegitimate or unenforceable 
governmental policies have in some cases made the impact of drivers even worse.98  
This section analyses governance performance in 35 REDD-plus countries with the 
highest gross deforestation contributing over 80 percent of global forest loss.99 The 
FKRLFH LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH WKHVLV¶ IRFXV RQ HIIHFWLYHQHVV 7KH VDPSOH LV ODUJH
enough to be representative of the whole spectrum of likely REDD-plus participant 
countries, as it includes countries that represent all the macro-regions (South-East 
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central and South America), are at different stages of 
development (from least developed countries to emerging economics), experience 
extremely diverse drivers, and have wide-ranging governance capacity.  
Several dimensions of governance have been extrapolated from the literature and 
organised in three clusters. The first cluster concerns government capacity: this is the 
substantive (also formalistic or positivistic)100 element of governance concerned with 
the material outcome of government action. Developing and implementing policies 
to address the drivers requires government capacity that, for ease of analysis, has 
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here been described as a product of three factors: quality of regulations, bureaucratic 
capacity and the rule of law.  
5HJXODWRU\ TXDOLW\ LV D JRYHUQPHQW¶V DELOLW\ WR IRUPXODWH DQG LPSOHPHQW VRXQG
policies and regulations:101 it depends on the technical ability of law-makers (for 
which capacity building is important), their knowledge of the subject being regulated 
(for which participation is crucial) and the fairness of the decision-making process 
(for which transparency is central). Unclear, incomplete and incoherent forest laws 
QHJDWLYHO\DIIHFWDJRYHUQPHQW¶VFRQWURORYHULWVIRUHVWUesources.102  
Bureaucratic capacity denotes the ability to give effect to public policies through 
specific measures of a programmatic, regulatory or incentive nature (e.g. action 
plans, programmes, projects and other measures such as positive incentives).103 The 
lack of human, financial or technical capacity in the administration therefore causes 
ineffective government action, and it also breeds inefficiency and corruption.104  
Finally, the rule of law (i.e. the principle that no-one is above the law) gives stability 
and consistency to governance practices, and it is the foundation for stable and 
predictable social interactions.105 It has three elements: (i) a fair, independent and 
effective judicial system (judiciary, prosecution and bar associations); (ii) 
mechanisms or arrangements that ensure equal access to justice, especially by 
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disadvantaged social groups; and (iii) an incorruptible, well-resourced and non-
arbitrary police force that consistently enforces the law. 
The second cluster of governance dimensions reODWHV WR D JRYHUQPHQW¶V RSHQQHVV
and includes mechanisms for public participation, transparency, accountability, and 
control of corruption. This is the procedural (or democratic) element.106 The 
distinction between substantive and procedural governance is mostly theoretical107 
because undemocratic governance usually leads to poor substantive governance.108  
The pervasiveness of the drivers, the weak presence of the State and the 
incompatibility with command-and-control instruments imply that effective forest 
policy must be made with and for the stakeholders more than other areas of 
government policy. In order to achieve this, stakeholders must be involved actively, 
through ad hoc mechanisms for public participation, and passively, giving the public 
the power to monitor government behaviour and to hold it accountable for any 
wrongdoing.  
Governance is also heavily influenced by the level of transparency and 
DFFRXQWDELOLW\ WRZKLFK WKRVH LQSRZHUDUHVXEMHFWHG7UDQVSDUHQF\ LV µWKHFRQGXFW
of public affairs in the opHQRURWKHUZLVHVXEMHFW WRSXEOLFVFUXWLQ\¶DVRSSRVHGWR
µRSDTXHSROLF\PHDVXUHVZKHUHLWLVKDUGWRGLVFRYHUZKRWDNHVWKHGHFLVLRQVZKDW
WKH\ DUH DQG ZKR JDLQV DQG ZKR ORVHV¶109 In a transparent system, rules and 
procedures are followed throughout and information is freely available and directly 
accessible to the public, especially those who will be affected by such decisions.  
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Lack of transparency breeds corruption, a phenomenon that is positively correlated 
with ineffective government action110 and unsustainable development paths.111 
Corruption can be political when individuals, groups or firms illicitly influence the 
decision-making process to their own advantage112 (also called µstate capture¶);113 or 
it can be bureaucratic if it influences the implementation and enforcement of the 
law.114  
Finally, governments must be liable to be called to account or to answer for 
responsibilities and conduct, particularly wrongdoings. The two key dimensions of 
government accountability are answerability (the right of the governed to make 
claims and demand a response) and enforceability (mechanisms for sanctioning non-
responsiveness).115  
The third cluster describes the business environment of developing countries, with a 
particular emphasis on political stability. It is important because it describes the 
attractiveness of doing business in REDD-plus countries for international investors 
and it is thus a good proxy to assess the likelihood and extent of direct participation 
in the programme by the private sector. 
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The review compares six governance studies: the World Governance Indicators 
(WGI)116 and the World Development Indicators (WDI),117 prepared by the World 
Bank; the Corruption Perception Index (CPI)118 and the Government Integrity Index 
(GII),119 prepared by NGOs; the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)120 and the 
Euromoney Country Risk (ECR),121 prepared by commercial providers of business 
information. The criteria used in the selection of the six studies are: (i) their authority 
and widespread utilisation; (ii) their representativeness of different interests and 
subjective conceptions of good governance (i.e. from international organisations, 
NGOs and the private sector); (iii) their use of different indicators and slightly 
different foci.122  
It is important to note that perception-based governance assessments are vulnerable 
to bias. The World Bank assessments are criticised for being biased in favour of an 
idea of good governance which revolves around minimal regulation and strong 
property rights.123 Kurtz and Schrank argue that most governance assessments 
carried out through voluntary surveys are also affected by the same pro-business 
bias, as was also evident in a UN-commissioned review of public governance 
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indicators.124 For instance, measures that impose taxes or regulatory demandV µDUH
likely to be judged burdensome and growth-LQKLELWLQJ¶E\PDQ\VXUYH\UHVSRQGHQWV
despite their overall positive impact, and this introduces systematic bias in an 
assessment of governance that should be independent of policy choices.125 
According to Seligson, surveys may also be affected by the economic performance 
of a country, with a government being assessed more positively in favourable 
economic times regardless of its actual performance.126 In the case of corruption, the 
validity of the sources, cultural differences and samples that focus on business 
excluding women and the poor also cast doubts on the objectivity of these studies.127 
Concerns over systematic bias, cultural differences and subjective methodology 
advise against placing excessive emphasis on the quantitative estimate per se. With 
this caveat, there is reason to believe that a comparative review of six assessments 
SURYLGHV D UHOLDEOH SLFWXUH RI D FRXQWU\¶V JRYHUQDQFH E\ PLWLJDWLQJ H[FHVVLYH ELDV
and methodological errors that may affect a single study.  
The short summary below provides a snapshot of the governance situation across the 
developing world. More detailed information on the assessments, including 
individual country results, and a definition of scores and criteria, can be found in 
Annex B.  
(i) Government openness 
Developing countries generally have a very poor record in terms of participation, 
transparency and accountability, and corruption. The Global Integrity Indicators 
indicate that out of 22 countries considered only two have strong transparency and 
accountability, four KDYH D VFRUH RI µPRGHUDWH¶ DQG 16 are equally split between 
weak and very weak integrity. Interestingly, the study shows that the problem does 
not lie in the deficiency of the legal framework but rather in its inconsistent 
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 .XUW]6KUDQNµGrowth and Governance: Models, Measures and Mechanisms¶2007) 69 (2) J. of 
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 Kurtz and Schrank, Ibid. 
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 SeligsonµThe Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin 
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application. Five out of 20 FRXQWULHVVKRZDµKXJH¶JDS LQ WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQDQG
enforcement of transparency, accountability and anti-corruption legislation, six a 
µYHU\ ODUJH JDS¶ eight D µODUJH¶ JDS DQG RQH D µPRGHUDWH¶ JDS 7KH :RUOG
Governance Indicators assessment of transparency and accountability found that of 
the 35 countries considered none has a satisfactory situation, seven have a mediocre 
situation, 17 a bad situation, seven a very poor situation and four an extremely poor 
one. 
With regard to corruption, the WGI assesses the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption as well 
as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Out of the 35 sampled 
countries, seven have an extremely poor corruption record, seven have a poor one, 
11 a bad record, four a mediocre one and only one FRXQWU\ LV DVVHVVHG DV µJRRG¶
(Botswana). The findings are similar to those published by Transparency 
International in its Corruption Perception Index for 2013: out of the 35 countries 
considered, 15 are among the 50 most corrupt countries in the world, a further nine 
are among the 80 most corrupt and only one is in the 50 least corrupt countries in the 
world (Botswana) with the others in the middle. An indirect measure of corruption is 
SURYLGHG E\ WKH *,,¶V DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH JDS LQ WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI JRRG
governance and anti-corruption legislation. It indicates that out of 23 countries, five 
have a very weak anti-corruption legal framework, seven a weak one, seven a 
moderate one, two a strong one and two a very strong one. Moreover, there is a huge 
gap in the implementation of anti-corruption laws in six countries, a very large one 
in six countries, a large one in seven countries and a moderate gap in one country. 
No country has a small or very small implementation gap, meaning that even in 
those cases where the legal framework is moderately strong, corruption in practice is 
a major problem. 
(ii) Government capacity 
The capacity of REDD-plus country governments to develop, implement and enforce 
sound policies, plans and programmes is also very poor. The WDI found that public 
sector capacity is overall unsatisfactory. No government of the 22 countries 
considered reaches a satisfactory result, with eight countries rating as thoroughly 
unsatisfactory and only two as almost satisfactory. The WGI rates government 
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HIIHFWLYHQHVVDVµH[WUHPHO\SRRU¶LQfour FRXQWULHVµYHU\SRRU¶LQ16µEDG¶LQnine, 
µPHGLRFUH¶LQfive DQGµJRRG¶LQRQH 
Two basic criteria to assess government capacity are the quality of its laws and the 
capacity to enforce them so as to generate a general expectation about their 
SHUHPSWRULQHVV 7KH :*, IRXQG WKDW LQ QR FRXQWU\ LV UHJXODWRU\ TXDOLW\ µJRRG¶RU
µYHU\ JRRG¶ LQVWHDG LW LV µH[WUHPHO\ SRRU¶ LQ six out of 35 REDD-plus countries, 
µYHU\SRRU¶LQeightµEDG¶LQ13 DQGµPHGLRFUH¶LQeight. It also finds that the rule of 
ODZLVLQQRFDVHVµJRRG¶RUµYHU\JRRG¶LQsix FRXQWULHVWKHVLWXDWLRQLVµPHGLRFUH¶
in 11 LWLVµSRRU¶LQ12 µYHU\SRRU¶DQGLQsix µH[WUHPHO\SRRU¶ 
Another governance criterion that can be used to understand government capacity 
and effectiveness is political stability. It is clear, in fact, that only stable governments 
can build the expertise, practices and institutional and regulatory framework to 
consistently implement their policy (in this case REDD-plus) across sectors and 
levels. In this category, too, very little good news emerges for REDD-plus. For the 
WGI, political stability (i.e. the likelihood that the government will not be 
GHVWDELOL]HGRURYHUWKURZQE\XQFRQVWLWXWLRQDORUYLROHQWPHDQVLVµH[WUHPHO\SRRU¶
in five FRXQWULHVµYHU\SRRU¶LQ9µEDG¶LQ12DQGµPHGLRFUH¶LQfour.  
(iii) Risk of doing business 
Finally, the risk of doing business in prospective REDD-plus countries is also high, 
although the providers of information on governance for the private sector give a 
somewhat less dramatic picture of the situation. The International Country Risk 
Guide states that, in 2011, out of 30 REDD-plus countries none has a very low risk 
for investment, only four are low-risk, 11 have moderate risk, 13 have high risk and 
three very high risk. The Euromoney Country Risk (ECR) finds that out of 35 
REDD-plus countries none belongs to group of political stable and predictable 
countries, two countries are moderately stable but moderately unpredictable 
countries, 17 belong to the group of moderately unstable countries with 
unpredictable governments and 10 to the group of highly unstable and unpredictable 
countries. This slightly better assessment is perhaps due to the fact that political 
instability does not necessarily threaten international investments unless it involves a 
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radical change of regime, and that extractive industries (prevalent in REDD-plus 
countries) tolerate corruption better than most other businesses.128 However, this 
entails that investors will seek higher-than-average returns from their investments in 
virtually all REDD-plus countries, making REDD-plus less cost-effective. Moreover, 
these assessments do not include reputational risks that may derive from problems of 
corruption of the breach of human rights that may happen in such countries, and 
which would be particularly damaging for firms working on REDD-plus. 
*** 
This chapter has shown that environmental degradation is as much a failure of the 
market as it is a failure of the State. In fact, if forest loss is driven by market demand 
for, inter alia, timber and agricultural commodities (and the contextual failure to 
recognise the value of environmental services), its impact is determined by the 
manner in which developing countries respond to external and internal economic 
pressures.  
The multi-level nature of drivers makes matters particularly complicated for the 
State. Given the economic relevance of deforestation-related activities, the State 
seems to have little room to restrain economic activity on environmental grounds 
using command-and-control regulations without hurting development. This is 
particularly so in developing countries, where poor public sector governance has led 
to an inefficient and disorderly organisation of economic activities and to increased 
environmental harm. Additionally, governments have de facto little control over the 
action of subnational actors due to their poor capacity to monitor and enforce 
environmental legislation.  
Addressing the causes of global forest emissions therefore requires addressing both 
market and State failures. The next chapters will look at how REDD-SOXVµSRVLWLYH
LQFHQWLYHV¶DQGµSROLF\DSSURDFKHV¶DUHUHVponding to these problems. 
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 2¶+LJJLQV µ&RUUXSWLRQ8QGHUGHYHORSPHQW DQG([WUDFWLYH 5HVRXUFH ,QGXVWULHV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9LFLRXV &LUFOH¶ 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3 
Deforestation in international environmental law: REDD-
plus and the rise of incentives instruments  
 
This chapter considers the international legal response to the problem of forest loss, 
comparing REDD-plus to previous legal initiatives. Section 3.1 briefly reviews past 
international instruments and tries to identify the reasons for their ineffectiveness. 
Section 3.2 introduces the main elements of REDD-plus¶ µSRVLWLYH LQFHQWLYHV¶, 
showing how they fit within a general trend towards market-based environmental 
policy. Section 3.3 asks whether a multi-level governance framework built on 
financial incentives can tackle the economic causes of forest loss without addressing 
the gap in public governance. 
3.1. Forests in international environmental law: turning to the 
market? 
Tropical deforestation is considered a common concern of mankind,1 but 
international efforts to address this problem have so far floundered. While forests are 
an important carbon sink, their worth to humans is much greater than their 
contribution to climate change mitigation.2 The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
identified four types of ecosystem services:3 (a) provision of food, fuel and fibre for 
human consumption (provisioning services); (b) direct support for human economic 
                                                 
1
 Sands (ed.), Greening International Law (DUWKVFDQ%UXQQpH1ROONDHPSHUµ%HWZHHQWKH
forests and the trees ± DQHPHUJLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOIRUHVWODZ¶(QY&RQVHUYDW 
2
 This discussion does not consider the intrinsic value of the species and organisms that make up the 
forest ecosystems, but only their instrumental worth to humans. For a discussion on the value of 
nature VHH %RZPDQ µ%LRGLYHUVLW\ ,QWULQVLF 9DOXH DQG WKH 'HILQLWLRQ DQG 9DOXDWLRQ RI
(QYLURQPHQWDO+DUP¶LQ%RZPDQ%R\OHEnvironmental Damage in International and Comparative 
Law: Problems of Definition and Valuation (OUP 2002) 41. 
3
 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Synthesis (Island Press 
2005) vi. 
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activities (supporting services); (c) processes controlling the climate and the flow of 
water (regulating services); (d) services that support human relations (cultural 
services). Forests provide services from all these categories, as seen in table 2 below. 
Table 2: Ecosystem services provided by forests4 
Provisioning  Supporting  Regulating  Cultural  
Food (fruits, nuts, 
forest animals); fresh 
water; fuel, wood 
and fibre; non-timber 
forest products; silk, 
rubber, bamboo; 
genetic resources; 
biochemical or 
natural medicines, 
habitat for humans 
Soil formation and 
erosion prevention; 
nutrient cycling 
through atmosphere, 
plants and soils; 
primary production, 
habitat for predator-
prey relationships 
and ecosystem 
resilience 
Water purification; 
climate regulation; 
flood and drought 
regulation; 
pollination; carbon 
sequestration 
Aesthetic; spiritual; 
educational; 
recreational; 
tourism; 
inspirational 
The truism that forests are much more than reservoirs of carbon is relevant to this 
discussion in two ways. The first is that REDD-plus does not operate in a 
consequential vacuum: reducing forest emissions is a complex endeavour which can 
have considerable benefits beyond carbon sequestration and storage, but also 
negative consequences on other services.5 In order to maximise the provision of all 
services, REDD-plus activities must follow ecological criteria. Moreover, humans 
have adapted to the local environment so as to maximise the environmental services 
they benefit from. About 350 million RIWKHZRUOG¶V poorest people rely heavily on 
forests for their subsistence and survival, including over 60 million indigenous 
people, while 1.2 billion people in developing countries depend on them for 
                                                 
4
 Adapted from: Gupta, van der Grijp, Kuik (eds.), Climate Change, Forests and REDD: Lessons for 
Institutional Design (Routledge 2013) 8. 
5
 For instance, replacing degraded natural forests with fast-growth plantations may have some climate 
benefits but would hamper many provisioning, supporting and cultural services. World Bank, Forests 
Sourcebook: Practical Guidance for Sustaining Forests in Development Cooperation (World Bank 
2008) 1. 
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subsistence, as an economic safety net or as a direct source of income.6 Any change 
to the supporting, provisioning, regulating and cultural benefits of forests will impact 
human activities. Conversely, forest loss is caused by activities that affect economic 
prosperity and cannot be easily trumped by a superior environmental interest. A 
realistic consideration of the multiple impacts of REDD-plus activities on the 
environment, the economy and society is thus in order. 
The second, connected argument is that the programme does not operate in a legal 
vacuum. Some of the services provided by forests have been the object of legal 
protection at the international level. Ecosystem services occur at different scales, 
from the local (e.g. food, non-timber products, habitat for humans) to the global (e.g. 
habitat for biodiversity, medicines, carbon sequestration). The level at which these 
services are received causes the creation of different loci of interests that may 
conflict and require regulatory intervention. 
Indeed, several environmental treaties are concerned in some way with protecting 
forests. The treaties concluded in the 1970s were influenced by the UN Conference 
on the Human Environment (UNCHE) and approached forest protection from a 
conservation perspective.7 The 1971 Ramsar Convention established a protective 
regime that was applicable to forested wetlands;8 the 1972 World Heritage 
Convention secured the protection of sites of outstanding natural value which also 
included extensive tropical forest areas;9 the 1973 CITES strictly regulated 
international trade in threatened tree species;10 and the 1979 Bonn Convention has 
led to the establishment of protected forest habitats for migratory species such as 
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 Bhargava, Global issues for global citizens: an introduction to key development challenges (World 
Bank 2006) 305-6; Scherr, White, Kaimowitz, A new agenda for forest conservation and poverty 
reduction: making markets work for low-income producers (Forest Trends 2003) 6. 
7
 UNCHE saw the participation of 113 countries, 19 intergovernmental agencies and hundreds of 
NGOs, and it is widely regarded as the birthmark of the modern environmental movement. Its main 
outcome document is the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
(adopted 16 June 1972) 11 ILM 1416. 
8
 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (adopted 16 
November 1971, entered into force 17 December 1975) 996 UNTS I-14583. 
9
 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (adopted 16 November 
1972, entered into force 17 December 1975) 1037 UNTS 151. 
10
 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (adopted 3 
March 1973, entered into force July 1975) 933 UNTS I-14537. 
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gorillas and elephants.11 By contrast, the treaties concluded in the 1990s took a more 
anthropocentric approach consistent with the landmark UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED),12 emphasising the role of forest resources 
in promoting sustainable development. The 1992 UN Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) requires countries to protect ecosystems13 ± including forest 
ecosystems - LQ RUGHU WR DFKLHYH WKH µFRQVHUYDWLRQ RI ELRORJLFDO GLYHUVLW\ WKH
sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits 
DULVLQJ RXW RI JHQHWLF UHVRXUFHV¶14 The 1994 UN Convention to Combat 
Desertification (UNCCD) recognises the important role of reducing deforestation to 
tackle land degradation and desertification, and demands addressing forest 
conservation in national plans.15  
The only legally-binding instrument entirely dedicated to forests is the  International 
Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA).16 The ITTA is not an environmental treaty but a 
commodity agreement concluded under the auspices of the UN Commission on 
Trade and Development. It is aimed at improving cooperation and trade in tropical 
timber between developing country exporters and industrialised country importers; 
the treaty merely encourages reforestation and the ill-defined sustainable utilisation 
of timber resources, but it has had a marginal impact on conservation. To date, no 
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 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (adopted 23 June 1979, 
entered into force 1 November 1983) 1651 UNTS 28395. 
12
 UNCED, also known as the World Summit on Sustainable Development, the Rio Conference and 
the Earth Summit, was organised on the 20th anniversary of the Stockholm Conference. It saw the 
participation of 172 governments and over 2,400 NGOs. Report of the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (13 June 1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I-III). 
13
 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio De Janeiro, 5 June 1992 (in force 29 
December 1993) 1760 UNTS 79, article 8. 
14
 Ibid article 1. 
15
 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (adopted on 17 June 1994, entered into force 
26 December 1996) 1954 UNTS 3 (UNCCD), Annex I, article 8(3), Annex II article 2(b), Annex III 
article 4, Annex IV article 6. 
16
 The ITTA established the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) in order to administer 
and review the Agreement; International Tropical Timber Agreement (adopted 27 January 2006 
entered into force 7 December 2011) UN Doc TD/TIMBER.3/12. 
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binding international instrument is dedicated to the protection and sustainable 
management of forests specifically.17  
Political will to conclude a binding treaty arose in the 1980s, as tropical deforestation 
accelerated dramatically and the phenomenon began to acquire international 
relevance alongside other global environmental problems such as desertification, 
overfishing, biodiversity loss, oil spills, acid rain and other transboundary 
atmospheric pollution. 18 Expectations, certainly in the North, were that a legal 
framework on forests would have been concluded at UNCED, but negotiations on 
GHIRUHVWDWLRQZHUHKLMDFNHGE\WKHGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV¶UHTXHVWVto include all types 
RIIRUHVWVLQWKHDJUHHPHQWWREDQDQ\µGLVJXLVHG¶WUDGHEDUULHURQWLPEHUSURGXFWLRQ
from rainforests, and receive large-scale financial assistance. The Conference only 
produced a non-binding instrument known as the Forest Principles19 and guidelines 
on forest management and conservation in the Agenda 21 action plan.20 The Forest 
Principles reaffirmed the sovereign right of all countries to exploit their own 
resources and, it is submitted, served to stigmatise any attempt to legislate 
internationally on tropical forest protection.21  
The failure of Rio in this regard tainted international cooperation on forests 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.22 Discussions continued in a number of 
international fora but with limited success. In 1995, the Commission on Sustainable 
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 See Hornborg, McNeill, Alier, Rethinking environmental history: world-system history and global 
environmental change (Rowman Altamira 2007); Williams, Deforesting the Earth: From Prehistory 
to Global Crisis, An Abridgment (University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
18
 The 1980s had seen the emergence of the first international initiative dedicated to forest protection, 
which was promoted by the World Bank, FAO, UNDP and the NGO World Resources Institute: the 
Tropical Forests Action Plan (TFAP). Concluded in 1985, the TFAP presented a conceptual 
framework for action to tackle uncontrolled deforestation by supporting the creation of national plans 
for conservation and management, but its technocratic approach, sectoral scope, lack of resources and 
general disregard for governance problems greatly limited its effectiveness. Gupta et al (n 4) 11; 
Winterbottom, µThe Tropical Forestry Action Plan: Is it Working?¶(1) NAPA Bulletin 60. 
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 Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the 
Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of Forests (adopted 14 August 
1992) 31 ILM 881. 
20
 Report of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (13 June 1992) UN Doc 
A/CONF.151/26, Chapter 11: Combating deforestation. 
21
 ³6WDWHVKDYH WKH VRYHUHLJQ DQG LQDOLHQDEOH ULJKW WR XWLOL]H PDQDJH DQGGHYHORS WKHLU IRUHVWV >@ 
including the conversion of such areas for other uses within the overall socio-economic development 
plan and based on rational land-XVHSROLFLHV¶ UNCED (n 12) principle 2(a). 
22
 Birnie, Boyle, Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3rd ed., OUP 2009) 695. 
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Development established the Intergovernmental Panel of Forests which met four 
times and was then replaced in 1997 by the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests and 
finally by an intergovernmental body called the United Nations Forum on Forests 
(UNFF) in 2000.23 Another attempt to negotiate a forest treaty was quickly dismissed 
in 1997. Such bodies were tasked with advancing the international discussions on 
forests with a view to concluding a binding agreement, but after twelve years all they 
could achieve was another soft law instrument in 2007.24 The UNFF has not given 
up on its ambition to facilitate the conclusion of a binding treaty on forests, but 
international discussions have been postponed to 2015 and at this stage the prospects 
for a global forest treaty are as bleak as ever.25 
Despite the great number of international instruments bearing on forest protection, 
the lack of a specific substantive requirement for conservation and sustainable 
management (either in binding or non-binding form) leaves little doubt that 
international law has so far failed to protect the forests effectively. Such failure has 
many causes. The political and economic importance of forest exploitation was 
certainly decisive. Resource nationalism entered the political manifesto of 
developing countries anxious to affirm their sovereignty26 and to boost their 
economic development.27 At the same time, developed countries¶main justification 
for international legislation did not rest on arguments about transnational impacts 
that had motivated much of previous international environmental law. And even 
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 6HH +XPSKUH\V µForest negotiations at the United Nations: explaining cooperation and discord¶
)2532/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,QVWLWXWLRQDO )UDPHZRUNV¶ 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 UNGA Res 62/98 (17 December 2007) UN Doc A/RES/62/98. 
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 MacKenzie (n 23) 115. 
26
 See, for example, UNGA Res 626 (VII) (21 December 1952) UN Doc A/2361; UNGA Res 
1515(XV) (15 December 1960) UN Doc A/4648; UNGA Res 1803(XVII) (14 December 1962) UN 
Doc A/5217; UNGA Res 3016(XXVII) (18 December 1972) UN Doc A/8963; International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (adopted on 19 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 
UNTS 171, art 1(2); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 
December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3, art 1(2); UNGA Res 3281(XXIX) 
(12 December 1974) 29 UNGAOR Supp No 31. 
27
 The right to development has also been reiterated in several regional and global instruments, 
including: UNGA Res. 41/128 (4 December 1986); UNGA, Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action (adopted 12 July 1993) 32 ILM 1661; Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
(adopted 14 June 1992) 31 ILM 874. However, it is uncertain whether such right is attributable to 
individuals, peoples or States; Sands, Principles of international environmental law (2nd ed.,  CUP 
2009) 55. 
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among developed nations, consensus on the use of legally binding instruments was 
weak.28  
The repeated failures to achieve prescriptive regulations in international forestry left 
space for the emergence of alternative approaches. The 1990s saw the expansion of 
environmental regulatory instruments consistent with the political ideology of 
neoliberalism,29 which by the early 1990s was dominating the international political 
discourse.30 Neoliberalism applied to international environmental law has three 
central tenets: voluntary compliance as opposed to binding obligations, property 
rights over nature as opposed to public goods, and the use of market incentives as 
opposed to top-down regulation.31 Drawing a parallel between domestic and 
international contexts, some authors have used an evolutionary, almost Aristotelian 
explanation for the blooming of economic incentives in environmental law, seeing 
their diffusion as a response to the intrinsic limits of command-and-control 
instruments.32 This approach was a powerful antidote to the lDFNRIµFRHUFLYHILDW¶LQ
the international legal system,33 as well as to the inefficacy and inefficiency of 
centralised regulation.34  
Economic concepts surfaced in the 1992 Forest Principles¶ encouragement of the 
³LQFRUSRUDWLRQ RI HQYLURQPHQWDO FRVWV DQd benefits into market forces and 
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 For instance, in the negotiation that led to the 2007 Non-legally Binding Instrument, the US 
opposed time bound and quantifiable deforestation reduction targets and even compulsory national 
reports; Humphreys, Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Governance (Earthscan 2006) 
112, cited in HumphreyVµDiscourse as ideology: Neoliberalism and the limits of international forest 
policy¶)2532/DW 
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 For a good summary see Anderson, Leal, Free market environmentalism (Revised ed., Palgrave 
2001&DVWUHH µ1HROLEHUDOLVLQJQDWXUH WKH ORJLFVRI GHUHJXODWLRQ DQG UHUHJXODWLRQ¶ (QY
and Plan A 131 
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 Born as a radical economic theory from thinkers such as Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, 
neoliberalism gained importance and credibility as a political ideology under the leadership of Ronald 
Reagan in the US and Margaret Thatcher in the UK; Jones, Masters of the Universe: Hayek, 
Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics (Princeton University Press 2012). 
31
 Humphreys (2009, n 28) 320. 
32
 %XVFK -RUJHQV 7HZV µ7KH *OREDO 'LIIXVLon of Regulatory Instruments: The Making of a New 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO(QYLURQPHQWDO5HJLPH¶$QQDOV 
33
 :LHQHUµ*OREDO(QYLURQPHQWDO5HJXODWLRQ,QVWUXPHQW&KRLFHLQ/HJDO&RQWH[W¶ Yale 
L. J.  683. 
34
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PHFKDQLVPVLQRUGHUWRDFKLHYHIRUHVWFRQVHUYDWLRQDQGVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW´35 
The idea was further developed by the International Panel on Forests which 
recommended that national forest programmes36 HQFRXUDJH WKH ³LQFRrporation of 
environmental costs and benefits into market mechanisms, in order to achieve forest 
FRQVHUYDWLRQ DQG VXVWDLQDEOH GHYHORSPHQW´37 The 2007 non-binding instrument 
further promotHV WKH ³UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH UDQJH RI YDOXHV GHULYHG IURP JRRGV DQG
serYLFHV´SURYLGHGE\IRUHVWVDQG³ZD\VWRUHIOHFWVXFKYDOXHVLQWKHPDUNHWSODFH´38  
Market ideas have found expression in the use of information-based and positive 
incentive instruments.39 Information-based instruments disclose the environmental 
performance of products, production processes, services or activities to 
constituencies (e.g. consumers, investors and government officials) whose decisions 
influence the profitability of the activity driving forest loss. Of particular note in this 
context are private sector-led voluntary certification systems, such as the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest 
Certification (PEFC) which promote adherence to high ecological and social 
standards in the production of timber and non-timber forest products.40  
%\FRQWUDVWLQFHQWLYHLQVWUXPHQWV³LPSRVHDSULFHRQRSSRUWXQLW\FRVWRIHDFKXQLW
RI SROOXWLRQ ZDVWH VWUHVV RU UHVRXUFH FRQVXPSWLRQ E\ UHJXODWHG DFWRUV´ OHDYLQJ
³IOH[LELOLW\ WRGHWHUPLQLQJ WKHTXDQWLW\RI >UHVRXUFHXVH@DV well as the appropriate 
FRQWURO PHDVXUHV´41 An early example of environmental incentive instruments are 
SD\PHQWV IRU HFRV\VWHP VHUYLFHV 3(6 D YROXQWDU\ PHFKDQLVP LQ ZKLFK ³D ZHOO-
defined ecosystem service, or a land-use likely to secure that service, is being 
                                                 
35
 UNCED (n 12) paragraph 13(d). 
36
 National forest programmes are a tool for the implementation of international forest policy that was 
particularly popular at the turn of the millennium. See chapter 4 section 3.1. 
37
 UNIPF, Report of the Ad-Hoc Intergovernmental Panel on Forests on Its Fourth Session (1997) 
UN Doc E/CN.17/1997/12, paragraph 12. 
38
 UNCED (n 12) paragraph 6(j). 
39
 6WHZDUW µ,QVWUXPHQW &KRLFH¶ LQ %RGDQVNL %UXQQpH +H\ Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law (OUP 2007) 152. 
40
 µForest Stewardship Council, Who We Are: Global, multi-stakeholder, membership organization¶ 
<https://ic.fsc.org/about-us.1.htm! $FFHVVHG  )HEUXDU\  µ:KR ZH DUH¶ 3()&
<www.pefc.org/about-pefc/who-we-are> Accessed 9 February 2014. 
41
 Stewart (n 39) 151; DOVRVHH6DO]PDQµ7HDFKLQJ3ROLF\,QVWUXPHQW&KRLFHLQ(QYLURQPHQWDO/DZ
7KH)LYH3¶V¶'XNH(QYLURQPHQWDO/DZ	3ROLF\ 
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µERXJKW¶ E\ DW OHDVW RQH EX\HU IURP DW OHDVW RQH SURYLGHU ± if, and only if, the 
SURYLGHUVHFXUHVWKHSURYLVLRQRIWKHVHUYLFH´42 PES mechanisms have been used in 
several countries to provide financial support for forest protection.43 These 
developments are part of a broader shift of forest policy away from prescriptive 
regulations and towards a neoliberal model of environmental governance that lend 
support to 5KRGHV¶WKHRU\RIWKHKROORZHG-out State. REDD-plus fits into this trend. 
3.2. The international regulatory framework for REDD-plus: the 
SURYLVLRQRIµSRVLWLYHLQFHQWLYHV¶ 
3.2.1. Forests in the Kyoto Protocol 
Positive incentive instruments found expression in the climate change regime too. 
The Kyoto Protocol introduced three flexibility mechanisms that Annex I countries 
can use to reduce their emissions. Article 12 establishes the clean development 
mechanism (CDM), which allows developed countries (and authorised subnational 
entities) to meet their quantified emission reduction or limitation targets (the national 
µFDS¶ RQ HPLVVLRQV by financing emission reduction or removal projects in 
developing countries.44 These projects generate certified emission reductions (CERs) 
that are transferred to the developed country and used by the latter to offset domestic 
emissions. Article 6 establishes the joint implementation (JI) mechanism, which 
generates emission reduction units (ERUs) for developed States from activities 
carried out in countries in transition and other µFDSSHG¶ States. CERs, ERUs and 
unused HPLVVLRQ DOORZDQFHV RU µFDUERQ FUHGLWV¶ FDQ DOVR EH ERXJKW DQG sold 
                                                 
42
 Wunder, µPayments for environmental services: some nuts and bolts¶ (CIFOR 2005) 3. 
43
 Successful examples of large-scale PES mechanisms can be found in Costa Rica, Mexico, and the 
US, and include ecosystem services such as freshwater production and carbon sequestration. These 
schemes will be looked at in more detail in chapter 7 section 2. 
44
 As seen in chapter 1, such cap is established under article 3(1) and it is detailed in Annex B of the 
Kyoto Protocol. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(adopted 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) 37 ILM 22. 
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between operators XQGHUWKHHPLVVLRQWUDGLQJV\VWHPDOVRFDOOHGµFDUERQPDUNHW¶,45 
established under article 17.  
CERs and ERUs can be generated by forestry projects. These mechanisms permit to 
reduce emissions where it is cheaper to do so, increasing the cost-effectiveness of 
mitigation activities in Annex I countries. Moreover, they also function as a positive 
incentive instrument which actors in non-Annex I countries can voluntarily adhere to 
if they want to reduce their carbon footprint. In this sense, the mechanism is akin to a 
multi-level PES in which the developing country entity is the seller, the developed 
country entity the buyer and carbon sequestration is the ecosystem service 
transacted. However, while in domestic PES mechanisms providers and buyers are 
located in the same jurisdiction (sometimes in the same location) and payments can 
be based on either the actions of the service provider or indirect ecological 
indicators,46 under the CDM and JI the parties operate in different countries and the 
services transacted are intangible and difficult to measure.47 This requires complex 
intermediary functions of measurement, reporting and verification (MRV).48 
There is a fundamental difference in scope between JI and CDM. While ERUs can 
be generated by afforestation, reforestation, avoided deforestation and improved 
forest management projects, the COP stipulated that only afforestation and 
reforestation projects can be included in the CDM.49 In countries with no binding cap 
it is impossible to account for the overall change in forest emissions. In such context, 
                                                 
45
 Emission reduction or limitation thresholds - DOVRNQRZQDVµFDSV¶- are established nationally and 
divided per sector and per each industrial installation.  
46
 Arriagada, Perrings, Making Payments for Ecosystem Services Work (UNEP 2009) 3.  
47
 REDD-SOXV¶ DFWLYLWLHV provide different ecosystem services: reduced deforestation, reduced 
GHJUDGDWLRQ DQG VXVWDLQDEOH IRUHVW PDQDJHPHQW DFWLYLWLHV JHQHUDWH µHPLVVLRQ UHGXFWLRQV¶ HPLVVLRQV
that would have been generated were it not for the prospect of achieving financial compensation 
XQGHU WKH SURJUDPPH FRQVHUYDWLRQ RI FDUERQ VWRFN SURGXFHV µDYRLGHG HPLVVLRQV¶ LQGLFDWLQJ WKH
carbon that could have been emitted had the country a more aggressive forest policy); the 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks affordVµHPLVVLRQUHPRYDOV¶LHWKHYDOXHRIWKHFDUERQWKDWLV
sequestered in the growth of the planted or regenerated trees). This distinction is only important in the 
context of determining the methodology used for measuring and verifying the validity of the offset. 
For the sake of simplicity this thesis will refer to emission reductions to include also avoided 
emissions, consistent with the terminology used in the literature. 
48
 Under the CDM this functions are carried out by an independent international body called 
Executive Board. UNFCCC, COP Decision 3/CMP.1 (2005) UN Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1, 
Annex, paragraphs 5-19. 
49
 UNFCCC COP Draft decision -/CMP.1, Land use, land-use change and forestry (2001) UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, Annex, paragraph 13. 
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only the additionality of afforestation and reforestation projects (that remove carbon 
from the atmosphere) can be ensured, while that of avoided deforestation and forest 
management projects remains uncertain due to problems of µOHDNDJH¶RUµGLVSODFHG
HPLVVLRQV¶ DQG µQRQ-SHUPDQHQFH¶ RU µHPLVVLRQ UHYHUVDOV¶50 Leakage is the 
³XQDQWLFLSDWHGORVVRIQHWFDUERQEHQHILWVDVDFRQVHTXHQFH of the implementation of 
WKHSURMHFWDFWLYLWLHV´51 for instance, if the CDM protects a forest that is under the 
threat of logging, loggers can simply increase their production from outside the 
project boundaries negating the overall mitigation impact of the activity. Non-
permanence describes a situation in which emission reductions and sequestrations 
that are compensated using results-based payments are subsequently reversed 
because the forest is removed due to human or natural causes.  
As land-use emissions come mostly from ongoing deforestation activities in 
developing countries, the narrow scope of the CDM greatly limited the Kyoto 
3URWRFRO¶VLPSDFWin this sector. A new mechanism was needed. 
3.2.2. REDD-plus: objective and approach  
REDD-SOXV DLPV WR ³VORZ KDOW DQG UHYHUVH IRUHVW FRYHU DQG FDUERQ ORVV´ LQ
developing countries.52 7KLVJRDO LV WREH DFKLHYHG µFROOHFWLYHO\¶ WKXVPDLQWDLQLQJ
an element of flexibility that allows differentiation between historically high emitters 
(who will bear most of the burden) and countries with low forest emissions.53 The 
programme supports a wider range of activities than the CDM:54 (a) reducing 
emissions from deforestation; (b) reducing emissions from forest degradation; (c) 
conservation of forest carbon stocks; (d) sustainable management of forests; and (e) 
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 UNFCCC COP Decision 5/CMP.1 (2005) UN Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1, Annex, 
paragraph 37. 
51
 Auckland HW DO µ$ conceptual framework and its application for addressing leakage: the case of 
avoided deforestation¶ (2003) 3 Climate Policy 123, at 124±5. 
52
 UNFCCC COP Decision 1/CP.16 (2010) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1. 
53
 7KLVFDYHDWLVHTXLWDEOHEHFDXVHLWUHZDUGVµJRRG¶VWDWHVDQGUHTXLUHVDPDMRUHIIRUWIURPWKRVHZKR
benefited from deforestation, and pragmatic because the heaviest polluters can as a rule more easily 
reduce deforestation. 
54
 UNFCCC (n 52) paragraph 70. 
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enhancement of forest carbon stocks.55 Consistent with the principle of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities enshrined in the Convention,56 GHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV¶
participation and compliance are voluntary (i.e. no sanctions are imposed for failing 
to reduce forest emissions)57 DQGGHSHQGRQ³QDWLRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVFDSDFLWLHVDQG
FDSDELOLWLHV RI HDFK GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWU\ 3DUW\ DQG WKH OHYHO RI VXSSRUW UHFHLYHG´58 
By contrast, developed countries commit to providing ³DGHTXDWH DQG SUHGLFWDEOH´
support for REDD-plus actions, although it is unclear what such level should be.59  
Aside from capacity-building and technology development and transfer, support 
should be largely provided in the form of results-based, ex post financial payments 
for emission reductions that are measured, reported and verified in much the same 
way as under the CDM. It has also been assumed that, similarly to the CDM, REDD-
plus activities would generate emission reductions certificates that can be used as 
carbon offsets in developed countries.60 More specifically, the greenhouse gases that 
are not emitted by deforestation and degradation activities (emission reductions) or 
that have been sequestrated through reforestation and restoration (emission 
removals) are sold to polluting entities in developed countries, creating a virtual 
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 Enhancement of forest carbon stocks includes forest restoration, afforestation and reforestation.  
56
 This is one of the founding principles of the Framework Convention, affirmed in article 3(1); it 
gives rise to differential obligations for developed and developing countries and it underpins a number 
of provisions on financial assistance, such as those contained in articles 4(3), 4(4), 4(5) and 11. Its 
application has been justified largely on the bases of two considerations: (a) that industrialised nations 
must take the lead in mitigating climate change because they are most responsible for causing it, and 
E WKDW WKH\ PXVW DVVLVW GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV¶ HIIRUWV WR UHGXFH WKHLU HPLVVLRQV EHFDXVH WKHy have 
more capacity to do so. 6HH5DMDPDQLµ7KH3ULQFLSOHRI&RPPRQEXW'LIIHUHQWLDWHG5HVSRQVLELOLW\
DQG WKH %DODQFH RI &RPPLWPHQWV XQGHU WKH &OLPDWH 5HJLPH¶   5(&,(/  )UHQFK
µ'HYHORSLQJ 6WDWHV DQG ,QWHUQDWLRQDO (QYLURQPHQWDO /DZ WKH ,PSortance of Differentiated 
5HVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶   ,&/4  %UXQQpH 6WUHFN µThe UNFCCC as a negotiation forum: 
towards common but more differentiated responsibilities¶Climate Policy 589. 
57
 UNFCCC (n 52) paragraph 70. 
58
 Ibid, paragraph 74. Consistently with the above, REDD-plus ZLOO OLNHO\ EH SDUW RI ³QDWLRQDOO\
DSSURSULDWHPLWLJDWLRQDFWLRQV´1$0$VZKLFKDUHYROXQWDU\DFWLRQVWDNHQE\GHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV
³LQWKHFRQWH[WRIVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW´ in order WRDFKLHYH³DGHYLDWLRQLQHPissions relative to 
µEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO¶HPLVVLRQV´; ibid, paragraph 48.  
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 81)&&&QSDUDJUDSKVDQG$OVRQRWHWKDWSDUDJUDSKGHFLGHVWKDW³VFDOHG-up, new 
and additional, predictable and adequate funding shall be provided to developing country 3DUWLHV´
HPSKDVLVDGGHG7KLVPXVWEH³LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHUHOHYDQWSURYLVLRQVRIWKH&RQYHQWLRQ´ZKLFK
are yet to be decided. 
60
 UNFCCC, Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to stimulate 
action - Submissions from the Governments of Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica (2005) UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1. 
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marketplace of carbon offsets (the primary market). Offsets are then used by 
industrial installations in developed States to meet their emission reduction targets 
or, if a cap-and-trade system is in operation, they are exchanged in an emission 
trading scheme (the secondary market).61  
However, as said above, measuring emission reductions is more complicated than 
removals. Emission reductions result from the difference between the actual 
emissions and a hypothetical expected level of emissions under a business-as-usual 
scenario, FDOOHG µIRUHVW UHIHUHQFH OHYHO¶ RU µforest reference emission level¶ (from 
QRZ RQ µUHIHUHQFH OHYHO¶ RU µEDVHOLQH¶).62 Unsurprisingly, the calculation of the 
hypothetical reference level has raised much methodological and political 
controversy.63 Eventually it was decided at Warsaw in 2013 that reference levels will 
be submitted by developing countries using agreed international guidelines and then 
technically assessed by independent experts.64  
Previously, it had also been decided that problems of leakage and permanence, 
which are especially acute at sub-national level,65 would be resolved by setting the 
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 In cap-and-trade systems, operators who do not meet their emission limit can purchase emission 
allowances (also called carbon credits) from operators within their jurisdictions who reduce their 
emission below their prescribed cap, or they can buy carbon offsets from emission reduction projects 
outside the jurisdiction. The first and largest carbon market in operation is the European 8QLRQ¶V 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). 
62
 µ5HIHUHQFHHPLVVLRQOHYHOV¶FRQVLGHUVWKHQHWFKDQJHVLQFDUERQVWRFNVIRUVSHFLILFSHULRGVZKLOH
µUHIHUHQFH OHYHOV¶PHDVXUH WKH WRWDOFDUERQVWRFN LQD IRUHVWGXULQJDVSHFLILFSHULRGUDWKHU WKDQ WKH
changes (the first is known as flow-based and the second as stock-based accounting). Flow-based 
accounting would be more appropriate for countries with historically high emissions, while stock-
based accounting would be more useful in the case of conservation of forest carbon. To simplify the 
discussion WKHPRUH LQIRUPDODQGJHQHULF WHUPµUHIHUHQFH OHYHO¶ LVSUHIHUUHGKHUH IRUDGLVFXVVLRQ
see Chagas et al, Reference Levels: Concepts, Functions, and Application in REDD+ and Forest 
Carbon Standards (Climate Focus 2013). 
63
 Gupta et al (n 4) 85. Also see: Angelsen et al, Modalities for REDD+ Reference Levels: Technical 
and Procedural Issues (Meridian Institute 2011). 
64
 UNFCCC COP Decision 13/CP.19 (2013) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1. 
65
 Leakage can also occur at larger scales through international market, but its effect is more limited. 
The theory is that reduced production of a forest commodity caused by REDD-plus would increase 
international commodity prices and, indirectly, on the profitability of deforestation/degradation 
activities across the globe; StUDVVEXUJHWDOµReducing emissions from deforestation: tKH³FRPELQHG
LQFHQWLYHV´PHFKDQLVPDQGHPSLULFDOVLPXODWLRQV¶*ORE(QY&K6FKZDU]H1LOHV
2ODQGHU µ8QGHUVWDQGLQJ DQG 0DQDJLQJ /HDNDJH LQ )RUHVW-Based Greenhouse Gas Mitigation 
ProMHFWV¶360 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. A 1685. 
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reference level at national scale.66 However, as project activities are easier to 
implement than national-scale ones, observers proposed a system to µQHVW¶ small-
scale activities (supported by private sector funding) with national implementation. 
Subnational (project-level and jurisdiction-level) REDD-plus activities are 
individually rewarded for emission reductions achieved below their own reference 
level.67 But then the host country is only allowed to receive financial payments (e.g. 
selling carbon offsets) for the emission reductions and removals generated by the 
sum of individual projects. If national emission reductions are lower than the sum of 
projects/jurisdictional activities, the government would have the responsibility to 
make up for the missing credits.68 
Over the past few years, hundreds of forest projects generated emission reductions 
that were transacted as carbon offsets in the voluntary carbon market,69 with the 
expectation that they would be accepted under a future compliance market. These 
efforts spurred considerable analytical effort to find ways to develop solid MRV 
systems and to link REDD-plus performance at project level with national 
baselines.70 TKHQHVWHGDSSURDFKLVVWLOOUHJDUGHGDVµPDLQVWUHDP¶E\VRPH,71 perhaps 
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 UNFCCC COP Decision 4/CP.15 (2009) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, paragraph 7; 
Grainger, µDifficulties in tracking the long-term global trend in tropical forest area¶ (2008) 105(2) 
PNAS 818. 
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 Pedroni et al, 7KHµ1HVWHG$SSURDFK¶$IOH[LEOHPHFKDQLVPWRUHGXFHHPLVVLRQVIURPGHIRUHVWDWLRQ 
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Approaches to REDD+ An Overview of Issues and Options (Climate Focus 2010) 30 
<http://theredddesk.org/resources/nested-approaches-redd-overview-issues-and-options> Accessed 31 
January 2014. 
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 The means by which a government would compensate for missing credits are still unclear. Options 
include: reducing emissions in other sectors, using carbon credits set aside in a so-FDOOHG µEXIIHU¶
(which have been proposed to deal with non-permanence issues in jurisdictional and nested REDD-
plus), using insurance mechanisms or even buying the missing credits on the carbon markets. 
69
 A 2012 study counted 451 such projects, which marketed voluntary carbon offsets of a combined 
value of US$ 237 million; Peters-Stanley, Hamilton, Yin, Leveraging the Landscape: State of the 
Forest Carbon Markets 2012 (Ecosystem Marketplace 2012) i <www.forest-
trends.org/documents/files/doc_3242.pdf> Accessed 9 February 2014. 
70
 A number of standards to measure and verify forest emissions have been developed that give 
credibility to the voluntary carbon market. Some of these are sufficiently rigorous to be used as a 
model for a future compliance market. See, e.g., VCS, Jurisdictional and Nested REDD Initiative: 
Summary of Technical Recommendations, Version 2.0 (Voluntary Carbon Standard 2012); CAR, 
Forest Project Protocol, Version 3.3 (Climate Action Reserve 2012). 
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hoping to retain the engagement of private financial institutions. However, the slow 
decline of carbon markets casts doubts on the viability of this approach. 
3.2.3. Options for the generation and delivery of REDD-plus finance at the 
international level 
The idea that funding will be generated primarily by the sale of offsets in 
international carbon markets has deeply influenced the discourse around REDD-plus, 
the on-the-ground preparatory activities, and the technical and analytical work 
performed by prominent international actors and multilateral institutions. The Doha 
Decision launched a work programme for the establishment of a framework of 
approaches to enhance the cost-effectiveness of mitigation actions, including 
markets, and another to develop a new market mechanism operating under the 
guidance and authority of the COP.72 However there is still no agreement on the 
establishment of carbon markets, and the move towards a mechanism has lost 
momentum.  
The largest compliance market established under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU ETS, 
KDGJURZQYHU\IDVW LQ WKH\HDUV OHDGLQJ WR WKH3URWRFRO¶V first commitment period 
(2005-2008), but began declining in 2011 due to the failed attempt to agree on new 
emission reduction targets at Copenhagen.73 A few months after the Copenhagen 
debacle, the US Congress rejected a bill that would have established a similar 
emission trading scheme in the US.74 Despite the recent introduction of emissions 
trading schemes in California75 and Australia,76 the absence of legally binding 
international targets has turned the tide against this particular instrument. The option 
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 Karsenty, Financing options to support REDD+ activities: Based on a review of the literature, 
Report for the European Commission DG Climate Action (CIRAD 2012) 32 . 
72
 UNFCCC, COP Decision 1/CP.18 (2012) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1, paragraphs 47 and 50. 
73
 Linacre, Kossoy, Ambrosi, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2011 (World Bank 2011) 9-11. 
74
 The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454) was approved by the House of 
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 Title 17, California Code of Regulations (CCR), sections 95801-96022, as amended in 2013, 
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of carbon markets remains in place but UNFCCC Parties are looking for alternative 
sources of finance. 
The decline in private sector finance is in stark contrast with the pledge of US$100 
billion per annum in climate aid made by developed nations at the Copenhagen 
Conference and reaffirmed in subsequent decisions.77 In this uncertainty, the COP 
KDVUHSHDWHGO\DIILUPHGWKDW³ILQDQFH«PD\FRPHIURPDYDULHW\RIVRXUFHVSXEOLF
DQG SULYDWH ELODWHUDO DQG PXOWLODWHUDO LQFOXGLQJ DOWHUQDWLYH VRXUFHV´78 and that 
results-based activities can be supported using market-based and non-market-based 
approaches.79 The COP has not furnished further details on these issues, which are to 
be further discussed in the run up to COP 21.80 It is therefore impossible at this stage 
to determine what the sources of finance for REDD-plus could be. 
PDUWLHV¶Sroposals on alternative sources to carbon markets abound, but none seem to 
be getting sufficient support. The proposals can be divided between non-market and 
market-linked mechanisms.81 Non-market mechanisms include numerous options. A 
standard option involves contributions from national budgets, with developed 
nations setting aside large sums for climate mitigation and then delivering them to 
developing nations bilaterally, through multilateral institutions or via a COP-
mandated fund. Typically used in overseas development assistance, budget 
contributions are financing early REDD-plus activities but it is doubtful that this 
RSWLRQZLOOEHDEOHWRJHQHUDWHµDGHTXDWHDQGSUHGLFWDEOH¶VXSSRrt in the long run, as 
required in the preambular paragraphs of the Cancun and Durban REDD-plus text. 
Adequacy and predictability may be ensured if funding is based on international 
binding commitments rather than voluntary contributions. Along these lines, Mexico 
proposed to establish mandatory contributions based on gross domestic product, 
greenhouse gas emissions or population, leaving the decision of how to raise the 
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money in the first place to donor governments.82 However, the idea of a mandatory, 
relatively fix commitment was opposed by developed nations and is unlikely to 
make much headway in future discussions. Looking ahead, public sources are thus 
expected to be complementary rather than predominant sources of finance. 
Market-linked mechanisms generate REDD-plus funding from levies targeted to 
specific markets and sectors. These proposals can be further categorised as 
mechanisms linked to the carbon market and those linked to other sectors. The 
carbon market-linked mechanisms raise funds by applying a levy on carbon 
transactions. Options include levies on international transactions of carbon credits 
(similar to the two percent levy on CDM transactions that supports the Adaptation 
Fund),83 the auctioning of assigned amount units (AAUs) for the aviation and marine 
sectors,84 and the auctioning of a progressive percentage of AAUs for all sectors.85  
Revenues can also be raised via levies and taxes on a market other than the carbon 
market. This includes a proposal for a global carbon tax, minus a coefficient for the 
population,86 and a levy on specific polluting sectors, such as on bunker fuels or 
international aviation.87 The advantage of these options is that they would also have 
a double mitigation impact. Alternatively, revenues can be raised from markets that 
are not linked to greenhouse gas emissions, such as the financial transaction tax 
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proposed by the European Commission.88 Another proposal, put forward by the 
3ULQFH RI :DOHV¶ 5DLQIRUHVW 3URMHFW DQG VXSSRUWHG E\ 7XYDOX VXJJHVWV LVVXLQJ
µUDLQIRUHVW ERQGV¶ in order to mobilise finance from capital markets.89 Available 
market-linked proposals focus on economic sectors that are international in nature, 
taking therefore a sectoral approach rather than a jurisdictional one.  
No more clarity surrounds the way in which REDD-plus finance should be managed 
under the Convention. Pursuant to the Copenhagen pledge, the Durban COP 
GHVLJQDWHG WKH *UHHQ &OLPDWH )XQG WKH µ)XQG¶ DV DQ RSHUDWLQJ HQWLW\ RI WKH
financial mechanism under Article 11 of the Convention.90 The Fund is expected to 
provide support for, inter alia, adaptation and mitigation actions, including REDD-
plus through a thematic funding window.91 It can support many activities, including 
institutional strengthening, projects and programmes, following a country-driven 
approach;92 financing will be provided in the forms of grants and conditional loans 
DVZHOODV³ZKHUHDSSURSULDWH´UHVXOWV-based payments for verified mitigation.93  
Arguably, the Fund will be the main financial entity for REDD-plus under the 
control of the COP. However, it does not address problems of coordination of 
support affecting current REDD-plus activities. It remains to be seen, in fact, how 
the Fund will be linked to other sources of REDD-plus finance, a crucial question 
particularly if developed nations use market instruments. It seems unlikely that 
private investors will entrust the management of a REDD-plus investment portfolio 
to an international institution. Given the high volume of transactions involved,94 it is 
also difficult to imagine the Fund operating as a clearing house for REDD-plus or 
being otherwise involved in market monitoring. 
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Box 3.1: Non-market finance for REDD-plus  
While the UNFCCC negotiations struggled to move the discussion about REDD-plus 
finance forward, early REDD-plus finance started flowing via bilateral and multilateral 
channels established on the initiative of some Parties and operating independently from the 
&RQYHQWLRQ¶V ILQDQFLDO PHFKDQLVP LH WKH *lobal Environmental Facility). In reality, to 
date REDD-plus has taken place mostly outside the climate negotiations and quite 
autonomously. Although these initiatives have an interim nature and are subsidiary to the 
COP, their work is de facto advancing the REDD-plus agenda outside the climate 
negotiations and thus it is influencing the development of the programme.95  
This has generated a fragmented financial landscape. Finance is being disbursed through 
SURJUDPPHVPDQDJHGE\PXOWLODWHUDOLQVWLWXWLRQVLQFOXGLQJWKH:RUOG%DQN¶V)RUHVW&DUERQ
Partnership Facility (FCPF), Forest Investment Programme (FIP) and BioCarbon Fund; and 
the UN-REDD Programme jointly managed by UNEP, FAO and UNDP. These institutions 
are supporting actions at the national and subnational level that are propaedeutic to the 
functioning of carbon markets,96 or actively experimenting with carbon finance at project 
level.97 On top of this, there are many bilateral and multilateral agreements between 
developed and developing countries. Of these, the most remarkable is the Government of 
1RUZD\¶V ,QWHUnational Climate and Forests Initiative, which has committed over US$3 
billion to support REDD-plus readiness and demonstration activities in various countries.98  
Finally, a number of countries set up a framework called the REDD-plus Partnership, within 
which they may develop and implement collaborative REDD-plus efforts. The Partnership 
provides a platform where interested countries can share information and enter into legally 
ELQGLQJDJUHHPHQWVZLWKHDFKRWKHUVXFKSODWIRUPµZRXOGEHUHSODFHGE\DIXWXUH UNFCCC 
mechanism including REDD-SOXV¶99 The autonomy of these initiatives is not set to continue 
if REDD-plus does not form part of a broader climate mitigation agreement.  
7KH'RKD'HFLVLRQ³UHFRJQLVHVWKHQHHGWRLPSURYHWKHFRRUGLQDWLRQRIVXSSRUWIRU
WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI WKH DFWLYLWLHV´ DQG UHTXHVWV WKH WZR WHFKQLFDO ERGLHV RI WKH
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convention100 WR MRLQWO\ ³FRQVLGHU H[LVWLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQDO DUUDQJHPHQWV RU SRWHQWLDO
governance alternatives including a body, a board or a committee, and to make 
recommendatioQV RQ WKHVH PDWWHUV´ WR &23 101 The Warsaw COP adopted a 
Decision on coordination of support102 which invites developing countries to 
establish national entities or focal points to work as a liaison with relevant bodies 
³XQGHU WKH &RQYHQWLRQ´103 but postpones any decision on REDD-plus specific 
international institutional arrangements to 2017.104 It is unclear whether the 
TXDOLILFDWLRQ µXQGHU WKH &RQYHQWLRQ¶ ZLOO LQFOXGH PXOWLODWHUDO ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV
currently working on REDD-plus readiness.105 
3.3. The limiWV RI µSRVLWLYH LQFHQWLYHV¶ DQG WKH role of µSROLF\
DSSURDFKHV¶  
The use of economic incentive instruments in forest policy has encouraged broad 
participation from both developed and developing countries,106 and it has rallied the 
support of multilateral organisations, conservation NGOs and the private sector. 
Developed countries are adamant to outsource their emission reduction obligations 
and to exploit the low opportunity-cost of forest offsets, as argued by the influential 
µStern Review on the economics oIFOLPDWHFKDQJH¶107 and subsequently confirmed 
by several studies.108 At the same time, the results-based principle ensures that their 
investments achieve tangible results. Developing countries are enticed by the 
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promise of considerable financial influxes without the pressure of legally binding 
commitments which may place excessive constraints on development.109  
However, a sharp ideological divide is still evident in REDD-plus discussions. A 
common criticism targets carbon offsetting, deemed incompatible with the steep 
emission cuts in developed countries needed to prevent dangerous climate change.110 
Other criticisms focus on the danger that exercising property over forest carbon 
could lead to land grabs and the de facto eviction of forest stakeholders.111 Similar 
worries about indirect forms of land grabbing and environmental colonialism were 
expressed by some developing countries preferring a state-controlled mechanism.112 
The trade in ecosystem services is also criticised by some environmentalists on 
ethical grounds for it is a projection of an anthropocentric vision which ignores the 
inherent and intrinsic values of nature. This position, which falls within the radical 
ecology philosophy,113 rejects the connotation of environmental degradation as a 
µPDQDJHPHQW SUREOHP¶ DQG DUJXHV LQVWHDG IRU D UHGHILQLWLRQ RI WKH KXPDQ
relationship with nature.114 Other criticisms are advanced on ideological grounds, 
steeped into an opposition to neoliberalism which involves the privatisation of public 
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goods (the environmental services) and the superimposition of Western models of 
society on communitarian cultures.115  
A further criticism to offset-based payments is that this approach is not as efficient as 
believed, and that only a carefully crafted policy design can reduce costs.116 First, 
inaccuracy in setting reference levels may drive up the so-called transaction costs, 
that is, the price paid for activities that do not generate emissions reductions.117 
Second, if payments are made through the purchase of carbon offsets priced 
internationally, the actual opportunity cost of a REDD-plus activity would be 
disregarded. The divergence between the opportunity cost of implementing a REDD-
plus activity and the sum paid for it at the level of offset purchase generates a private 
profit (or rent) for the seller or the financial intermediary.118 If payments were based 
on the international price of carbon offsets, they would not match highly variable 
opportunity costs, creating huge profits where emission reductions are cheap and 
failing to protect forests where deforestation is more profitable.119  
Problems are not just limited to offsetting. Faith in the effectiveness of financial 
payments to reduce forest emissions builds on a reductionist perspective on the 
drivers of forest loss, which is so summarised: 
The fundamental reason for the unsustainable use of forests and for current 
trends in deforestation is that forests are worth more cleared than standing: the 
products derived from deforested lands ± be they beef, soybeans or palm oil ± 
offer financial revenue to landholders and economic opportunity to local 
communities and country governments, while standing forests do not.120 
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This vision has dominated REDD-plus discourse since the early days. Its theoretical 
background is the rational choice theory, according to which individuals, 
organisations and governments take environmental management decisions based on 
opportunity costs.121 Because the costs and profits of deforestation accrue at different 
times and to different actors, short-term exploitative behaviour is economically more 
µrational¶ than long-term sustainable management.122 It follows that the provision of 
an economic value to standing forests would generate a spontaneous alignment of 
EHKDYLRXURILQGLYLGXDOVDVZHOODV6WDWHVWRZDUGVWKHPRVWµHFRQRPLFDOO\UDWLRQDO¶
use. In other words, sufficient positive incentives would create a system of 
spontaneous, hands-RII JRYHUQDQFH WKDW UHFDOOV $GDP 6PLWK¶V WKHRU\ RI WKH
µLQYLVLEOH KDQG¶123 This model of µPDUNHW-EDVHG¶ governance should theoretically 
have two benefits: first, by engaging with the economics of deforestation it addresses 
directly the drivers rather than merely mitigating their impact; second, for the same 
reason, it does not need to engage in reforms of public governance in developing 
countries that have proven particularly complex, long and intractable. Neither 
benefit, however, stand scrutiny in practice.  
With regards to the first benefit, it is apparent that the economic drivers of 
deforestation cannot be made uneconomic using environmental incentives. Take as 
an example the two-year moratorium on new palm oil concessions recently agreed 
between the Governments of Norway and Indonesia.124 By virtue of this agreement 
Norway will transfer a total of US$1 billion to Indonesia (of which US$800 million 
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using results-based payments) in exchange for a ban on new palm oil plantations in 
forest areas. However, what Indonesia agreed is a two-year ban on new concessions 
in primary forest areas, thus excluding forest that had already been degraded as well 
as the hundreds of thousands of hectares of primary forests where concessions had 
already been awarded but not executed.125 This was nevertheless seen as a political 
victory for Norway because the loss of tax revenue the country will suffer as a result 
of the moratorium is estimated to be around US$3 billion.126  
It has thus become clear that REDD-plus is very likely to be considerably 
underfunded. A UNFCCC report on interim finance indicated that the programme 
needed between US$12±21 billion for the 2009-2012 timeframe, while achieving a 
50 percent reduction in forest emissions127 is estimated to cost several tens of US$ 
billion each year.128 The resources mobilised by developed countries, while 
substantial, are nowhere near that amount.129 This author has noted that current cost-
estimates are imprecise and may be too low.130 This scale of finance is unlikely to 
become available even after the entry into force of a new agreement. If carbon 
markets will materialise, their contribution is also bound to be insufficient, as it is 
estimated to mobilise only about US$7 billion per annum.131 REDD-plus does 
qualify for a share of the US$100 billion per year pledged at Copenhagen but even 
assuming that developed countries will be able to reach their target, this sum will 
cover mitigation from all sectors, adaptation, technology development and transfer, 
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capacity building, measurement and reporting obligations and so forth. Considering 
the moderate contribution of forests to climate change compared to fossil fuels, the 
rapid increase in industrial emissions in developing countries, and the increased 
needs for adaptation in a warming world, REDD-plus would only be entitled to 
receive a small fraction of that sum.  
As for the second benefit of market-based governance, the idea that economic 
instruments can work effectively on their own is disproven by much of the 
governance and economic literatures.132 (YHQ WKH PRVW H[WUHPH IRUPV RI µIUHH
PDUNHW HQYLURQPHQWDOLVP¶ DUH QRW VR PXFK DERXW PDUNHWV EXW UDWKHU DERXW WKH
institutional arrangements that allow markets to operate, such as property rights.133 
Said arrangements need a strong public sector.134 This is consistent with Peck and 
Tickell¶V insight that neoliberal policy is not anymore about the retreat of the State 
EXWDERXW WKH³construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, modes 
RIJRYHUQDQFHDQGUHJXODWRU\UHODWLRQV´HPSKDVLVLQRULJLQDO135  
The realisation that even market-based environmental policy requires a strong public 
sector has progressively raised the profile of public governance problems in REDD-
plus. µPolicy approaches¶ were initially limited to putting in place the rules and basic 
conditions for the operation of markets. This was the original purpose of REDD-
SOXV¶ µUHDGLQHVV SURFHVV¶ D V\VWHP RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRRSHUDWion established to 
prepare countries for the implementation of results-based activities and the effective 
use of economic incentives. However, the relatively narrow focus on technical 
measures and market infrastructures has progressively evolved into efforts to build a 
comprehensive governance framework in which public policies become central in 
promoting long term structural changes to the national development paradigm.136 
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Box 3.2: Funding gaps in other MEAs and the use of market mechanisms 
Gaps in financing for environmental conventions are not uncommon. Recently, the CBD 
Secretariat has stated that the global 2010 Biodiversity Targets were missed primarily 
because of insufficient funding. Funding needs for global biodiversity protection were 
around US$60 billion per annum in 2010 and will increase to US$150 billion per annum in 
2020, while the overall national budgetary support to biodiversity is estimated to be in the 
range between US$15-45 billion in 2010, with huge disparities between developed and 
developing countries.137 To make up for the funding shortfall, the COP launched a strategy 
for resource mobilization138 which aims to attract financial support from a number of 
sources, including public and private sector investments. In particular, it sets the goal to 
H[SORUH ³QHZ DQG LQQRYDWLYH ILQDQFLDO PHFKDQLVPV´ LQFOXGLQJ ³VFKHPHV IRU SD\PHQW IRU
HFRV\VWHP VHUYLFHV´ DQG ³ELRGLYHUVLW\ RIIVHW PHFKDQLVPV´139 Interestingly, among the 
options considered by the COP to create a biodiversity market a proposal has been gaining 
support to create a green development mechanism on the model of the CDM.140   
This signals a harmonisation of approaches towards increasing private sector contributions 
and ecosystem valuation as a strategy to bridge financial shortfalls. The UNCCD is 
exploring options to build bridges with the private sector and to use methodologies based on 
the economic valuation of land as a tool to promote sustainable land-use options.141 Recently 
introduced Integrated Financial Strategies DLPWRHQDEOH³SULYDWHLQYHVWPHQWVPDUNHW-based 
LQVWUXPHQWVDQGSROLF\DQGOHJLVODWLYHUHIRUPV´142 and is proving successful.143 The Ramsar 
Convention has also embraced the concept of ecosystem services (such as food, carbon 
storage, water flows regulation, energy, and biodiversity services provided by wetlands)144 
and may in the future support PES mechanisms to generate finance for wetland protection. 
                                                                                                                                          
Preparation Proposal, Template Version 6, for Country Use and Public Comment (World Bank 2011) 
40. 
137
 CBD, State of financing for biodiversity: draft global monitoring report 2012 on the Strategy for 
Resource Mobilization under the Convention - Note by the Executive Secretary (2012) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/11/INF/16, pp. 9-12. 
138
 CBD, COP Decision IX/11, Review of implementation of Articles 20 and 21 (2008), UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/11. 
139
 Ibid., paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2; CBD, COP Decision IX/6, Incentive measures (Article 11) (2008) 
UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/6, paragraph 4. 
140
 See, e.g.: Metcalfe, Vorhies, Exploring the case for a green development mechanism (CBD 2010) 
<www.cbd.int/financial/doc/gdm-exploring-the-case-en.pdf> Accessed 9 February 2014. 
141
 This was discussed at a special session of the 2nd UNCCD Scientific Conference, which was held 
in Bonn, Germany, on 11 April 2013. <www.global-mechanism.org/en/feature-story/economic-
valuation-of-land-and-ecosystem-services-building-bridges-with-the-private-sector> Accessed 12 
December 2013. 
142
 UNCCD, Integrated Financing Strategies for Sustainable Land Management (Global Mechanism 
of the UNCCD 2008) 13. 
143
 UNCCD¶V ¿QDQFLDO ÀRZV are based on: UNCCD, PRAIS reports: CRIC11 (UNCCD 2012) 
<www.global-mechanism.org/en/feature-story/analysis-of-financial-flows-to-unccd-related-activities-
reveals-increase-in-resources> Accessed 12 December 2013. 
144
 Ramsar Convention Secretariat, Wise use of wetlands: Concepts and approaches for the wise use 
of wetlands (4th ed., vol. 1, Ramsar Secretariat 2010) 9. 
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*** 
This chapter has shown that a prescriptive international forest regime could not be 
established due to the opposition of developing countries (and some developed 
countries) to any constraint on sovereign rights to exploit natural resources. This has 
left space for the emergence of incentive-based instruments that safeguard economic 
efficiency. REDD-plus falls in this category. It establishes a multi-level governance 
framework based on the transfer of economic incentives to developing countries 
conditional on the achievement of emissions reductions. Despite criticisms, this 
approach has fostered participation and generated political momentum to review 
forest management practices in developing countries. 
Some crucial elements of the programme are yet to be agreed, however. For instance, 
it is still unclear whether forest emission reductions will generate carbon offsets, 
whether there will be sufficient demand from carbon markets, and how REDD-SOXV¶
funding framework will be integrated in the financial architecture of the post-Kyoto 
treaty. Uncertainty over how financial resources will be raised by developed 
countries underlines another major challenge for the programme. For the incentive 
approach to work according to opportunity cost logics, incentives must make 
DFWLYLWLHV GULYLQJ GHIRUHVWDWLRQ µXQHFRQRPLF¶ 7KLV SURVSHFW LV KLJKO\ XQOLNHO\ DV
countries are already struggling to meet their modest financial commitments and 
prospects for private sector participation look bleak. This in turn further invalidates 
the idea that incentive instruments can be used as a substitute for public governance 
mechanisms. Instead of trying to impose prescriptive regulatory measures, economic 
incentives should be used to stimulate public sector governance reforms and then, 
only when such reforms provide a clear operational space for subnational actors, 
target stakeholders on the ground. The next chapter will explore how REDD-plus is 
building public sector governance in developing countries. 
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4 
Supporting national governance in international REDD-
plus 
 
This chapter analyses WKH FRQWULEXWLRQ RI µSROLF\ DSSURDFKHV¶ XQGHU REDD-plus. 
Aside from directly mandating certain behaviour, international legal processes can 
influence domestic policy in two ways: first, they create consensus over the 
desirability of certain results and so encourage national governments to adjust 
domestic policy accordingly; second, they provide technical and financial assistance 
and facilitate information sharing that can directly affect policy planning and 
implementation.1 REDD-plus does both things. The influence of positive obligations 
set by the COP is described in section 4.1, while section 4.2 discusses the role of 
extra-regime preparation activities. Finally, section 4.3 assesses the impact of these 
two contributions and asks whether they are likely to promote the changes needed to 
build an effective, efficient and equitable programme.  
4.1. Improving developing country governance: legal guidance from 
the COP 
:KLOH µSRVLWLYH LQFHQWLYHV¶ WR UHGXFH GHIRUHVWDWLRQ DUH SURYLGHG E\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
GRQRUV µSROLF\ DSSURDFKHV¶ DUH WKH SUHURJDWLYH RI GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV¶
governments. 7KH WHUP µSROLF\ DSSURDFKHV¶ LQ WKLV FRQWH[W LQGLFDWHV WKH  
regulatory measures, laws and funding priorities promulgated by a governmental 
entity (at national or, in some cases, subnational level) that are likely to reduce forest 
emissions either directly or indirectly. Despite such markedly domestic dimension, 
the international regime has considerable influence on the development of such 
                                                 
1
 (ED¶D $W\L 0DU\XGL, McGinley, µExamination of the influences of global forest governance 
arrangements at the domestic level¶ in Rayner, Buck, Katila, Embracing Complexity: Meeting the 
Challenges of International Forest Governance (IUFRO 2011) 111. 
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approaches. As seen earlier, the COP has recognised that REDD-plus does not 
operate in a vacuum. In this respect, the Cancun Decision contains numerous 
provisions that give broad policy guidance to developing countries.2 
4.1.1. General guidance 
The Cancun Decision states that REDD-plus activities should: be country-driven, 
respect environmental integrity, take into account the multiple functions of forests 
and other ecosystems, be undertaken in accordance with national development 
priorities and with national sustainable development needs and goals, and be 
consistent with adaptation needs.3 These provisions have implications for national 
policy development. Taking into account the multiple functions of forests would 
exclude policy approaches that allow the replacement of primary forests with 
intensive wood plantations, despite WKHODWWHU¶Vcontribution to carbon sequestration. 
Implementing REDD-plus activities in accordance with sustainable development 
priorities, needs and goals requires balancing conflicting goals, coordinating sectoral 
decisions and seeking synergies between actions. Similarly, mention of adaptation 
needs suggests that when deciding on REDD-plus implementation, the contribution 
of forests to local adaptation should be considered, e.g., to geographically prioritise 
protection. These provisions are hardly ground-breaking but have the merit of setting 
the programme in the broad international legal context and promoting the integration 
of diverse environmental values (i.e. the ecosystem services) and social objectives 
(i.e. the needs of present generations) in decision-making.4 
4.1.2. The safeguards 
The same Cancun Decision also guides national policy development through the so-
FDOOHGµVDIHJXDUGV¶7KHWHUPµVDIHJXDUG¶KDVWUDGLWLRQDOO\LQGLFDWHGWKHSROLFLHVDQG
procedures used by multilateral financial institutions to ensure that their investments 
                                                 
2
 UNFCCC COP Decision 1/CP.16 (2010) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1. 
3
 Ibid, Appendix I paragraph 1(c) to (j). 
4
 The principle of integration is one of the fundamental principles of sustainable development; 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ $VVRFLDWLRQ µ,/$ 1HZ 'HOKL 'HFODUDWLRQ RI 3ULQFLSOHV RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ
Relating to Sustainable Development, 2 April ¶   International Environmental 
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 211, at 216. 
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do not create unintended harm. In contrast, the REDD-plus safeguards aim to 
promote the achievement of non-carbon benefits during implementation. Similar to 
the general guidance discussed above, these provisions reaffirm objectives 
enunciated in other international instruments, but using more specific (and 
enforceable) language. 
The safeguards to be supported and promoted in REDD-plus are: 
(a) That actions complement or are consistent with the objectives of national 
forest programmes and relevant international conventions and agreements;  
(b) Transparent and effective national forest governance structures, taking into 
account national legislation and sovereignty;  
(c) Respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of 
local communities, by taking into account relevant international obligations, 
national circumstances and laws, and noting that the United Nations General 
Assembly has adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples;  
(d) The full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular 
indigenous peoples and local communities, in REDD-plus actions;  
(e) That actions are consistent with the conservation of natural forests and 
biological diversity, ensuring that REDD-plus actions are not used for the 
conversion of natural forests, but are instead used to incentivize the protection 
and conservation of natural forests and their ecosystem services, and to 
enhance other social and environmental benefits;  
(f) Actions to address the risks of reversals; and  
(g) Actions to reduce displacement of emissions. 5  
The attempt to promote integration between various international instruments and 
mutual supportiveness of their goals and approaches is clear from safeguard 2(a), 
which has two parts. First, this provision indicates that REDD-plus must build upon 
and coPSOHPHQW WKH µQational forest programmes¶ introduced in the late 1990s to 
facilitate the implementation of the non-binding Proposals for Actions of the 
                                                 
5
 UNFCCC (n 2) Appendix I paragraph 2. 
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Intergovernmental Panel on Forests and the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests.6 
They aim to promote sustainable forest management by establishing certain 
principles for policy planning that are consistent with the safeguards.7 Consistency 
with such programmes would prevent fragmented policy responses and place REDD-
plus into carefully crafted policies and strategies. Similarly, REDD-plus must also be 
consistent with XQVSHFLILHGµUHOHYDQWLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQYHQWLRQVDQGDJUHHPHQWV¶. The 
decision not to specify what conventions and agreements are to be considered 
µUHOHYDQW¶ FUHDWHV XQFHUWDLQWy as it does not contribute to the definition of specific 
instruments, documents or principles that could orient best practices in 
implementation. Arguably, relevant instruments should include, among others, all 
conventions and agreements concerned with biodiversity, desertification, sustainable 
timber use, sustainable rural development,8 and the rights of forest peoples.9 This 
open formulation allows aligning practice with future instruments and decisions.  
Nevertheless WZR µUHOHYDQW LQWHUQDWLRQDO DJUHHPHQWV¶ GHVHUYH SDUWLFXOar attention 
here. The first is the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP), which is mentioned in safeguard 2(c) as a relevant standard for the 
protection of local rights to access and use forests. This safeguard aims to address 
concerns that REDD-plus could threaten ORFDOFRPPXQLWLHVDQGLQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶
rights, for instance by granting property over carbon to foreign investors or by 
triggering a recentralisation of forest governance.10 Promulgated by the UN General 
Assembly in 2007 with 144 votes in favour and only four against, UNDRIP is the 
first international legal instrument of truly global significance to protect indigenous 
rights.11 $OWKRXJKWKHGRFXPHQW¶VVLJQLILFDQFHLVFOHDUO\OLPLWHGE\LWVQRQ-binding 
                                                 
6
 See chapter 3 note 23. 
7
 See section 6.2.2 for more details. 
8
 See chapter 3 section 1 for a partial list of relevant treaties. 
9
 UNGA Res 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (13 September 
2007)  UN Doc A/61/L.67 and Add.1 (UNDRIP). 
10
 3KHOSV:HEE$JUDZDOµ'RHV5(''7KUHDWHQWR5HFHQWUDOL]H)RUHVW*RYHUQDQFH"¶
Science 312, at 312. 
11
 ;KDQWDNLµ,QGLJHQRXVULJKWVLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZRYHUWKH ODVW\HDUVDQGIXWXUHGHYHORSPHQWV¶
0HOE-,QW¶O/DWS 
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nature,12 its widespread acceptance creates at least a moral expectation of 
compliance by States and adds some force to the argument that certain indigenous 
rights are becoming part of customary international law.13 Even though opposition 
by prominent countries demonstrates that the opinio juris of the international 
community does not go in this direction,14 if REDD-plus helps translate some of 
UNDRIP provisions into domestic legislation it will help establish the State practice 
necessary to the progressive solidification of such rights into customary international 
law.  
More relevantly, the far-reaching rights to self-determination accorded by the 
document to indigenous peoples are ± if incorporated domestically - likely to 
influence the implementation of the programme.15 One of the rights enunciated in 
UNDRIP is Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), which, literally interpreted, 
would put indigenous peoples on the same level as the State.16 Instead of endorsing 
                                                 
12
 Some authors have argued that UNDRIP is indeed binding on States that do not qualify as 
persistent objeFWRUV VHH HJ :LHVVQHU µ7KH &XOWXUDO 5LJKWV RI ,QGLJHQRXV 3HRSOHV $FKLHYHPHQWV
DQG &RQWLQXLQJ &KDOOHQJHV¶  (-,/  DW   ,W LV WKH YLHZ RI WKLV DXWKRU WKDW VXFK
interpretation would be irreconcilable with the choice of instrument (a General Assembly Declaration) 
as well as with the views expressed by many States in the decade-long discussions that preceded its 
adoption.  
13
 :LHVVQHU¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW VRPH RI WKH ULJKWV HQVKULQHG LQ WKH 'HFODUDWLRQ ± rather than the 
Declaration as a whole - are gDLQLQJ IRUFH LV PRUH FRQYLQFLQJ ³LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV DUH HQWLWOHG WR
maintain and develop their distinct cultural identity, their spirituality, their language, and their 
traditional ways of life; that they hold the right to political, economic and social self-determination, 
including a wide range of autonomy; and that they have a right to the lands they have traditionally 
RZQHG RU RWKHUZLVH RFFXSLHG DQG XVHG´ :LHVVQHU United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law 2009) 6, 
<http://65.60.52.92/sites/default/files/undeclarationontherightsofindigenouspeoples.pdf> Accessed 13 
August 2014. 
14
 Opposition to the Declaration was raised by prominent countries such as the US, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand.  
15
 See, for instance, articles 10, 18, 26, 27 and 32, detailing indigenous rights to use, control and 
develop their lands and territories and the natural resources within. States have a duty of consultation 
and cooperation with indigenous peoples, although it is still unclear whether the latter have a veto 
power on government decisions affecting their lands in case agreements cannot be found. UNGA (n 
9). 
16
 %DUHOOL VXPPDULVHV WKH PDLQ WHQHWV RI )3,& DV IROORZV ³)LUVW µIUHH¶ VKRXOG LPSO\ QR coercion, 
LQWLPLGDWLRQRUPDQLSXODWLRQ6HFRQGO\µSULRU¶VKRXOGLPSO\WKDWFRQVHQWPXVWEHVRXJKWVXIILFLHQWO\
in advance of any authorisation or commencement of activities, and that the relevant agents should 
guarantee enough time for the indigenous consultation/consensus processes to take place. Thirdly, 
µLQIRUPHG¶ LPSOLHV WKDW LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV VKRXOG UHFHLYH VDWLVIDFWRU\ LQIRUPDWLRQ LQ UHODWLRQ WR
certain key areas, including the nature, size, pace, reversibility and scope of the proposed project, the 
reasons for launching it, its duration, and a preliminary assessment of its economic, social, cultural 
DQG HQYLURQPHQWDO LPSDFW >«@ )LQDOO\ µFRQVHQW¶ VKRXOG EH LQWHQGHG DV D SURFHVV RI ZKLFK
FRQVXOWDWLRQDQGSDUWLFLSDWLRQUHSUHVHQWWKHFHQWUDOSLOODUV´ %DUHOOLµFree, prior and informed consent 
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FPIC, safeguard 2(d) sets the lower standard of ³IXOO DQG HIIHFWLYH SDUWLFLSDWLRQ´, 
which does not require the µFRQVHQW¶ of indigenous peoples.17 Countries have 
therefore the prerogative in deciding between consent and consultation based on 
WKHLU³QDWLRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVDQGODZV´18  
The second international instrument of particular relevance to this discussion is the 
UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Although not explicitly mentioned 
in the text, the relevance of the CBD is to be seen in the context of safeguard 2(e). 
Above all, this provision aims to prevent the conversion of low-carbon high-
biodiversity natural forests into high-carbon low-biodiversity intensive tree 
plantations. Aware that this activity may in some cases have net carbon benefits, 
many NGOs have lobbied hard to ensure that the text rules out the conversion of 
natural forests as a climate change mitigation strategy.19 A combined reading of 
safeguards 2(a) and 2(e) therefore suggests that Parties recognise the biodiversity 
potential of REDD-plus, and that biodiversity preservation must be achieved by 
factoring relevant provisions from other treaties in implementation.  
Efforts to promote mutual supportiveness between carbon and biodiversity goals 
have been more prominent in the CBD than in REDD-plus, however. Before the 
emergence of REDD-plus, the CBD COP had already established an expanded 
programme of work on forest biological diversity and climate change whose 
measures to improve forest governance, promote sustainable forest management, 
restore degraded forests, fight forest fires, develop good practices in forest law 
enforcement and clarify forest tenure clearly overlap with, and can contribute 
significantly to the success of REDD-plus.20 At its ninth session, the CBD COP 
invited UNFCCC Parties to establish formal collaborations among the subsidiary 
bodies to the three Rio conventions to increase mutual supportiveness and 
                                                                                                                                          
in the aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: developments and 
challenges ahead¶ 16(1) The International Journal of Human Rights 1, at 2. 
17
 Ibid.  A similar interpretation is also given by the World Bank in the application of FPIC for the 
projects it supports. Goodland, µFree, Prior and Informed Consent and the World Bank Group¶
4(2) Sustainable Development Law & Policy 66.  
18
 UNFCCC (n 2) Appendix I, paragraph 2(c). 
19
 Avoiding the conversion of natural forests was also seen as key to protecting the rights of local and 
indigenous forest communities, as stated in the footnote to this safeguard. Ibid, Appendix I. 
20
 UNCBD, COP Decision VI/22, Forest biological diversity (2002) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20, 
annex 
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established an Ad Hoc Expert Group on biodiversity and climate change 
(AHTEG).21 AHTEG developed recommendations for the implementation of REDD-
plus22 which were published in a number of detailed reports and put forward best 
practices and approaches to forest management and governance alongside the CBD 
6HFUHWDULDW¶VRZQZRUN23 This work in turn informed subsequent CBD decisions and 
can contribute to the development of sound national REDD-plus policies.24 It 
remains to be seen, however, to what extent these will be integrated into REDD-plus 
implementation and to what extent they will be monitored to ensure compliance with 
safeguard 2(e). In this respect, the request made by the COP to the Executive 
Secretary to identify indicators and mechanisms to assess and monitor REDD-plus 
biodiversity contribution is particularly important.25 
Further guidance for REDD-plus policies can be inferred by safeguard 2(b), which 
enunciates the principles of transparency and effectiveness. The word transparency 
in this context reveals a general expectation that international scrutiny will focus not 
only on the environmental integrity of emission reductions,26 but also on the 
underlying decision-making process. Effectiveness may refer to issues such as 
bureaucratic capacity and participation as well as to simplified bureaucratic 
procedures. The latter interpretation is consistent with the juxtaposition of 
effectiveness and transparency, which would both benefit from slim decision-making 
                                                 
21
 UNCBD COP Decision IX/16, Biodiversity and climate change (2008) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/16 
22
 CBD, Connecting Biodiversity and Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation: Report of the 
Second Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Biodiversity and Climate Change (CBD Secretariat 
2009). 
23
 See also: CBD, Interlinkages Between Biological Diversity And Climate Change: Advice on the 
integration of biodiversity considerations into the implementation of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol (CBD Secretariat 2003); CBD, REDD-plus 
and Biodiversity (CBD Secretariat 2011); Thompson et al, Forest Resilience, Biodiversity, and 
Climate Change. A synthesis of the biodiversity/resilience/stability relationship in forest ecosystems 
(CBD Secretariat 2009). 
24
 Interestingly, both the publications and the relevant CBD COP decisions on forest biodiversity 
consistently stress how good governance principles are key elements of the protection and sustainable 
management of forest biodiversity, such as clear land tenure, full and effective participation of local 
and indigenous communities, effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and so forth. This 
shows a trend towards a convergence of approaches, at least analytically, between different regimes 
and strengthens the arguments that will be put forward in the second part of this thesis. 
25
 UNCBD COP Decision X/33 Biodiversity and climate change (2010) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/33, paragraph 9(h). 
26
 UNFCCC (n 2) paragraph 71(c). 
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structures. As seen in chapter 2, transparency and effectiveness are particularly 
important missing elements in the forest governance mix of developing countries: 
given the sensitivity of such issue, the inclusion of such principles in the text is 
significant even though the SURYLVLRQ¶V legal force is watered down by the need to 
WDNHLQWRDFFRXQW³QDWLRQDOOHJLVODWLRQDQGVRYHUHLJQW\´ 
Finally, safeguards 2(f) and 2(g) deal with the problems of leakage and permanence 
discussed earlier.27 
4.1.3. Conditions to access results-based payments  
Paragraph 71 of the Cancun Decision establishes that in order to receive results-
based payments developing countries must develop the following elements: (a) a 
national strategy or action plan; (b) a national forest reference level or forest 
reference emission level;28  (c) a national forest monitoring system; and (d) a system 
for providing information on how the safeguards are being addressed. The reference 
level and monitoring system have already been discussed in chapter 3. Both present 
considerable technical challenges29 but neither has a major impact on public 
governance. By contrast, the other two requirements have important implications. 
The national strategy or action plan is a mandatory document setting out the 
modalities in which developing countries reduce forest emissions while achieving 
other environmental and development objectives. It stems from the realisation that 
many such countries are not ready to do so and need technical and capacity-building 
support before they can access results-based payments. In order to build 
preparedness, the document must consider the governance and policy framework 
surrounding REDD-plus implementationDVGHPRQVWUDWHGE\PHQWLRQRI³LQWHUDOLD
land tenure issues, forest governance issues, gender considerations and the 
VDIHJXDUGV´30  
                                                 
27
 Chapter 3 section 2.1. 
28
 Sub-national reference levels may be accepted as an interim solution: UNFCCC (n 2), paragraph 
71(b). 
29
 See, inter alia: UNFCCC COP Decision 13/CP.19 (2013) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1; 
UNFCCC COP Decision 11/CP.19 (2013) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1. 
30
 UNFCCC (n 2) paragraph 72. 
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The rationale of the safeguard information system is to demonstrate the achievement 
of social and non-carbon environmental objectives. What differentiates the 
safeguards from the provisions of appendix I paragraph 1 is that, despite their vague 
language,31 the Warsaw COP has made FOHDUWKDWVDIHJXDUGVPXVWEH³DGGUHVVHGDQG
respected before [developing countries] can receive results-EDVHG SD\PHQWV´32 
Information on safeguards is provided by developing countries as part of their 
biennial update reports. It should be transparent, comprehensive, accessible by all 
stakeholders and allow for improvement,33 but it is not subjected to independent 
verification or any other form of international scrutiny. This creates a double 
standard between carbon (subjected to MRV) and non-carbon objectives (subjected 
to unilateral reporting), but it does at least establish an international interest in 
ensuring the promotion of non-carbon benefits. It is reasonable to think that, given 
the active involvement of civil society and local and indigenous communities in 
international negotiations, national reports on safeguards will be carefully scrutinised 
and challenged on occasion. 
4.1.4. Drivers  
By providing incentives to developing countries, REDD-plus tries to influence the 
supply of forest products. This is consistent with paragraph 72 of the Cancun 
Decision which established that measures to address the drivers should be included 
in national strategies,34 and it differentiates the programme from other market-based 
international initiatives that address the demand-side of forest loss (box 4.1).  
The Bali Decision on REDD-plus incites parties to identify options and undertake 
efforts to address the drivers.35 The CancXQ'HFLVLRQ³Hncourages all Parties to find 
effective ways to reduce the human pressure on forests that results in greenhouse gas 
                                                 
31
 See in particular the hortatory language used in Appendix I paragraph 2 ± that VDIHJXDUGV³VKRXOG
EH SURPRWHG DQG VXSSRUWHG´ - and provisions that qualify safeguard application in the context of 
³QDWLRQDOOHJLVODWLRQDQGVRYHUHLJQW\´or ³QDWLRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVDQGODZV´ 
32
 UNFCCC COP Decision 9/CP.19 (2013) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1, paragraph 4. 
33
 UNFCCC COP Decision 12/CP.17 (2011) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.2, paragraph 2. 
34
 UNFCCC (n 2) paragraph 72. 
35
 UNFCCC COP Decision 2/CP.13 (2007) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, paragraph 3. 
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HPLVVLRQVLQFOXGLQJDFWLRQVWRDGGUHVVGULYHUVRIGHIRUHVWDWLRQ´.36 5HIHUHQFHWRµDOO
3DUWLHV¶ VXJJHVWV WKDW GHYHORSHG FRXQWULes whose foreign direct investments and 
market demand are causing forest emissions should also align their trade policies to 
the climate mitigation objective of REDD-plus. However, a few paragraphs later, the 
VDPH GHFLVLRQ ³UHTXHVWV GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWU\ 3DUWLHV >«@ WR DGGUHVV LQWHU DOLD WKH
GULYHUV RI GHIRUHVWDWLRQ´37 So while all Parties are encouraged to take actions to 
address deforestation drivers, only developing countries are requested to address 
them. This reveals the different emphasis placed on curbing demand vis-á-vis 
reforming the supply chain. 
Although drivers are to be addressed by the Parties, the COP showed a desire to 
legislate directly on this matter and at Warsaw it issued the first decision on 
³$GGUHVVLQJ WKH GULYHUV RI GHIRUHVWDWLRQ DQG IRUHVW GHJUDGDWLRQ´.38 However, this 
decision neither provides guidance nor establishes a process for the future 
development of international legislation on this issue. Instead, it only encourages 
UHOHYDQW DFWRUV WR ³FRQWLQXH WKHLU ZRUN WR DGGUHVV WKH GULYHUV´ DQG WR ³VKDUH WKH
UHVXOWV RI WKHLU ZRUN RQ WKLV PDWWHU´39 The postponement of international legal 
guidance on the drivers LVSDUWO\GXHWRWKH³FRPSOH[LW\RIWKHSUREOHP´DQGSDUWO\WR
concerns about national sovereignty, and implications for developed countries (i.e. 
the effects of measures on demand and supply of international commodities). The 
:DUVDZ'HFLVLRQQRWHVWKDW³DGGUHVVLQJWKHGULYHUVPD\KDYHDQHFRQRPLFFRVWDQG
LPSOLFDWLRQVIRUGRPHVWLFUHVRXUFHV´DVZHOODVIRUOLYHOihoods, and further states that 
actions ³DUH XQLTXH WR FRXQWULHV¶ QDWLRQDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV FDSDFLWLHV DQG
FDSDELOLWLHV´40  
4.1.5. The significance of the COP Decisions 
2YHUDOO WKH&23¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ WRGRPHVWLFSROLF\GHYHORSPHQW LV KDUGO\ JURXQG-
breaking but it is nonetheless significant considering the voluntary and incentive-
                                                 
36
 UNFCCC (n 2) paragraph 68. 
37
 Ibid paragraph 72. 
38
 UNFCCC COP Decision 15/CP.19 (2013) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1. 
39
 Ibid paragraph 4. 
40
 Ibid paragraph 2. 
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based nature of the programme. The general guidance in Appendix I of the Cancun 
Decision merely contains a wish-list of objectives that are, for the large part, either 
intrinsic to government action or already stated elsewhere in the Convention. 
Safeguards use vaguer language than other international guidelines41 and fail to 
establish an enforceable minimum standard of practice.42 They establish a set of 
principles for the country-led implementation of REDD-SOXVDFWLYLWLHVZKLFK³JXLGH
H[SHFWDWLRQVVXUURXQGLQJVRFLDODQGHQYLURQPHQWDORXWFRPHV´43 Their effectiveness 
will thus depend on whether consistent standards of practice will solidify over time, 
reducing country discretion. 
The COP also gives some indications as to how domestic REDD-plus policy should 
be developed. The fulcrum is the national strategy or action plan, which addresses 
issues like tenure, governance and safeguards. The safeguards set out certain guiding 
principles for national implementation. Among them, ideas of transparency and 
stakeholder participation are arguably both means to reduce forest emissions (i.e. 
criteria for developing effective policy approaches)44 and objectives in themselves 
(i.e. good governance principles).  
The focus on national planning is consistent with the approach taken by other MEAs 
and facilitates synergies in the domestic implementation of multiple international 
instruments. These synergies are explicitly sought in the text either by mandating 
consistency with relevant international obligations and agreements or by singling out 
specific objectives (such as biodiversity protection and respect for indigenous and 
local rights). Moreover, the text repeatedly states that REDD-plus must be consistent 
with national development needs, goals, and priorities, as well as with national 
circumstances and capabilities; this implies that domestic policy development should 
                                                 
41
 See, e.g., the international guidance provided to national forest governance, FAO, Understanding 
national forest programmes, Guidance for practitioners (FAO 2006). 
42
 Daviet, Larsen, Safeguarding Forests and People: A Framework for Designing a Nationa l System 
to Implement REDD+ Safeguards (WRI 2012) 28. 
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 -DJJHU /DZORU %URDNKDXV *HEDUD 6RQZD 5HVRVXGDUPR µ5(''-plus safeguards in national 
SROLF\GLVFRXUVH DQGSLORW SURMHFWV¶ LQ$QJHOVHQ HW DO Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices 
(CIFOR 2012) 303-4. 
44
 7KH µSROLF\ DSSURDFKHV¶ UHIHUUHG WR LQ WKH 5(''-plus text are clearly the prerogative of 
governments, i.e. WKH\UHIHUWRµSXEOLFSROLF\¶ 
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be informed by the integration principle, a pillar of the sustainable development 
concept.  
Box 4.1: Addressing the demand-side of deforestation 
REDD-plus tries to increase the efficiency of the production of timber and agricultural 
products that drive deforestation. Other initiatives aim to address the demand-side of forest 
loss. Recent trade measures to limit or ban the import of illegally logged timber, such as the 
EU Timber Regulation and FLEGT initiative and the 2008 amendments to the US Lacey 
Act, are an important precedent for expanding regulatory action in this sense.45 Another 
solution is using information-based instruments to create a market in sustainably sourced 
products by steering consumer choices through labelling standards. Examples include timber 
certification initiatives,46 sustainably labelled soy and beef products,47 or the more recent 
Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil.48 In practice, however, these schemes have had a 
limited impact so far.  
New and promising initiatives are being developed to restructure demand. The Banking 
Environment Initiative (BEI) brings together 10 global banks to find ways to support 
businesses worldwide achieve certain sustainability goals;49 in collaboration with the 
Consumer Goods Forum (GCF), it seeks to transform the value chain for deforestation 
commodities (palm oil, soy, beef and paper)50 by establishing credible, multi-stakeholder 
stewardship standards that can be used to guide responsible procurement practices.51 The 
participation of leading banks and global commodity producers can have a noticeable impact 
on global demand for such commodities.52 A connected initiative is the Tropical Forest 
Alliance 2020, a public-private partnership that aims to halt net deforestation by 2020 by 
supporting priority actions to reduce tropical deforestation and facilitates the exchange of 
information among partners. 
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 Council Regulation (EC) 995/2010 of 20 October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators 
who place timber and timber products on the market [2010] OJ L295/23; US Congress, Food, 
Conservation, and Energy Act (Farm Bill) of 2008 amending the Lacey Act of 1990, Section 8204, 
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 See chapter 3 section 1. 
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 RSPO, Transforming the market to make sustainable palm oil the norm (RSPO 2012) < 
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 µBanking Environment Initiative¶ (University of Cambridge 2014) <www.cpsl.cam.ac.uk/bei> 
Accessed 10 February 2014. 
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(University of Cambridge) <www.cpsl.cam.ac.uk/Business-Platforms/Banking-Environment-
Initiative.aspx?#fragment> Accessed 10 February 2014. 
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 The 400 partners of the GCF, for instance, have combined sales of over ¼ WULOOLRQ ZKLOH WKH
JOREDO SDUWQHUV RI %(, LQFOXGH VRPH RI WKH ZRUOG¶V OHDGLQJ ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV µ7URSLFDO )RUHVW
$OOLDQFH¶0HULGLDQ,QVWLWXWHZZZWIDFRPLQGH[SKSDERXW-tfa2020> Accessed 14 
February 2014. 
83 
 
The reaffirmation of objectives and legal principles that are already codified in other 
international instruments53 provides a basis for the elaboration of guidelines, best 
practices and codes of conduct in the readiness process. The contribution of the COP 
can therefore be fully understood only by looking at readiness. 
4.2. Influencing national policy through operational guidance: 
REDD-plus readiness  
The development and implementation of a national strategy that balances 
environmental, economic and social objectives places great pressure on developing 
countries. Aware of the complexity of this task, the Cancun Decision affirmed that 
REDD-plus implementation should proceed in phases. The first two phases, called 
µUHDGLQHVV¶ FKDQQHO QRQ-results-based support for preparatory activities including 
WKHGHYHORSPHQWDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI³QDWLRQDOVWUDWHJLHVRUDFWLRQSODQVSROLFLHV
and measures, and capacity-EXLOGLQJ´54 while the third phase deploys results-based 
payments for emission reductions at scale. This approach ensures that all countries 
can participate in REDD-plus and that they receive adequate support according to 
their relative capacity.55 
It is WKURXJK µreadiness¶ that developing countries are expected to build a strong 
system of governance. The term is commonly used to indicate three distinct though 
overlapping concepts: (i) a preparatory process consisting of investments in technical 
assistance and capacity building (readiness process), (ii) a temporal phase in the 
implementation of REDD-plus that precedes results-based incentives (readiness 
phase), and (iii) a status or condition to be acquired by participant countries before 
they enjoy full participation in the programme (readiness status).  
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 See, inter alia: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (adopted 14 June 1992) 31 ILM 
874, principles 4, 7, 10,  11, 16 and 22. 
54
 UNFCCC (n 2) paragraph 73. 
55
 Angelsen et al, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD): An 
Options Assessment Report (Meridian Institute 2009); Wertz-.DQRXQQLNRII $QJHOVHQ µ*OREDO DQG
national REDD-SOXVDUFKLWHFWXUH¶LQ$QJHOVHQRealising REDD-plus: National strategies and policy 
options (CIFOR 2009) 15. 
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Readiness has two connected functions: to create the conditions for the effective use 
of REDD-plus incentives, and to collect information and test different approaches to 
inform the negotiations and improve policy development. The work of actors 
involved in the readiness process has unearthed and explored problems of 
governance, illegality and lack of capacity later recognised in the REDD-plus 
safeguards. It would have been politically difficult to correctly assess the impact of 
these problems without the diagnosis carried out in the readiness process.  
There is no space here to provide an exhaustive summary of the many multilateral, 
bilateral and subnational initiatives that fall under the umbrella of readiness.56 Wertz-
Kanounnikoff and Konghpan-Apirak classify activities that fall in the area of 
readiness as: (a) demonstration activities or pilot projects testing specific small-scale 
arrangements and techniques at local scale; (b) national readiness activities including 
the measures and mechanisms that establish the implementation framework for 
REDD-plus; and (c) project activities without explicit carbon goals, such as 
payments for ecosystem services schemes or integrated conservation and 
development projects.57 Although only the first two types of activities can be 
considered strictly speaking part of readiness, all can provide information that feeds 
back into the negotiation process and inform the design of the programme. This 
section focuses on national-level reforms.  
4.2.1. The multilateral readiness process 
Two organisations have dominated the first phase of readiness: the UN-REDD 
ProJUDPPHDQGWKH:RUOG%DQN¶V)RUHVW&DUERQ3DUWQHUVKLS)DFLOLW\)&3)%RWK
in operation since 2008, the two organisations help developing countries prepare 
national REDD-plus strategies, build capacity and spread knowledge about the 
programme, and provide opportunities for dialogue between governments, civil 
society organizations and technical experts. Their action has focused on outlining the 
steps to be taken by governments to prepare for the receipt of large-scale payments 
                                                 
56
 For a good summary see: Johns, Johnson, Greeenglass (eds.), An Overview of Readiness for REDD: 
A compilation of readiness activities prepared on behalf of the Forum on Readiness for REDD, 
Version 2 (WHRC 2009); Westholm, Getting ready for REDD-plus (Focali 2010). 
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 Wertz-Kanounnikoff, Kongphan-apirak, Emerging REDD+: A preliminary survey of demonstration 
and readiness activities (CIFOR 2009) 2. 
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for emission reductions. After a period of uncoordinated work, UN-REDD and FCPF 
have increased collaboration and now work jointly on the basis of a common 
document template called Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP). The R-PP 
template documents are periodically updated by the technical bodies of the two 
organisations with the input of civil society groups,58 reflecting an idea of learning-
by-doing that has allowed the progressive inclusion of multilateral requirements on 
governance and participation.59 
The R-PP spells out best practices in the preparation for readiness activities, 
providing ³a framework for taking stock of the national situation with respect to 
deforestation, forest degradation, and the other REDD-plus activities, and also for 
DGGUHVVLQJ WKLV VLWXDWLRQ´60 It has four components: conclusion of the national 
REDD-plus strategy, analysis of the implementation framework, setting of the 
Reference Level, and preparation of the monitoring systems for carbon and 
safeguards.61 Applicant countries are awarded up to US$3.6 million to prepare the 
document, including such activities as technical advice and consultations.62 The 
submitted R-PPs are considered for approval by a political body (the FCPF 
Participants Committee or the UN-REDD Policy Board), which makes a decision on 
grant allocation in accordance with agreed criteria and procedures. Virtually all 
documents have gone through various rejections and re-submissions. 
7KHRXWFRPHRIWKHUHDGLQHVVSUHSDUDWLRQSURFHVVLVWKHµ5HDGLQHVV3DFNDJH¶RU5-
Package), a collection of documents that provide information on the components 
listed in the R-PP. The R-Package must also be approved by the political body 
before countries are allowed to apply for funding for emissions reductions 
                                                 
58
 The same process also applied to the document template, of which exist six versions. The last 
version was published in 2011; ibid. 
59
 The technical bodies are the Facility Management Team for the FCPF and the Secretariat of UN-
REDD. 
60
 FCPF/UN-REDD, Readiness Preparation Proposal, Template Version 6, for Country Use and 
Public Comment (World Bank 2011). 
61
 FCPF, Resolution PC/12/2012/1 (2012). 
62
 FCPF, Resolution PC/10/2011/1 (2011).  
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activities.63 At the moment of writing, 54 countries have submitted an R-PP, and 
many of them are in the final stage of phase one.64 
As countries move towards the implementation of their national REDD-plus 
strategies (phase 2), readiness is managed by other organisations. The Forest 
Investment Program (FIP) is a targeted programme of the Strategic Climate Fund 
administered by the World Bank,65 which so far operates in eight pilot countries.66 It 
VKRXOG³FRPSOHPHQWEHFRRUGLQDWHGZLWKDQGFRRSHUDWHFORVHO\ZLWKRWKHU5(''
demonstration and implementation initiatives and ongoing REDD efforts, such as 
FCPF and the UN-5(''3URJUDPPH´DQGEXLOGRQWKHLU³UHDGLQHVVZRUN´67 Yet it 
acts independently from the UN-REDD and FCPF: using its own assessment 
procedure, it selects countries with a sufficient level of readiness to prepare a 
national Investment Plan under its guidance.68  
The Programme was established in 2009 but it has only stepped up its operation 
from the second half of 2012, when the first phase of readiness was at a more 
                                                 
63
 Charter Establishing The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (World Bank 2010) sec. 6.3-6.4; UN-
REDD, UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure and Operational Guidance (UN-REDD 2009) 7-
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advanced stage.69 Albeit endowed with a capital of US$639 million, it has so far 
approved funding for less than US$70 million and disbursed a little over US$2 
million. Contributions are disbursed by intermediary multilateral banks in two forms: 
(a) as grants to support the preparation of national Investment Plans;70 and (b) as 
concessional loans for large-scale projects.71 
The FIP aims to promote transformational change in developing countries forest 
management and address the underlying causes of deforestation72 by supporting and 
promoting: institutional capacity (including for forest monitoring systems, forest law 
enforcement, cadastral mapping and land tenure reform, and landscape based 
planning), investments in forest mitigation (particularly through payments for 
ecosystem services) and investments outside the forest sector that reduce the 
pressure of drivers (such as poverty alleviation opportunities, alternative energy 
programmes, agricultural investments and intensification in the context of 
rationalised land-use planning).73 It is governed by a Sub-Committee comprising 
representatives of donor and recipient countries in equal number, which is 
responsible for overseeing and deciding on operations and activities, and particularly 
for approving financing terms and modalities.74  
Other efforts have had a siJQLILFDQW LQIOXHQFH RQ UHDGLQHVV SDUWLFXODUO\ 1RUZD\¶V
International Climate and Forest Initiative.75 The Scandinavian country has 
concluded bilateral agreements with Brazil, Guyana, Indonesia, Tanzania, Vietnam 
and the Congo Basin Forest Fund, on top of providing support to UN-REDD, FCPF 
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and the FIP.76 The remarkable level of financial support provided by Norway has 
accelerated the readiness process in these countries: for instance, the pledged 
contribution of US$1 billion has been instrumental in establishLQJ%UD]LO¶V$PD]RQ
Fund, which is discussed in chapter 7.77 The Memorandum of Understanding 
concluded with Indonesia in 2010,78 which is also backed by US$1 billion, also set 
in motion institutional and legal reforms.79 While remarkable from an international 
UHODWLRQV¶ SHUVSHFWLYH WKH VLJQLILFDQFH RI 1RUZD\¶V ELODWHUDO DJUHHPHQWV LV PRVWO\
political, i.e. related to the advancement of international cooperation on REDD-plus. 
From an analytical standpoint, these agreements follow the guidance provided by the 
readiness work of multilateral agencies and hence their contribution to the 
formulation of a comprehensive readiness policy seems secondary to the work of 
multilateral organisations. The next section will consider the analytical work of the 
multilateral readiness initiatives. 
4.2.2. Key documents in readiness practice  
The readiness process generally follows the guidance of the R-PPs and Investment 
Plans. The qualitative elements and best practices outlined in the R-PP are based on 
the guidance of the COP, i.e. as provided in the Cancun Decision at paragraph 71 
and the safeguards.80 In particular, two components of the R-PP are central to this 
discussion: (i) the development of a national REDD-plus strategy, which sets out 
measures to address the drivers based on a comprehensive analysis of land use, land 
use change, forest law, policy and governance;81 (ii) the implementation framework, 
ZKLFK GHVFULEHV ³FUHGLEOH DQG WUDQVSDUHQW LQVWLWXWLRQDO HFRQRPLF OHJDO DQG
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governance arrangements that may be necessary to enable the country to implement 
its [national REDD-SOXV VWUDWHJ\@´82 The document stresses that countries have 
flexibility in setting up their implementation framework and provides limited 
recommendations about the reforms that could be undertaken.83 This is not 
necessarily a bad thing as long as the implementation framework developed by 
national governments is subjected to international scrutiny based on clear criteria and 
standards.  
Such criteria and standards are not made explicit in readiness documents but some 
JXLGDQFH FDQ EH LQIHUUHG IURP WKH GRFXPHQW VXSSRUW IRU µPXOWLSOHV¶ RI JRRG
governance.84 Multi-sector integration is explicitly sought in the set-up of national 
readiness management arrangements in order to align REDD-plus with development 
priorities and to address the drivers.85 To this end, a country may use an existing 
coordinating body or create new ad hoc ones with representatives from different 
government sectors.86 The participation of stakeholders builds on information 
sharing and the promotion of early dialogue on the readiness process.87 In 
application of the safeguards, participant countries must carry out extensive 
consultation (particularly on issues concerning tenure)88 while the higher standard of 
FPIC is required for the participation of indigenous and traditional forest 
communities in UN-REDD countries.89 Multi-stakeholder involvement is also sought 
in the context of the Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment and the 
                                                 
82
 Ibid component 2c. 
83
 Ibid 41. 
84
 Chapter 2 (n 99). 
85
 FCPF/UN-REDD (n 62) component 1a. 
86
 A typical example of such institutional arrangement is the REDD-plus Task Force established in 
Indonesia which has evolved into a National REDD-plus Agency for phases 2 and 3. Indonesian 
REDD+ Task Force, REDD+ National Strategy (2012) <www.satgasreddplus.org> Accessed 10 
February 2014. 
87
 FCPF/UN-REDD (n 62) component 1b. 
88
 Ibid component 1c. 
89
 FPIC also applies to FCPF countries that have endorsed UNDRIP. FCPF/UN-REDD (n 50) 27; also 
see UN-REDD, Programme Guidelines on FPIC (New York, 2009) <www.un-
redd.org/Launch_of_FPIC_Guidlines/tabid/105976/Default.aspx> Accessed 10 February 2014; 
Colchester, Farhan, Making FPIC ± Free, Prior and Informed Consent ± Work: Challenges and 
Prospects for Indigenous Peoples (FPP 2009); UNGA (n 9) articles 10, 11, 19, 28, 29 and 32.  
90 
 
preparation of the Environmental and Social Management Framework,90 and the 
document also demands the establishment of accessible feedback and grievance 
redress mechanisms. 91 Finally, multi-level coordination is implicit in the treatment 
of REDD-plus institutional arrangements in the document. The national readiness 
management arrangements must describe the relative hierarchy between institutions, 
and their relations with the coordinating institution.92 Existing institutional 
arrangements should be assessed and improved as necessary so as to ensure 
increased effectiveness, transparency and equity. However, apart from 
recommending the use of a national registry of REDD-plus activities,93 the document 
leaves the issue of multi-level legal and institutional coordination to the discretion of 
the recipient government, a solution that is made necessary given the persisting 
uncertainties over the final shape of the programme.94 
The Investment Plan endorses the implementation of the safeguards;95 it reiterates 
concepts of transparency, participation and access to information;96 sets a multi-
sectoral approach by aiming to reduce pressures on forests from other land use 
sectors; emphasises the need to ensure the consistency of regulations so as to avoid 
providing perverse incentives and urges coordination among delivery partners;97 and 
underlines the need to build institutional capacity, a fiscal and regulatory framework, 
land use policies, market infrastructures and expenditure frameworks to leverage 
private finance.98 Finally, the FIP design document recommends taking into account 
³H[LVWLQJ sustainable development plans, national climate change efforts, forest-
related programs, and ongoing and planned [Multilateral Development Bank] 
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RSHUDWLRQV LQ WKH FRXQWU\¶V IRUHVW VHFWRU´99 The FIP guidance is less detailed than 
that provided by the R-PP: this is partly to avoid overlaps and partly because the 
Investment Plan is prepared through country-led joint missions whose objective is to 
ensure that the consolidated investment criteria of the Fund are met.100 The 
involvement of independent international experts emphasises collaboration over 
supervision, thus further promoting flexibility.  
4.2.3. The contribution of the readiness process 
In order to assess readiness, one must look at the three main documents used in the 
process: the R-PP, the Investment Plan and the national REDD-plus strategy. Annex 
A shows the availability of such documents in the 35 countries with highest net 
deforestation considered in this thesis:101 as of December 2013, 19 R-PPs have been 
submitted among the sampled countries, but just five Investment Plans and three 
national REDD-plus strategies.102 Such difference is only partly surprising: as seen 
above, developing countries have been working on the R-PPs since 2008 while work 
on the Investment Plans is more recent; moreover, the FIP only operates in eight 
pilot countries. As for the national REDD-plus strategies, these should be one of the 
main outputs of the readiness process laid out in the R-PP and it is understandable 
that few countries have finalised such an important document. Nevertheless, given 
the low number of FIP Investment Plans and national REDD-plus strategies, 
documents submitted by countries that are not among the sampled countries will also 
be included in the assessment.  
Annex C sums up the assessment of these three documents. All texts have been 
analysed using the same methodological approach.103 However, the analysis of the 
                                                 
99
 CIF (n 74) paragraph 33. 
100
 FIP-supported actions must contribute to climate change mitigation, have demonstration potential 
at scale, are cost-effective, feasible, and integrated within a sustainable development strategy, and 
meet the REDD-plus safeguards. CIF, Forest Investment Programme: Investment Criteria and 
Financing Modalities (2010) FIP/SC.3/4 . 
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 See chapter 2 section 2.2. 
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 Out of a total of 5 national REDD-plus strategies completed. Infra, Annex A. 
103
 The methodology for this part of the research is based on a textual analysis, on the qualitative and 
comparative assessment of the information and on the statistical occurrence of key terms that indicate 
whether or not sufficient consideration was given to the issues listed in Annex C. No attention was 
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R-PPs uses a scoring system104 to assess the statistical occurrence and quality of 
treatment of selected issues.105 This is possible due to the healthy number of 
documents considered as well as their relative uniformity. By contrast, FIP 
Investment Plans and national REDD-plus strategies are too few (and often in draft 
form) to draw credible conclusions on their adequacy; moreover, their content is less 
uniform and therefore it does not allow a systematic comparison. Instead, the 
strengths and weaknesses of each document are analysed in a discursive fashion.106 
It is important to bear in mind the different goals and functions of each type of 
document. The R-PP helps identify institutional arrangements and procedures to 
implement REDD-plus policies and distribute positive incentives, as well as the key 
obstacles to their success; the national REDD-plus strategy addresses the political 
aspects of the programme, looking in particular to set up a legal, institutional and 
policy framework that promotes its integration with development policy; the 
Investment Plan aims to promote transformational change by funding innovative 
demonstration activities at project or jurisdictional level (supported by the private 
sector) as well as strategic interventions at the policy level.  
Even taking into consideration such differences, the contrast between documents is 
remarkable. The R-PPs concluded more recently (particularly since the introduction 
                                                                                                                                          
paid to the practical viability of the proposed solutions, for obvious reasons. The list of key words is 
too long to be included in the research; as a means of example, some of the terms researched are: 
stakeholder map, dispute resolution, law enforcement, corruption, proximate/indirect drivers/causes, 
customary/informal tenure, accountability, access to information, roadmap and so forth. 
104
 Each R-PP is given a score of zero if it does not address an issue, one if it addresses it 
incompletely, and three if it addresses adequately. The assessment is issue-based using the sum of the 
country scores on each of the twenty-seven issues considered. This value can range from 0 (no 
document addresses the issue) to 57 (all documents adequately address the issue). The scoring system 
is organised as follows: total score equal to or higher than 45 = the issue is adequately addressed in 
the large majority of documents; score equal to or higher than 35 = the issue is adequately addressed 
in some countries but not in others; score equal to or higher than 20 = the issue has received 
consideration but most documents do not adequately address it; score lower than 20 = the issue is 
inadequately considered or ignored in most countries. See Annex C for more details. 
105
 These are: stakeholder participation; government coordination; transparency and accountability in 
financial matters; monitoring of readiness activities; land and forest tenure; forest management 
FDSDFLW\ DQG DUUDQJHPHQWV ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW FDSDFLW\ GULYHUV¶ DQDO\VLV LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ FRVWV DQG
times; political strategy. Twenty-seven guiding questions covering the above issues are listed in 
Annex C. Some of such questions are adapted from an assessment carried out by the NGO World 
Resource Institute: Goers-:LOOLDPVHWDOµ*HWWLQJ5HDG\A Review of the World Bank Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility Readiness Preparation Proposals¶:5,www.wri.org/publication/getting-
ready> Accessed 10 February 2014. 
106
 See Annex C, tables 14 and 15. 
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of the last template)107 are of a much higher standard than those concluded 
previously. The majority of R-PPs contain an adequate analysis of the drivers of 
deforestation (score 37 out of 57) and forest degradation (score 40), although in 
some cases the analysis is superficial; less often are the proposed REDD-plus 
policies and measures linked to the drivers¶ analysis (30). The establishment of a 
forest management system is considered thoroughly in some documents and much 
less so in others (36); there is, however, a general recognition that effective forest 
management must involve other stakeholders (39). A stakeholder analysis is 
ubiquitous (45) and mechanisms for stakeholder engagement are usually proposed, 
with various degrees of detail (42). Participation is mostly based on consultation and 
the process is often carried out at various government levels (40). On a less positive 
note, the documents most commonly fail to establish systems to promote 
government accountability vis-a-vis the stakeholders (20) and/or grievance 
mechanisms (23). Moreover, they generally lack a clear political strategy (23), 
although stakeholder mapping contributes should contributes to its subsequent 
elaboration. 
Virtually all analysed R-PPs consider REDD-plus in the context of other sectoral 
activities, particularly agriculture and timber production, and in the broader context 
of national development strategies (49). However, multi-sector coordination is 
promoted through the establishment of ad hoc institutions at ministerial level or 
directly under the control of the cabinet (e.g. a REDD-plus steering committee, a 
REDD-plus strategy and so forth) whose coordinating powers are sometimes 
unclear/unspecified (37). Similarly, the need to coordinate action across levels - 
while implicitly recognised in all documents - does not always result in explicit 
multi-level coordination mechanisms (35). Tenure is discussed in virtually all 
documents but in many cases only superficially, with no dedicated strategies 
proposed to address outstanding problems (36). No consideration is given to the 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VFDSDFLW\WRVROYHWHQXUHFRQIOLFWV:LWKUHJDUGVWRIRUHVWODZWKH
R-PPs generally seek to frame regulatory activity on REDD-plus within the existing 
legal and policy framework and in some cases suggest the enactment of specific laws 
as well as the revision of old ones (40). Consideration of law enforcement capacity is 
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inconsistent (32), while mention of corruption problems is either absent or 
inadequate in all documents (8). 
The management of REDD-plus finance is underdeveloped. In particular, very little 
consideration is given to embedding transparency and accountability in the revenue 
management system (24) and virtually no measures are proposed to increase 
transparency (15), except the general provisions on access to information discussed 
below. Participation in readiness preparation extends in some cases to discussion on 
benefit-sharing mechanisms (25), but little consideration is given to reviewing 
lessons from previous programmes (22). Monitoring and evaluation of readiness 
activities is generally insufficient. A healthy number or documents support efforts to 
spread information and awareness raising but no specific mechanisms are usually 
established (32); moreover, the proactive dissemination of information, while good, 
may be manipulated by the government if independent access to information is not 
ensured and mechanisms for independent oversight are not established (11). The 
documents give scant recognition to monitoring governance and the safeguards (21). 
On a more positive note, the R-PPs contain a generally exhaustive and detailed 
summary of costs for each component (50). By contrast, the times of implementation 
are often vague, limited to the short term and used as supporting information for 
receipt of funding (25); there is little or no discussion of the actual time needed to 
implement the proposed activities and timeframes are often unrealistically short 
(possibly, because the document itself requires the achievement of certain objectives 
in the interim period until 2012 for old documents or until 2015 for new ones). 
With regards to the FIP Investment Plans, it is possible to make some preliminary 
comments on their strengths and weaknesses, bearing in mind the caveat that not 
enough documents have been published to provide a conclusive assessment at this 
stage. The assessment is overall positive, the documents being fairly comprehensive 
and detailed. Most plans contain a good analysis of drivers and support activities that 
can be scaled-up. In the attempt to address the drivers, cross-sectoral integration and 
the harmonisation of the legal and policy frameworks are generally considered in 
some detail. The focus on addressing forest loss across the various sectors of the 
economy is remarkable, as it is the attempt to integrate programme activities within 
national policy. Institutional aspects and capacity-building needs are also given good 
consideration and so are the non-carbon benefits of the proposed action. Costs and 
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timetables are always included, although in a few cases they are rather vague 
(perhaps to ensure flexibility). On a less positive note, monitoring and evaluation of 
progress is more often than not poorly addressed in the document; there is also a 
weak analysis of institutional risks and crime, and inadequate provisions on revenue 
transparency. There also seems to be a bias towards projects that support 
community-level action despite recognition that the drivers are very often of an 
industrial nature.  
Finally, national REDD-plus strategies are the least detailed documents in terms of 
goals, language and concrete proposals. They have some recurrent strengths, 
including the emphasis on coordination across sectors and levels of government, 
stakeholder participation, integrated management of multiple funding sources, focus 
on institutions and attempts to reconcile REDD-plus activities with a broader vision 
of development. However, the documents are less impressive than those concluded 
with the support of multilateral institutions. Common flaws include the lack of a 
political strategy, the vagueness of the proposed vision, the absence of timetables, 
inadequate consideration of governance and institutional capacity gaps, weak or non-
existent monitoring and evaluation processes, scarce attention to transparency and a 
general lack of details on the proposed measures. The lower level of detail of the 
national REDD-plus strategies can be caused by many factors, including the nature 
of the document, the absence of international support and oversight, a choice not to 
repeat information contained in R-PPs and FIP Investment Plans, as well as a lack of 
interest by developing countries. However, the issue is worrying: first, because  the 
national REDD-plus strategy is the only mandatory document to access results-based 
payments, pursuing to paragraph 71 of the Cancun Decision;108 second, because the 
national REDD-plus strategy is one of the main results of the readiness preparation 
process, hence countries should be in a position to produce good quality documents; 
ILQDOO\ WKLV PD\ FRQILUP 6KDUPD¶V VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV KDYH
approached plan-making as a tick-boxing exercise to receive international funds.109 
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 UNFCCC (n 2). 
109
 Sharma, Planning to deliver: Making the Rio Conventions more Effective on the Ground: Climate 
Change, Biodiversity, Desertification (GTZ 2009) 7. 
96 
 
The international readiness process has many positives and, on the whole, provides a 
solid basis to identify and address the regulatory, institutional and capacity gaps 
affecting the effectiveness of national REDD-plus actions. Its major strength has 
been the ability to advance understanding and action in areas of policy that are 
normally precluded to the international legislator or discussed in vague terms of 
aspirational goals. The extent of participation in readiness activities and the great 
financial, analytic and political effort spent in their management are what 
differentiate REDD-plus from other legal regimes that use planning tools to foster 
implementation. The fact that these activities have taken place prior to the 
conclusion of such regime is a testament to the impact that REDD-plus has already 
had on forest governance across the tropics, at least at the level of discourse. 
Part of the reason for this success is that the international organisations managing the 
readiness process have managed to strike a balance between harmonising 
international practice and giving developing countries flexibility in policy design 
without superimposing blueprint solutions.  This approach has made it politically 
more palatable to discuss such matters internationally by encouraging national 
ownership of the reforms. It would be incorrect to suggest that international 
UHDGLQHVV GRHV QRW LQIOXHQFH D FRXQWU\¶V DSSURDFK WR IRUHVW DQG ODQG JRYHUQDQFH
reform, but the freedom in drafting their national REDD-plus strategy, setting their 
priorities and building the accompanying institutional architecture enjoyed by 
developing countries is a positive development in international cooperation. The 
equal representation of developing and developed countries in the steering 
committee of multilateral readiness organisations also ensures that donors do not 
dominate the process.110  
The polycentric nature of readiness is advantageous because multilateral 
organisations are free to apply their own internal safeguards, which are stricter and 
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 It can be argued that donor countries influence is more indirect. For instance, the neoliberal bias of 
the World Bank is evident in the emphasis R-PPs templates put on tenure reforms, decentralisation 
and carbon MRV. The FIP investment plans, besides also being biased towards private sector 
cooperation, are assessed by independent reviewers based on internal rules of multilateral 
development banks which are arguably dominated by western concepts and values. 
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more detailed than those agreed in the text.111 At the same time, the process has 
drawn on the considerable expertise of multilateral institutions in the areas of 
governance and natural resource management, which partly compensates for the lack 
of domestic capacity in developing countries. The fluid and open nature of the 
process has also allowed its continued improvement thanks to the input of relevant 
stakeholders and the lessons learned in the field. The latest version of the R-PP 
template document has addressed many of the comments and criticisms that were 
levied against previous versions by civil society organisations and now gives a 
comprehensive account of the elements of governance to be considered by national 
policymakers, substantiating the generic provisions of the safeguards. Investment 
Plans give more succinct guidance to countries but the involvement of multilateral 
experts in a joint drafting process also produces rather comprehensive documents. 
The role of multilateral institutions has also ensured that readiness policies and 
measures are formulated and implemented in a more transparent way than they 
would otherwise be. R-PPs and national REDD-plus strategies are published online, 
and civil society organisations are asked to provide comments on the validity and 
congruency of these documents.112 R-PPs are typically resubmitted a couple of times 
before they are granted approval by the steering committee while Investment Plans 
are subjected to an independent review to ensure they meet the quality assurance 
procedures of the multilateral development banks.113 The difference between R-PPs 
submitted a few years ago and those submitted a few months ago is striking: the new 
ones are more comprehensive, specific, clear and realistic. This proves that an 
iterative process of continued assessment and improvement by other countries and 
with the input of civil society is an effective way of promoting compliance. Access 
to information and participation are important at the domestic as well as the 
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 Plainly, this advantage is contingent to this situation as it depends on the organisational safeguards 
of funding entities. It cannot be concluded, therefore, that a polycentric approach is inherently 
superior to centrally defined policy guidance. 
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 For example, BIC/FPP, Comments on the Revised R-PP Template, SESA and ESMF Guidelines 
(BIC 2010) <www.bicusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/FCPF+UN-
REDD+Stakeholder+Guidelines+Note+Draft+11-17-10+2-1.pdf> Accessed 10 February 2014. 
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 CIF, Procedures for the Preparation of Independent Technical Reviews of investment plans under 
the Forest Investment Program (2011) paragraph 8 
<www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/FINAL_Procedures_for
_the_Preparation_of_Independant_Technical_Reviews_of_FIP_IPs_November2011.pdf> Accessed 
10 February 2014. 
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international level. The Investment Plans are also of a good quality, because they 
benefit from the experience of the R-PP preparation and also from the expertise of 
FIP staff. This is also a good way of assisting countries prepare for national 
implementation, as already experimented in other MEAs.114 
Readiness activities have already generated some positive outcomes. Virtually all 
countries now have a better idea of what sectors, activities and actors are driving 
forest loss, and the normally hidden politico-economic dynamics that cause or 
oppose forest loss are coming to the fore in public debates. Many countries are trying 
to coordinate forest-related activities across government sectors by creating ad hoc 
bodies and task forces. Some countries have undertaken an analysis of their domestic 
legislation and have embarked upon complex reforms to clarify, simplify and 
harmonise the laws and regulations impacting on forests. There is generally good 
consideration of how to integrate emerging REDD-plus policy within existing legal 
and policy frameworks for environmental protection and, more sporadically, also 
those relating to agriculture, timber production and other drivers. 
4.3. Challenges and new approaches in domestic implementation 
4.3.1. Political challenges to governance reform 
The combination of COP guidance with technical and financial support from 
international readiness organisations, with its incentive-based, flexible and iterative 
approach, has encouraged participation and reduced monitoring and enforcement 
requirements, and may counter-intuitively favour compliance. However, it is unclear 
whether this system will achieve the ambitious changes it is advocating. The 
implementation of plans and strategies concluded under other multilateral 
environmental agreements tells a cautionary tale.  
National and subnational planning is a well-established tool in international 
HQYLURQPHQWDO ODZ $JHQGD  VWDWHV WKDW ³QDWLRQDO VWUDWHJLHV SODQV SROLFLHV DQG
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 E.g., note the Ramsar Advisory Missions mechanism: Ramsar Convention COP 4, 
Recommendation 4.7: Mechanisms for improved application of the Ramsar Convention (1990) REC. 
C.4.7 (Rev.). 
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SURFHVVHV DUH FUXFLDO WR >«@ LWV VXFFHVVIXO LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ´115 and the three Rio 
Conventions116 use strategies and action plans to align their implementation with 
national development planning.117 As seen earlier, the UN has pressed forward with 
the idea of national forest programmes as a tool to promote sustainable forest 
management even in the absence of a global convention on forests coming out of the 
Rio Summit. Older treaties have also incorporated national plans of a similar 
character in their practice.118 
Such plans share many characteristics with REDD-plus readiness documents: they 
follow guidelines or principles promulgated by a law-making body (the COP in the 
case of plans concluded under a MEA,119 an international organisation in the case of 
national forest programmes);120 such guidelines and principles are similar to those 
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 Report of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (13 June 1992) UN Doc 
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I-III), preamble 1.3. 
116
 These are the treaties concluded at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro: UNFCCC, CBD and 
UNCCD. UNCCD was not adopted at Rio, but UNCED called on the UN General Assembly to 
establish an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to prepare the Convention. 
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 7KH&RQYHQWLRQRQ%LRORJLFDO'LYHUVLW\UHTXLUHVHDFK3DUW\WR³GHYHORSQDWLRQDOVWUDWHJLHVSODQV
or proJUDPPHVIRUWKHFRQVHUYDWLRQDQGVXVWDLQDEOHXVHRIELRORJLFDOGLYHUVLW\´DQGWR³LQWHJUDWHDV
far as possible and as appropriate, the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity into 
relevant sectoral or cross-sectoral plans, programmes and SROLFLHV´ 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV &RQYHQWLRQ RQ
Biological Diversity, Rio De Janeiro, 5 June 1992 (in force 29 December 1993) 1760 UNTS 79, 
article 6. The UNFCCC calls for the adoption of National Adaptation Programmes of Action to 
identify and communicate priority adaptation activities in least developed countries, UNFCCC COP 
Decision 6/CP.7 (2001) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, paragraph 1(a). The Convention to 
Combat Desertification requires Parties to develop National Action Programmes: United Nations 
Convention to Combat Desertification (adopted on 17 June 1994, entered into force 26 December 
1996) 1954 UNTS 3 (UNCCD), articles 9-10. 
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 For instance, the Ramsar Convention now requires the adoption of National Wetland Policies (also 
called National Wetland Strategies and National Wetland Plans). In 2008 , the COP reiterated the call 
for Parties to "formulate their Wetland CEPA Action Plans (at national, subnational, catchment, or 
local levels) for priority activities that address international, regional, national, and local needs " 
Ramsar COP10, Resolution X.8 (2008), paragraph 13. 
119
 CBD regime: R.T. Hagen, A Guide for Countries preparing National Biodiversity Strategies and 
Action Plans (UNDP 1999); CBD Secretariat, The Biodiversity Planning Process: How to Prepare or 
Update a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plans (NBSAP training modules version 2.1, 
2011) <www.cbd.int/doc/training/nbsap/b2-train-prepare-update-nbsap-revised-en.pdf> Accessed 10 
February 2014. UNCCD criteria have been further elaborated in a number of decisions taken by the 
COP and by the Committee for the Review of the Implementation of the Convention (CRIC). Ramsar 
has perhaps the most extensive set of international guidelines: Ramsar Convention Secretariat, 
Handbooks for the wise use of wetlands (4th ed., Ramsar Secretariat 2010). 
120
 ECOSOC, Report of the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Panel on Forests on its fourth session (1997) 
UN Doc E/CN.17/1997/12. 
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put forward in REDD-plus;121 they increasingly seek collaboration with the private 
sector and the use of ecosystem services in implementation;122 and they are flexible 
instruments to be constantly updated and improved through participatory processes. 
It is therefore possible to learn from these experiences in order to better understand 
readiness. 
The impact of national plans undertaken under the Rio Conventions is decidedly 
underwhelming. 177 Parties to the Biodiversity Convention have submitted national 
biodiversity strategies and action plans pursuant to article 6, receiving financial 
support of over US$3 billion per year.123 Yet the implementation of biodiversity 
plans was hampered by the lack of a roadmap, of adequate technical and financial 
resources,124 and of operational guidance on how to mainstream environmental 
concerns in the activity of other sectors and government agencies.125 The 
international community has missed the 2010 global biodiversity target quite 
spectacularly, with the rate of biodiversity loss increasing rather than diminishing 
since the adoption of the Convention.126   
The UNCCD has also distributed substantial financial support (averaging US$1.5 
billion in the years 2005-2007)127 to pursue the objectives set out in the national 
plans submitted so far. But these plans have been described as wish-lists of 
objectives with no concrete measures to guide implementation;128 only in a few 
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 CBD Secretariat, Synthesis and analysis of obstacles to implementation of National Biodiversity 
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countries have they been incorporated in the national budget; and political ownership 
of the process remains a challenge,129 partly because the rhetoric on participation 
was not matched by reality.130 As a result, desertification is advancing unabated at an 
alarming pace, and the Convention is generally regarded as having had marginal 
ecological and social consequences.131  
The national forest programmes were no more successful. In terms of result, the 
soaring deforestation rates of the 1990s and 2000s show the general ineffectiveness 
of this tool in the developing world. Despite the fact that more than 130 countries are 
developing or implementing national forest programmes,132 Schanz notes that such 
documents have been ineffective because the vagueness and ambiguity of the 
guiding principles have led to arbitrariness and lack of clarity in programme 
formulation and implementation.133 The failure of national forest programmes is 
particularly worrying for national REDD-plus strategies because both documents 
aim at promoting sustainable forest management through country-led efforts, are 
process-oriented and focus on similar matters.134 At the same time, both fail to 
explain how reforms will be delivered, both are voluntary, and both are non-
standardised hence difficult to assess comparatively.135 
The experience of the Ramsar Convention is somewhat more encouraging. A draft 
assessment of the impact of National Wetland Policies found that they are associated 
with a better overall wetland status in the adopting countries.136 Bowman has 
REVHUYHG WKDW RYHUDOO WKH 5DPVDU &RQYHQWLRQ KDV DFKLHYHG ³FRQVLGHUDEOH SURJUHVV
                                                 
129
 Bodemeyer, National Action Programmes under UNCCD: Rules and Reality (GTZ 2007). 
130
 Sharma (n 99) 15-19; see also 6WULQJHUHWDOµ,PSOHPHQWLQJWKH81&&'3DUWLFLSDWRU\FKDOOHQJHV¶
(2007) 31(3) Issue Natural Resources Forum 198, particularly at 200-206. 
131
 .RKOPH\HU µ7KH &RQYHQWLRQ WR &RPEDW 'HVHUWLILFDWLRQ 5HOHYDQW RU D UHOLFW"¶  
Agriculture & Rural Development 26, at 26-7. 
132
 FAO (n 43) vii. 
133
 SFKDQ]µ1DWLRQDOIRUHVWSURJUDPPHVDVGLVFXUVLYHLQVWLWXWLRQV¶)2532/DW 
134
 Such as capacity-building, participation mechanisms, tenure security, decentralisation, respect for 
ORFDO ULJKWV LQWHJUDWLRQ ZLWK D FRXQWU\¶V VXVWDLQDEOH GHYHORSment strategies, legal and institutional 
reforms, private sector investments and so forth.  
135
 Schanz (n 135) 170. 
136
 3UWLFKDUGµ7KH5DPVDU&RQYHQWLRQRQ:HWODQGVDQGLWVLQGLFDWRUVRIHIIHFWLYHQHVV¶,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Expert Workshop on the 2010 Biodiversity Indicators and Post-2010 Indicator Development, 
Reading, July 2009) UN Doc UNEP/WCMC/Post-2010/0709/8d, p. 6. 
102 
 
>«@LQWKHUHDOPVRIZHWODQGFRQVHUYDWLRQ´137 but it can be argued that this positive 
assessment should be seen against the relatively low expectations generated by the 
Convention. Moreover, the guidance provided by the Ramsar Secretariat to 
implementing parties is considerably more detailed than that given by REDD-plus.  
Sharma noted that these documents are undermined by a lack of political will in 
developing countries to implement demanding reforms, particularly those that affect 
power distribution. Several governments have made high-level commitments to 
support REDD-plus,138 and early legal and institutional arrangements are a 
promising sign of a genuine attempt to mainstream REDD-plus in national policy.139 
However, efforts to translate this rhetoric into practice face politico-economic 
challenges and may be frustrated by entrenched mechanisms of status quo 
preservation. A sound strategy is for REDD-plus to foster domestic demand for 
reform. First, the emphasis on stakeholder participation in the preparation of national 
strategies can help uncover conflicts of interest and generate sufficient political 
support for the programme. Second, the step-by-step assistance provided in the 
readiness process can help devise sound political strategies and empower key 
stakeholders. Finally, potentially large economic incentives can sway public opinion 
in favour of the programme. These characteristics tell REDD-plus apart from other 
regimes and may work in favour of national strategies.  
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 For instance, the President of Indonesia Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has been at the forefront of 
the discussions in multilateral meetings, promising in 2011 to dedicate his subsequent three years of 
preVLGHQF\ WR ,QGRQHVLD¶V IRUHVWV /DQJ µPresident Yudhoyono promises to dedicate the next three 
\HDUV WR SURWHFWLQJ ,QGRQHVLD¶V IRUHVWV¶ 5(''-plus Monitor, 28 September 2011) <www.redd-
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<http://gina.gov.gy/wp/?p=10538> Accessed 10 February 2014. 
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 For a review of REDD-plus policies and institutional arrangements in selected countries, see table 
5 at page 181. 
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4.3.2. Future prospects for REDD-plus: from forests to landscapes? 
Although REDD-plus should be implemented in the context of sustainable 
development, the tension between environmental and development objectives 
remains unresolved in practice. What is needed is a conceptualisation of sustainable 
development that can guide decision-making in forest areas. Initially, the UNFCCC 
held discussions on including agriculture in REDD-plus, but this issue was 
postponed to avoid further complicating the negotiations at a time when getting 
REDD-plus done was better than getting it right.140  
At the 2013 Warsaw COP two high profile side-events gave new vigour to 
integrative approaches to governance that had been hovering around REDD-plus 
discussions for a while. The idea of µVXVWDLQDEOHODQGVFDSHV¶was re-introduced in the 
debate as the conceptual and physical space in which the human and natural 
subsystems collide.141 Over 1,200 experts and decision-makers from the forestry, 
agricultural and rural development communities gathered at the Global Landscape 
Forum to discuss ways to integrate, inter alia, forest and agricultural mitigation, 
adaptation, poverty alleviation, biodiversity and good governance objectives in 
sectoral policies.142 7KH)RUXP¶VILUVWFRQWULEXWLRQZDVDOLVWRI12 recommendations 
for the UNFCCC and the UN General Assembly. It remains to be seen whether and 
to what extent these recommendations will be incorporated in future COP decisions 
on REDD-plus or in the work of other international organisations.143 
                                                 
140
 Reference to agriculture was for the first time made in Durban: J. Parry, J. Boyle, Addressing 
Financing for Agriculture: Ensuring a triple dividend for smallholders ,,6'µ0LWLJDWLRQRI
&OLPDWH &KDQJH LQ $JULFXOWXUH 0,&&$ 3URJUDPPH¶ )$2 
<http://www.fao.org/climatechange/micca/75369/en> Accessed 10 February 2014. 
141
 This idea is not new. In 1992 the World Heritage Convention became the first international 
LQVWUXPHQW WR UHFRJQLVH DQG SURWHFW FXOWXUDO ODQGVFDSH DV ³FRPELQHG ZRUNV RI QDWXUH DQG RI PDQ´
(article 1): Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (adopted 16 
November 1972, entered into force 17 December 1975) 1037 UNTS 151. In 2000 the member states 
of the Council of Europe adopted the European Landscape Convention (also known as the Florence 
Convention) which aims to promote Europe-wide landscape protection, management and 
management: European Landscape Convention (adopted by the Council of Europe at Florence, 20 
October 2000, in force since 1 March 2004) ETS 176, article 3 . 
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 Global Landscapes Forum Outcome Statement (Warsaw, 4 December 2013) 
<www.landscapes.org/global-landscapes-forum-outcome-statement/#.UsF3_dJDt0g> Accessed 10 
February 2014. 
143
 Prior to the launch of the Global Landscape Forum, REDD-plus discussions were influenced by 
another high-OHYHO HYHQW FDOOHG µ)RUHVW 'D\¶ ZKLFK ZDV KHOG LQ VL[ FRQVHFXWLYH RFFDVLRQV DW
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The emerging focus on landscapes was confirmed by another high profile initiative 
ODXQFKHGDW:DUVDZ7KHµ%LR&DUERQ)XQGIRU6XVWDLQDEOH)RUHVW/DQGVFDSHV¶LVDQ
initiative managed by the World Bank and supported by Norway, the UK and the 
86ZKLFKDLPVWRKHOS³QDWLRQDORUMXULVGLFWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWVWRFRQVLGHUWKHWUDGH-
offs and synergies between different land-uses that may compete in a jurisdiction - 
such as agriculture, energy, and forest protection - and successfully identify 
LQWHJUDWHGVROXWLRQVWKDWVHUYHPXOWLSOHREMHFWLYHV´144 The BioCarbon Fund takes an 
integrated approach to REDD-SOXVE\VXSSRUWLQJGHYHORSPHQWWKDWLV³FOLPDWHVPDUW
equitable, productive and profitable at scale and strives for environmental, social, 
DQGHFRQRPLF LPSDFW´145 It seeks to create a portfolio of four to six jurisdictional 
programmes in forest-agricultural landscapes and, in cooperation with global and 
local companies in the agricultural and food sectors, to reduce the environmental 
impact of production by influencing their demand for sustainably sourced products. 
7KH)XQGZLOOSURYLGHJUDQWVXSSRUWIRUWKH³FUHDWLRQRIHQDEOLQJHQYLURQPHQWVWKDW
change the way land-use GHFLVLRQVDUHPDGH´DVZHOODVUHVXOWV-based payments for 
emission reductions and the achievement of other social and environmental 
benefits.146  
These two initiatives may signal a shift towards landscape approaches in REDD-plus 
practice. The landscape is large enough to be encompassed in ad hoc policies and 
large-scale spatial plans, sufficiently cohesive to tackle particular categories of 
drivers and to involve a relatively homogeneous category of stakeholders and 
inherently cross-sectoral. Landscape governance drives forward the integration 
principle147 and it provides a conceptual and physical space for the creation of 
political consensus about land and natural resource use. If adequately incorporated in 
REDD-plus strategies and actions, the landscape approach can certainly improve 
                                                                                                                                          
UNFCCC COP from 2007 to 2012. This event had considerable influence in setting the agenda and 
framing the terms of the REDD-plus negotiations.  
144
 World Bank, BioCarbon Fund, Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes (World Bank 2013) 
<www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/SDN/BioCF_ISFL_Flyer.pdf> Accessed 10 
February 2014. 
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 Ibid. 
146
 Ibid. 
147
 Matthews, Selman µLandscape as a Focus for Integrating Human and Environmental Processes¶
(2006) 57(2) Journal of Agricultural Economics 199. 
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their acceptability and effectiveness. )RU WKLV UHDVRQ WKH FRQFHSW RI µVXVWDLQDEOH
IRUHVW ODQGVFDSHV¶ ZLOO EH XVHG in this discussion as a proxy policy objective for 
REDD-plus carbon and non-carbon goals, and it will be intended to incorporate 
criteria of multi-sector, multi-stakeholder and multi-level governance. This concept 
will be particularly useful in the second part of the research. 
*** 
The first part of the research has shown that both positive incentives and policy 
approaches are needed to establish an effective multi-level governance system that 
reduces forest loss. REDD-plus follows a two-track pattern: on the one hand, 
µSRVLWLYHLQFHQWLYHV¶DUHJHQHUDWHGDWWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHYHODQGGHOLYHUHGWRQDWLRQDO
authorities principally through results-based payments for quantified emission 
UHGXFWLRQV DQG UHPRYDOV RQ WKH RWKHU KDQG µSROLF\ DSSURDFKHV¶ DUH QDWLRQDOly-
owned but follow international guidelines and benefit from international assistance.  
The progress of governance-building activities and the availability of financial 
resources overlap. The realisation of governance reforms clearly depends on the 
availability of adequate and predictable incentives, which stresses the importance of 
providing substantial funding for readiness activities that do not necessarily generate 
emission reductions. At the same time, a good domestic governance framework for 
REDD-SOXVFRXOGKHOSEULGJHWKHSURJUDPPH¶VIXQGLQJJDSE\LQFUHDVLQJWKHFRVW-
efficiency of results-based activities as well as by attracting private investments in 
sustainable activities. There is, therefore, a recognised need to build the conditions 
for involving the private sector and other subnational actors in REDD-plus through 
and beyond the carbon markets.  
REDD-plus has flirted with the idea of creating a system of multi-level governance 
based on transnational markets, local empowerment and a marginal role of national 
governments that would have validated 5KRGHV¶ WKHRU\ RI WKH KROORZHG RXW 6WDWH
However, it has then tilted towards a system of governance that, while still rejecting 
government control, builds on a strong State. How much State intervention will or 
should be encouraged under REDD-plus is unclear. Part II of the research will try to 
answer this question by looking at the role of the State in the context of three policy 
catalysts for establishing a multi-level governance system for sustainable forest 
landscapes. 
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Part II 
The national and subnational levels of REDD-plus: policy 
catalysts for improving domestic governance 
 
 
The second part of the research considers the domestic governance framework 
needed to achieve sustainable forest landscapes under REDD-plus. It identifies four 
areas of policy that need consideration. First, there is a need for legality in the forest 
sector of developing countries, too often plagued by crime, violence and corruption. 
Second, stakeholders must have clear and secure rights and responsibilities. Third, a 
permanent system for the collective definition of the optimum use of the landscape 
must be established. Fourth, it is necessary to create an efficient system for the 
distribution of financial and technical support for implementing the changes 
identified collectively.  
Contextually, it proposes three catalysts for public policy interventions under 
REDD-plus: tenure reform, spatial planning and financial intermediation. Chapter 5 
argues that tenure security clarifies stakeholder rights and responsibilities, 
encouraging sustainability, reducing conflicts and consequently the space for 
illegality. Chapter 6 shows that the establishment of an effective spatial planning 
system disseminates information, builds consensus over sustainable development 
policies, and helps to identify synergies among different sectors and policy options. 
Chapter 7 suggests that a national infrastructure for the distribution of financial 
support to environmentally sustainable activities can foster green investments from 
non-REDD-plus sources. In all such areas the State does not have exclusive control 
over the decision-making process but rather an important role of coordination and 
facilitation.  
109 
 
5 
Building legality through tenure security  
 
The first policy catalyst for REDD-plus implementation is tenure security. Secure 
tenure builds the foundations for the establishment of a rational regime of forest 
governance because it defines the rights and responsibilities of forest stakeholders in 
a context often dominated by corruption, crime and conflict. This is a conditio sine 
qua non for subnational results-based payments and for addressing the drivers. 
Section 5.1 explores the links between forest crime and tenure insecurity and the 
benefits that tenure reform would have for REDD-plus. Section 5.2 discusses some 
domestic measures to improve tenure in tropical forests. Section 5.3 explores the 
international dimension of tenure security and REDD-plus potential contribution to 
tenure reforms. 
5.1. The link between illegality and tenure in tropical forests 
5.1.1. Illegality, forest loss and existing international responses 
Deforestation can take place pursuant to legal activities by the State or private actors 
or it can result from illegal or unlawful activities.1 Illegal deforestation is very 
common across tropical forest regions and, according to Rosembaum,2 it is caused 
by two factors: 
x Failure of the law: clashes of norms, poorly drafted laws (which makes 
enforcement difficult), weak penalties and conflict of legislation; 
x Failure of implementation: poor dispute resolution, unfair application, 
bureaucratic inefficiency of law enforcement agencies, lack of capacity and 
                                                 
1
 6NXWVFK 9DQ /DDNH µ5('' DV PXOWL-level governance in-the-PDNLQJ¶  19(6) Energy & 
environment 833. 
2
 5RVHPEDXPµ,OOHJDO$FWLRQVDQGWKH)RUHVW6HFWRU$/HJDO3HUVSHFWLYH¶-3) J. of Sust. 
For. 263, at 266. 
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coordination, lack of cross-sectoral enforcement of laws and lack of 
government oversight. 
Chapter 2 showed that the rule of law is very weak in developing countries. This 
problem is even more acute in forest areas. .QR[HWDOQRWH WKDW³VWDWHSUHVHQFH LQ
PDQ\UXUDORUOHVVSRSXODWHGIRUHVWDUHDVLVPLQLPDORUHYHQDEVHQW´DQGWKDWZKHUH
it exists, officials regularly lack the equipment and technical capacity necessary to 
perform their jobs.3 Investments in law enforcement capacity in Brazil are seen as 
instrumental to the recent reduction in deforestation in the Amazon,4 but in most 
tropical countries the situation is still critical. Poor law enforcement in tropical forest 
regions has been widely documented.5 For instance, illegal logging is estimated to 
contribute between 70 and 90 percent of the total timber production in several 
tropical countries, and even in countries with high law enforcement capacity such as 
Brazil, Vietnam and Malaysia it is still estimated to account for between 20 and 40 
percent.6 This causes losses in assets and revenues in excess of US$10 billion 
annually and a further US$5 billion is lost because of evaded taxes and royalties on 
legally sanctioned logging.7  
The rule of law is the fundamental prerequisite to the implementation of both public 
policy and market instruments. No protective measure, contract, transaction or 
investment can be safely and effectively performed in a context of rampant illegality. 
International stakeholders would not have any assurance that developing countries 
(or local partners in developing countries) will be able to reduce forest emissions, 
despite their best intentions, unless agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society. 
                                                 
3
 .QR[HWDOµLand tenure and payment for environmental services: challenges and opportunities for 
REDD+¶/DQG7HQXUH-RXUQDODW 
4
 Boucher, Brazil's Success in Reducing Deforestation (UCS 2011) 
<www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global_warming/Brazil-s-Success-in-Reducing-
Deforestation.pdf> Accessed 10 February 2014. 
5
 For an overview and impacts, see: Lawson, MacFaul, Illegal Logging and Related Trade Indicators 
of the Global Response (Chatham House 2010); Tacconi, Illegal logging: law enforcement, 
livelihoods and the timber trade (Earthscan 2007);  Human Rights Watch, Wild Money: The Human 
5LJKWV&RQVHTXHQFHVRI,OOHJDO/RJJLQJDQG&RUUXSWLRQLQ,QGRQHVLD¶V)Rrestry Sector (HRW 2009). 
6
 HRW (n 5) 9. 
7
 World Bank, Strengthening Forest Law Enforcement and Governance Addressing a Systemic 
Constraint to Sustainable Development (World Bank 2006) 1. 
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Improving the rule of law in REDD-plus countries is a huge task requiring far-
reaching reforms of the judiciary, law enforcement and ± to some extent ± local 
culture. But more targeted measures can be employed, and are being employed, to 
address and uphold the rule of law in the forest sector. Below are some prominent 
international initiatives that address specific areas of illegality. 
7KH :RUOG %DQN¶V )RUHVW /DZ (QIRUFHPHQW DQG *RYHUQDQFH )/(*8 programme 
includes three regional initiatives in East Asia and the Pacific, Africa, and North 
$VLDDQG(XURSHZKLFK³FUHDWHWKHSROLWLFDOµVSDFH¶DWQDWLRQDODQGUHJLRQDOOHYHOVWR
address the complex and politically sensitive issues related to illegal logging, and in 
partnership with major stakeholders from civil society and the private sector´9 One 
RI WKH SURJUDPPH¶V PDLQ DFKLHYHPHQWV LV WKH LQFRUSRUDWLRQ RI LOOHJDO ORJJLQJ DQG
forest crime in the work agenda of regional organisations. The programme has 
arguably been more effective at the national level where it has facilitated the 
conclusion of National Action Plans to prevent illegal logging in a small subset of 
countries.10 Its impact is still limited, particularly because of its scarce penetration in 
the tropics and soft political nature. 
A more incisive initiative is the EU Regulation and Action Plan on Forest Law 
Enforcement, Governance and Trade (EU FLEGT),11 a voluntary licensing scheme 
which focuses on trade in timber products. The European Commission negotiates the 
implementation of the licensing scheme with timber producing countries with a view 
to concluding Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs). These bilateral 
agreements allow EU Member States to take measures against the import of illegal 
timber and help exporting countries to develop a legal, monitoring and enforcement 
framework to implement the licensing scheme. VPAs include a Legality Assurance 
                                                 
8
 µForest Law Enforcement and Governance¶ (World Bank 2013) 
<http://go.worldbank.org/FMKUFABJ80> Accessed 10 February 2014. 
9
 µRegional Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) Initiatives¶ :RUOG %DQN  
<http://go.worldbank.org/32M8CUBPN0> Accessed 12 July 2013. 
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 World Bank (n 7) 16-8. 
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 The legal framework for this scheme is established by the Council Regulation (EC) No 2173/2005 
of 20 December 2005 on the establishment of a FLEGT licensing scheme for imports of timber into 
the European Community (2005) OJ L347, articles 1-6 and further regulated in the Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 1024/2008 of 17 October 2008 laying down detailed measures for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 2173/2005 on the establishment of a FLEGT 
licensing scheme for imports of timber into the European Community  (2008) OJ L 277, articles 23-9. 
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System, which sets up a procedure for verifying legality throughout the supply chain, 
establishes independent monitoring and verification of forest management practices, 
and sets out a plan with clearly defined, time-bound actions for improving forest 
governance and social safeguards.12 The EU FLEGT initiative is considered an 
effective model of international cooperation for forest protection, because of its 
incisiveness and the significance of trade incentives.13 The EU believes that 
considerable overlaps exist between REDD-plus and FLEGT beyond the issue of 
legality, and that a convergence of approaches is therefore needed as well as efforts 
to promote mutual learning and supportiveness.14 Box 5.1 below sums the potential 
complementarities between FLEGT and REDD-plus The scheme is currently being 
implemented in six countries, while nine more are in advanced negotiations and 11 
have sought information about the VPAs.15 Although no country has yet achieved 
licensing status the VPA requirements are triggering far-reaching measures to 
improve transparency, monitoring and enforcement capacities in the forestry 
sector.16 The scheme is limited to logging activities, hence it excludes the major 
deforestation drivers, but lessons learned tackling illegal logging and other forest 
degradation drivers can inform better policy responses to agricultural drivers (see 
box 5.1). 
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 EFI, Voluntary Partnership Agreements (EFI 2007) cited in Rutt, Social protection in REDD+ 
initiatives: A Review (University of Copenhagen 2012) 9 
<www.theredddesk.org/sites/default/files/resources/pdf/2012/redd_plus_social_protections_rfgi_work
ing_paper_rebecca_rutt__4_jan_2012.pdf> Accessed 10 February 2014. 
13
 NGOs are however campaigning to include independent monitoring as part of the licensing scheme 
in developing countries in order to ensure genuine compliance with the Regulation; Brack, Léger, 
Exploring credibility gaps in Voluntary Partnership Agreements: A review of independent monitoring 
initiatives and lessons to learn (Independent report 2013) <www.fern.org/sites/fern.org/files/IM-
VPAsFinalWeb_EN.pdf> Accessed 10 February 2014. 
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 To this end, it has established the EU REDD Facility at the end of 2010, which operates alongside 
the EU FLEGT Facility within the European Forest Institute; the EU REDD Facility explores 
interactions between FLEGT and REDD-plus processes at country level and informs the EU 
international position on REDD-plus. 
15
 The full list of countries is available online: µ93$&RXQWULHV¶(),ZZZHXIOHJWHILLQWYSD-
countries> Accessed 10 February 2014. 
16
 Bollen, Ozinga, Improving Forest Governance: A Comparison of FLEGT VPAs and their Impact 
(FERN 2013) <www.fern.org/sites/fern.org/files/VPAComparison_internet_0.pdf> Accessed 10 
February 2014 
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Box 5.1 Potential synergies between FLEGT and the REDD-plus policy catalysts 
Despite the limited focus on legality in the timber sector, the EU believes that FLEGT will 
provide valuable lessons for a much broader set of domestic forest policies and that this will 
in turn greatly benefit REDD-plus implementation. A document published by the EU REDD 
Facility states that FLEGT and REDD-plus can support each other in six areas: addressing 
the economic drivers of forest loss, addressing the governance drivers, improving national 
processes relating to land use governance and management, establishing effective MRV 
mechanisms, combining national efforts to implement both programmes and changing the 
nature of consumption of timber and agricultural commodities.17  
In particular, many of the measures advocated by FLEGT confirm that the three policy 
catalysts discussed in this thesis are indeed of priority importance for REDD-plus policy 
approaches undertaken in the readiness phase. The document states that measures to 
harmonise domestic legislation, improve transparency and ensure better law enforcement 
developed under FLEGT will be clearly beneficial to REDD-plus. Similarly, mechanisms to 
ensure multi-stakeholder participation and multi-level coordination are beneficial to both 
programmes, and synergies should be sought in this respect. Moreover, REDD-plus can also 
aide the implementation of FLEGT by facilitating a fair allocation of land and resources and 
clarifying rights and responsibilities of different stakeholders operating in and around 
forests.18  
Given the need to develop effective policies to ensure legality and good forest governance, 
the contribution of FLEGT to REDD-plus is double. First, by testing approaches in the field, 
the programme will be able to identify challenges and best practices that are common across 
the developing world. Second, these very experiences will further highlight the importance 
of public policies and governance reforms among EU countries and may contribute to 
creating a positive political environment in developing countries for the enactment of serious 
reform. 
In 2012, Interpol launched a law enforcement programme called Project Leaf (Law 
(QIRUFHPHQW$VVLVWDQFH IRU)RUHVWVZKRVHREMHFWLYHVDUH ³SURYLGLQJDQRYHUYLHZ
and review of ... networks involved in illegal logging, corruption, fraud, laundering 
and smuggling of wood products; supporting countries in improved enforcement 
efforts; providing training and operational support; providing insights into the way 
organized criminals organize their activities; and developing best practices for 
combating REDD-related and forest-UHODWHGFRUUXSWLRQ´19 The programme organises 
                                                 
17
 EU REDD Facility, Linking FLEGT and REDD+ (EFI and Proforest 2014) 
<www.euredd.efi.int/files/attachments/euredd/documents_2014/linking_flegtredd_brief.pdf> 
Accessed 13 August 2014. 
18
 Ibid 6-13. 
19
 µ3URMHFW /HDI¶ ,QWHUSRO  www.interpol.int/es/Crime-areas/Environmental-
crime/Projects/Project-Leaf> Accessed 10 February 2014. 
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training, workshops and high-level meetings for national law enforcement agencies 
and it supports the establishment of national environmental task forces.20  
The slow-changing and complex nature of forest crime makes it crucial that legality 
initiatives receive predictable political and financial support. REDD-plus could 
provide operational support (e.g. coordinating the work on readiness and forest law 
enforcement at the World Bank and FAO, or on governance and corruption at 
UNDP)21 and political support (e.g. mandating participation in existing international 
forest sector governance programmes or encouraging accession to anti-corruption 
treaties, where appropriate). Complementing these actions seems a better option for 
REDD-plus than inaugurating yet another initiative that duplicates their work, as it 
will be discussed in section 5.2.6. 
5.1.2. Tenure, illegality and REDD-plus 
A more direct way of tackling illegality under REDD-plus is by promoting 
µVWDNHKROGHU HQIRUFHPHQW¶ LH involving local actors in forest management. 
Participation is positively correlated with the quality of decisions as well as their 
acceptance, hence favouring compliance.22 Stakeholder cooperation is more effective 
than top-down enforcement of environmental legislation23 and, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, countries with high rates of forest crime are also those in which the 
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 Interpol, National Environmental Security Task Force: Bringing Compliance and Enforcement 
Agencies Together to Maintain Environmental Security (Interpol 2012); Interpol, Environmental 
crime: Establishment of national working parties on problems of waste (1996) Res AGN/65/RES/25. 
21
 Readiness funds are being used, and should be further deployed, to support developing countries 
carrying out governance reforms, yet work in this area is still confused and inorganic, at the same 
time overly ambitious in scope and underwhelming in impact. Cross-reference with chapter 6. 
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 See Pellizzoni, µUncertainty and participatory democracy¶2003) 12(2) Environmental Values 195; 
Steele, µParticipation and deliberation in environmental law: exploring a problem-solving approach¶
(2001) 21(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 415; Schenk, Hunziker, Kienast, µ)DFWRUV LQIOuencing 
the acceptance of nature conservation measures: A qualitative study in Switzerland¶2007) 83 Journal 
of Environmental Management 66. 
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 Blaser, Forest law compliance and governance in tropical countries: A region-by-region 
assessment of the status of forest law compliance and governance in the tropics, and 
recommendations for improvement (ITTO/FAO 2010) 9-15; Thorpe, Ogle, Staying on Track: 
Tackling Corruption Risks in Climate Change (UNDP 2011) 24. 
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rights and responsibilities of stakeholders are not clearly established in the law.24 
These rights and responsibilities are defined by tenure.  
Tenure indicates a system of rules which ³define how property rights to land are to 
be allocated within societies [and] how access is granted to rights to use, control, and 
transfer land, as well as associated responsibiOLWLHVDQGUHVWUDLQWV´25 This definition 
also applies to natural resources such as forests,26 although these are disciplined by 
an ad hoc regime27 ZKLFK ³DVVLJQV PDQDJHPHQW REMHFWLYHV DSSURSULDWH IRU WKRVH
spaces and subjects them to the authority of specialised administration representing 
WKH µSXEOLF LQWHUHVW¶´28 Tenure rights are usually recognised and protected by law 
(formal or statutory tenure). Alternatively, they can exist de facto but not de jure 
(informal or customary tenure), in which case they are extra-legal rather than 
illegal.29 7KHµEXQGOH¶RISURSHUW\ULJKWVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWHQXUHLVGHVFULEHGbelow.30 
The discrepancy between de jure and de facto tenure rights in developing countries 
is remarkable. Forests are usually under the domain of the State, which then leases 
some tenure rights to private entities and local communities.31 Globally, about four 
percent of forests are managed by local and indigenous communities while 
remaining under public control and 13 percent is given under concession to private 
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 See below (n 41). 
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 FAO, Land tenure and rural development (FAO 2002) 7. 
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 Ibid. 
27
 Ad hoc treatment is not exclusive to forest resources: another classical example is the retaining of 
access and use rights by the State on subsoil resources (minerals and hydrocarbons) found below 
privately owned land.  
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 .DUVHQW\$VVHPEpµLand tenure and implementation of REDD+ in central Africa¶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Tenure Journal 105, at 116. 
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 Although, in legal systems around the world custom may be sufficient to create legal rights, in most 
developing countries ad hoc ODZV DUHQHHGHG WR ³PDNH FXVWRPDU\ ODQG FODLPV HTXDO LQ ZHLJKW DQG
YDOLGLW\ WR GRFXPHQWHG ODQG FODLPV´ .QLJKW Statutory recognition of customary land rights in 
Africa: An investigation into best practices for lawmaking and implementation (FAO 2010) vi. 
30
 An interesting classification differentiates operational-level property rights over natural resources 
(access and withdrawal) from collective-choice property rights (management, exclusion and 
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firms (figure 5.1).32 About 18 percent of tropical forests are actually owned by local 
and indigenous communities (although in Africa the percentage is close to zero). 
Even in such cases, private forest owners have their tenure rights restricted by 
regulation (e.g. through the requirement of forest management plans, see box 5.2). 
However, data on forest tenure distribution in 27 developing countries shows a 
marked shift in tenure allocation over the decade 2002-2012: direct administration 
by the State fell from 72 to 60 percent, while forests owned by communities rose 
from 18 to 25 percent and those designated for their use doubled to six percent.33 
This shift is part of a trend towards decentralisation that has characterised the 
attempt over the past two decades to achieve a more efficient and effective forest 
management.34  
Table 3: Bundle of tenure rights over land and natural resources 
Right Definition Description 
Access The right to enter or pass 
through a particular space 
The most basic tenure right 
Exclusion The right to exclude others 
from the land or forest 
Relies on the right-holder¶V 
ability to enforce the right directly 
or through a legitimate authority  
Use or withdrawal The right to use and obtain 
products from the land or forest 
Regulated by the owner or 
proprietor 
Management The choice of who will have an 
access right and the restrictions 
on the use of land or forest 
Operated by the claimant but set 
in conjunction with the 
owner/proprietor  
Alienation The right to transfer access and 
management rights to another 
entity underpins land markets 
Customary rights to the land or 
forest are normally inalienable. 
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The vast mDMRULW\RI WKHZRUOG¶V IRUHVWV DUH still under the direct administration of 
national governments35 and observers fear that REDD-plus payments could trigger a 
wave of tenure recentralisation.36 State tenure extends to 65 percent of forestlands, 
ranging from just 33 percent in Latin America to 98 percent in Africa. Yet across the 
developing world less than 30 percent of the territory is covered by land titles.37 
Presumption of State tenure dominates despite ample evidence that traditional or 
migrant communities usually live in forests declared by default under State tenure. 
The situation is not unique to forests: as Palmer et al note ³WKH ODFN RI OHJDO
recognition of land rights has led to a perception that some countries have abundant 
land which can be used for large scale agricultural investments, but in reality there is 
OLWWOHODQGWKDWLVQRWDOUHDG\EHLQJXVHGRUFODLPHG´38 
The misalignment of formal and customary tenure systems provides breeding ground 
for illegality. It creates problems of political legitimacy, legal uncertainty, 
discrimination and abuse.39 If tenure rights are not clarified, no-one has 
responsibility to protect forests and open access dynamics encourage illegal forest 
encroachment. In areas where substantial profit can accrue from forest exploitation, 
encroachment is driven by migrants or organised criminals. This may cause tensions 
and conflict with local communities and indigenous peoples. Further conflicts can 
accrue between local stakeholders and corporations (e.g. over concession 
boundaries), between indigenous communities and the State (e.g. for the 
establishment of protected areas or building of infrastructures).40 In such cases, the 
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demarcation and regularisation of tenure rights will have the advantage of unearthing 
underlying incongruences between de jure and de facto situations before the 
development plans are laid out (i.e. the State awards concessions, establishes 
protected areas or plans infrastructure building). 
Fig. 1: Tropical forest tenure in 2008 (Global and Regional)41 
 
 
Forest people with insecure tenure rights have no incentive to manage timber 
resources sustainably and, deprived of critical livelihood resources, tend to adopt a 
µFDWFK-while-catch-FDQ¶ EHKDYLRXU42 Tenure insecurity is connected with 
unsustainable, often illegal, small-scale logging and fuelwood collection in much of 
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the developing world.43 In States with weak law enforcement, privatising a public 
good may be a valid strategy to govern the commons. Empowered users tend to 
exercise custodianship over their property44 and the ability to secure livelihoods by 
using local resources is perhaps the strongest incentive for sustainability.45 For 
instance, in Honduras and Mexico communities with secure tenure rights self-
organised to oppose illegal loggers and expelled them without any support from the 
government.46 Locals may also have an interest to protect neighbouring areas outside 
their forest domain from illegal activities. For example, in the heavily logged 
mountain forests of North-West Ecuador, local communities protect vegetation under 
State domain to maintain the provision of freshwater, soil stability and 
precipitation.47  
If REDD-plus puts a monetary value on forests, more competing tenure claims are 
likely to be filed and conflicts would increase.48 A highly unequal distribution of 
land coupled with high demand by the landless poor generates an explosive mix for 
social stability and environmental sustainability because it creates the conditions for 
occupations and conflict in or around areas under protection. This is clear in the 
experience of countries such as Brazil, where the concentration of land in few 
wealthy hands ignites continuous conflicts and illegality.49 That the equitable 
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distribution of tenure rights is essential to achieve poverty reduction and 
sustainability50 is further corroborated by history: redistributions of tenure rights in 
the past were sparked by massive inequality in tenure distribution (such as the 
Communist revolutions of Russia 1917, China 1949 and Cuba 1959), but also more 
µPRGHUDWH¶ODQGUHIRUPVLQUHFHQWWLPHVZHUHQRUPDOO\LQVSLUHGE\VLPLODUSULQFLSOHV
(as the various failed attempts of land reform in Brazil attest).51 Tensions are already 
characterising the REDD-plus debate. Indigenous people and peasant organisations 
are vigorously opposing the programme for fears that it would cause mass evictions 
from forestlands whose tenure rights have not yet been secured.52  
Without tenure security, moreover, carbon markets cannot operate.53 If respective 
rights to use resources are not clarified beforehand, problems arise when deciding on 
programme participation and on the distribution of incentives. Take, for example, the 
case of the soya industry in Brazil discussed earlier which, moving out of the 
Amazon and into the Cerrado, has displaced ranching back to the forest with overall 
little environmental benefit.54 In this case, who should be the beneficiary of REDD-
plus incentives? Should cattle ranchers be compensated for directing their activities 
to non-forested areas? What if, in doing so, they displace other activities such as, for 
example, subsistence farming? What would prevent these actors from colonising the 
Amazon IXUWKHU FDXVLQJ µOHDNDJH¶ RI HPLVVLRQV? At the most basic level, REDD-
plus demands the clear identification of a provider of the environmental service 
(carbon sequestration and storage) with legally recognised tenure over the resource, 
and the demarcation of boundaries within which the provider bears rights and 
responsibilities.55 For REDD-plus activities, land demarcation determines the 
boundaries within which emission reductions can be calculated and performance 
measured against a project or jurisdictional reference level.  
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Besides demarcation and mapping, the identification of rightful counterparts to any 
REDD-plus agreement (i.e. those entitled to compensation are those whose rights are 
being restricted) is highly problematic and uncertain tenure rights may at any point 
affect the validity of a carbon contract.56 One might assume that the right to profit 
from carbon sequestration would accrue to the landowner,57 but what matters for the 
provision of the environmental service is who has what rights to use/manage the 
forests rather than who maintains ownership over the land.58 Thus, in order to 
increase accountability, compensation should be paid to the actual forest users,59 
though a rent for the owner could be factored in.60 In some cases, governments may 
be willing to co-manage forests, sharing the benefits and responsibilities of 
providing REDD-plus services with local stakeholders.61  
Regularisation should thus start from land and forest tenure and end with carbon 
rights, which are nested within them.62 In countries where the State owns all trees, 
even those within private lands (such as Cameroon), the right to use/manage the 
FDQRS\WRRQH¶VSURILWFRXOGVWLOOEHJUDQWHGWRWKHODQGRZQHU, hence allowing carbon 
payments to private entities. But it is equally possible that, where public ownership 
of forest resources is the norm, carbon is declared a publicly-owned commodity, 
meaning that the government would have exclusive rights over it including the 
power to sell carbon credits. Some States may decide that carbon is inseparable from 
the physical resource that retains it, in which case its sale or lease could not happen 
without a formal transfer of title over the land or forest and no further regulation 
would be required. This would make it virtually impossible to establish a large-scale 
offsets market without large-scale land acquisitions. Another possibility is that 
carbon is separated from tree tenure and considered a public good upon which no 
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private right can be exercised; this would make it impossible to trade offsets, but 
developing countries could still claim results-based payments for preserving the 
public good.63  
Finally, tenure security should also be promoted at the forest-agricultural frontier so 
as to address the drivers of deforestation. Tenure security justifies upfront 
investments in agricultural productivity and soil conservation measures because 
farmers have a reasonable expectation of enjoying returns over the long-term, and it 
allows credit to be obtained using land as collateral.64 This dynamic underpins 
agricultural intensification in non-forested areas and, by increasing the total yield 
(agricultural output), it reduces global commodity prices, land prices and pressure on 
forests. Locally, however, productivity gains may increase land prices and stimulate 
agricultural expansion into forests: a number of contextual factors determine the 
impact of increased agricultural output on deforestation (such as distance from the 
forest frontier, geographic and topographic conditions, availability of infrastructures, 
mechanisation, scale and type of agriculture) and must influence local agricultural 
strategies.65  
If the lack of incentives to invest in sustainability and productivity (e.g. soil 
conservation measures) leads to environmental degradation and food insecurity, rural 
populations may become more prone to internal migration. In the past, the promise 
RIVHFXUHWHQXUHULJKWVLQXQRFFXSLHGIRUHVWODQGVZDVWKHµSXOOIDFWRU¶RIPLJUDWLRQ
and the consequent population boom in tropical forest frontiers.66 In some cases, the 
colonisation of rainforests was actively planned by governments to alleviate 
pressures from the landless poor: for instance, land reforms in Latin America and 
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South East Asia gave tenure rights to migrants provided that they put the claimed 
ODQG WR µSURGXFWLYH XVH¶ FRQYHQWLRQDOO\ PHDQLQJ WKDW WKH\ KDG WR GHIRUHVW D JRRG
part of it for agricultural or other purposes (see box 5.2).  
Box 5.2: Agrarian reform, environmental regulations and tenure in Brazil 
%UD]LO¶V KLVWRU\ RI XQHTXDO WHQXUH GLVWULEXWLRQ PDGH IDPRXV E\ WKH /DQGOHVV¶ :RUNHUV
Movement, has its roots in the colonial times. After the dictatorship, the agrarian reform 
/DQG6WDWXWHDOORFDWHGULJKWVRYHUXQFODLPHGµLGOH¶ODQGVWRDQ\RQHZKRKDGOLYHGRQ
them and had put them to productive use. These lands were mainly located in the Amazon, 
where productive use was demonstrated by clearing the vegetation to start an agro-pastoral 
activity. Between 1985 and 2006, over 900,000 families were settled in an area of over 80 
million hectares, yet the concentration of land has hardly changed and Brazil still has one of 
the highest inequality indexes in the world.67  
Soaring deforestation rates forced the government to progressively enact a number of laws 
and regulations dedicated to environmental protection. At the end of this process, in 2003, 
41 percent of the Amazon was under some form of protection (half of which are indigenous 
lands), 35 percent was private property (registered or informal), and 24 percent was still 
public land without land use destination.68 In each of these categories various forest tenure 
situations are disciplined by several environmental regulations. On privately owned lands, 
the Forest Code requires owners to prepare a forest management plan which ensures the 
protection of 80 SHUFHQW RI IRUHVWV RQ VXFK ODQGV WKH µOHJDO UHVHUYH¶69 Brazil also 
recognises a number of tenure regimes for local and indigenous communities, each subject 
to specific conservation requirements: extractive reserves, sustainable development reserves, 
national forests, agro-extractive settlement projects, forest settlement projects, sustainable 
GHYHORSPHQW SURMHFWV µ4XLORPEROD¶ FRPPXQLWLHV DQG LQGLJHQRXV ODQGV70 However, many 
protected areas are informally occupied while much of the privately-owned land was 
registered through a fraudulent process,71 facilitated by the absence of a cadastre for private 
lands and of a land registry for public lands.72 Tenure uncertainty in the Amazon region has 
long thwarted efforts to implement and enforce environmental legislation. In recent years the 
strengthening of environmental monitoring and enforcement capacity, alongside continued 
efforts to clarify tenure rights, reduced average deforestation rates in Brazil, but it is still too 
early to determine whether this trend will continue.73 
                                                 
67
 Reydon (n 49) 132. 
68
 Ibid 133-4. 
69
 The provision was stipulated in the law as early as 1965 (Lei no. 4771), and then reinforced in 1986 
(Lei no. 7511), but it was not implemented until 2006 (lei no. 11.284/2006); Cotula and Myers (n 34) 
28. 
70
 Almeida et al (n 31) 60-1. 
71
 Reydon (n 49) 134. 
72
 Ibid 131. 
73
 On the development and impact of environmental regulation in Brazil see Hirakuri, Can the Law 
Save the Forest? Lessons from Finland and Brazil (CIFOR 2003). 
124 
 
Land conflicts at the forest margins may have large-scale consequences on 
deforestation, e.g. when a situation of land scarcity is caused by internal factors 
(such as demographic increase), external human factors (such as migration or large-
scale land acquisitions), or climatic factors (such as prolonged droughts). 
Productivity gains are needed to face pressing demands for agricultural products, but 
such increases may be prevented by tenure insecurity. Competition generates 
scarcity and stress that in some cases may escalate into conflicts; conflicts worsen 
environmental degradation which in turn causes even greater scarcity of productive 
land in a vicious circle.74 When conflicts become violent they may cause the 
displacement of large numbers of people deep into the forest (as in the case of the 
1998 second Congo War, also known as the First African War). Violent conflicts 
over tenure rights also arise where actors wrestle over control of natural resources. 
Unfortunately, the literature has no shortage of examples of this kind of conflict. A 
UNEP analysis of intra-state conflicts found that over the past 60 years 40 percent of 
them were associated with natural resources, and that this type of conflict is twice as 
likely to reignite shortly after a peace agreement is found.75  
5.2. Domestic measures to secure tenure  
This section identifies six public sector measures to secure land and forest tenure in 
developing nations. Although their presentation implies a stepwise approach, it 
should be interpreted as a checklist for the elements that must be in place to achieve 
tenure security rather than a chronological sequence. 
5.2.1. Review and complete the regulatory framework 
The starting point for tenure reform is reviewing existing legislation to fill legal 
gaps, harmonise fragmented laws and regulations and address conflicts between 
customary and statutory norms. An obvious gap in the legislation would be that 
dealing with carbon rights, which will be discussed in the next section. Other tenure 
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laws and regulations must be reviewed and harmonised too. Most tropical forest 
FRXQWULHVKDYHOHJDOGXDOLW\³ZKHUHµPRGHUQ¶ODQGOHJLVODWLRQDOORZVRQO\IRUSXEOLF
or private ownership, without room for local tenure arrangements, whether 
customary oUK\EULG´76 Customary systems in fact contemplate tenure relationships 
in which forests are considered common-pool resources subjected to simultaneous 
uses (e.g. passage, grazing, cultivation, management and withdrawal of forest 
resources) or in which tenure rights are collectively assigned to community members 
and cannot be transferred.  
These forms of tenure are often not recognised in the law. Although Almeida et al 
found that 25 of the 27 developing countries considered give some legal recognition 
to indigenous and community tenure rights,77 less than one-third of the tenure 
regimes surveyed fully comply with such instruments, especially with regards to 
management and exclusion rights.78 A review of six national tenure systems by 
Larsson et al gives a slightly different picture.79 In Indonesia and Vietnam customary 
rights are not recognised, in Cameroon they are limited to use rights, in Tanzania 
customary rights are granted only in very small areas, while in Peru they are only 
recognised after a long and costly regularisation process. Only Brazil is found to give 
sufficient recognition to informal tenure arrangements.  
Problems remain even when the law recognises customary tenure.80 For instance, in 
35 percent of tenure regimes analysed in Africa, Almeida et DO IRXQG WKDW µULJKWV
cannot be implemented due to a lack of supplementing regulations that clearly define 
the recognised rights and the process by which such rights may be allocated in 
SUDFWLFH¶81  
Another common problem is that tenure is affected by laws and regulations from 
various sectors (forest, agriculture, environment and so forth) whose provisions are 
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not always co-ordinated, creating legal uncertainty and inconsistent interpretations. 
In every legal framework there is a measure of inconsistency between provisions 
contained in different instruments; these are generally dealt with using the legal 
principles of lex posterior derogat legi priori (a later law repeals a previous one) and 
lex superior derogat legi inferiori (a law higher in the hierarchy repeals the lower 
one). However, the situation in developing countries may be too confused to clearly 
identify which provision prevails, and court challenges would likely be too frequent 
to ensure the stability and effectiveness of the legislation.  
The reconciliation of the various pieces of legislation addressing land and forest 
tenure demands a substantial regulatory effort,82 \HW DV 5ZDQGD¶V WHQXUH
regularisation process proves,83 establishing clear rules and setting precedents for the 
determination of which provisions prevail is not enough: full legal certainty will 
require the intervention of the legislator to either abrogate some provisions or to 
provide authoritative interpretations that reconcile them with other relevant laws. For 
example, Karsenty and Assembé underline the importance of reviewing the notion of 
WKH µSURGXFWLYHXVH¶RI ODQGVRDV WRHQFRPSDVV UHFHQWO\ LQWURGXFHGHQYLURQPHQWDO
goals such as carbon sequestration and storage and biodiversity conservation.84  
Doherty and Schneider challenge the assumption that the harmonisation of statutory 
and customary tenure systems will lead to tenure security because, they argue, the 
latter are extremely diverse and specific to each local community and therefore 
cannot be harmonised with State law, especially is predicated on market notions.85 
Moreover, the superimposition of statutory rights would mean very little to local 
communities, particularly where customary tenure arrangements are seen as having 
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more legitimacy.86 These critiques are sound. Harmonising customary and statutory 
tenure should be intended as a process by which statutes recognise and legitimise 
custom rather than customary tenure systems being changed to fit within Western-
style concepts of property law.  
)LQDOO\ .QR[ HW DO QRWH WKDW ³WKe clarity and precision of the rights required by 
carbon finance may not align with the fluid and overlapping nature of customary 
WHQXUH V\VWHPV´87 Ad hoc legislation would remove these doubts, reassuring 
investors that REDD-plus contracts will not be invalidated by subsequent legislative 
developments on forest or carbon tenure.88 States have to establish a tenure regime 
for carbon so as to clarify who can exercise what rights, and under what conditions; 
in particular, the relation between the tenure of carbon, forests and land must be 
disciplined in detail in order to generate confidence in a compliance carbon market.89 
Clarity must also be established as to how the existing use and management rights of 
communities are affected by their participation in a REDD-plus project or 
programme, since very often the right to alter existing forest use and management 
conditions belongs to the government. 
5.2.2. Review duration, withdrawal and restriction of rights 
Not all tenure rights are permanent. As seen earlier, quite often tenure rights are only 
leased by the State. States that retain ownership of their forests must ensure that 
concessions, licences and leases of such rights have sufficient duration which must 
take into account economic, social and cultural aspects. The duration of leased 
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access, use and management rights is crucial to security. Unduly short tenure rights 
are detrimental to sustainability because they discourage long-term investments that 
ZRXOG LPSURYH WKH VLWH¶V FRQGLWLRQ DQG WKH VXVWDLQDELOLW\ RI Sroduction, because 
these are bound to generate returns over long time-frames.90  
The duration of the leased rights depends on two factors. The first is the land-use 
destination of the leased area. In contexts where considerable initial investments are 
needed, such as farmlands at the forest frontier suitable for intensification, even 99-
year leases may be insufficient for banking purposes (i.e. as collateral security) and 
governments should consider according freehold rights to farmers. By contrast, on 
forestlands destined to timber and non-timber managements shorter leases may be 
sufficient. The second factor to be considered is the condition of the beneficiary, 
whether it is a large-scale or small-scale commercial enterprise or indeed a local 
stakeholder operating on a subsistence basis. In the latter case, tenure security should 
be framed in inter-generational terms while for commercial operations short-term 
leases may be more appropriate. 
When there is no pre-set time limit, tenure rights granted by the State may still be 
YXOQHUDEOH WR ZLWKGUDZDO $V QRWHG E\ /DUVRQ ³LQ DOO FDVHV WKH FHQWUDO LVVXH
regarding tenure security is whether the new rights can be withdrawn, and (if so) 
KRZ DQG XQGHU ZKDW FLUFXPVWDQFHV´91 Property titles tend to be the most secure, 
whereas rights granted through, e.g., decrees, regulations and contracts are generally 
quite vulnerable to be overturned unilaterally.92 In Nicaragua, a plan to decentralise 
forest management was reversed simply with a change of government personnel.93 
Households and communities that rely on forests for their livelihood would not be 
incentivised to settle in, and sustainably manage areas upon which they have tenure 
rights that can be arbitrarily withdrawn.  
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Finally, breach of environmental guidelines for forest management should constitute 
ground for the withdrawal of such rights. Clearly, forest management restrictions 
should not prevent the right-holder from enjoying tenure rights or undermine 
effective local management institutions.94 In particular, local stakeholders must be 
granted management rights that allow them to carry out the subsistence and 
commercial activities necessary to sustain and increase their living standards. This 
includes the removal of geographical limitations which reduce the areas available to 
sustain local livelihoods, as in the case of Tanzania mentioned earlier. As the 
example of post-colonial forest policy in India demonstrates, excessive limitations to 
community tenure rights lead to poverty and crime.95  
5.2.3. Build human and technical capacity to clarify and demarcate titles 
Larsson notes that, alongside problems of corruption and government capture, tenure 
regularisation is hampered by limited technical, human and financial capacity which 
FDXVH ³GHOD\V LQ LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ >RI WHQXUe reforms] or the failure of the state to 
GHPDUFDWHWHUULWRULHVDFFXUDWHO\IDLUO\RULQDWLPHO\IDVKLRQ´96 The State often has 
insufficient personnel to verify tenure rights in the field, monitor abuses or provide 
protection; or the available staff may be badly trained, underpaid and susceptible to 
corruption.97 It is thus recommended that a new breed of tenure experts be trained 
by, inter alia, increasing the budget of the relevant departments, forging links with 
Universities and other research institutions, and establishing bilateral and multilateral 
channels for information sharing (especially South-South). These experts should not 
be bureaucrats but mediators able to work with local stakeholders to achieve bottom-
up tenure mapping. Experience in Indonesia demonstrates that clarifying customary 
tenure rights is also a complex and politically sensitive endeavour.98 Rather than 
producing a rigid set of prescriptions, experts should support a flexible and adaptive 
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process based on continuous review and analysis of policy, legal and organisational 
frameworks.99 More emphasis should be placed on setting up organisational 
frameworks and capacity that allow the continued gathering of data and the 
constructive participation of stakeholders.  
Secondly, governments may not have access to updated aerial or satellite images; 
they may lack the capacity to deploy modern information technologies at the local 
level to speed up land registration processes. A strong multi-disciplinary analysis, 
baseline studies and cross-country learning must be undertaken to generate 
understanding of tenure problems, their causes and the expected impacts of the 
proposed changes.100 Mapping exercises must be carried out with the active 
involvement of stakeholders. Greater investments in natural surveys and socio-
environmental inventories could complement carbon-stock measurements with other 
information, both biophysical (e.g. biodiversity value, watershed functions etc.) and 
social (e.g. existing settlements, sprawl of activities and location of development). 
Satellite techniques, geographic information systems, surveys and social assessments 
could be carried out at various scales and integrated in regional maps.  
A focal point for bridging the technical gap is modernising the land registry and the 
cadastre101 so as to establish a uniform and transparent process for the registration of 
tenure rights that can be used as evidence against competing claimants.102 These 
V\VWHPVDUHPHDQWWRµSURYLGHDFFHVVLEOHLQIRUPDWLRQRQWHQXUHULJKWVDQGGXWLHVLQ
order to increase tenure securities and to reduce the costs and risks of 
WUDQVDFWLRQV¶103 they activate legal protection for right holders and allow the 
collection of rural taxes; they help to decide the most appropriate land use 
destination, facilitating the spatial planning processes and the establishment of 
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restrictions on forest use; they certify that providers of environmental services have 
legitimate rights and that emission reductions are additional (e.g. by showing that 
payments are not directed to areas already under protection).104 A sound land registry 
or cadastre can limit informal tenure arising from large-scale migrations and it can 
provide more certainty and transparency to land markets, thereby contrasting land 
speculation, land concentration and abuse of customary rights.105  
Land registries and cadastres are developed using large-scale images (aerial 
photographs, satellite images or topographic maps) and supported by field 
verification, and they must be frequently updated. Developing countries have out-of-
date and incomplete land registries and cadastres and woefully inadequate systems to 
register information. This adds to the time and cost of tenure regularisation.106 
Because large scale tenure legalisation is a lengthy exercise (sometimes lasting 
decades),107 speed is important to create legal certainty and to ensure that right 
holders do not lose the incentive to complete the process. If land transactions occur 
before the registration is complete, the land registry or cadastre will be outdated 
before its completion.108 Modernising these instruments is thus crucial to the 
effectiveness, efficiency and expediency of tenure reform as well as, indirectly, of 
spatial planning. Frequent access to up-to-date aerial or satellite images is important 
to the accuracy of tenure information.109 The use of electronic systems for storing 
tenure data abates costs and increases speed, it makes updating tenure records 
simpler and can safeguard the information more securely. The digitisation of tenure 
data also facilitates coordination among different registries, which is important to 
prevent registration of competing land claims.110 The digitisation of cadastral 
information should be extended from the centre to the rural periphery; until this 
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happens, special provisions should be made to coordinate digital and non-digital 
information. 
5.2.4. Simplify the regularisation process  
Securing tenure rights starts with the documentation of their nature and extent, the 
demarcation of boundaries within which they apply and their registration by the 
authorities.111 A major problem is that even if customary rights are legally 
recognised, stakeholders are often unaware of such rights, they may not understand 
the importance of registering or validating land titles, or they may lack sufficient 
information about how to do so. Box 5.2 provides a snapshot of such problems. It is 
thus crucial that governments actively disseminate information, making it accessible 
and understandable for interested communities.112  
Local and indigenous communities are often excluded from tenure legalisation by 
³FRVWO\ ODQG GHOLPLWDWLRQ SURFHVVHV WKH XQGXH UHTXLUHPHQWV IRU FRPPXQLWLHV WR
acquire legal status; the complex legalese of applications and other documentation; 
the need to provide evidence of the traditional use of forest land; and the short 
timeframe during which communities must comply with the complicated procedures 
HVWDEOLVKHGE\ ODZ´113 Simplification should also reduce costs. It is important that 
any saving from reduced bureaucracy is passed on to the citizens in order to allow 
the most disadvantaged groups to undertake the process. The positive experience 
with Rwanda¶V Land Tenure Regularisation programme shows that, with simplified 
procedures and a coherent legal and institutional framework, large-scale tenure 
regularisation is feasible at relatively low costs. In some cases, pro bono support 
should be provided to local communities, particularly those who are not integrated in 
the market economy.  
Problems dealing with dual tenure systems spurred the development of alternative 
registration techniques that reduce costs, increase speed and simplify the 
bureaucratic procedure to the advantage of prospective right-holders. Registries must 
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allow for the recording of tenure rights at the community level and for less 
demanding formalisation processes (such as validation and certification) that can be 
subsequently updated through standard registration. Reydon and Costa discuss the 
case of the Brazilian state of Para, which has recently concluded a large-scale project 
of tenure regularisation through the improvement of cadastral information.114 They 
note that the pilot project, which included the identification of public and private 
lands, the verification of land claims and the assignment of titles, demanded 
substantial investments. They thus suggest that the scaling-up of this pilot to the 
national scale could be made more cost-effective by using GPS technology, satellite 
imagery (which Brazil already uses) and broad stakeholder participation.  
Traditional cadastral maps are being used in combination with sophisticated tools 
such as the Social Tenure Domain Model in order to accurately differentiate between 
de jure rights and de facto tenure relationships.115 Developing countries are also 
experimenting with simpler and more cost-effective tools to provide tenure security, 
such as certification (which verifies claims to land in the absence of titles at the 
community level) or other forms of validation.116 A variety of such instruments has 
now been tested in the field with discrete success: the crux of the matter is turning 
existing best practices into common practice.117 Where it is difficult to unbundle 
individual tenure rights, collective (community) rights should be used to simplify the 
regularisation process. Karsenty and Assembé suggest that this should go beyond the 
PHUHGHVLJQDWLRQRI µFRPPXQLW\IRUHVWV¶ WKDWGRHVQRWDVVLJQHQIRUFHDEOHULJKWV118 
instead it should consist of identification, demarcation and certification (or other 
forms of validation) of tenure rights at the level of the community.  
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5.2.5. Provide access to justice  
Access to justice requires broader reforms that address issues as disparate as the 
dissemination of information and education, the provision of legal aid, and the 
trialling of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms. Ensuring legal standing before 
the courts in cases of environmental crime is a problem that has often prevented 
public interest organisations from bringing suits purely to protect the environment.119 
Any unwarranted legal obstacle to standing in cases of illegal deforestation should be 
removed for environmental organisations as well as local actors including those who 
have no direct interest in the resources. The most important international instrument 
promoting access to justice is the 1998 Aarhus Convention, which focuses on access 
to information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice on 
environmental matters.120 However, the Aarhus Convention is a regional treaty with 
46 Parties from the pan-European region, hence it does not cover any prospective 
REDD-plus country.121 Outside Europe, the promotion of access to domestic legal 
remedies is carried out by the UN in the context of poverty alleviation,122 in the case 
of criminal justice,123 in the context of legal aid and on the independence of the 
judiciary.124 However, these initiatives have not solved the serious problems 
affecting the justice system in many countries, as seen in chapter 3.125 
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The regularisation of tenure rights is often a precondition to receive legal protection 
by the State, yet the regularisation process itself may generate scope for abuse over 
vulnerable actors, especially by government officials. Secondly, tenure security 
depends not so much on formal land titles but rather on the protection granted,126 for 
which responsibility is shared between the right-holders and the State.127 It is 
therefore crucial that these stakeholders are granted access to judicial or quasi-
judicial remedies to protect their interest, particularly the most vulnerable ones. 
Access to justice is precluded to forest communities that are distant from courts of 
law, have low literacy and are unaware of their rights, lack familiarity with the legal 
process, or cannot afford the cost of legal representation.128 Reducing costs, 
simplifying procedures and disseminating information are thus some of the measures 
that would improve access to justice in forest areas. States may consider introducing 
inexpensive specialised tribunals or bodies that deal exclusively with matters related 
to tenure, planning regulation or land evaluation. Moreover, they could consider 
providing specialised legal aid for tenure cases involving local and indigenous 
communities or other minorities. This would further the spirit of numerous 
international human right instruments,129 and it would be consistent with the recent 
recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and 
lawyers that the right to legal aid must not be limited to the criminal justice system 
but instead should extend to other areas, including violations of community or 
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PLQRULWLHV¶IXQGDPHQWDOULJKWV130 Box 5.3 provides an example of the importance of 
legal aid for forest communities.  
Alternative forms of dispute resolution may be more appropriate in certain contexts, 
but these must be strongly backed by the State for appeal and enforcement. Some of 
these reforms would be easier if alternative dispute settlement mechanisms were 
established to substitute costly and long litigation for less serious cases.131 
Accessible out of court settlement of disputes in these regions ± e.g. through 
mediation, arbitration and simplified administrative procedures ± may facilitate the 
resolution of minor tenure disputes which are likely to arise prior to and after 
regularisation (e.g. the registration of land titles, the demarcation of boundaries and 
so forth) and which would clog up the justice system as well as require considerable 
financial costs for plaintiffs and defendants. In some cases it would be sufficient to 
give recognition to traditional dispute settlement mechanisms (as long as they are 
FRPSDWLEOHZLWKDFRXQWU\¶VOHJDOSULQFLSOHV)RULQVWDQFH)UHG-Mensa suggests that 
ODQGWHQXUHFRQIOLFWVLQUXUDO*KDQDZKLFKSXUVXDQWWRWKHFRXQWU\¶VDGPLQLVWUDWLYH
and legal decentralisation fall under the jurisdiction of local community tribunals, be 
solved using alternative dispute resolution techniques such as mediation and 
negotiation.132 Finally, special provisions should be made to ensure that indigenous 
and marginalised forest communities have appropriate and affordable (including pro 
bono) legal assistance.133 
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Box 5.3: Customary land and forest tenure in Papua New Guinea 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) has a very peculiar tenure situation. Around two thirds of its 
464,000 square kilometres are covered in forests,134 and 97 percent of the land is held under 
customary law while the remaining three percent is property of the State.135 Customary law 
is widely used for tenure, and there are legal restrictions on the sale of customary lands. 
Although forest tenure is vested within the land, there are legal limits to forest use rights 
from customary owners. The 1991 Forestry Act allows landowners to harvest a maximum of 
FXELFPHWHUVSHU\HDULQHDFKLQGLJHQRXVJURXS¶VWHUULWRU\IRUFXVWRPDU\XVHPDQGDWLQJ
that the National Forest Authority must grant a logging concession for any harvesting 
beyond that threshold.  
However, the de jure recognition of tenure rights to indigenous communities does not 
automatically translate into effective authority and control over the forests. For any 
commercial activity forest management rights rest with the National Forest Authority which 
is the only entity legally authorised to enter into agreements with indigenous people in order 
to acquire timber rights, which can then be leased back to private operators at the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V GLVFUHWLRQ 8QIRUWXQDWHO\ HYLGHQFH VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH JRYHUQPHQW JHQHUDOO\
lacks capacity to monitor compliance with contract requirements, especially with regard to 
environmental sustainability, and provide support to indigenous people for the enforcement 
of their rights; illegal invasions and breaches of contract are not uncommon and often 
remain unpunished.136  
A second issue is that indigenous peoples are often unaware of their rights and obligations. 
This has influenced negotiations with logging companies which resulted in unfavourable 
contractual conditions and even more widespread illegality.137 Attempts to conclude REDD-
plus agreements with indigenous peoples by so-FDOOHGµFDUERQFRZER\V¶IXUWKHUKLJKOLJKWHG
the problem. The extensive rights held by indigenous communities, the absence of 
framework legislation and the generally passive role of the State in PNG forests seemed the 
perfect opportunity for unscrupulous businessmen. However, after attracting negative 
attention from the international media, the carbon cowboys have largely disappeared from 
PNG and the contracts signed are seen as having no validity.138 These examples point at the 
necessity of providing legal aid to communities prior to the arousal of controversies. 
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5.2.6. Improve law enforcement 
Regularising tenure rights makes certain activities illegal, but the rights are enjoyed 
in practice only if illegal activities can be stopped. A typical example is that of 
forests under State domain: in the case of illegal logging in Ecuador discussed 
earlier,139 several actors (from subsistence farmers to organised loggers) cut and burn 
forests that are formally under State domain. Some do it to sustain their livelihoods, 
for others it is business. The discrepancy between de jure situations (forests under 
State control) and de facto situations (forest used by a number of local actors) is 
known, but the State does little to prevent illegal activities. In such case, the State 
may either legalise use rights of certain stakeholder groups or, if it decides to make 
all forest exploitation illegal, it must have the capacity to monitor and enforce the 
law.  
If right-holders do not have exclusion rights, or if they have exclusion rights but not 
the power to enforce them, they may be hard-pressed to avoid further deforestation 
because the forest would in practice be treated like commons.140 For instance 
incentives could be given to those who are most affected by changes in forest 
management regime (e.g. subsistence farmers, small-scale loggers) but are unlikely 
to have the power to stop illegal activities. Alternatively, incentives could be given 
to those who have the power to exclude other users regardless of their local 
legitimacy (e.g. prominent members of the local timber cartel); this may improve 
effectiveness but may reinforce inequality, create livelihood problems and social 
conflict. Legal recognition of stakeholder rights would have to be complemented by 
effective police powers. 
Tenure security is ultimately about the capacity to protect and enforce rights. The 
major risk is that of land grabbing and dispossession, or the arbitrary acquisition of 
control over lands and forests. Land grabs often happen when right-holders are not 
aware of their rights, but sometimes it results from conflicts arising despite regular 
                                                 
139
 See chapter 2 box 2.3. 
140
 This would trigger thHµWUDJHG\RIWKHFRPPRQV¶G\QDPLFGLVFXVVHGDERYHFKDSWHUQ 
139 
 
titling.141 In forest regions, where the rule of law is often absent and the State is a 
dim presence, registered land titles may be of little importance. The support of public 
authorities is necessary for upholding the rule of law, monitoring compliance and 
mobilising police forces rapidly and effectively. This depends on the manner in 
which public institutions administering the land rights system perform their 
functions. Improving law enforcement in rural and forest areas must be done as part 
of a comprehensive land policy reform that makes institutions more efficient and 
transparent, able to execute their specific functions.  
Institutional capacity should be built at various levels, focusing on local 
governments. The subsidiarity principle requires an extensive transfer of financial, 
human and technical capacity to local governments. In order to avoid the problems 
RI µZLOG¶ GHFHQWUDOLVDWLRQ ORFDO IRUHVW PDQDJHPHQW QHHGV LQVWLWXWLRQV ILQDQFLDO
incentives, transparency and the full support of public authorities.142 Capacity must 
be built at the lower government levels, and the decentralisation of planning and 
management functions must keep pace with such capacity increases.  
The gap between the letter and practice of laws and regulations is particularly large 
in remote forest regions.143 In order to ensure that tenure rights are protected, local 
stakeholders should be supported by effective police and judicial authorities.144 
Governments could consider establishing dedicated law enforcement units, such as 
%UD]LO¶V QHZ HQYLURQPHQWDO VHFXULW\ IRUFH,145 and in line with ,QWHUSRO¶V /HDI
Programme.146 Such specialised enforcement bodies could be dedicated to the 
permanent monitoring and policing of many environmental crimes, from wildlife 
trafficking to illegal logging, and could also support the enforcement of tenure rights 
in forests and other areas with significant illegality. They could also be part of 
coordinated regional efforts to tackle transboundary crime. Creating a specialised 
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police force for tenure and environmental crimes is demanding. As said earlier, 
REDD-plus should at least acknowledge and encourage participation in such 
international initiatives, and it could also provide additional targeted financial and 
political support as necessary.  
6XSSRUWWRGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV¶DGPLQLVWUDWLYHDQGODZHQIRUFHPHQWFDSDFLW\LVDOVR
channelled through development assistance. The World Bank assists nearly 30 
developing nations in building bureaucratic capacity through country-specific and 
multi-stakeholder participatory approaches, and the sharing of best practices and 
information.147 The UNDP works in more than 100 developing nations to promote 
µGHPRFUDWLF JRYHUQDQFH¶ WKURXJK ILYH JOREDO SURJUDPPHV RQ DFFHVV WR MXVWLFH DQG
the rule of law, corruption and development effectiveness, electoral cycle support, 
human rights, and parliamentary strengthening.148 The OECD uses the leverage of 
donor assistance to promote development goals and also to create a favourable 
environment for international investments, tackling corruption and crime. Most 
often, capacity concerns are addressed on a thematic basis by ad hoc treaty 
provisions. Most MEAs contain assistance norms which encourage capacity transfers 
in order to implement the relevant obligations, often subjecting developing 
FRXQWULHV¶LPSOHPHQWDWLRQWRWKHUHFHLSWRIVXFKDVVLVWDQFH149 
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Table 4: Summary of challenges and possible solutions 
Tenure problem Possible solution 
Lack of clarity on ownership, overlapping 
claims 
Harmonise legislation, reform land 
registry/cadastre, increase stakeholder 
participation in mapping processes 
Customary rights versus state ownership Review and harmonise legislation 
(recognition of informal tenure arrangements 
in the law) 
Lack of bureaucratic capacity  Strengthen institutes in charge of 
registration, promote institutional 
coordination, simplify regularisation process  
Lack of stakeholder information and 
capacity 
Simplify land allocation and registration 
process, provide legal aid, raise awareness 
Poor rule enforcement, monitoring and 
sanction  
Strengthen local and state institutions, use 
multi-stakeholder processes, establish 
specialised environmental police force 
Vested interests, abuse by elites/government  Promote transparency and decentralisation 
5.3. The international dimension of tenure reforms 
Highlighting the necessity of tenure reforms is not sufficient: the international 
community should also assist developing countries in carrying out such reforms. 
.DUVHQW\ DQG 2QJROR FRQYLQFLQJO\ DIILUP WKDW WKH JRYHUQPHQW RI D ³IUDJLOH´
developing country (i.e. a country lacking governance capacity) would be unable to 
³LPSOHPHQWDQGHQIRUFHWKHDSSURSULDWHSROLFLHVDQGPHDVXUHVZKLFKFRXOGWUDQVODWH
LQWR GHIRUHVWDWLRQ UHGXFWLRQ´150 Political corruption could worsen the uneven 
distribution of land rights in favour of government officials or powerful groups so as 
to benefit from REDD-plus funds.151 Bureaucratic corruption could undermine the 
validity of the carbon monitoring process, overlooking illegal logging and other 
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activities or creating fraudulent land titles or carbon rights.152 A partial and 
ineffective judiciary undermines the functioning of a market economy.153 Despite 
REDD-plus still being in its conception phase, major episodes of market fraud have 
already occurred,154 prompting IQWHUSROWRGHFODUHWKDW³WKHSRWHQWLDOIRUFULPLQDOLW\
[in REDD-plus] is vast and has not been taken into account by the people who set it 
XS´155 
Decisions about the allocation and extent of rights over land and natural resources 
have profound impacts on several policy objectives, including, inter alia, the 
eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, the attainment of environmental 
sustainability and the establishment of an integrated partnership for development 
(part of the Millennium Development Goals).156 It is unsurprising, then, that 
international law has considered the issues of land tenure quite extensively. The 
fundamental right to own and not be arbitrarily deprived of property sanctioned in 
article 17 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights is arguably the first 
provision that grants some legal protection. The 1966 International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognises the right to adequate housing in 
article 11(1).157 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
subsequently specified that the right to housing contains seven elements, one of 
which - WKH µOHJDO VHFXULW\ RI WHQXUH¶ ± guarantees legal protection against forced 
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eviction, harassment and other threats, regardless of the type of tenure enjoyed.158 
The right was subsequently confirmed by a number of international instruments, 
inter alia the 1996 Istanbul Declaration and the Habitat Agenda,159 and the UN 
5HVROXWLRQRQµDGHTXDWHKRXVLQJDVDFRPSRQHQWRIWKHULJKWWRDQDGHTXDWH
VWDQGDUGRIOLYLQJ¶160 
The protection of tenure rights has been further expanded for indigenous and other 
traditional communities rights by the ILO Convention 169161 and UNDRIP.162 The 
ILO Convention has been ratified by 20 countries, mostly in Latin America,163 while 
UNDRIP was adopted with 144 votes in favour and only 11 abstentions and four 
against.164 These instruments establish the indigenous right to own, use, manage, 
develop or conserve lands and resources;165 the duty of the State to consult and share 
benefits with indigenous peoples for resources extracted in their territory;166 the duty 
of the State to recognise customary tenure systems;167 the duty of the State to prevent 
evictions and dispossessions168 DQG WR DFWLYHO\ SURWHFW LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOH¶V WHQXUH
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rights;169 and the duty of the State to obtain free prior and informed consent before 
the approval of any project affecting indigenous land and resources.170 
More recently, the first international instrument dedicated to tenure issues was 
DJUHHG XQGHU WKH DXVSLFHV RI )$2¶V &RPPLWWHH RQ )RRG 6HFXULW\ 7Ke Voluntary 
Guidelines on best practices for tenure governance171 help build international 
consensus on matter related to land and natural resource tenure. The guidelines cover 
recognition, transfer and administration of tenure rights and aim to spur countries to 
improve the governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests with the primary 
objective of achieving food security and sustainable development.172 
REDD-plus thus operates in the context of extensive, albeit fragmented, international 
instruments which have already stated the importance of secure tenure as a human 
right and as a tool to achieve environmental sustainability and food security, and 
which has already produced a conceptual effort to codify the conditions for tenure 
security. The proposed prRJUDPPH¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ ZLOO WKXV EH JHDUHG WRZDUGV WKH
fulfilment of existing international obligations and guidelines. As a matter of fact, 
the COP has acknowledged the importance of tenure security and requested 
countries to address tenure problems.173 However, reference to tenure in UNFCCC 
COP decisions is only cursory and, on the official UNFCCC agenda, the issue has 
received overall far less attention than carbon-related aspects.174  
Tenure has been considered at project level, but results are less than encouraging. 
Some evidence suggests that current REDD-plus projects are reinterpreting land and 
forest legislation so as to create benefit-sharing mechanisms that favour the private 
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sector over communities or the State.175 This backs up the argument that the 
establishment of carbon rights cannot be left to private contractual negotiations and 
that different forms of tenure must be addressed together in legislation so as to avoid 
piecemeal interventions.  
The establishment of property rights over carbon must be flexible so as to be 
compatible with these systems, and not a constraint to the recognition of tenure 
rights. Rather than attempting to superimpose a Western conception of tenure with 
top-down rules on carbon property, REDD-plus should first and foremost encourage 
the resolution of existing tenure conflicts, the enactment of nationally appropriate 
legislation and the recognition of diverse types of tenure at the local level. This can 
be done indirectly, e.g. by requesting the application of the FAO Guidelines on 
Tenure or certain specific requirements relating to community involvement, or 
directly through the endorsement of best practices and the work of the multilateral 
institutions in the readiness process. In both cases, there are evident benefits in 
having independent monitoring of progress in this area.176  
2QH RI WKH SURJUDPPH¶V PDMRU FRQWULEXWLRQV ZLOO EH WKH SURYLVLRQ RI ILQDQFLDO
support for tenure reforms. Olsen and Bishop provided some estimates of the 
transaction cost of tenure regularisation at project level using empirical data from 
%UD]LO¶V GHPDUFDWLRQ RI LQGLJHQRXV WHUULWRU\ 0R]DPELTXH¶V GHPDUFDWLRQ
programme, the creation of social reserves and protected areas in Brazil and World 
Bank cost estimates of land titling programmes in Laos, the Philippines, Indonesia 
and Cambodia.177 7KH HVWLPDWHV LQFOXGH ³WKH FRVWV RI DZDUHQHVV UDLVLQJ GLVSXWH
resolution, equipment and material, staff costs (government and NGO), training, 
DGPLQLVWUDWLYHFRVWVDQGUHFXUUHQWFRVWVRIWUDLQLQJVWDIIHWF´178 They conclude that 
expenses DUH UHODWLYHO\ ORZEXW WKDW³LQYHVWPHQW LQ ULJKWVDQG WHQXUHUHFRJQLWLRQ LV
FULWLFDO´179 Scaling up tenure regularisation efforts to the national level, which 
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includes the modernisation of the cadastre and the deployment of GPS and remote 
technology, would entail higher costs.180 Moreover, the timescale of land reforms is 
such that financial support must be stable and predictable over the long term.181 
Finally, the cost of assisting disadvantaged stakeholders in the regularisation process 
must also be factored in. Earmarked support for national-level tenure reforms must 
thus be scaled-up and extended beyond the short time-frame of readiness.182 Some 
financial support should also EH UHVHUYHG³IRUFRXQWULHV WKDWKDYHPDGH VXEVWDQWLDO
progress in allevLDWLQJWHQXUHFRQFHUQV´183  
Furthermore, REDD-plus can provide a platform for sharing information and 
developing best practices on tenure among countries. Multilateral institutions can 
proactively disseminate information and organise joint missions, international 
workshops and technical meetings ± as it is already praxis in most MEAs. 
Information sharing among countries in a particular region would be sensitive to the 
cultural, economic and social context of each country. Similarly, capacity-building 
courses for national tenure specialists could be organised under the auspices of 
REDD-plus so as to form an efficient and professional bureaucracy. Further, REDD-
plus can facilitate the transfer of technology to developing countries, including 
sharing of expensive remote sensing imaging (GPS, satellite) with more resourceful 
countries including in the South. For instance, Brazil has recently entered 
discussions with other developing countries to export its remote sensing forest 
monitoring technology.184 REDD-plus could work as a forum to promote bilateral or 
multilateral deals of this kind, both South-South and North-South.  
Finally, and perhaps most crucially, REDD-plus could generate forward political 
momentum on this issue. Both the regularisation process and the long-term security 
of tenure rights are deeply affected by politico-economic dynamics and relations, 
corruption, elite capture and government collusion. Inadequate recognition and 
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protection are often caused by a lack of government transparency.185 Vested 
interests, ethnic divisions, class warfare and traditional privileges create political 
economic dynamics that allow powerful groups to gain from tenure insecurity and 
block reforms. In some cases, officials abuse their power to directly acquire property 
rights over forested lands. In other cases, they disregard due process to speedily 
implement development projects (e.g. mining, infrastructure) or grant licences to 
private operators (e.g. logging or agricultural enterprises). Tenure distribution was 
historically used as a mechanism to allocate power across society (whether 
redistributing it or reinforcing previous inequalities),186 and the control over land and 
natural resources mirrors, in societies across the world, the social distribution of 
power (status, class, wealth). Seen in this light, tenure chaos is not the result of the 
neglect of urban elites for remote rural areas, but rather a deliberate attempt to 
consider these as empty spaces that can be appropriated at whim by some segments 
of society. The lack of recognition for traditional rights, for instance, becomes a 
political strategy and not a consequence of incapacity.  
Major land reforms typically occurred alongside radical political transformations, 
such as revolutions, decolonisation or the end of communism.187 Anything short of a 
revolution will require long and strenuous political efforts to prepare and debate a 
policy or law. This may take several years and require the application of adequate 
incentives.188 Moreover, changing the political economy of tenure distribution is 
even more difficult if forests are perceived to be worth more because of REDD-plus. 
There are fears that REDD-plus would push land values up triggering large-scale 
land acquisitions from foreign and national elites, or that the State may claim 
exclusive rights to carbon and consequently limit forest management rights for local 
people (especially in countries where most forests already belong to the State).189 
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This could cause mass evictions de jure (in case of large-scale land acquisitions) or 
de facto WKURXJKWKHXQODZIXOGHSULYDWLRQRIIRUHVWSHRSOHV¶PHDQVRIVXEVLVWHQFH 
But the importance of bringing tenure issues into the international agenda and giving 
voice to national stakeholders in international fora should not be underestimated. 
Provisions on tenure in the REDD-plus text may have very limited direct 
consequences if they are drafted in soft terms and are not accompanied by 
independent monitoring and strict reporting obligations. However, spelling out 
safeguards on tenure would provide a voice for stakeholders to speak out on such 
issues at international meetings, exposing government wrongdoings and applying 
political pressure. This would add context to existing international instruments 
dealing with tenure and may, over time, foster the establishment of best practices 
that incorporate many of the provisions drafted in documents such as the FAO 
Voluntary Guidelines.  
More crucially, civil society in developing countries must be fully behind tenure 
reforms, resistance from the groups that lose out must be addressed, and political 
leaders must show genuine commitment. Luckily, the urgency of reform is already 
perceived in many countries, especially where inequalities in tenure distribution are 
evident: marginalised groups, such as indigenous peoples, are joining forces and 
raising their voices nationally and in international fora. These forces must be 
harnessed and supported to build the political platform that pushes the reform agenda 
up the political ladder. Combined action from organised domestic and international 
actors offers the best prospects for challenging existing imbalances of power and 
political economies.  
*** 
This chapter has shown that illegality and tenure insecurity are linked in tropical 
forests and that this hampers the implementation of consistent forest policies. 
Economic incentive instruments empower stakeholders in forest management but the 
devolution of responsibilities requires the prior recognition and protection of their 
tenure rights. In fact, tenure insecurity impedes the sale of ecosystem services at the 
subnational level because it interferes with the relationship between the provider and 
the buyer of such services. By contrast, tenure reform can reduce REDD-plus costs, 
generate political support, reduce conflicts and crime, attract investments, and 
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mitigate drivers. It is only by providing legal certainty over management rights and 
responsibilities that rural policies and measures can be successfully implemented. As 
such, tenure clarity is the fundamental prerequisite of a sound forest governance 
framework.  
The analysis also suggests some measures to regularise and protect tenure rights, 
whose implementation is extremely complex, costly and both legally and politically 
challenging. This makes a clear case for REDD-plus to reinforce its contribution to 
tenure regularisation by, e.g., endorsing the FAO Guidelines, providing earmarked 
assistance, monitoring the allocation of rights as part of safeguard implementation 
and supporting vulnerable stakeholders. Once tenure is regularised and protected 
from illegal activities, empowered stakeholders can participate in the definition of a 
comprehensive landscape policy. Participation could be achieved using spatial 
planning tools, and this collective level of action is necessary to avoid fragmentation 
and to achieve the goal of REDD-plus. The contribution of spatial planning in 
building effective landscape governance will be analysed in the next chapter. 
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6 
Spatial planning for sustainable landscapes in REDD-plus 
 
The second policy catalyst for domestic landscape governance is spatial planning. 
While tenure reform clarifies the rights to access and use forest landscapes, spatial 
planning adds an element of collective negotiation in regulating such rights. 
Commonly regarded as a top-down prescriptive instrument that affirms State 
supremacy over the market, spatial planning is here intended as a tool to promote 
informed participation in decision-making and support market-based environmental 
policies. Section 6.1 defines spatial planning and suggests general principles for its 
correct application. Section 6.2 demonstrates that spatial planning can contribute to 
sustainable forest landscapes by addressing the drivers in the landscape and by 
establishing a focal procedure to mainstream participatory processes in land use 
decisions. Section 6.3 presents the specific benefits that spatial planning can have for 
REDD-plus implementation. Finally, section 6.4 reviews the penetration of spatial 
planning in international environmental law and it suggests ways in which REDD-
plus can contribute to its development. 
6.1. The concept and character of spatial planning 
6.1.1. Definition and interpretations  
Spatial planning is a practice and a discipline concerned with the physical 
organisation of development activities across the territory. It defines the desired 
outcome of land use, the management regime anticipated to achieve such outcomes 
and the underlying decision-making process.1 Its key goals are to create a more 
                                                 
1
 US Department of the Interior, Land Use Planning Handbook (USDOI 2005) 12-3. 
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rational territorial organization of land uses, to co-ordinate public investment2 and to 
reconcile competing policy goals by identifying long- or medium-term objectives 
and strategies.3  
The treatment of plans in the literature, variedly defined as agendas, policies, visions, 
designs and strategies,4 reflects the versatile but also inherently vague nature of the 
concept and the deeply divergent views between practitioners and scholars about its 
nature and applicability. It also reflects a tension between the increasingly 
specialised and fragmented understanding of planning in research and its integrative 
ethos in practice. In fact, because the practice of planning deals with a spectrum of 
development activities - from the built environment to urban infrastructure, from 
rural development to habitat conservation ± the discipline of planning has evolved 
into sub-fields, each with its own literature and theoretical underpinnings.  
In this discussion, spatial planning is intended in its widest possible sense as an 
integrated system of decisions adopted through a formalised process and aimed at 
promoting the optimal use of land and natural resources over a well-defined space 
and period of time. This definition contains all the constitutive elements of spatial 
planning: (i) it is a decision-making procedure; (ii) such procedure is formal (i.e. it 
follows an established form or rule);5 (iii) it is directed towards the optimal use of 
space and resources across the landscape; and (iv) the decision-making process is 
characterised by high complexity which demands a set of interdependent decisions 
underpinned by a high level of organisation and coordination.6 More specialised 
definitions of planning can be subsumed in this broad connotation of the term.7 
                                                 
2
 Commission, The EU compendium of planning systems and policies, Regional Development Studies 
Report 28 (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 1997) 21. 
3
 UNECE, Spatial Planning: Key Instrument for Development and Effective Governance with Special 
Reference to Countries in Transition (2008) UN Doc ECE/HBP/146, p. 1. 
4
 Couclelis, µ:KHUHKDVWKHIXWXUHJRQH" Rethinking the role of integrated land-use models in spatial 
SODQQLQJ¶ (2005) 37 Environment and Planning A  1356. 
5
 Mintzberg defines formalisation as the µdecomposition, articulation and rationalisation of individual 
decisions¶ KHUH ZH FKRRVH D PRUH OLteral definition of formality that accentuates the conventional 
character of the planning procedure. Mintzberg, The rise and fall of strategic planning (Free Press 
1994) 15. 
6
 Ibid 12. 
7
 As in all fields of human investigation, there is here no shortage of views that contrast with this 
interpretation of the term. The reader will be thus asked to accept the definition provided here as the 
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Spatial planning is typically associated with landscape governance. For instance, the 
European Landscape Convention requires each Party ³WRLQWHJUDWHODQGVFDSHLQWRLWV
UHJLRQDODQGWRZQSODQQLQJSROLFLHV´8 The inclusion of Protected Landscapes in the 
,8&1¶V classification of protected areas implies a previous process of demarcation 
and designation, which is a typical spatial planning measure.9 
3ODQQLQJ¶V UHJXODWRU\ GLPHQVLRQ FRPPRQO\ ILQGV H[SUHVVLRQ LQ ]RQLQJ UHJXODWLRQV
and planning permissions, two instruments used by the authorities to define the 
permitted land and natural resource use on a case-by-case basis.10 On the one hand, 
spatial planning historically embodied a technocratic conception of governance, 
dominated by networks of professionals and moved by a quasi-scientific, highly 
technical ethos.11 It used a rationalistic and quantitative approach that assumes the 
existence of ³an identifiable and quantifiable public interest´.12 Such approach needs 
conspicuous scientific and technical data which, given time and resource constraints, 
are often inaccurate or uncertain.13 Critics also point out that technical planning lacks 
vision, that it is characterized by short-time horizons and by short-sighted and ad hoc 
value choices.14  
On the other hand, spatial planning is also intended to include ³WKHinstitutional and 
social resources through which [legislative and regulatory] frameworks are 
                                                                                                                                          
basis for this particular discussion. For different interpretations see, for instance: K. Bishop, M. 
Tewdwr-Jones, D. WilLQNVRQ µ)URP 6SDWLDO WR /RFDO 7KH LPSDFW RI WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ /RFDO
$XWKRULW\ 3ODQQLQJ LQ WKH 8.¶   -RXUQDO RI (QYLURQPHQWDO 3ODQQLQJ DQG 0DQDJHPHQW
309. 
8
 COE, European Landscape Convention (adopted on 20 October 2000, ETS 176, entered into force 1 
March 2004) 1 ETS 176, article 5. 
9
 Dudley (ed.), Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (IUCN 2008) 20-2. 
10
 UK Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Planning Policy Statement 1: Delivering Sustainable 
Development (UK Government 2005) 
11
 Couclelis (n 4) 1356; the same point is made also in Beek, Burrough, McCormack (eds.) Quantified 
Land Evaluation (ITC Publication 1987); Driessen, Konijn, Land Use Systems Analysis, (Wageningen 
Agricultural University 1991); +DOO µ7KHFLW\RI WKHRU\¶, in LeGates, Stout (eds.), The City Reader 
(Routledge 1996) 382. 
12
 Briassoulis, µ:KRSODQVZKRVHVXVWDLQDELOLW\"$OWHUQDWLYHUROHVIRUSODQQHUV¶-RXUQDO
of Environmental Planning and Management 889, at 893. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Couclelis (n 4) 1357. 
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LPSOHPHQWHG FKDOOHQJHG DQG WUDQVIRUPHG´15 In recent years a resurgence of 
strategic planning and the introduction of strategic environmental assessment have 
revamSHGWKHLGHDWKDW³SROLWLFVDQGFRQIOLFWOLHDWWKHKHDUWRISODQQLQJ´.16 As noted 
E\3DOPHUHWDOµODQGJRYHUQDQFHLVPRUHDERXWSRZHUDQGWKHSROLWLFDOHFRQRP\RI
ODQG>WKDQLWLVDERXWWHFKQLFDOFDSDFLW\@¶17 Spatial planning is widely recognised as 
having the important political function of creating a process for the reconciliation of 
diverging stakeholder positions and a restructuring of their social relations,18 as 
shown in box 6.1; it is an arena for political confrontation in which governments are 
asked to bring coherence and unity among different group positions. As such it can 
be an instrument for conflict prevention and conflict resolution.19  
International initiatives designed to improve land administration systems in 
developing countries have been relatively unsuccessful for they focused 
disproportionately on technical and institutional aspects while ignoring burning 
political questions, such as who benefits from the existing legal, institutional and 
policy frameworks for land, what are the incentive structures for the various 
stakeholders or who has what influence on land use decisions.  In tropical forests, 
technocratic spatial plans would fail to attract support from stakeholders, therefore 
suffering from enforcement problems and the absence of a stable political 
environment.20 A politically astute process is therefore necessary to the successful 
implementation of the plan.  
                                                 
15
 'DYRXGL &UDZIRUG 0HKPRRG µClimate Change and Spatial Planning responses¶ LQ 'DYRXGL
Crawford, Mehmood (eds.), Planning for Climate Change: strategies for mitigation and adaptation 
for spatial planners (Earthscan 2009) 14. 
16
 Jones et al, Strategic environmental assessment and land use planning: an international evaluation 
(Earthscan 2005) 4. 
17
 Palmer, Fricska, Wehrmann, Towards improved land governance (UN-HABITAT 2011) 1. 
18
 Jones (n 16); Dalal-Clayton, Dent, Dubois, Rural Planning in the Developing World with a Special 
Focus on Natural Resources: Lessons Learned and Potential Contributions to Sustainable 
Livelihoods - An Overview (IIED 2000). 
19
 Susskind, van der Wansem, Ciccareli, Mediating Land Use Disputes: Pros and Cons (Lincoln 
Institute of Land Policy 2000); Solberg, Miina (eds.), Conflict Management and Public Participation 
in Land Management (Proceedings of the International Conference, Joensuu, Finland, June 1996). 
20
 Dalal-Clayton et al (n 18) 31. 
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Box 6.1: An example of conflict-SURQHSODQQLQJµIRUWUHVVFRQVHUYDWLRQ¶21 
Protected areas have typically been established using top-down regulatory measures based 
on planning decisions that had little concern for local realities. This approach led to 
mounting tensions between conservation objectives and human needs. Today, more than 
122,000 nationally designated protected areas coYHU RYHU  SHUFHQW RI WKH HDUWK¶V ODQG
surface and another 1.6 percent of the oceans.22 Permanent settlements are already found 
within the boundaries of 70 percent of protected areas in tropical forest regions, and some 
form of human land use occurs around all but the most remote protected areas.23  
A paradigmatic example of how top-down segregative planning can backfire is provided by 
the expansion of forest reserves in India in the early twentieth century. The overwhelming 
complexity of regulating human use of forests outside protected areas led the government to 
expand its system of forest reserves without consultation. But the widespread and 
coordinated noncompliance by local villagers with regulatory planning undermined the 
conservation goal and gradually forced the forest department to convert many of these 
protected areas into community forests managed by village-level forest councils.24 Many 
protected areas established through top-down planning decisions have proven impossible to 
defend from illegal invasions, and their status is increasingly threatened by downgrading, 
downsizing, and degazettement.25 Degazettement is a popular measure used by regional 
governments in Indonesia to reduce the extent of protected forests in their territory, and the 
national Government too has recently justified it on grounds of the de facto degraded 
condition of certain forests.26 This proves that the long-term effectiveness of environmental 
protection measures must be based on a vision of territorial development shared by all 
stakeholders. 
%ULDVVRXOLV FDOOV µK\EULG SODQQLQJ¶ DQ DSSURDFK WKDW UHFRJQLVHV WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI
both technical and political elements.27 Analytical data provide a basis to understand 
                                                 
21
 Brockington, Igoe, µEviction for Conservation. A Global Overview¶ (2006)  4(3) Conservation and 
Society 424, at  443. 
22
 Bertzky et al, Protected Planet Report 2012: Tracking progress towards global targets for 
protected areas (IUCN/UNEP 2012) 5. 
23
 DeFULHVHWDOµ/DQGXVHFKDQJHDURXQGSURWHFWHGDreas: management to balance human needs and 
HFRORJLFDOIXQFWLRQV¶2007) 17(4) Ecological Applications 1031, at 1034. 
24
 6HH $JUDZDO µ&RPPXQLW\ ,QWLPDWH *RYHUQPHQW DQG WKH 0DNLQJ RI (QYLURQPHQWDO 6XEMHFWV LQ
.XPDRQ,QGLD¶&XUUHQW$QWKURSRORJ\$JUDZDO2VWURPµ&ROOHFWLYH$FWLRQ3URSHUW\
5LJKWV DQG 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ LQ 5HVRXUFH 8VH LQ ,QGLD DQG 1HSDO¶   3ROLWLFV 	 6RFLHW\
485. 
25
 µDRZQJUDGLQJ¶ is any decrease in legal restrictions on the number, magnitude, or extent of human 
activLWLHVZLWKLQDSURWHFWHGDUHDµGRZQVL]LQJ¶is a decrease in size of a protected area through a legal 
ERXQGDU\FKDQJH µGHJD]HWWHPHQW¶ is a loss of legal protection for an entire protected area; Mascia, 
Pailler, µProtected area downgrading, downsizing, and degazettement (PADDD) and its conservation 
implications¶ (2010) 00 Conservation Letters 1.  
26
 6LPDPRUDµ*RYW>VLF@OHJDOL]HVFRQYHUVLRQRISURWHFWHGIRUHVWDUHDV¶Jakarta Post (3 March 2010) 
cited in Mascia and Pailler (n 28) 5. 
27
 Briassoulis (n 12) 895. 
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the character, causes and consequences of forest loss and the possible measures to 
regulate it, setting a safe minimum standard below which the desired policy 
objective cannot be achieved. Within this boundary, stakeholders negotiate trade-offs 
to achieve consensus over the final outcome. While spatial planning as a theoretical 
discipline is often confined in the orthodox view of the extremes, its practical 
application is invariably hybrid: knowingly approaching it from this perspective 
would promote popular support while maintaining a firm scientific basis. 
6.1.2. Principles of good spatial planning 
If planning is a hybrid exercise rooted in social science, its implementation cannot be 
defined by technical rationalism only. Value choices are made when deciding who 
has what rights to use land and resources, how competing uses (and the interests 
underpinning such uses) are to be reconciled and how benefits and costs should be 
distributed. General principles emerge from the literature to guide these choices.28 
The democratic principle postulates that planning decisions should be made by 
accountable bodies with legitimate authority, through procedures established in law 
that ensure fairness and respect of human rights, and taking into account 
recommendations made by relevant experts. Accountability should be clearly defined 
at all levels of administration and local communities must gain direct and substantial 
benefits, either monetary or in kind, from sound local management.29 Corruption and 
vested interests should be addressed by relevant laws and with an active role of the 
judiciary, with particular attention to avoid µVOHLJKWVRIKDQG¶E\ WKH6WDWHRU to de 
facto evict people through zoning.30  
The subsidiarity principle states that planning matters should be handled by the least 
centralised authority/entity capable of addressing them effectively.31 Top-down 
                                                 
28
 I use in particular the classification proposed by UNECE (n 3) 11-2. 
29
 De Wit, Verheye, µLand Use Planning for Sustainable Development¶ in Verheye (ed.), Land use, 
land cover and soil science (vol. III, EOLSS Publishers 2003) 18-9. 
30
 /\VWHU µREDD+, transparency, participation and resource rights: the role of law¶  (QY
6FLHQFH	3RODWVHHDOVR5LERW/DUVRQµReducing REDD risks: Affirmative policy on an 
uneven playing field¶,QW-RIWKH&RPPRQV 
31
 The principle has been most famously adopted to guide environmental policy at the EU level to 
justify and limit the action of the Union vis-á-vis Member States in areas of shared competence: 
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planning demands a high degree of capacity in government, an in-depth 
understanding of local trends, and a high degree of political consensus.32 Because 
these conditions are typically absent in tropical forests, decentralised forest 
management has gained ground in the last two decades. However, the allocation of 
competences must be based on a capacity assessment: whenever the scale of the 
objective being pursued cannot properly be addressed at the local level, the decision 
must be taken at higher levels. Box 6.2 shows why subsidiarity is a better guiding 
principle for planning than decentralisation. 
The integration principle affirms that integration should be sought between levels of 
government (vertical or multi-level integration) and across policy sectors (horizontal 
or multi-sector integration) so as to promote coherence in decision-making and avoid 
conflicts within the administration.33 Spatial planning can promote multi-level 
integration by articulating powers and responsibilities for land and natural resource 
use at various levels. With regards to multi-sector coordination, increased 
institutional coordination could be achieved by creating a high-level planning task 
force that enables a holistic and integrated approach to land resources management. 
The participation principle maintains that opportunities to participate in planning 
decisions should extend beyond the normal democratic process, that transparency 
must be ensured by providing access to information, and that stakeholders must have 
the possibility to make formal objections on draft plans and appeal against planning 
decisions. Hoare notes how rigid planning instruments such as zoning have 
systematically failed to achieve their goals when employed at large scale because 
they do not muster popular support.34 Planning can stimulate compliance using legal 
compulsion or economic incentives, but it is through participation that genuine 
                                                                                                                                          
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (adopted 13 December 2007, entered into force 1 
December 2009) (Consolidated version 2012) OJ C326, article 5. 
32
 Chomitz, At loggerheads?: Agricultural Expansion, Poverty Reduction, and Environment in the 
Tropical Forests (World Bank 2007) 171. 
33
 In this sense, the integration principle is not to be confounded with the international principle of 
integration underpinning the concept of sustainable development, i.e. the idea that environmental 
considerations should be integrated with development policies in the early phases of decision-making. 
34
 Hoare, Divided Forests: towards fairer zoning of forest lands (RFUK 2006). 
158 
 
support is generated. Mediation and conflict resolution are important parts of the 
exercise.35  
The proportionality principle strives to balance commitment with flexibility in 
spatial planning: on the one hand, the peremptoriness of spatial plans creates 
certainty for investors and is crucial to safeguard finite resources; on the other hand, 
flexibility is necessary to adapt to evolving economic, social and technological 
trends, which in turn ensures the relevance and resilience of outcomes.36 Hall states 
that a good planning framework promotes policy learning, which is ³a deliberate 
attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience and 
new information´.37 He points out that centralised planning and technocratic 
modelling do not provide the flexibility needed for timely policy learning. This is 
FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK &KRPLW]¶ LPSOLFLW suggestion that participatory planning is 
intrinsically adaptive and that priority should be given to building the conditions for 
the continued, participative revision of plans and their impacts.38 
The precautionary principle VWDWHV WKDW µZKHUH WKHSRWHQWLal damage caused by any 
development activity is serious or irreversible, the lack of certainty about impacts 
should not be used as a reason for inappropriate policy decisions or the failure to 
WDNH FRUUHFWLYH DFWLRQ¶39 This principle has found recognition in key international 
instruments and is central to the development of environmental law. Precaution 
demands that when potential damage caused by a development activity identified in 
a spatial plan is serious or irreversible, lack of scientific certainty about impacts does 
not constitute a valid reason for allowing the activity. The principle is applied, inter 
alia, by carrying out strategic social and environmental assessments of spatial 
plans.40  
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 Chomitz (n 32) 159-61. 
36
 Ibid 31; Graham, Vignola, REDD-plus and agriculture: A cross-sectoral approach to REDD-plus 
and implications for the poor (ODI/CATIE 2011) 5. 
37
 Hall, µPolicy paradigms, social learning and the state: the case of economic policy-making in 
Britain¶ (1993) 25(3) Comparative Politics 275, at 278. 
38
 Chomitz (n 32) 159-61. 
39
 Ibid 12. 
40
 See, e.g., Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain 
public and private projects on the environment (1985) OJ L175; Convention on Environmental Impact 
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Box 6.2: Pros and cons of decentralisation in forest planning and management 
Some of the literature heralds decentralisation as the panacea for all management 
problems.41 Some ills associated with centralised planning are: the inequity and 
ineffectiveness of decisions taken for the people but not with the people; the increased 
sectoral interests and institutional competition of central governments; the insufficient 
capacity to gather, absorb and manage the necessary information at large scales; and the 
endemic institutional weakness and corruption in developing countrLHV¶ FHQWUDO
administrations. CRQVLGHUHG D µVRFLDOLVW¶ SROLF\ FHQWUDOLVHG SODQQLQJ IDFHG ideological 
challenges too:42 in the late 1980s decentralisation became a pillar of the neoliberal paradigm 
introduced by the Washington Consensus and spread to the developing world through 
changes in international aid policy.43 Planning for the people became no longer acceptable 
and planning with the people proved too complex, so planning by the people became the 
UDOO\LQJ FU\ RI PDQ\ µQHZ¶ SODQQHUV44 In forest policy, the transition to decentralised 
management promised a more equitable distribution of benefits and reduced poverty, the 
empowerment of marginalised groups, improved local accountability and sustainable 
management.45  
However, evidence challenges this idealised conception of decentralisation and suggests that 
subsidiarity is a better guiding principle. While the recognition of tenure has had a positive 
impact on development, in fact, the devolution of powers to local governments is not 
intrinsically more successful than central planning.46 Some of the problems of 
decentralisation are: local residents lacking management capacity; corruption of local 
authorities and leaders;47 nominal participation in land and resource management;48 and a 
loss of the strategic dimensLRQRISODQQLQJZKLFK LQ VRPHFDVHVGLGQRW DOORZ WR µVHH WKH
IRUHVWIRUWKHWUHHV¶49 
                                                                                                                                          
Assessment in a Transboundary Context (adopted 25 February 1991, entered into force 10 September 
1997) 1989 UNTS 310; Council Directive 2001/42/EC of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the 
effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (2001) OJ L197/30. 
41
 See Selfa, Endter-Wada µThe politics of community-based conservation in natural resource 
management: a focus for international comparative analysis¶Environment and Planning A 
962; De Wit and Verheye (n 29). 
42
 Couclelis (n 4) 1358. 
43
 See Mosley, Harrigan Toye, Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy Based Lending (vol. 1, 
Routledge 1995) 
44
 Couclelis (n 4) 1358. 
45
 Dalal-Clayton et al (n 18) 31; Chomitz (n 32) 171. 
46
 Dalal-Clayton et al (n 18) 31-4. 
47
 P. Shyamsundar, E. Araral, S. Weeraratne, Devolution of Resource Rights, Poverty, and Natural 
Resource Management: A Review (World Bank 20055%ULIIDXOWµOur localism: part I - The 
structure of local government law¶ 90(1) Columbia Law Review 1, at 105. 
48
 Selfa and Endter-Wada (n 41) 958. 
49
 *RRGVWDGW3DUWLGiULRµ6SDWLDO3ODQQLQJDQG(QYLURQPHQWDO$VVHVVPHQWV¶LQSukhdev (ed.), TEEB: 
The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity for Local and Regional Policy Makers (TEEB 2010) 
105-23. 
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The prevention principle postulates that plans should not only respond to 
environmental harm and degradation, but also aim to prevent it by regulating 
development activities within the environmental limits. This is based on the 
consideration that preventing environmental harm is cheaper, easier and safer than 
reacting to it. Finally, rural households whose livelihoods depend on the local 
environment should be allowed access to these resources or adequate compensation 
when this is not possible (equity principle).  
The application of these principles is likely to make spatial planning more resilient, 
legitimate and effective. Moreover, if complemented by adequate incentives, good 
spatial planning is more likely to lead to outcomes that are environmentally, 
economically and socially sustainable. 
6.2. Achieving sustainable landscape governance using spatial 
planning 
6.2.1. Spatial planning as a technical exercise to tackle the drivers  
Spatial planning can contribute to achieving sustainable landscape governance by 
identifying adequate responses to the drivers of forest loss at the most appropriate 
level. The stakes are clear: global expansion of rural land (for agricultural 
production), urban land (urbanisation), and land set aside for environmental goals 
(achieving REDD-plus/climate change mitigation and adaptation, reducing 
desertification, protecting biodiversity and providing other ecosystem services) are 
strictly interconnected trends that demand a better organisation of activities across 
the landscape. The importance of taking a holistic approach to landscape 
governance, and contextually to improve the geographical organisation of rural 
activities, is gaining recognition in climate change discussions as a valuable climate 
mitigation strategy. The Global Landscapes Forum Outcome Statement50 
recommended that REDD-SOXV QHJRWLDWRUV ³FRQVLGHU data from land-use change 
models that simulate and map future biodiversity loss, commodity production trends 
                                                 
50
 Global Landscapes Forum Outcome Statement (Warsaw, 4 December 2013) 
<www.landscapes.org/global-landscapes-forum-outcome-statement/#.UsF3_dJDt0g> Accessed 10 
February 2014. 
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and change in land cover, to inform land-use planning and REDD-SOXV SROLFLHV´
Spatial planning and REDD-plus can thus work hand in hand to promote sustainable 
landscape governance. 
$V D JHQHUDO REVHUYDWLRQ WKH GULYHUV¶ DQDO\VLV KLJKOLJhts that, while forest 
degradation is a management problem, deforestation is largely a spatial problem 
influenced by the location of development as much as by the intensification of 
production. *UDKDPDQG9LJQRODVSHOO LWRXWFOHDUO\E\VWDWLQJWKDW³WKH Oocation in 
which various policy options are implemented will also influence their effectiveness 
in achieving REDD-plus goals, and overall climate change mitigation. Landscape 
scale land-use planning will therefore be essential to underpin these decisions and 
identify areas that are appropriate for agricultural intensification, REDD-plus and 
RWKHUODQGXVHV´51  
(a) Segregative spatial planning 
Spatial planning can help address both deforestation and degradation by using two 
techniques. First, segregative planning separates the natural environment from 
human land uses. Traditionally, it has accorded defensive protection to natural 
ecosystems via regulatory instruments such as zoning and strict conservation areas 
(µplanning for places¶). Segregation of rural and urban uses, natural and built 
environments, and the designation of strictly protected areas, embodied and 
reinforced an idea of nature as external to society and opposed to development.52 
This technique presents numerous problems. Ring-fencing parks and protected areas 
PD\ SURYLGH µD VLJQDO WR QRQ-conservationists that they are free to develop 
XQSURWHFWHG DUHDV ZLWK OLWWOH HQYLURQPHQWDO VWHZDUGVKLS¶53 which in the case of 
REDD-SOXVZRXOGWULJJHUSUREOHPVRIµOHDNDJH¶54 Moreover, segregative techniques 
often disregard local rights and preferences, breaching the equity principle.55 Finally, 
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 Graham and Vignola (n 36) 5. 
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 Whatmore, Boucher µBargaining with Nature: The Discourse and Practice of 'Environmental 
Planning Gain'¶(1993) 18(2) Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 166, at 169-70. 
53
 Geisler, µMust Biodiversity Hot-Spots Be Social Not-Spots?: Win-Win Ecology as Sustainable 
Social Policy¶ 4(1) Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development 119, at 120. 
54
 See chapter 2 section 2.1. 
55
 McNeely, µ7KHIXWXUHRIQDWLRQDOSDUNV¶ (1990) 32 Environmental Education 16.  
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by limiting the activities of local forest dwellers segregation also increases the 
opportunity cost of REDD-plus and creates security concerns.  
Box 6.3: Segregative planning in Indonesia and Brazil 
Indonesia has only recently begun to integrate environmental concerns into spatial planning. 
For instance, Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 requires the strategic environmental assessment 
of all spatial plans, including on carbon emissions.56 Planning is also being used to achieve 
environmental objectives. Alongside the national moratorium on new palm oil concessions,57 
the World Resource Institute and Sekala are working with the Government of West 
Kalimantan on a project to relocate palm oil production on degraded land as part of their 
national REDD-plus effort. The project has identified nine suitable sites for a total of about 
3.3 million hectares of degraded land suitable for palm oil expansion.58  
The state of Sumatra is experimenting with an ecosystem-based spatial plan that guides local 
and regional authorities in the allocation of palm oil and pulp and paper concessions. A 
technical programme mapped high-biodiversity and high-carbon habitats as well as the 
ongoing phenomena of erosion and degradation, so as to identify priorities for conservation, 
restoration and PES schemes including REDD-plus.59 Recommendations were then provided 
to district governments that enjoy considerable autonomy in concluding spatial plans.  
Similarly, Brazil has been using agro-ecological zoning since 2002 to concentrate farming 
on lands with better climatic, hydrological and soil conditions. In 2009 and 2010 zoning was 
extended to sugarcane and palm oil respectively and more emphasis was placed on 
ecological criteria.60 Sugarcane cultivation is banned in the Amazon (including previously 
deforested areas), in the hydrological basin of the Pantanal wetland, and more generally in 
all areas with high conservation-value and/or high declivity.61 By contrast, the agro-
ecological zoning of palm oil aims to incentivise the recovery of degraded land within the 
Amazon basin. Nationally protected and indigenous lands are also excluded. Agro-
ecological zoning is implemented via a combination of financial incentives (particularly 
access to credit) and regulatory enforcement (i.e. a permit system for the use of local 
processing facilities). 
However, there are cases in which segregation is the appropriate way forward (see 
box 6.3). Planning authorities can prevent development in remote and uninhabited 
regions or in areas with sparse population and a traditional economy of subsistence, 
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QHLWKHU RI ZKLFK LQWHUIHUHV ZLWK VWDNHKROGHUV¶ SUHIHUHQFHV +HUH PHDVXUHV WKDW
maintain the remoteness and inaccessibility of unthreatened forests - including 
protected areas and bans on infrastructure development ± are likely to be successful. 
Another scenario is when large-scale deforestation has already occurred in 
neighbouring regions and there is mounting pressure from exogenous actors to 
expand into new forests. Because the threat is non-specific, non-immediate and 
exogenous, planning authorities can prevent the onset of drivers in such areas.  
(b) Integrative spatial planning 
The second technique is integration, a strategy that strives to reconcile the human 
and natural sub-V\VWHPVE\IRFXVLQJRQHFRORJLFDOIRUPVRIODQGXVHµSODQQLQJIRU
SHRSOH¶62 Integrative spatial planning seeks to achieve a win-win situation whereby 
human needs are met while maintaining ecological functions.63 Typical examples of 
integrated land uses are low-carbon agriculture, agroforestry, and sustainable forest 
management. Where human populations are already heavily reliant on local 
resources, integration promotes livelihood alternatives that maintain human well-
being while contrasting the overexploitation of forests.64  The spatial dimension of 
integration is evident, for instance, in those cases in which geographically-specific 
incentives are used to promote a transition to low-impact activities. Integrative 
planning is the better technique in inhabited forest landscapes while segregative 
planning can be used to preserve natural forest landscapes. 
Integration is a more recent technique in environmental planning, with a number of 
international initiatives emerging in the last four decades (see box 6.4). Since the 
1970s, agroforestry has been recognized as an effective way of expanding low-
impact agriculture while providing habitats for biodiversity and maximising the flow 
of ecosystem services provided by forests.65 Much of the over 400 million hectares 
of forest managed by local communities or indigenous peoples worldwide is 
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subjected to sustainable multi-functional use,66 and many forests that were long 
FRQVLGHUHG µXQWRXFKHG¶ RU µYLUJLQ¶ DUH UHYHDOLQJ VLJQV RI KXPDQ LQWHUYHQWLRQ Ey 
indigenous communities, especially in the distribution of edible species.67 Yet in 
their review of integrated conservation and development projects in tropical forest 
contexts, Blom et al note that win-win situations are exceedingly rare.68 This is due, 
inter alia, to insufficient clarity in goals, institutional constraints and a failure to take 
into account local stakes and priorities.69  
Past attempts to promote integration were not always successful, and the degree to 
which environmental and development goals can be combined remains an open 
question.70 The negotiation of trade-offs between conservation and development in 
the forest context is complicated by two factors: first, that the benefits of sustainable 
resource management are not immediately evident at local scale while costs are 
borne upfront (e.g. reduced economic output); second, that monetary compensation 
for lost development opportunities may be either insufficient or wrong in kind. 
Financial support from REDD-plus is certainly critical to herald a transition to 
sustainability, but payments must be reinvested into locally appropriate forms of 
development.71 
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Box 6.4: Integrative approaches to planning in international environmental policy 
Limited forms of integration between resource use and nature conservation have been 
acknowledged since the early environmental treaties.72 However, it is only in the last four 
decades that integration was actively pursued at the planning level with mixed-used 
biosphere reserves, buffer zones, and Integrated Conservation and Development Projects.73 
The UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Programme is viewed by some as the gold standard 
for integrative environmental protection.74 Biosphere Reserves served as experimental 
laboratories where conservation and human development are organised spatially.75  
Another interesting conservation concept is that of cultural parks and landscapes as 
markedly different from protected areas qua parks.76 Cultural landscapes in Britain and 
France, for instance, support human settlement, farming, forestry, and commerce while 
emphasizing natural and cultural protection.77 The 1972 World Heritage Convention 
provides for the conservation of sites of outstanding natural or cultural importance.78  
In the early 1990s, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
introduced two categories of protected areas that foster integration.79 µ3URWHFWHG/DQGVFDSHV¶
are places where the interaction of people and nature over time has produced significant 
aesthetic, ecological, and/or culture value while VWLOO UHWDLQLQJKLJKELRGLYHUVLW\ µ0DQDJHG
5HVRXUFH 3URWHFWHG $UHDV¶ DUH SUHGRPLQDQWO\ XQPRGLILHG QDWXUDO V\VWHPV PDQDJHG WR
combine long-term maintenance of biological diversity with the provision of a sustainable 
flow of natural products and services to meet community needs.80 Section 6.4 will introduce 
some of the instruments that promote integrative planning at the more abstract level of 
policy principles. 
(c) Spatial planning and the drivers 
There are contexts in which integration is only second best to segregation and others 
where development is worth some environmental degradation. In some instances, 
tolerable land use restrictions yield great benefits in terms of biodiversity, such as in 
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areas where even small disturbances could create serious damage. Conversely, in 
frontier regions where forests are already fragmented and degraded it could make 
sense to encourage industrial forest management which involves the plantation of 
FRPPHUFLDOO\ YLDEOH VSHFLHV :KHQ LW LV SRVVLEOH WR LGHQWLI\ µVPDOO ORVV±big gaiQ¶
RSSRUWXQLWLHV VFLHQWLVWV VSHDN RI µQRQOLQHDU UHODWLRQVKLSV¶ EHWZHHQ HFRORJLFDO
responses and the area under protection.81  
The choice of which technique should be used ultimately depends on how the driver 
has evolved in a particular geographical context. It is nevertheless possible to make 
some generic observations on the suitability of spatial planning techniques to tackle 
the drivers. Commercial ranching and intensive agriculture (for food or biofuels) are 
land uses incompatible with maintaining carbon stock and other ecological services 
provided by forests. These activities cannot be part of REDD-plus and must thus be 
located onto non-forested lands using a segregative planning approach. A typical 
example of spatial segregation is land swaps, the idea of exchanging concessions 
over carbon-dense lands with low-carbon lands82 and governments should become 
directly involved in such efforts using their land use information and planning 
capability.83  
Another interesting application of the segregative approach is in the context of the 
Land Sparing Hypothesis, the idea that pristine (and carbon rich) ecosystems can be 
preserved by boosting outputs on existing agricultural lands.84 Investments in 
agricultural productivity increase the supply of produce which in turn lowers 
commodity prices and thus the incentive to clear more land to produce such 
commodities. However, this relationship assumes a fixed demand for agricultural 
products which is only applicable to cases in which individual small scale farmers 
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are isolated from markets and are thus unable to sell additional produce.85 More 
commonly, intensification increases deforestation thanks to higher profits, greater 
access to capital, increased access to international commodity markets and product 
GLYHUVLILFDWLRQ ³1R /DQG 6SDULQJ +\SRWKHVLV´86 In order to work, the Land 
Sparing Hypothesis should be complemented by regulatory measures that limit the 
spatial expansion of production on carbon-dense ecosystems. Such measures can 
have various degrees of peremptoriness: from normative instruments that outlaw 
certain kinds of developments in forest regions, to economic incentives that make 
production in forest regions less convenient (such as geographically-explicit fiscal 
incentives and the selective provision of infrastructures that improve access to 
markets in non-forest areas). Policies that combine incentives with spatial 
regulations are regularly used by central governments for social and economic 
purposes, particularly to drive investments to less well-off regions, and similar 
strategies could be used to reduce forest emissions.  
Spatial planning can also limit the impact of industrial logging, most typically by 
refusing to grant concessions for timber and pulp extraction in primary forests. New 
concessions could be awarded on secondary and degraded forests, imposing a 
management regime based on restoration/reforestation and sustainable forest 
management (including by planting native commercial species). Planning should 
also seek to identify degraded areas at the forest margins that, if opportunely restored 
DQG FRPPHUFLDOO\ H[SORLWHG FRXOG ZRUN DV µSURWHFWLYH EHOWV¶ IRU WKH LQWDFW DUHDV
Similarly to agricultural development, these planning measures can be realised 
through regulation, incentives or a combination of both.  
When deforestation is caused by small-scale activities such as farming and wood 
extraction, integrative planning approaches are most effective. Sustainable practices 
can be promoted through a participatory process that limits tenure rights through 
local land use plans. Various kinds of incentives, from PES and carbon payments to 
subsidised credit for sustainable activities can be used to promote compliance with 
such plans. Investments in improved agricultural practices, agroforestry, sustainable 
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forest management or eco-efficient wood-burning stoves reduce human impacts by 
lessening local reliance on unsustainable activities and by facilitating the transition 
to a low-carbon local economy. In Tanzania, devolution of land use management 
responsibilities to local communities (which began in the 1980s) is organised 
through multi-level spatial planning: the negotiation of the plan, the demarcation of 
boundaries and the registration of tenure rights was done at the village level, but they 
were informed by a broad vision and science-based regulations decided at the higher 
levels.87 Almost half of the national budget for environmental protection is allocated 
to spatial planning, with encouraging results: in all areas where the process was 
completed at village level, deforestation decreased by 90 percent.88 
The expansion of surface transport infrastructures (roads, rail-tracks and ports) is a 
good proxy for the spatial distribution of development activities within forest areas. 
Because of their positive socio-economic impact, and because they are a visible sign 
of government action, transport infrastructures are the cornerstone of development 
strategies in most developing nations and enjoy the full support of multilateral 
financial institutions. Infrastructures can reduce pressure on forests by improving 
production efficiency in non-forest areas, or they can facilitate economic expansion 
across the territory and into remote forest areas.89  
The coming decades will see an unprecedented expansion of surface transport 
infrastructure in developing nations. For instance, the Initiative for the Integration of 
the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) is realising two new highways 
in the Amazon and a waterway that connects the town of Manta in coastal Ecuador 
with the city of Manaus in the heart of the Brazilian Amazon. The future rate of 
deforestation will hence be affected by whether or not public authorities try to 
minimise the impact of these new infrastructures on forests. In particular, roads grant 
access to undisturbed forest areas facilitating illegal colonization and studies 
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demonstrate that almost all new deforestation and forest degradation occur within 50 
kilometres of a road.90  
Given such significant environmental impact, Lawrence and Balford suggest that ³D
collaborative, global zoning exercise is needed to identify where road building or 
improvement should be a priority, where it should be restricted and where existing 
URDGVVKRXOGEHFORVHG´91 Developing countries can carry out an impact assessment 
of the social, economic and environmental impact of major road projects in forest 
areas,92 taking climate change considerations into account consistent with the proviso 
of UNFCCC article 4(1)(f). Planners could consider the use of alternative 
infrastructures such as railways and fluvial transport that do not provide the same 
level of accessibility. Even if roads are eventually built, adequate planning could 
reduce carbon impacts by establishing protected areas along the road, which would 
provide a credible legal deterrent for human expansion into the forest.  
Spatial planning could lead to a direct reduction of forest emissions in all cases 
where a low-carbon solution comes at little extra cost. Yet even when relocating 
development projects or achieving sustainable resource use is costly, costs may still 
be lower than trying to implement REDD-plus without previous planning since the 
fragmentation of land use decisions at the individual level would not help the 
identification of cost-effective alternative to business-as-usual emissions.  
6.2.2. Planning as a political tool for improved decision-making  
The second way in which spatial planning can lead to sustainable landscape 
governance is by mainstreaming participatory processes in land use decisions at 
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multiple levels. $JUDZDOQRWHVWKDW³ZKHUHJURXSVDUHYHU\VPDOODQGFRPSHWHIRUD
share in local resources, their performance in protecting resources may improve if 
government policies create institutional incentives for smaller groups to join 
WRJHWKHU´93 Planning can thus be used as a focal point to mainstream the 
participation and democratic accountability principles in land use decisions, 
including REDD-plus. As seen earlier, the REDD-plus safeguards require broad 
stakeholder participation in the readiness process. Looking forward, however, there 
is much less certainty that the participatory structures and processes established in 
the preparatory phases will be maintained to ensure that stakeholders continue to 
have a say on land use decisions. 
Spatial planning does not, in itself, guarantee continued stakeholder participation 
either. To the contrary, the participatory process may be limited to the initial phases 
of plan-making and, once a decision has been taken, an element of rigidity may 
prevent further influence.94 However, recent experiences in developed countries 
demonstrate that spatial plans can indeed be flexible and adaptive if adequate 
regulatory and institutional frameworks are in place.95 Plans may have to be 
reviewed due to changing circumstances (e.g. a major natural event changes the 
geography of a locality making certain land uses impossible), ineffectiveness (e.g. it 
sets environmental protection goals that unduly restrict resource use rights and 
triggers illegal activities) or conflicts. Recognising that plans are flexible instruments 
implies that the planning process itself should be flexible and adaptive. 
There is nothing intrinsically averse to continued participation in spatial planning: it 
depends on the balance struck between certainty and adaptiveness, i.e. whether, to 
what extent and under what conditions amendments to the plan are allowed. There 
may be institutionalised opportunities to renegotiate parts of the plan at certain 
intervals, e.g. in the context of annual or biennial reviews of implementation. The 
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SODQ¶V level of detail is also important to determine flexibility and adaptability: 
spatial plans that regulate in great detail individual uses will likely be more difficult 
to conclude and less prone to be re-discussed. 
Spatial planning can thus be set up as a tool to channel participation in land use 
decisions. It would provide a permanent institutional structure that can be used by 
stakeholders on a regular basis to receive information about the plan, provide further 
inputs, or file complaints. This institutional structure would facilitate communication 
across levels of government, and between stakeholders and the public sector using a 
nested system.  
A clear division of responsibilities is key to ensure transparency and accountability. 
The national level sets the strategic vision and the legal framework. The strategic 
YLVLRQGHILQHVWKHJRDOVDQGSULQFLSOHVRISODQQLQJZKLFKJXLGHµWKHGLVSDUDWHDFWLRQV
RIJRYHUQPHQWGHSDUWPHQWVWKHSULYDWHVHFWRUDQGFRPPXQLWLHV¶96 REDD-plus may 
influence this vision and provide resources for its realisation using incentives and 
disincentives in a macro-economic framework.97 Central governments also establish 
the legal framework for planning. Legislation must clarify roles and responsibilities 
of government agencies at all levels, the requirements for collaboration among local 
authorities and for public participation, the mechanism for the supervision of lower 
level authorities, and the methods by which incentives and sanctions are applied.98 
The government could run national consultations on certain parts of the proposed 
legislation, or it could seek the input of established stakeholder groups (e.g. 
federation of agribusiness industries, federations of local and indigenous 
communities, coalitions of national and international NGOs and so forth) but 
participation is generally limited at this level. 
Regional and State governments interpret and adapt national policies to regional 
conditions.99 The regional spatial plan is a more comprehensive and detailed 
document which organises the distribution of development, redevelopment and 
investment, the coordination of infrastructure and the preservation of environmental 
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resources.100 This is the ideal level for the spatial identification of natural areas that 
deserve particular protection, and for putting in place measures that address large-
scale commercial drivers. Segregative planning is typically decided at this level (box 
6.3)'XDQ\HWDOVWDWHWKDWWKHUHJLRQDOSODQPXVWPDSWKHUHJLRQ¶VQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHV
the existing protected natural and rural areas, and a hierarchy of the areas with 
development priorities.101 Once these sectors are mapped, governments at every level 
can use incentives and coordinate policies to prioritise development.  
Smaller jurisdictional units such as districts or provinces may further link local 
priorities to the higher levels, providing a rapid response to grassroots needs as well 
as information and technical support.102 Landscape governance arrangements are 
established at this level. Participation may consist of consultations and face-to-face 
meetings between local stakeholders, civil society organisations, local politicians and 
business leaders. District plans generally include the regulation of tenure rights over 
natural resources, enforcement provisions and, in decentralised contexts, service 
delivery (e.g. water, schools, infrastructures).  
Finally, local land use plans detail the tenure restrictions and the distribution of the 
relative penalties and incentives in a well-defined area. This can be done on 
community lands or across administrative boundaries (e.g. in the case of national 
parks or large-scale community-managed forests).103 Local plans may be relevant in 
the context of REDD-plus projects or programmes that allow for some development 
within a protected carbon sink, e.g. if they permit changing land use over a portion of 
the territory. Participation at this level is at its highest, with communities actively 
crafting and implementing plans through appropriate local processes. 
There is a risk that planning bureaux could be controlled by powerful vested interests 
that would exercise undue influence on final land use decisions. Corruption in land 
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use planning has been thoroughly examined in various developing countries,104 and 
can take the form of rent-seeking from land conversion and re-zoning,105 acquisition 
of land through state capture or by investors having received insider information, 
abuse of office or straightforward bribery.106 It is therefore important to discuss the 
planning process at the international level, not only to identify capacity gaps but also 
to foster good governance principles of transparency and accountability. Secondly, 
land use plans should be ± as much as possible ± implemented voluntarily and with 
adequate incentives, so that local stakeholders are not unduly affected by external 
decisions (particularly those whose livelihoods depend on resource use).107 
Moreover, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and ad hoc judicial 
mechanisms such as the land tribunals discussed in the context of tenure108 should be 
established to solve disputes arising in the participative development and 
implementation of spatial plans.  
By combining an analytical element (technical plans) and a social element 
(negotiated decisions) at early stages of decision-making, participatory spatial 
planning carries RQWKHEHVWSUDFWLFHVLQWURGXFHGLQWKHUHDGLQHVVSURFHVV¶6WUDWHJLF
Environmental and Social Assessment to the subsequent phases of REDD-plus.109 
The same process can also be used to assess social and environmental impacts during 
REDD-plus implementation, as required in the readiness documents.110 
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6.3. Benefits of spatial planning for REDD-plus 
On top of the direct effect on the drivers, spatial planning also has the potential to 
facilitate the implementation of the REDD-plus programme at various scales. Below 
is a non-exhaustive list of the benefits spatial planning can have on REDD-plus.  
(i) Generate political support  
As seen earlier, REDD-plus competes with other legitimate policy objectives.111 
Spatial planning sets out to achieve a balanced trade-off between these objectives in 
a geographically-H[SOLFLW PDQQHU JLYLQJ ³D FRPPRQ GLUHFWLRQ WR SROLFLHV DQG
programmes, as well as a strategic assessment of what is desirable and what is 
possible in various cRQWH[WV´112 Political support is achieved through an open, 
transparent and inclusive process which provides a platform for stakeholders to voice 
their preferences and concerns.113 REDD-plus can be targeted to compensate those 
stakeholders that would lose out disproportionally under a more climate-friendly 
land and forest management regime.  
(ii) Identify barriers for implementation and generate investor confidence  
Spatial plans agreed through inclusive multi-stakeholder processes can create a 
stable and secure business environment unearthing latent conflicts of interest and 
combating illegality. Illegal activities, in fact, thrive in the uncertainty, which is 
reduced not only by securing tenure rights but also by formalising land use 
destinations at landscape scale. Following tenure regularisation efforts, participative 
planning establishes what activities are and are not allowed in a certain area and then 
publicises it, facilitating the exposure of illegal uses.114 A side effect of the increased 
legal certainty provided by plans is that investors would have greater confidence that 
carbon contracts signed with individual right-holders will not be subsequently 
declared unlawful or that they will not be easily expropriated by government-
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initiated development.115 The combination of undisputed tenure rights and a spatial 
plan supported by local stakeholders reduces the risk of carbon investments, hence 
lowering costs and limiting profits for investors. 
(iii) Provide accurate information on drivers and reference levels  
An integral part of the planning process is the systematic gathering of information 
UHJDUGLQJ DQ DUHD¶V JHRJUDSK\ QDWXUDO VWDWXV VRFLR-economic conditions and 
historical land use trend. The spatial representation and combination of this 
information has important consequences for REDD-plus processes. For instance, 
mapping tenure rights, locating the drivers of land use change, and the SEA of 
spatial plans could help identify the entry points for maximising the effectiveness of 
REDD-plus actions. The geographical representation of social, economic and 
environmental data could provide a basis for the coordination and integration of 
policy responses to the drivers of forest loss, facilitate the pricing of the short-term 
cost of a transition to a sustainable land management framework, and help set more 
accurate reference emission levels. Socio-environmental inventorying would gather 
information useful for monitoring safeguards, perhaps allowing the setting of a 
baseline for non-carbon benefits of REDD-plus. More broadly, it would also 
improve emergency responses, taxation assessments and other areas of planning (for 
the economy, social services, infrastructure etc.).116  
(iv) Coordinate and integrate national policies across sectors  
The absence of institutional coordination across government sectors results in 
inconsistent policies and programmes. As governments struggle to balance 
development and environmental objectives, it is not uncommon to note conflicting 
sectoral policies that simultaneously promote forest protection and the expansion of 
activities that drive forest loss. Although not unique to these sectors, the 
fragmentation of responsibilities among resource-management agencies (also 
                                                 
115
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referred to as the µVLORHIIHFW¶)117 is particularly damaging in case of forests because 
of the extensive cross-sectoral implications discussed in chapter 2. The inability to 
overcome fragmentation thus reduces the effectiveness of government action and 
could severely undermine the success of REDD-plus. Mitchell points out that trying 
to achieve policy coordination and integration via government re-organisation is 
IXWLOHEHFDXVHµZKHQUHVWUXFWXULQJRUJDQL]DWLRQVERXQGDULHVRUHGJHVDUHPRYHGQRW
UHPRYHG¶118 He therefore recommends setting up mechanisms or processes that 
address the problems created by fragmentation.119 Spatial planning can be one such 
mechanism because it embraces complexity instead of trying to reduce it,120 
facilitating the revision of inconsistent policies and programmes and their 
prioritisation in a geographical dimension. Moreover, it can mainstream multi-sector 
coordination by providing a process to align decisions from various government 
DJHQFLHV ZLWK D FRPPRQ VWUDWHJLF YLVLRQ DQG DWWHPSWLQJ WR ³FUHDWH V\QHUJLHV
between policies (win-ZLQVLWXDWLRQV´121 Table 5 sums up the laws and policies that 
influence forest loss in six developing countries, including those that support it and 
those that clash with its aim. 
(v) Coordinate and integrate national policies across levels of government  
As seen above, institutional coordination also has a vertical dimension. Poor 
coordination across government levels is exemplified by the case of Indonesia, a 
large federal country which over the last decade has devolved legislative, executive 
and budgetary powers to regional and district authorities. ThH FRXQWU\¶V XQFOHDU
governance structure, partly caused by piecemeal and inconsistent constitutional 
amendments, failed to lay out the relationship and division of powers between levels 
                                                 
117
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thus creating legal and administrative confusion.122 The central government has 
recently tried to repatriate some of the devolved powers facing resistance from local 
bureaucrats. A comprehensive evaluation of the powers and responsibilities at 
various government levels on matters related to land and forest use, and their 
rationalisation using the subsidiarity principle, can be facilitated through a nested 
spatial planning structure such as that exemplified in section 6.2.2. Consistency 
across levels of government reduces opportunity and implementation costs and can 
generate further synergies in implementation by pooling REDD-plus funds with 
other resources. 
(vi) Create synergies with other environmental programmes  
Planning can also facilitate coordination and synergies in the implementation of 
international obligations.123 Multilateral environmental agreements have chosen a 
regime-specific approach which has caused a proliferation of parallel and 
overlapping national action plans.124 Action plans identify national options and 
priorities for implementing international obligations. By contrast, spatial plans 
transpose policies into a spatial dimension, providing a common language that 
facilitates cooperation between regimes. It can provide information on local 
circumstances and preferences and it can be used to channel environmental 
obligations into local development models.125 This would allow the pooling of 
financial and technical resources from various international and national sources 
towards actions that can achieve multiple and overlapping policy objectives 
including climate adaptation and mitigation, biodiversity conservation, livelihood 
improvement. Parrotta et al note that the integration of REDD-plus strategies into 
H[LVWLQJ SODQQLQJ WRROV ³PD\ KHOS WR UHGXFH WKH RYHUDOO FRVWV DQG EXLOG D PRUH
coherent REDD-plus policy framewRUN´DQGFLWHWKHH[DPSOHRIELRGLYHUVLW\DVDQ
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area of policy which would benefit from spatial analysis.126 Such synergies would 
greatly improve effective treaty implementation, avoiding duplication of efforts 
within and across international regimes.  
(vii) Facilitate tenure regularisation and protection  
The underlying tension between husbanding local forest values and protecting 
public-good values of forests is clear. Advocates of tenure security emphasise 
unfettered individual and group rights,127 whereas advocates of spatial planning, 
especially in its centralised form, bestow extensive powers on governments to 
regulate land use for public purposes.128 Reconciling the trade-offs between local 
rights and collective responsibilities is a major challenge for natural resource 
governance.129 Yet observers often overemphasise the different ideological 
background of tenure security and spatial planning.  
Radical interpretations are very uncommon nowadays and unhelpful to this 
discussion: a free-market approach based on targeted economic incentives will be 
ineffective without supporting regulatory frameworks while a central planning 
approach would require an unrealistic level of capacity to enforce regulations in 
remote forest areas without the support of the regulated stakeholders. The bottom 
line is that both elements must be part of the governance mix.130 There is potential to 
cultivate synergies between property rights and planning, for instance by adding a 
tenure regularisation objective to local planning processes or by setting up 
participation mechanisms that can serve both purposes. Synergies can be created at 
higher decision-making levels as well if the dual objective of securing tenure rights 
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and improving the spatial organisation of activities (and the consequent restriction of 
rights) are integrated in policies and programmes. For instance, tenure regularisation 
can be set in national strategies, and specific programmes can be included in regional 
strategies and implemented at the district or province level at the initial stages of the 
planning process. 
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Table 5: Drivers of deforestation and policies hindering and enabling change 
Country  Drivers of forest 
loss 
Policies and operational tools that clash 
with REDD-plus aims 
Policies that could support REDD-plus Bodies and policy milestones associated 
with REDD-plus 
Brazil  
  
 
Ranching; 
agriculture (large 
and small scale); 
infrastructure; 
selective logging; 
mining; fire 
 
Rural credit for cattle-ranching and 
infrastructure development (roads and 
dams); poor enforcement of tenure rules 
 
Forest Code conservation requirement on 
private land; improved enforcement of 
land use policies; economic and 
ecological zoning; efforts to certify 
producer legality commercial chains 
(beef, soy); land regularisation process 
and demarcation of indigenous land; real-
time monitoring of deforestation 
(2008) Brazil Amazon Fund and National 
Plan on Climate Change  (2010) NAMA 
includes REDD; (2011) Mato Grosso state 
bill on REDD; (2011) National REDD-
plus Strategy formulation 
Cameroon  
 
Agriculture 
(medium and small 
scale, subsistence); 
logging; mining 
Currency devaluation boosting logging 
exports; infrastructure (roads, rail and 
dams); mining and large-scale agriculture 
projects 
Law No. 2011/08 on Guidelines for 
Territorial Planning and Sustainable 
Development in Cameroon 
(2009): REDD Cameroon pilot steering 
committee; (2009) National Observatory 
on Climate Change; (2011) UN-REDD 
Programme; (2012) R-PP submitted 
Indonesia  
  
 
Agriculture (large 
scale including 
forest plantations 
such as oil palm, 
small scale, 
subsistence); 
logging; mining 
 
Tax dependence on forest and mining; tax 
breaks for forest products, farming 
produce, pulp and paper; mining permits 
in protected areas; fiscal and non-fiscal 
concessions for food estate and energy 
estate development; biofuel development; 
land allocation for oil palm plantations 
 
(1990) Law on Conservation of Natural 
Resources and Ecosystems; (1994) Law 
on Ratification of UNFCCC; (2009) Law 
on Environmental Protection and 
Management; (2011) Master Plan for 
Acceleration and Expansion of Economic 
Development for 2011±2025; (2012) 
Ministry of Forestry Regulation on 
Guidelines on Natural Environmental 
Services Business 
 
(2007) Indonesian Forest Climate 
Alliance; (2008) National Climate Change 
Council; (2009) Indonesian Climate 
Change Trust Fund; Ministry of Forestry 
Regulation 68/2008 on REDD; (2009) 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 36 Carbon 
Sequestration Licences; UN-REDD; 
(2010) Letter of Intent with Norway; 
REDD-plus Task Force; (2011) 
Presidential Regulations No. 61 and 71 on 
GHG Emission Inventory and National 
Action Plan for Reducing GHG 
Emissions; (2010) REDD-plus Task 
Force; REDD-plus pilot province (Central 
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Kalimantan); national strategy and public 
consultation; (2011) moratorium on new 
licences in natural primary forests; R-PP  
Nepal  
 
 
Agriculture; illegal 
logging; 
resettlement; 
infrastructure; fire 
Agricultural  modernisation and 
associated infrastructure development; 
hydropower development; local road 
construction; mining of sand, boulders and 
stone; lack of land use policy 
Subsidies for kerosene, biogas, micro-
hydro, solar and improved cooking stoves; 
community forestry programme 
 
(2009) Establishment of REDD cell and 
working group; R-PP finalised; UN-
REDD Programme; (2010) proposed 
amendment to Forestry Act; (2011) R-PP 
grant signed 
PNG  
 
Commercial 
logging; 
subsistence 
agriculture; clearing 
for plantations; 
mining; forest fires 
 
Low and unequal levels of development 
and reliance on forestry sector to provide 
basic services (roads, health, education) in 
rural areas; Forest Clearance Authorities 
granted as part of Special Agriculture and 
Business Leases; National Agriculture 
Development Plan (2007±2016) 
promoting expansion of palm oil industry 
Customary land ownership; informed 
consent for Forest Management  
Agreements (but not enforced); Forestry 
and Climate Change Framework for 
Action 2009±2015; 2010 Climate-
Compatible Development Strategy 
(carbon neutrality by 2050); PNG 
Development Strategic Plan 2010±2030  
(2008) R-PIN submission; (2009) UN-
REDD Programme; REDD-plus MRV; 
(2010) National Climate Change 
Committee and Technical Working 
Groups 
Vietnam  
 
Agriculture; 
infrastructure; 
logging; fire; 
shifting cultivation; 
migration 
 
Infrastructure (roads and hydropower); 
self-sufficiency in food and cash crop 
development (rubber and coffee); National 
Socio-Economic Development Plan; 
credit schemes to alleviate poverty; land 
allocation; economic development as main 
goal of Forest Development Strategy 
Decision 380 and Decree 99; payment for 
forest environmental services including 
benefit-sharing regulation; Law on Forest 
Protection and Development 2004 and 
Land Law 2003: legal foundation for 
carbon rights 
(2009) National REDD network and 
technical working groups, UN-REDD; 
(2010) National Climate Change Strategy 
and National REDD programme; (2011) 
National MRV framework endorsed; R-PP 
resubmitted 
Source: Brockuahs et al 2013131  
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6.4. Avenues to improve spatial planning in developing countries 
Spatial planning has a long history in international environmental law. Principles 14 
DQG  RI WKH  81 6WRFNKROP 'HFODUDWLRQ GHVFULEH µUDWLRQDO SODQQLQJ¶ DV DQ
essential tool for reconciling conflicts between development and environmental 
protection, and to obtain maximum social, economic and environmental benefits.132 
The 1980 World Conservation Strategy dedicates a chapter to the integration of 
environmental protection and development through planning and rational use 
allocation.133 The 1982 World Charter for Nature emphasises planning of social and 
economic developmeQW DFWLYLWLHV SDUDJUDSK  DQG SDUWLFXODUO\ ³WKH >SODQQHG@
DOORFDWLRQ RI DUHDV RI WKH HDUWK WR YDULRXV XVHV´ SDUDJUDSK  The non-legally 
ELQGLQJ  )RUHVW SULQFLSOHV XQGHUOLQH WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI µUDWLRQDO ODQG-use 
SROLFLHV¶ in reducing deforestation.134 The UNCCD SURPRWHVWKHGHILQLWLRQRIµUROHV
and responsibilities of central government and local authorities within the framework 
RIDODQGXVHSODQQLQJSROLF\¶135  
Agenda 21136 VWUHVVHVWKDWSK\VLFDODQGODQGXVHSODQQLQJSURPRWHWKH³DOORFDWLRQRI
laQGWRWKHXVHVWKDWSURYLGHWKHJUHDWHVWVXVWDLQDEOHEHQHILWV´137 and it emphasises its 
ability to promote the integration of environmental, social and economic concerns in 
natural resource management,138 particularly to combat deforestation.139 The 
document also stresses the need to strengthen technological capacity and 
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institutions140 with the support of international organizations.141 Consequently,142 the 
FAO has developed land use databases, a methodology for classifying and mapping 
agro-ecological zones, a land evaluation framework, and methodologies for 
matching climate and crop environmental requirements.143 Thanks to this work, 
practical understanding of planning processes in developing countries has improved 
considerably144 and participative approaches to planning have been advocated 
instead of the current top-down approach.145  
Spatial planning has also been used extensively at the regional level. In 1970 the 
Council of Europe launched a Conference of Ministers responsible for 
Spatial/Regional Planning (CEMAT) which made environmental concerns central to 
its agenda from the beginning. CEMAT has contributed to shaping European 
territorial policy through awareness raising, exchange of best practices and the 
promotion of planning principles that mainstream concepts of sustainability in 
development policy.146 The 1979 Bern Convention required Parties to take into 
DFFRXQWWKHFRQVHUYDWLRQRIKDELWDWVDQGZLOGIDXQDDQGIORUDLQWKHLUµSODQQLQJDQG
GHYHORSPHQWSROLFLHV¶147 At the EU level the 1999 European Spatial Development 
Perspective148 promotes integration of environmental considerations in spatial plans 
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as a basis for sustainable development, although it has been contested that the spatial 
discourse of economic competitiveness is emerging at the expense of social and 
environmental interests.149 EU conservation initiatives also made conspicuous use of 
spatial planning. Furthering an approach introduced with the 1979 Wild Birds 
Directive,150 the 1992 Habitats Directive151 requires EU Member States to designate 
a network of protected areas within their territory and to review their spatial planning 
and development policies accordingly.152  
The appreciation of spatial planning to achieve sustainable development also 
permeates the 1968 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources and its revised 2003 version.153 In particular, the 2003 text affirms that 
any decision regarding the conservation of species and their habitats should be taken 
µZLWKLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRIODQG-use planning and RIVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW¶154 and 
with emphasis on community participation in land use planning and management.155 
However, the 1968 Convention had little impact due to its lack of monitoring and 
enforcement capacity, while the 2003 Convention is yet to enter into force. 
Despite its use in environmental treaties, spatial planning has been underutilised in 
developing countries. In addition to weak political commitment, Pierce et al156 list 
three challenges to the affirmation of planning as a mainstream tool for sustainable 
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development: (i) a lack of awareness, among local governments, of the importance of 
planning to protect priority areas; (ii) a disparity in objectives and, therefore, in 
structure and content between the scientific products generated by conservation 
assessments, and those required for land-use planning, and (iii) lack of local 
government capacity to integrate conservation into planning products.  
Given such shortcomings, there is a great margin to improve spatial planning 
practices in developing countries under the UNFCCC so as to achieve mitigation and 
adaptation objectives. The protection of land ecosystems was readily singled out as a 
strategic option in climate adaptation, following the UHDOLVDWLRQWKDW³YXOQHUDELOLW\WR
climate change can be exacerbated by other stresses, including the loss of habitats 
DQG QDWXUDO UHVRXUFHV UHGXFHG HFRV\VWHP VHUYLFHV DQG ODQG GHJUDGDWLRQ´157 The 
81)&&& LPSRVHV DQ REOLJDWLRQ RQ DOO SDUWLHV WR µFRRSHUDWH LQ SUHSDULQJ IRU
adaptation to the impacts of climate change; develop and elaborate appropriate and 
LQWHJUDWHGSODQVIRU>«@ZDWHUUHVRXUFHVDQGDJULFXOWXUHDQGIRUWKHSURWHFWLRQDQG
UHKDELOLWDWLRQ RI DUHDV >«@ DIIHFWHG E\ GURXJKW DQG GHVHUWLILFDWLRQ DV ZHOO DV
IORRGV¶158 The Kyoto Protocol goes eveQIXUWKHUQRWLQJWKDWµDGDSWDWLRQWHFKQRORJLHV
and methods for improving spatial planning would improve adaptation to climate 
FKDQJH¶159  
While countries have begun to integrate climate adaptation goals into spatial 
planning,160 land-use and spatial planning are still underutilised in climate change 
mitigation. However, REDD-plus countries are slowly beginning to embrace the idea 
of employing spatial planning, albeit in a piecemeal fashion. For instance, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo has begun a standardisation process of different 
zoning methods in 2008 as part of its readiness preparation efforts, and adopted 
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methodological guidance to participatory zoning in national forest lands.161 The R-
PP has then identified capacity gaps and requested support to build an institutional 
framework for national planning and a comprehensive Land use and Development 
Plan to guide the National REDD-plus Strategy.162 ,QGRQHVLD¶V )RUHVW ,QYHVWPHQW
Plan of 2012 dedicates a work stream to community land use planning with the aim 
RI SURGXFLQJ ³PLFUR VSDWLDO SODQV RU ODQG XVH SODQV´163 It also notes how the 
effectiveness of larger-scale spatial plans was hampered by uncertain tenure and 
aims to address the two issues in conjunction and requests supports for institutional 
capacity building for spatial planning.164 Similarly, the 2012 Burkina Faso 
Investment Plan dedicates support to developing sustainable land use plans in rural 
areas, which address the drivers of forest loss consistent with its National Land use 
Development Policy of 2007.165 The BioCarbon Fund for Sustainable Forest 
Landscapes launched at Warsaw166 also supports land use planning as tool to create 
enabling environments that change the way land-use decisions are made, and to 
achieve sustainable landscape governance.167  
6SDWLDO SODQQLQJ¶V limited contribution to sustainable landscape governance in 
developing countries leaves room for improvement that can be harnessed with a 
relatively small injection of technical and financial capital. A survey conducted by 
the Global Planners Network168 lists the major challenges facing spatial planners in 
developing countries. Some problems are intrinsic to balancing development with 
social and environmental outcomes, which is particularly acute in fast-growing 
developing countries. Then there are extra-sectoral problems of difficult solution, 
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such as corruption and crime, and scarce awareness of environmental issues. Finally, 
spatial planning also has internal problems of scarce institutional, professional and 
financial capacity,169 often due to the lack of planning culture within the government. 
The survey highlights that despite the growing economic capacity of many 
developing and emerging countries, the gap in spatial planning capacity compared to 
developed countries is not shrinking.170  
Wollemberg et al note how the implementation of spatial plans in Indonesia is 
hampered by poor technical capacity (inaccurate or unavailable maps), institutional 
problems (poor vertical and horizontal coordination), legal confusion, a lack of 
bureaucratic capacity and financial resources, and the influence of vested interests.171 
Dalal-Clayton remarks how decentralisation has shifted some of these concerns to 
district and local authorities, which have been devolved a host of functions formerly 
under the responsibility of central governments without a commensurate devolution 
of powers and resources.172 Goodstadt and Partidário stress that lack of technical 
resources is a particularly challenging problem in developing countries where there 
is abundance of informal settlements and a widespread lack of tenure clarity.173 They 
DOVRQRWHWKDWWKHUHLVµDVKRUWDJHRISODQQHUVZKRKDYHDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHUROH
RI WKH HFRV\VWHP VHUYLFHV DSSURDFK LQ HIIHFWLYH SODQQLQJ¶174 Capacity issues are 
relevant at the stage of plan-formation (e.g. due to a lack of adequate information) 
and even more so at the stage of delivery, especially if a top-down approach is 
followed.  
The limited use and impact of spatial planning is also caused by the uncertain status 
enjoyed by the discipline within the administration. Kilgore et al show that even in 
rich developing countries forest planning suffers a lack of resources, and of political 
                                                 
169
 Another survey shows that this is particularly acute in Latin America: French, Natarajan, Some 
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and stakeholder support.175 Burby and May suggest that this may be due to the fact 
that governments are reluctant to use planning to implement international 
environmental obligations since this entails commitment to certain policies that they 
are not prepared to take.176 As spatial planning is influenced by power dynamics, the 
lack of consensus for embedding planning into development and decision making is 
due to the opposition of powerful vested interests; by contrast, where spatial 
planning is used the government is often keen to retain the power and interprets it as 
a top-down instrument which gives a territorial application to centralised policies, 
with little regard for local realities, demands and aspirations. In Indonesia, despite 
the wild decentralisation of the post-Suharto years, the central government still uses 
spatial planning to assert its control over a vast and fragmented territory and the 
HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI WKH H[HUFLVH LV ³FRPSURPLVHG E\ D KLVWRU\ RI FHQWUDOLVHG VHFWRU-
based planning, a lack of information about existing forest and land characteristics, 
and weak stakeholder inpXW´177  
REDD-plus can contribute to improve spatial planning practices in several ways. The 
most obvious one is by bridging current under-investment. Establishing an accurate 
planning system from the local to the national level implies upfront and ongoing 
costs to acquire information, build geographic databases, train the personnel, 
purchase equipment, set up organisational structures, disseminate information and 
set up participatory processes. Participation is slow and costly, requiring government 
staff on the ground over long periods of time. International financial institutions 
could support the development of inclusive multi-stakeholder planning systems as a 
readiness effort.178 Brazil is the clearest example of how investments in data 
availability, monitoring (from both satellite imaging and ground patrols) and 
bureaucratic capacity are the backbones of good land and forest administration 
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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systems. Most developing countries, however, lack technical capacity and need 
international support to acquire accurate geographical data and establish efficient 
administrative processes.179 Even in relatively wealthy countries such as Tanzania, 
planning is hampered by a lack of technical and financial support from the 
government and by the absence of qualified planners at the local level.180  
A detailed mapping of forest areas, including protected areas, concessions, and other 
public, private and customary tenure arrangements is the natural starting point to 
improve the management of forest regions. Coordinating support at the multilateral 
level could create synergies when gathering remote sensing data (on forest cover, 
soils, crop potential, climate and so forth) and improve cooperation in transboundary 
contexts. Indonesia has embarked in a national-level exercise to create an indicative 
map of the areas covered under the palm oil moratorium funded by Norway.181 The 
map contains information on land cover, status and existing plantation licences but 
has struggled to integrate information on tenure.182 The two-year delay in completing 
the map shows the practical and political complexity of the process, and the 
importance of international support to persuade a government to deal with such 
complex matters.  
REDD-plus could also raise awareness about the advantages of using participative 
approaches. Concrete steps that could follow are the review of the legal framework 
for planning and the establishment or improvement of dedicated institutional 
DUUDQJHPHQWV DW PXOWLSOH OHYHOV RI JRYHUQPHQW )RU LQVWDQFH ,QGRQHVLD¶V QDWLRQDO
REDD-plus strategy proposes to strengthen the National Spatial Planning 
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Coordination Board through revision of the relevant legislation.183 The objectives of 
this legal and institutional update are clear from the above discussion: to make 
planning a process that promotes multi-sectoral integration, multi-level coordination, 
and multi-stakeholder participation in decision making; to use it as a tool to 
disseminate information within the government and to increase the effectiveness of 
policies and programmes; and to give clarity and legal force to plans that are 
properly monitored and enforced. 
Finally, REDD-plus can set best practices and quality standards for spatial planning 
according to agreed principles, such as those listed above. Such principles could be 
incorporated as non-binding guidelines for promoting sustainable landscape 
governance and endorsed by the COP. Developing countries would then be expected 
to gradually internalise and apply them using the information and technical support 
received from other countries and international organisations. International task 
forces of experts and capacity-building programmes could be established at the 
multilateral level, and fora could be used to share information and best practices on 
spatial planning for climate change mitigation and adaptation. All in all, existing 
legislative and operational initiatives that are either part of REDD-plus or 
complementary to it, including expert fora and high-level events, provide enough 
room to develop guidelines and expertise that would allow raising the political 
profile of the discipline and create national capacity for its successful application. 
*** 
This chapter has shown that spatial planning can introduce an element of collective 
rationality in landscape governance which rebalances the otherwise fragmented 
nature of incentive-based environmental policies. It does so by contributing technical 
information when locating development activities, and by establishing an 
institutional focal point for the continued participation of stakeholders in land use 
decisions. This collective decision-making process addresses the drivers of forest 
loss and can generate political support, reduce opportunity costs, and increase 
LQYHVWRUV¶FRQILGHQFHLQ5(''-plus.  
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However this is only possible if the planning process is transparent and participative, 
has the institutional structure to achieve multi-level coordination, and the power to 
influence multi-sector harmonisation of policies; if plans are built bottom-up, giving 
priority to local needs and circumstances and securing broad support; if conflicts are 
identified and mediated at early stages, using non-confrontational means where 
possible but also increasing access to justice; and if the plans themselves are flexible 
and adaptive, the authorities responsible for their implementation fully accountable. 
Some developing countries are beginning to appreciate the potential contribution of 
spatial planning to REDD-plus, but there does not seem to be widespread awareness 
that such contribution will only be realised if planning follows the above principles. 
Continued and more targeted international support through technical cooperation, 
financial assistance and information sharing is thus needed to raise the profile of the 
discipline and to ensure that best practices are implemented consistently throughout 
the developing world. Only when good-quality plans are in place incentives can be 
consistently used to achieve clearly defined, contextualised management goals. 
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7 
Managing REDD-plus incentives: the national financial 
infrastructure 
 
³5LJKWQRZZKDWZHXQGHUVWDQG LVD VRUWRI&'0-like offset system because we know the 
SULYDWH VHFWRU KDV EHHQ LQYROYHG LQ WKH &'0 >«@ LW ZRXOG EH YHU\ VDG LI SULYDWH-sector 
investments in REDD would be limited to the purcKDVHRIFDUERQRIIVHWFUHGLWV´ 
Benoit Bosquet, World Bank1 
 
The third policy catalyst for domestic governance reform is the national financial 
infrastructure. The rules and institutions set up to distribute REDD-plus finance are 
crucial to support the shift to sustainable landscape governance envisaged in the 
planning process. Section 7.1 analyses the convenience of establishing a national 
governance structure dedicated to the management of REDD-plus finance, 
explaining why this is primarily a national issue and why this matter can neither be 
left to existing institutions nor to the market. Section 7.2 suggests that developing 
nations are showing a strong preference for a centralised infrastructure based on 
national funds. Section 7.3 argues that this is not a bad option as long as the fund 
meets certain requirements. Finally, section 7.4 presents a possible model for the 
stepwise development of a composite fund that meets such requirements. 
  
                                                 
1
 9ROFRYLFLµA Slow Start for the Carbon Credit Market¶New York Times (24 July 2011). 
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7.1. Sharing the burden: governing REDD-plus finance at the 
national and international levels 
Finance is unquestionably the most debated subject in international REDD-plus 
discussions, and yet there is relatively little understanding of the mechanisms 
governing its distribution. Echoing the Doha Decision on REDD-plus,2 the last COP 
LQ :DUVDZ VWLOO KDG WR LGHQWLI\ ³ZD\V DQG PHDQV WR WUDQVIHU SD\PHQWV IRU UHVXOWV-
EDVHGDFWLRQV>DQG@WKHSURYLVLRQRIILQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVIRUDOWHUQDWLYHDSSURDFKHV´3 
One of the reasons why discussions on financial delivery are still at the starting block 
is that up until 2012 they were addressed jointly with the as yet unresolved issue of 
finance generation.4 These two phases of the funding process are clearly distinct: the 
generation of funds takes place at the international level whereas delivery happens 
both internationally (finance is delivered to developing countries) and within 
developing countries (finance is distributed locally to achieve emission reductions). 
The realisation that financial delivery is largely a developing country affair was slow 
WR FRPH LQIOXHQFHG E\ WKH H[SHULHQFH ZLWK WKH .\RWR 3URWRFRO¶V IOH[LELOLW\
mechanisms, observers and decision-makers set out to build a detailed international 
rulebook for transnational, project-level REDD-plus finance.5 This keenness to 
regulate financial matters in great detail, however, was frustrated by the problems 
discussed in chapter 3.6 Disagreements, rather than a decision to build flexibility into 
the system, meant that international guidance on finance has remained vague so far, 
allowing countries to experiment with a range of different financial instruments.7 It 
is, of course, still possible that pressures to create a uniform international financial 
                                                 
2
 UNFCCC COP Decision 1/CP.18 (2012) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1, paragraph 29. 
3
 UNFCCC COP Decision 9/CP.19 (2013) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1, paragraph 20. 
4
 The distinction is also hardly noticeable in early country proposals, a summary of which was 
presented by Parker et al: Parker et al, The Little REDD+ Book: A guide to governmental and non-
governmental proposals for reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (GCP 2008). 
5
 Such pressures came primarily from the private sector, because rules are the enemy of uncertainty 
and risk. This observation reinforces the argument that one of the precepts of neoliberalism - that 
markets thrive with deregulation ± is indeed a misrepresentation. 
6
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7
 Infra, section 7.2.2. 
195 
 
mechanism will spill over to the national level, de facto causing a trickle-down effect 
of financial rules and procedures8 - but many signs point to the opposite direction. 
'HYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV UHDVVHUWHG FRQWURO RYHU ILQDQFH FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK ³FRXQWU\-
GULYHQ´ DSSURDFKHV WKDW ³UHVSHFW QDWLRQDO VRYHUHLJQW\´9 The Warsaw Decision on 
institutions recognises the need for the coordinated management of different funding 
sources through existing international institutions or alternative governance 
arrangements in the short term and possibly using a dedicated institutional entity in 
the future.10 Yet, until such institution or coordinated mechanism is in place, it 
proposes that the integrated management of different funding sources, each carrying 
its own operational requirements, be undertaken by domestic governments.11 Parties 
are therefore invited to GHVLJQDWH³DQDWLRQDOHQWLW\RUIRFDOSRLQWWRVHUYHDVDOLDLVRQ
ZLWK WKH VHFUHWDULDW DQG UHOHYDQW ERGLHV RI WKH &RQYHQWLRQ´ ZKLFK FDQ LQ WXUQ
³QRPLQDWHWKHLUHQWLWLHVWRREWDLQDQGUHFHLYHUHVXOWV-EDVHGSD\PHQWV´12  
The establishment of the national focal point and national financial entities is born 
out of practical concerns for the efficiency and expediency of international financial 
transfers and a productive cooperation across levels of decision-making. However, it 
also reinforces the idea that programme implementation must follow a coherent 
national policy (as set out in the national REDD-plus strategy or action plan) and 
avoid sectoral fragmentation.  
REDD-plus thus needs two parallel organisational structures and rules for financial 
management: one at the international level, decided directly by the UNFCCC COP 
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 Specifically, the main concern is that the rhetoric on national approaches is contradicted by the 
SHUVLVWHQW LQIOXHQFH RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO SURFHVVHV WKDW UHPDLQ ³VLORHG´ LQWR D &'0-like vision (with 
marginal modifications as in the case of the nested approach), and distorted by narratives of results-
based payments as the antidote to inefficient government-based management. These influences may 
de facto restrict the choice of financial instruments in developing countries either because these are 
stigmatised by donor countries or because they are simply incompatible with the mainstream view of 
REDD-plus by developed countries. 
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as part of the broader financial architecture of the post-Kyoto treaty;13 the other at 
the national level, established under the authority of, and working closely with the 
national government. The latter is here called national financial infrastructure 
KHUHLQDIWHU ³1),´ ZKLFK GHQRWHV WKH system of rules, decisions, procedures and 
structures underpinning the management of REDD-plus financial resources within a 
national jurisdiction. The concept embraces both centralised (fund-based, 
government-controlled) and decentralised (market-based, investor-controlled) 
approaches to domestic delivery of REDD-plus finance.14 For instance, if REDD-
plus is funded by transnational private investments, the NFI would be concerned 
with domestic rules governing the inflow of such capital, crediting of emission 
reductions, sharing of benefits, taxation of profits and similar issues. If, by contrast, 
REDD-plus money is delivered through government schemes, the NFI would include 
the institutions established for and/or tasked with the management of international 
resources, the rules governing the internal management of finance, and their 
distribution to stakeholders. If, as it is most likely, REDD-plus will be financed 
through a variety of approaches, the NFI will have to accommodate different 
delivery methods.  
By definition, the absence of an integrated nation-wide infrastructure for the 
management of REDD-plus finance increases risks of fragmentation, inefficiency 
and inefficacy in so far as uncoordinated financing mechanisms operate 
                                                 
13
 It falls within the international domain to: define the level below which emission reductions are 
compensated (baseline or reference level); decide the modalities through which funds are raised from 
multilateral, bilateral and subnational sources; establish whether there should be a supervision of 
financial transfers through COP-control institutions (e.g. the Green Climate Fund) or whether funds 
can be transferred over the counter; detail to what extent financial transfers must be results-based and 
indeed offset-based; standardise the monitoring, verification and reporting of emission reductions and 
the condition for crediting offsets; certify the integrity of carbon credits and limit the quota of offsets 
that can be used in developed countries (so as to avoid flooding); prevent leakage and permanence 
problems; regulate private sector engagement (i.e. the modalities of participation of subnational 
entities) and protect investments; set up mechanisms to stabilise the international price of carbon so as 
to give financial stability to the trading system. International actors will also retain supervisory and 
advisory functions over national financial delivery through the usual tools of external support for 
national processes seen in the previous chapters. Some guidance and supervision will be needed to 
ensure that policies and measures are compatible with the financial architecture for finance 
generation. Best practices could be established with regards to transparency and accountability in 
financial management, technical assistance and sharing of information can be useful for States to 
develop their own national financial infrastructure. 
14
 Hence it must not be confused with the rules governing the distribution of climate finance between 
countries discussed in chapter 3 section 2.3. 
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simultaneously and overlap with each other, failing to achieve economies of scale 
and reduce transaction and implementation costs, or even competing with each other. 
Indeed, as funds will be raised using both market and non-market mechanisms and 
IURP³DZLGHYDULHW\RI VRXUFHV´15 the coordination and harmonisation of financial 
inflows can only happen at the national level.  
It is worth asking whether it is beneficial to have a REDD-specific framework. It 
could be argued that the creation of dedicated financial rules is unnecessary or even 
counterproductive because it competes with functions that are normally performed 
by existing financial institutions (i.e. the disbursement of liquidity in the form of 
credit or grants), creating confusion and over-regulation. In fact, this scenario seems 
to contradict the principles of vertical and horizontal integration previously 
discussed.16  
However, the NFI provides new and additional services that complement existing 
RQHVWKHXQLTXHQHVVDQGFRPSOH[LW\RIWKHSURJUDPPH¶VIXQGLQJSURFHVVUHTXLUHad 
hoc procedures, rules and institutions in order to deal with complexity. Several 
examples can be presented. First, these mechanisms must be tailored to the needs of 
donors and investors so as to establish a direct link between the resources invested 
and the emission reductions generated, a task for which development credit and other 
standard financial services are ill-fitted. Second, financial institutions (perhaps with 
the exception of some rural development banks) may have difficulties when 
operating outside the logics of profit, which may be needed under REDD-plus to 
balance out financial concerns with social and environmental objectives. Third, 
REDD-plus funding often targets people with low literacy, no formal rights to land 
and scarce integration in a market economy that would not qualify to receive funding 
under the standard risk assessments of banks and other commercial organisations. 
Fourth, the complexity of REDD-plus funding requires arrangements that could 
hardly be managed by standard financial institutions: for instance, incentives may be 
provided as physical or human capital as opposed to just financial; funds should be 
distributed in different forms and under different conditions to accommodate the 
needs of beneficiaries, and so forth.  
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 UNFCCC COP Decision 2/CP.17 (2011) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, paragraphs 65-66. 
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 See chapter 6 section 1.2. 
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The sheer amount of decision-making enshrined in REDD-plus is likely to stretch 
financial institutions beyond their capacity. A recent World Bank assessment of 
financial infrastructures in developing nations found that the institutions and norms 
regulating contract enforcement (linked to the efficiency of the judicial system), 
access to credit (in terms of coverage of the public, information and secure rights of 
borrowers and lenders) and investor protection (in terms of disclosure and liability) 
in developing countries are generally underdeveloped.17 Rural credit systems are 
particularly deficient.18  
The view that REDD-plus needs a dedicated infrastructure for financial delivery is 
shared by virtually all actors engaged in the process (multilateral institutions, donor 
and recipient countries, local stakeholders, civil society and the private sector), and it 
has recently begun to converge towards a particular arrangement: the national 
REDD-plus fund.  
7.2. The rise of the national fund 
If the drivers of REDD-plus can only be addressed using a cross-sectoral landscape 
approach, it is axiomatic that the NFI must bring various financial arrangements into 
a coordinated national effort. This may start with REDD-plus but should be able to 
progressively integrate finance from other sources, including other international 
instruments and the private sector.  
A report on REDD-SOXV ILQDQFH QRWHV WKDW ³VWURQJ LQVWLWXWLRQV ZLOO EH QHHGHG to 
govern fund mobilisation, allocation and disbursement«WR GHPRQVWUDWH WKH
effectiveness, responsiveness, environmental integrity, and fiduciary accountability 
QHFHVVDU\WRJDLQWKHFRQILGHQFHRILQYHVWRUVFLYLOVRFLHW\DQGRWKHUVWDNHKROGHUV´19 
The national focal point and the financial entities to be established pursuing to the 
Warsaw Decision on coordination of support demonstrate that Parties envisage 
                                                 
17
  Brook, Stein, Financial Infrastructure: Building Access Through Transparent and Stable Financial 
Systems (World Bank 2009) 1-3. 
18
 Thillairajah, 'HYHORSPHQWRI5XUDO)LQDQFLDO0DUNHWVLQ6XEí6DKDUDQ$IULFD (World Bank 1994) 
25-7; Trivelli, Venero, Agricultural Development Banking: Lessons from Latin America? (Instituto de 
Estudios Peruanos 2007) 2. 
19
 Global Witness, Building Confidence in REDD: Monitoring Beyond Carbon (GW 2009) 31 
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country-level financial management, but maintain options open for the development 
of a NFI. It is up to the domestic stakeholders to decide whether the organisational 
structure of the NFI should be centralised or polycentric, and the level of autonomy 
from the government.  
The simplest form of financial infrastructure capable of combining funding from 
various sources is the national REDD-plus fund. This can be used as a platform for 
the continuous replenishment of finance (revolving fund) from governmental, non-
governmental and private sector sources (multi-donor fund). The literature 
distinguishes between two types of national funds: independent funds and funds 
under State administration.20 The degree to which the trust fund operates 
independently from the host government determines many of its characteristics. 
A fund under State administration is placed under the control of a Ministry or 
Agency; its PDQDJHPHQW FRXOG EH LQWHJUDWHG LQ WKH FRXQWU\¶V EXUHDXFUDF\ LH LW
could be run by a government office) or it could be run by an ad hoc committee that 
is in turn controlled by government representatives. In the first case, the fund would 
likely use existing disbursement channels and procedures whilst in the latter it may 
have its own structure, agreed with donors, but decisions on funding allocation 
would in both cases be taken by the government with little outside input. 
An example of State-administered fund is the Climate Change Trust Fund (ICCTF), 
established in September 2009 by the Government of Indonesia to support the 
FRXQWU\¶V WUDQVLWLRQ WR ORZ FDUERQ JURZWK21 The ICCTF receives international 
support from various international sources and channels it to land-based mitigation, 
energy and adaptation. Funding is managed exclusively by government agencies ± 
although non-governmental actors can be involved in implementation. A slightly less 
centralised fund that is still controlled by the government is the Guyana REDD-plus 
Investment Fund (GRIF). Established in 2009 pursuant to a Memorandum of 
                                                 
20
 Vatn, Angelsen, µOptions for national REDD+ architectures¶ LQ Angelsen (Ed.), Realising 
REDD+: National Strategy and Policy Options (CIFOR 2009) 57. 
21
 Grüning et al, Case Study: The Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund (Frankfurt School of Finance 
& Management 2012) <http://fs-unep-centre.org/publications/case-study-indonesia-climate-change-
trust-fund-icctf > Accessed 12 February 2014 
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Understanding between the Governments of Guyana and Norway,22 the GRIF 
benefits from the secretarial support of the World Bank and it is governed by a 
Steering Committee chaired by the Government of Guyana and with members from 
the contributors, but in which civil society and the private sector are only invited as 
observers. The GRIF is open to multiple donors, but so far Norway is the only 
contributor with an initial donation of approximately US$150 million to be delivered 
in the form of results-based payments.23  
By contrast, independent funds are governed by a multi-stakeholder committee and 
have little or no formal connection with the government. Conservation trust funds, 
which developing nations have considerable experience with, are a typical 
example.24 For instance, the Peruvian Trust Fund for National Parks and Protected 
Areas (PROFONANPE) is a private not-for-profit organisation established in 1992 
WRLPSURYHWKHPDQDJHPHQWRI3HUX¶VSURWHFWHGDUHDVDQGVXUURXQGLQJEXIIHU]RQHV
PROFONANPE has so far raised over US$130 million raised from multiple 
international sources, both governmental and non-governmental.25 It is governed by 
a Steering Council with four government representatives, two members from 
environmental NGOs, a private sector representative and a representative from 
international aid agencies. However, the Warsaw Decision on institutions de facto 
excludes the use of independent funds to deliver REDD-plus finance because all 
financial entities are to be established under the authority of the national focal 
point.26 
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 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana 
and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway regarding Cooperation on Issues related to the Fight 
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23
 Starbroek NHZV µ$V RI -XQH  1R 1HZ *5,) GHSRVLWV VLQFH ¶ 6WDEURHN 1HZV  -XQH
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Several intermediate solutions have been developed. Funding decisions could be 
made directly by the government but with full disclosure to donors or they could be 
delegated to a multi-stakeholder board, but one whose composition and deliberative 
procedures would be highly influenced by the host state administration.27 This is the 
case in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the Government has 
created a National REDD-plus Fund pursuant to the approval of the national R-PP by 
UN-5(''DQG)&3)1RYHPEHU7KH)XQGDLPVWR³PRELOLVHDQGFRPELQH
various funding sources (public and private, national and international) to meet the 
national objective of REDD-plus, as defined in the National REDD-SOXV6WUDWHJ\´28 
Although created and guided by the government, the DRC National REDD-plus 
Fund will be independent from the public administration and managed according to 
internationally approved fiduciary rules.29  
Alternatively, fund management could be entrusted to a national development bank, 
an independent institution whose operation is usually aligned with government 
policies and over which the administration retains some control. This solution would 
increase political legitimacy and also benefit from the financial expertise of the host 
LQVWLWXWLRQ %UD]LO¶V $PD]RQ )XQG LV D SURPLQHQW H[DPSOH RI VXFK DUUDQJHPHQW
Established in 2008 following a pledge to reduce deforestation in the Amazon by 70 
percent by 2018, the Amazon Fund is managed by the National Bank of Economic 
and Social Development, which is independent but marginally influenced by the 
federal government. Critics claim that this ambiguous governance arrangement has 
resulted in poor coordination with other sectoral policies which bear influence on 
deforestation.30 Yet a number of important activities have been financed in different 
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 ProtocROH G¶$FFRUG HQWUH OH *RXYHUQHPHQW GH OD 5HSXEOLTXH 'HPRFUDWLTXH GX &RQJR HW OH
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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sectors and at various scales,31 amongst which the support for agro-ecological zoning 
initiatives and for the Forest Conservation Grant Fund stands out.32 The Amazon 
Fund is supported by a handful of countries, and particularly through the US$1 
billion pledged by Norway. Although incentives are disbursed based on results 
(deforestation reduction),33 the closure of the Amazon Fund to carbon markets is a 
consequence of %UD]LO¶V rejection of offset-based mitigation.34  
Other countries have developed national fund structures to manage ecosystem 
service payments (e.g. Costa Rica35 and Mexico36), and also supranational ones (such 
as the Congo Basin Forest Fund).37 The rising popularity of national environmental 
funds suggests that developing countries have expressed a clear preference for this 
form of management of climate change and sustainable development finance from 
various sources. So while it is still early to say that the national fund will be the 
standard approach, it surely will be a prominent feature of the REDD-SOXV¶QDWLRQDO
financial infrastructure in many countries.  
The spread of national funds is influencing the development of REDD-plus. For 
instance, the UN-REDD programme has launched a South-South Knowledge 
Exchange on National Fund Design, which has met twice in 2013 and is set to 
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further international best practices.38 This is, in principle, a positive development. 
National REDD-plus funds are to be preferred to both a CDM-like market-based 
system for the reasons explained in chapter 3, and to budget support (i.e. to the 
management of international funds by government agencies) if one considers the 
problems of transparency, corruption and mismanagement discussed in chapter 2. 
However, the positive impact depends on the extent to which they exhibit certain 
characteristics. 
7.3. Best practices for the national REDD-plus fund¶VGHVLJQ 
7.3.1. Desirable qualities of the national fund 
If adequately managed, the national fund is uniquely placed to promote sustainable 
landscape governance for it has the possibility to establish dedicated funding 
windows for locally-appropriate activities that address the drivers of environmental 
degradation and promote alternative forms of development. In order to ensure that 
the fund functions effectively, it is important to review the lessons learned from the 
operation of other funds and those that can be inferred from this discussion. 
(i) Autonomy 
The first lesson is that national funds should be independent from the host 
government but maintain well-oiled mechanisms of coordination with it. On paper a 
government-controlled REDD-plus fund would be well placed to integrate activities 
across sectors and scales, and it would also be cost-effective if its administration is 
shouldered by the government.39 This arrangement would in principle have 
international legitimacy40 whereas domestic legitimacy depends on the national 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV³LIWKHJHQHUDORSHUDWLRQRIDJRYHUQPHQWKDVORZOHJLWLPDF\EHFDXVH
of high corruption, allocating REDD-plus resources outside government structures 
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PLJKWEH WKHRQO\ FUHGLEOH VROXWLRQ´41 However, even if they operate according to 
specific sets or rules, State-controlled funds would be more vulnerable to the internal 
problems of the national bureaucracy, such as corruption, inefficiency and bad 
management, lack of transparency and accountability.42 Just as poor governance 
harPVDFRXQWU\¶VLQYHVWPHQWDWWUDFWLYHQHVV43 the private sector might be reluctant to 
invest in REDD-plus if the management of portfolio investments is run by a less-
than-trustworthy government agency, and if returns depend on country-level 
performance. Under such arrangements, the perceived risks of the investment would 
only be offset by a track record of high profits that is consistent over time and across 
countries.  
Independent funds are in principle more open, transparent and accountable, but their 
use has been ruled out by the COP. This is a sensible choice because independent 
funds may have coordination problems with the host country administration or their 
legitimacy could be contested insofar DV LWZRXOGEH³SROLWLFDOO\GLIILFXOW WRDFFHSW
that decisions ... are side-OLQHGE\DFRXQWU\¶VJHQHUDOGHFLVLRQ-making structures and 
ODQGXVHSROLF\´44 The intermediate solutions explored in section 7.2 combine the 
advantages of an independent governance structure (e.g. balanced representation of 
stakeholders, openness, accountability) with those of working alongside the host 
government (integration and coordination).45 Such funds are managed by a multi-
stakeholder committee, but with different degrees of independence. In Indonesia the 
trust fund is under the firm control of the recipient government, with the committee 
chaired by one or more senior government officials and made up of a majority of 
government representatives.46 In Ecuador and DRC the steering committee has a 
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more balanced representation of stakeholders and the fund is administered by the 
UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office has been appointed.47 The Amazon Fund is 
governed by a representative multi-stakeholder board free from overbearing 
JRYHUQPHQWLQIOXHQFHEXWOLPLWHGE\WKH1DWLRQDO%DQN¶VRSHUDWLQg procedures.48 In 
all considered cases the disbursements are approved by the steering committee with 
the support of a technical committee and following an application and review 
process. The national government keeps some control over the management of 
international climate change finance, although this varies from very little (Amazon 
Fund) to substantial (Ecuador and DRC) to predominant (Indonesia). 
Implementation is devolved to private national entities (civil society organizations, 
the private sector, academia, professional associations and others), except in 
Indonesia where government agencies have a more prominent role.  
Despite the differences, this semi-independent governance structure is less 
bureaucratic than multi-layered government management under a budget support 
option, although the creation of dedicated funding windows or sub-funds can greatly 
increase bureaucracy. It is also simpler than a carbon market approach in that 
funding is managed by one entity rather than dispersed through a multitude of 
channels, which may make the overall picture of national REDD-plus action rather 
complicated. Moreover, multi-stakeholder representation increases transparency, 
democratic legitimacy and accountability.49 This is particularly so if disbursement 
criteria and performance measurements are open to external scrutiny from both 
donors (top-down accountability) and stakeholders (bottom-up accountability).50 
Legitimacy would depend upon the balanced composition of the steering committee 
                                                                                                                                          
Coordinator and one representative each for civil society, the private sector and the UN Partner 
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and on voting rules - as well as, implicitly, on the legitimacy of the individual 
committee members themselves.51  
(ii) Fiduciary responsibility 
Although clear and transparent fund governance is necessary for effective financial 
management, it is not sufficient. The second element of an effective national fund is 
to have in place strict fiduciary standards. In finance, the fiduciary relationship is the 
highest standard of customer care between a financial advisor and the investor. It 
entails both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty, and requires the fiduciary to act in 
the best interest of the customer, disclosing any conflict of interest and other material 
facts that may influence its work. In this context, international donors and investors 
are the customers that entrust their money to tKH QDWLRQDO IXQG 7KH IXQG¶V
management bodies, trustees and other seniors with management responsibilities 
should thus be legally bound, individually and collectively, to act according to the 
fiduciary standard and must be legally and/or politically accountable before donors 
and investors for all mismanagements.52 Fiduciary standards are particularly 
important for non-results-based payments. But even when funds are transferred ex 
post and based on results, there may still be space for misappropriation and 
mismanagement of scarce resources. 
An area in which government support is crucial is regulation. The national fund 
should be accompanied by extensive national laws and regulations that reduce the 
scope for financial crimes. As REDD-plus countries generally have poor procedural 
governance,53 a big injection of funds within these systems would make the problem 
PRUH DFXWH DQG LV ERXQG WR FRPSURPLVH WKH SURJUDPPH¶V LPSDFW $V WKH &DQFXQ
'HFLVLRQ UHTXHVWV GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV WR GHYHORS ³WUDQVSDUHQW DQG HIIHFWLYH
QDWLRQDOIRUHVWJRYHUQDQFHVWUXFWXUHV´WKHQDWLRQDOIXQGPXVWPLQLPLVHWKHSRWHQWLDO
for mismanagement and corruption.54 One way to ensure this is by placing an 
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obligation on each entity involved in the management of REDD-plus to fully 
disclose information on its activity. Moreover, a streamlined delivery process that 
does not involve too many intermediaries can be regarded as intrinsically more 
transparent than one where responsibilities are shared among different actors. Precise 
mandates and exclusive competences for all the actors throughout the revenue chain 
promote the clear-cut allocation of responsibilities.55 Finally, there should be full 
accountability for any mismanagement of funds both towards donors, multilateral 
funding agencies and monitoring organisations (top-down accountability) and 
towards local stakeholders (bottom-up accountability). 
The obligations arising out of the fiduciary standard should be set out in detail. There 
are two options for setting fiduciary standards in national funds. The first is the 
adoption of an international fiduciary standard, such as the one used by the 
Adaptation Fund to regulate national implementing entities pursuant to a COP 
decision.56 In this scenario, national fiduciaries have to comply with specific 
management, procedural and monitoring duties to ensure financial integrity, cost-
effectiveness and transparency.57 7KH VHFRQG RSWLRQ LV WR LQIHU WKH QDWLRQDO IXQG¶V
fiduciary standard from the operating modalities of REDD-SOXV¶ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
disbursement entities. Although the second option would seem riskier, it could in 
fact result in higher ± albeit inconsistent - standards. In fact, as developing countries 
are likely to receive support from various sources, their fiduciary standard will have 
to be at least as high as that required by each funding entity, and this can result in 
very demanding conditions. However, it would also result in a duplication of 
guidelines, reporting procedures, procurement practices and so forth, which are 
likely to increase the operational costs of the fund as well as slow down its operation. 
For this reason, the adoption by the COP (through one of its subsidiary bodies) of an 
international fiduciary standard for national REDD-plus funding management seems 
a better option.  
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An obvious starting point for this is the drafting of fiduciary rules for REDD-plus 
funds disbursed by the Green Climate Fund, which operates under the control of the 
COP. The GCF Governing Instrument has begun a process for the development of a 
guiding framework containing two sets of basic and specialised fiduciary principles 
and standards, which define: minimum administrative and financial capacity, level of 
transparency and accountability, specialised project or programme management 
capacity, and financial management practices of all recipient entities.58 The 
establishment of legally binding fiduciary standards, which accreditation of national 
funding entities and hence the receipt of funds depends upon, is a good starting 
point. However, as REDD-plus funds will come from a variety of sources, it is 
essential that the same standards and best practices are applied to the management of 
funds that are not disbursed by the CGF (e.g. through bilateral or multilateral 
governmental agreements or directly from the private sector). 
(iii) Cost-efficiency 
The third quality of the national fund should be to keep unproductive expenditures 
low, which is imperative given the current funding gap. Trust funds are likely to 
have low administrative costs, although these can vary significantly with size and 
management practices. A recent review of conservation trust funds found that their 
administrative costs range between 10-20 percent of the annual budget, and that 
donors commonly establish a ceiling on administration costs of around 15 percent.59 
In the case of large scale financial entities, costs may be even lower. For instance, 
the administrative costs of the Global Environmental Facilities (which include 
project management costs of executing agencies, project cycle management costs 
and corporate costs of GEF Agencies) are covered by a 10 percent fee off the project 
budget.60 The administrative cost of state-controlled funds may be even lower if trust 
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funds rely on existing government agencies or national financial institutions.61 For 
instance, the Amazon Fund reported administrative costs as low as three percent.62 
This estimate contrasts with the high transaction costs and private rents of the carbon 
market option.63  
Other cost categories will depend on the capacity of the fund managers. For instance, 
programmatic delivery may create economies of scale and thus reduce 
implementation and transaction costs.64 At the same time, rents are lowered if the 
national fund ensures that incentives are commensurate with the on-the-ground costs 
rather than determined by the global price of carbon.65 Ideally, any profit should be 
generated by the low-carbon activities that REDD-plus supports, rather than drained 
GLUHFWO\ E\ WKH SURJUDPPH¶V OLPLWHG ILQDQFLDO SRW 8VLQJ DQ H[LVWLQJ ILQDQFLDO
institution, such as a national development bank or the advice of multilateral 
financial institutions, would ensure that the fund is administered with financial 
expertise and that administration costs are reduced. 
Compared to direct project-based investments, funds are not an attractive option for 
the private sector. +RZHYHU WKH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK WKLV µIRUFHG LQWHUPHGLDWLRQ¶ LV
tolerated by investors would depend on the the entailed benefits and costs. 
Independence from government interference, slim bureaucracy, fiduciary standards 
of care, transparency, low administration costs and adequate representation in the 
governing body should make funds more attractive for the private sector. Moreover, 
vetting mechanisms, carbon offset guarantees, and other services that make the 
risk/reward ratio of investments more convenient  would ease foreign direct 
investments in activities with emission reduction potential.  
Participation should be sought from companies operating in the carbon market (often 
speculative investors) as well as companies that invest in low-risk, low-return, long-
term agricultural development projects, sustainable forestry operations, and other 
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environmentally certified commodities (particularly long-term investors). With the 
expected growth of primary commodity demand worldwide, investments in these 
markets are bound to expand considerably. In theory, the role of REDD-plus would 
be to increase the profitability of investments in low-carbon rural and forestry 
activities that would not otherwise be made. This way, REDD-plus could draw from 
a much larger financial pool: the total value of certified emission reductions (CERs) 
traded in the primary carbon market in 2011 was less than US$1 billion,66 whereas 
foreign direct lending to non-bank sectors in developing countries was just under 
US$1.5 trillion (2010)67 and foreign direct investments were around US$684 billion 
(2011) and in rapid recovery after the 2008 crash.68 Additionally, the private sector 
has the financial, technology and human resources, and the innovative capacity to 
make REDD-plus activities more cost effective. 
7.3.2. Targeting the delivery of financial support 
The establishment of a national fund is nothing more than the creation of a safe 
repository of international finance and it is only the first step in the development of a 
NFI. After the IXQG¶Vgovernance structure is established, the challenge is to develop 
effective disbursement mechanisms and procedures that are compatible with 
international rules and principles. The ability to tailor disbursement modalities and 
financial instruments to the circumstances of recipients is pivotal to addressing the 
drivers and promoting sustainable landscape governance, and thus it deserves 
separate treatment.  
The first challenge is to ensure that a broad range of entities, including individuals, 
for-profit and not-for-profit organisations, communities and government bodies, are 
legally entitled and able to access REDD-plus funds. The legal entitlement of 
different stakeholders could be either spelled out in the law or simply left 
unregulated and to the discretion of the government. The disadvantage of the latter 
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option is that the government could discriminate between different categories of 
actors, e.g. under the influence of vested interests.69 However, even listing 
permissible fund recipients could be interpreted restrictively so as to exclude actors 
that do not fit exactly within one of the categories included. For this reason, the COP 
must ensure that safeguards 2(c) and 2(d) of the Cancun Decision70 are adequately 
scrutinised DQG WKDW FRPPXQLFDWLRQ FKDQQHOV DUH LQ SODFH WR PDNH VWDNHKROGHUV¶
voices heard. 
A more difficult task it to ensure that all legally entitled beneficiaries of REDD-plus 
support have access to it. This requires that funding be distributed at appropriate 
scales and that different disbursement modalities/financial instruments be used. 
Flexibility of scale is integral to a strategy that aims to tackle the drivers consistently 
with the policy response identified in the participatory planning process. For 
instance, if a driver has significant national impact and well-known dynamics that 
are consistent across the territory, as is the case of palm oil production, then the 
national and provincial levels would be best placed to implement a systematic 
response to the problem. The national fund must therefore be equipped to routinely 
administer payments for large-scale interventions. Parker et al call this type of 
ILQDQFLDO VXSSRUW ³SURJUDPPDWLF VHUYLFH GHOLYHU\´71 For landscape-scale 
interventions funds might be directed to regional authorities (or state authorities for 
federal states), such as in the case of land reforms and planning (e.g. agro-ecological 
zoning), and large capacity-building programmes (e.g. monitoring and enforcement). 
Financing might also be earmarked to specific interventions, such as large 
infrastructural projects (e.g.to favour the localisation production outside forest 
areas), technological investments (e.g. in agricultural intensification), and national 
investment programmes (e.g. tax credits for sustainable activities).  
By contrast, in those cases where forest loss is driven by locally-specific and 
generally small-scale activities, such as fuelwood collection, incentives targeted to 
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village and council levels would be more effective. The national fund should be 
made accessible to communities or grassroots organisations, for instance by 
establishing a dedicated funding window backed by a diffuse delivery system 
integrated in the territory. The Fund should proactively spread information and 
provide assistance to potential beneficiaries to ensure widespread participation. Box 
7.1 highlights the importance of investing in local capacity-building alongside the 
provision of credit in order to change local economic dynamics in a way that 
addresses the drivers; the same principle applies for other kinds of economic 
incentives.  
Secondly, financial distribution must use instruments that are targeted to the needs of 
stakeholders as well as to the type of the drivers under consideration. In this light, 
pressures to harmonise financial rules internationally would backfire because 
excessively detailed and prescriptive international regulations would limit the choice 
of financial instrument.72 The intermediation of the national government, whether 
through an institution such as the national REDD-plus trust fund or through domestic 
legislation, is crucial to ensure that the disbursement modalities are consistent with 
³QDWLRQDO GHYHORSPHQW SULRULWLHV REMHFWLYHV DQG FLUFXPVWDQFHV´ ³QDWLRQDO
sustainable development nHHGV DQG JRDOV´ DQG SDUWLFXODUO\ WKH JRDO RI ³UHGXFLQJ
SRYHUW\´73 To this end, financial support may have to be provided to activities that 
tie in with traditional development assistance.74 The idea is that support must be 
given according to modalities and conditions that are appropriate to the activities 
identified as well as to the conditions, needs and capacity of the recipients. An 
element of flexibility must thus be built into the system which does not standardise 
the provision of incentives across the board but which is instead responsive to local 
needs.  
                                                 
72
 This should not be read as an endorsement of light-touch financial regulation, which could have 
negative social consequences, as well as increased economic risks and illegality. It should rather be 
intended as a call for balanced international financial regulation, one that combines flexibility with 
consistency and high fiduciary standards. 
73
 UNFCCC (n 9) appendix I. 
74
 Palmer et al note that without the provision of agricultural extension services, land reforms that 
focus on tenure redistribution remain incomplete and do not achieve their goals; they also note that 
³WKH FRVWV RI SURYLGLQJ DGHTXDWH VXSSRUW WR EHQHILFLDULHV IDU H[FHHG WKH FRVWV RI DFTXLULQJ DQG
transferring the land [and] can account for 60-SHUFHQWRIWKHWRWDOFRVWVRIDODQGUHIRUP´. Palmer, 
Fricska, Wehrmann, Towards improved land governance (UN-HABITAT 2011) 31. 
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Financial instruments are legal agreements determining the conditions for the 
transfer of any sort of monetary value. Several discrete instruments can be employed 
to address the specific drivers of forest loss, for instance supporting activities defined 
in the spatial planning process. These instruments vary greatly in terms of their 
potential scale and applicability, hence their choice will be determined as much by 
the behaviour of drivers in the national and local context as by the strings attached to 
specific international funding streams. For instance, if international support to a 
REDD-plus country is largely results-based, domestic authorities will have to choose 
an appropriate financial instrument that is also results-based; and if the disbursement 
is primarily driven by the private sector, the domestic financial instruments used 
must be not only compatible with private sector participation but also attractive for 
it. In this sense, some influence by international financial generation arrangements 
over national disbursement instruments is inevitable, but it is crucial that national 
VWDNHKROGHUV¶PDLQWDLQWKHIUHHGRPWRGHFLGHZKLFKRSWLRQWRXVH 
Financial instruments for REDD-plus can be divided into grants and results-based. 
The difference between grants and results-based finance has already been analysed.75 
Results-based instruments can be further divided into asset-based, debt-based and 
risk-transfer. Asset-based instruments involve the transfer of an environmental 
service (usually emission reductions and sequestrations in the form of a carbon 
offset) to the donor/investor; they require MRV or a comparable form of 
measurement of results as a basis for the transfer of the environmental service. Debt-
based instruments are designed to allow the recipient to raise funds to make its 
activity low-carbon; access to subsidised credit could be made contingent upon 
environmental performance. Risk-transfer instruments incentivise investments in 
REDD-plus activities by providing guarantees against capital losses or lost profits; 
rather than a financial delivery instrument per se, they are a complementary 
condition to the distribution of finance via standard capital investments. On top of 
this, tax instruments can use grants or results-based techniques to deliver incentives 
(and disincentives), depending on whether they use ex ante discounts or ex post 
rebates. The financial instruments available to REDD-plus are summarised in table 
6.  
                                                 
75
 Chapter 3 section 2. 
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Table 6: Financial instruments for the delivery of REDD-plus incentives76 
Financial 
Instrument 
Description Scale of 
Implementation 
Disbursement 
Condition 
Grants Financial support for 
reforms, capacity-building or 
projects 
Local to Regional Non results-based 
Tariffs and Taxes Tax rebates or deductions for 
sustainable activities or 
performance 
National Flexible 
Public-Private 
Partnership  
Joint implementation of 
activities, shared risks and 
shared profits 
Local to National Flexible 
PES scheme Nationally mediate payments 
for carbon storage and 
sequestration 
Regional to National Asset-based (MRV) 
Carbon market International payment for 
carbon credits  
Local Asset-based (MRV) 
Subsidised Credit Preferential loans 
conditional to the 
performance of  certain 
activities or on achievement 
of results 
Regional to National Debt-based 
Guarantee and 
Insurance 
5HGXFWLRQRILQYHVWRUV¶ULVN
for a share or lost profits or 
for specific events 
Regional to National Risk-transfer 
The list is fairly comprehensive but non-exhaustive, as countries should be free to 
explore new and innovative mechanisms in their national approaches. Each 
instrument has discrete advantages and disadvantages, which will be discussed 
below. What is clear, however, is that many instruments will be used in combination 
to ensure that resources are delivered at the right scale and conditions. Although 
theoretically there is no limit to the number of financial instruments that can be 
employed simultaneously, it is likely that after a period of initial experimentation 
implementation will settle on a limited number of options that are considered most 
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 Adapted from: Streck, Zurek, Addressing Agricultural Drivers of Deforestation: Opportunities for 
Catalytic Donor Interventions (Climate Focus 2013) 17-8. 
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effective in a certain context, particularly where such instruments are supported by 
public policies and programmes. 
7.3.2.1. Grants  
Grant-based financial delivery is widely used in development assistance. In its 
simplest form it is managed by a government agency or a national development bank 
to support specific activities, including readiness activities. Grants can be provided 
to compensate stakeholders for unpopular measures (such as restrictive zoning), 
increase government capacity (e.g. in monitoring and law enforcement) or 
decentralise responsibility for forest protection (for instance by allocating resources 
WKURXJK DQ ³DSSOLFDWLRQ DQG UHYLHZ´ SURFHVV VLPLODU WR WKDW XVHG E\ LQWHUQDtional 
financial institutions).77 In all cases it would be difficult to establish a clear link 
between the money invested in REDD-plus and the emission reductions generated at 
the national level, which may still be required by international donors. Moreover, 
lack of transparency and accountability in the allocation process is positively 
correlated with corruption and mismanagement.78 The most crucial problem is the 
lack of private sector support for this option. Earmarked financial support to 
government budget is currently used to finance readiness activities,79 and Vatn and 
$QJHOVHQ QRWH WKDW ³GXULQJ WKH ODVW GHFDGH EXGJHW VXSSRUW RU PDFUR-level 
SURJUDPPHDLGKDVEHHQDQLQFUHDVLQJO\SRSXODUDLGPRGDOLW\´ZKLFKUHSUHVHQWHGD
³VKLIWIURPWUDGLWLRQDOex ante FRQGLWLRQDOLW\WRDSDUWQHUVKLSDSSURDFK´80 However, 
the lack of capacity in national administrations casts doubts on the capacity of 
developing countries governments to distribute REDD-plus finance.81 For these 
UHDVRQVDVZHOODVIRUWKHGRQRUFRXQWULHV¶high debts, grant-based finance should be 
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 Governments can receive support for activities under their control, or they could endorse private 
initiatives (in the latter case a national designated authority or focal point decides on the endorsement 
of projects). Within the climate change regime, this process is used to finance readiness activities 
(intermediation being provided by UN-REDD and FCPF), as well as government-endorsed mitigation 
adaptation projects (as in the case of the GEF-managed Adaptation Fund and LDC Fund funds).  
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 Vatn and Angelsen (n 20) 69. 
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 Chapter 3 box 3.1. 
80
 Vatn and Angelsen (n 20) 72. 
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 Allen, Schiavo-Campo, Garrity, Assessing and Reforming Public Financial Management (World 
%DQN-RQHV.HWWOµ$VVHVVLQJ3XEOLF0DQDJHPHQW5HIRUPLQDQLQWHUQDWLRQDO&RQWH[W¶
4(1)  International Public Management Review 1. 
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limited in scale and scope to the cases in which private sector participation and 
results-based implementation are unviable, or to specific cases in which the 
government establishes a priority to achieve non-carbon benefits or other 
development objectives. 
7.3.2.2. Tariffs and taxes  
An alternative form of incentive delivery that relies on government control is by way 
of specific tax arrangements on activities that either cause or reduce forest emissions. 
These arrangements can be grant-based or results-based: grants would support tax 
deductions for activities that are generally regarded as sustainable/low-carbon (such 
as agroforestry production, ecotourism, agricultural intensification and so forth); 
results-based finance would support tax rebates for activities that have had a proven 
mitigation impact (for instance, companies producing timber and other commodities 
could be exempt by taxation if they obtain independent certification of their low-
carbon impact).82 By contrast, tariffs could be increased on activities that cause 
forest emissions. This arrangement would mimic the operation of a carbon tax on a 
sectoral basis rather than on the specific emissions, thus hitting entire industries and 
encouraging the development of more carbon-efficient modes of production. For this 
reason, tariffs may not be compatible with the approach taken by developing 
countries and their use could be limited to activities with particularly high carbon 
impact, such as palm oil cultivation in peatland areas.83 Tax arrangements are a form 
of incentives alternative to financial payments, and they can be used in combination 
with other financial instruments to ensure additionality. This instrument requires 
extensive and accurate information to identify activities whose growth would lead to 
reduced forest emissions, the level of tax incentives that could lead to such growth 
and whether or not there are knowledge-related, infrastructural or capital investment 
barriers.84 Their use is limited by the fact that they do not apply in case of 
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 See, foU LQVWDQFH µRainforest Alliance FRIIHH FHUWLILFDWLRQ VFKHPH¶ 5DLQIRUHVW $OOLDQFH
<www.rainforest-alliance.org/agriculture/crops/coffee> Accessed 12 February 2014. 
83
 Peatland forests store more carbon than normal forests and their preservation is therefore a priority 
for REDD-SOXV 3DQ HW DO µ$ /DUJH DQG 3HUVLVWHQW &DUERQ 6LQN LQ WKH :RUOG¶V )RUHVWV¶ 
6045(333) Science 988-93 3DJH µThe amount of carbon released from peat and forest fires in 
Indonesia during ¶420 Nature 61. 
84
 Fosci (n 64) 174. 
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subsistence activities, activities that are generally untaxed (such as illegal activities), 
and activities that already have a low taxation regime (for which, it is implied, a tax 
rebate for environmental performance would not constitute a sufficient incentive). 
7.3.2.3. Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)  
As seen earlier, the limited availability of public sector funds calls for the 
involvement of the private sector in implementation.85 One way of doing this is 
through PPPs. PPP is a broad concept that includes many forms of cooperation 
between the public and private sectors, and in fact all the REDD-SOXV¶ financial 
instruments that involve private entities are supported, directly or indirectly, by 
public resources. This paragraph discusses a form of PPP in which both parties are 
directly involved in the management of a geographically and temporally limited 
REDD-plus activity, whether it be a project or a programme. PPPs of this kind bring 
substantial benefits insofar as the public sector entity reduces its cash outflows by 
attracting foreign investments and the private sector reduces the initial costs and 
risks of the investment. Arrangements can be made to share profits in such a way 
that the investor has a minimum profit floor (i.e. a minimum guaranteed return) but 
also a profit ceiling (beyond which extra revenues could accrue to the government to 
cover its expenses and further invest in forest protection). A strategic dialogue would 
be needed to identify the respective strengths of partners:86 e.g. the private sector 
could contribute its financial expertise to increase the profitability of a REDD-plus 
activity (e.g. through sustainable agricultural intensification) while the public sector 
could bear forest protection costs, build critical infrastructure or undertake capacity-
building programmes in the project-area. Although this type of instrument can 
accommodate various disbursement modalities, achieve cost-effectiveness and attract 
the private sector, its use can only be limited: scaling up the use of PPPs from a few 
pilot projects to become the standard way of implementation may be too demanding 
for States in light of the lack of administrative capacity discussed earlier,87 and may 
distort competition (e.g. if the activities have a productive dimension) and create 
transparency problems in the selection of private sector partners.  
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 Chapter 3 section 3. 
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 Streck and Zurek (n 76) 29. 
87
 Chapter 2 section 2. 
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7.3.2.4. Subsidised credit  
A more replicable way of distributing REDD-plus resources with relatively minor 
financial inputs is by providing access to subsidised credit. Low-interest credit lines 
could be created to support activities with a proven emission reduction or 
sequestration potential, such as sustainable forest management, agricultural 
intensification, or expensive agroforestry enterprises. Using REDD-plus resources in 
the form of subsidised credit has a number of advantages: first, it is sustainable and 
low-cost even though it may not be commercially viable; second, it may be targeted 
to stakeholders with little or no collateral and who would otherwise have no access 
to credit; third, it could be flexible enough to support activities that address different 
drivers in a context-specific manner; fourth, rural development banks already 
distribute subsidised credit and would thus be well-placed to manage a REDD-
specific credit line at the macro-level; fifth, it can promote long-lasting emission 
reduction by changing the economics of deforestation in loco. In order to prevent the 
spread of a successful low-carbon enterprise into forest areas at a later stage, further 
measures must be taken, such as linking the favourable loan repayment conditions to 
demonstrated environmental performance or stipulating contracts that bind the 
recipient of funds to preserve forest carbon. The provision of credit in rural areas 
must be complemented by supporting services (see box 7.1). The limit of this option 
is that access to credit would only effectively reduce forest emissions where there is 
a readily available economic alternative and local capacity to implement it with 
adequate credit. Moreover, lack of access to credit is a problem for small enterprises 
as big logging and agricultural companies do not seem to have liquidity problems. 
Hence subsidised credit would only be an effective instrument where forest 
emissions are driven by local activities, such as local fuelwood collection and 
subsistence agriculture, whereas it would not challenge the economic rationale of 
large-scale commercial drivers. 
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Box 7.1: Microcredit and supporting services 
Lack of access to credit is often cited as one of the main obstacles to rural development, and 
a cause of environmental degradation.88 Some observers proposed to include micro-financial 
services to forest communities in national REDD-plus readiness strategies.89 In such case, 
attention should be paid to address some of the problems of microfinance. First, finance may 
negatively affect social structures and further local inequality;90 to avoid that, funding 
governance at community level must be strengthened (e.g. by establishing community trust 
funds).91 Secondly, microcredit has become a commercial product concerned with its own 
economic sustainability; the socio-environmental objective of microcredit must be 
reinforced with regards to funding allocation and commercial conditions (e.g. REDD-plus 
resources should lower interest rates considerably). Thirdly, focus on credit must not ignore 
the need to provide supporting services for rural economic development. Supporting services 
can be seen as investments in human capital (such as technical training, sharing information 
on best practices and general management skills) and in physical capital (such as market 
infrastructures, transport, seeds and so forth).92 Tomaselli and Hajjar maintain that the 
SURYLVLRQ RI VXSSRUW VHUYLFHV ³can be incorporated into REDD-plus readiness strategies 
WKURXJK QDWLRQDO FDSDFLW\ EXLOGLQJ VFKHPHV´93 However, in their analysis of land reform, 
3DOPHUHWDOQRWHWKDW³WKHFRVWVRISURYLGLQJDGHTXDWHVXSSRUWWREHQHILFLDULHVIDUH[FHHGWKH
costs of acquiring and transferring the land [and] can account for 60-70 percent of the total 
FRVWV RI D ODQG UHIRUP´94 These costs must therefore be budgeted early on in the reform 
process. 
7.3.2.5. Guarantees and insurances  
By contrast, risk-transfer instruments would make large-scale as well as small-scale 
investments in desired low-carbon activities more attractive by lowering risk. As a 
                                                 
88
 See Spantigati, Springfors, Microfinance and Small-Scale Forest-Based Enterprises (FAO 2005); 
6LHYHUQ9DQGHQEHUJ µ6\QHUJLHV WKURXJK/LQNDJHV:KR%HQHILWV IURP/LQNLQJ Micro-Finance and 
%XVLQHVV 'HYHORSPHQW 6HUYLFHV"¶ 2007) 35(8) World Development 1341; Wenner, Wright, Lal, 
µ(QYLURQPHQWDO 3URWHFWLRQ DQG 0LFURHQWHUSULVH 'HYHORSPHQW LQ WKH 'HYHORSLQJ :RUOG $ 0RGHO
%DVHGRQWKH/DWLQ$PHULFDQ([SHULHQFH¶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Journal of Microfinance 95. 
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 Tomaselli, HajjarµPromoting Community Forestry Enterprises in National REDD+ Strategies: A 
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2011) 2 Forests 283, at 286-8. 
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 5DQNLQ µGoverning development: neoliberalism, microcredit, and rational economic woman¶
(2000) 30 Economy and Society 18DW3DVJDDUG&KHDµ'RXEOH,QHTXLW\"7KH6RFLDO'LPHQVLRQV
RI 'HIRUHVWDWLRQ DQG )RUHVW 3URWHFWLRQ LQ /RFDO &RPPXQLWLHV LQ 1RUWKHUQ &DPERGLD¶  
ASEAS 330, at 348. 
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 See, e.g. ICIMOD, Pilot Forest Carbon Trust Fund: Rewarding local communities for forest 
conservation for instance (Nepal, 2011) <http://communitycarbonforestry.org/icimod-
pilot_forest_carbon_trust_fund_.pdf> Accessed 1 February 2014. The community filter could also 
reduce transaction, monitoring and enforcement costs, and credit risk thanks to better information on 
the borrowers and a social control element. 
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 Macqueen, Supporting Small Forest Enterprises: A Cross-Sectoral Review of Best Practice (IIED 
2008); Tomaselli and Hajjar (n 94); Palmer et al (n 78) 31. 
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 Tomaselli and Hajjar (n 94) 283. 
94
 Palmer et al (n 74) 31. 
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general rule, the return on investment must at least compensate the investor for the 
risk incurred. In the case of foreign direct investments in low-carbon activities, 
returns may not always be sufficiently high to compensate risk.95 REDD-plus 
finance could thus be used to provide guarantees or insurance to those investments 
that meet certain climate mitigation and sustainability criteria but without actively 
participating in their management. A guarantee can be used to compensate private 
losses arising from unsuccessful REDD-plus investments, whereas insurance could 
cover the entire loss of profit caused by specific events (e.g. forest fires, regulatory 
changes, illegal activities etc.).  
Both instruments aim to lure investors by reducing their exposure to risk, the 
downside of which is that they could lead to excessive risk-taking by investors 
unless there is a meticulous pre-screening of projects, leaving the host country to 
bear excessive costs. A second challenge is that risk transfer instruments would be 
particularly attractive for direct investments in offset-generating activities, which are 
still unknown to markets and pose a number of technical and methodological 
questions. But such investments are currently limited by a structural deficit in 
demand:96 to change this dynamic one must attract investments in standard rural and 
forestry activities, for which carbon offsets are just a premium. In the latter case, 
however, the major obstacles may be the lack of structural conditions for investment 
(such as supporting infrastructure, local capacity and so forth) rather than risk. This 
option can thus be used in combination with grant-based readiness expenditures that 
create the enabling conditions for investments in low-carbon activities.  
As already discussed, financial incentives to reduce forest emissions can also be 
based on the sale of property rights over carbon. The nested approach has the 
advantage of attracting private sector support (although only from the languishing 
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 Investments are exposed to many types of risks. In the case of foreign direct investments in low-
carbon rural and forestry activities, the main types of risk involved are operational risk (due to 
inadequate internal processes), market risk (particularly due to commodity price fluctuations), 
regulatory risks (such as expropriation) and reputational risk (for instance if projects do not comply 
with certain social or environmental standards). 
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 Chapter 3 section 3. 
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carbon markets),97 of maintaining relatively simple institutional arrangements, and of 
(marginally) increased transparency and flexibility.98 However, this option ³GRHs not 
appear to address the many flaws identified in WKH&'0DSSURDFK´99 and depends on 
a strong demand from carbon markets that is currently lacking.  
7.3.2.6. Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES)  
A similar asset-based financial instrument is the PES mechanism. PES may or may 
not require the creation of an asset such as the carbon credit, upon which property 
rights can be exercised, but it is based on the identification of a service provided by 
ecosystems (such as water generation) that derives from the lDWWHU¶V intact or pristine 
condition (e.g. the maintenance of vegetation in a watershed region). Payments are 
transferred for the maintenance of such conditions that allow the continued provision 
of the service (i.e. they are results-based). PES mechanisms are often managed by 
governments and payments are transferred from service users and providers located 
within a limited geographic area (subnational or national). For instance, the 
Dominican Republic Forest Law (law 118 of 1999) promotes the valuation of the 
ecosystem services of forests (including carbon sequestration), and allows the 
government to issue negotiable reimbursement certificates to finance up to 80 
percent of the expenses of capital and investments made in the establishment and 
handling of plantations and management and protection of forests.100 Under Costa 
5LFD¶V 3(6 PHFKDQLVP D 1DWLRQDO )RUHVW )LQDQFH )XQG LV DOORZHG WR LVVXH
certificates for forest conservation representing payment for ecosystem services; the 
certificates can be used by the landowners to pay taxes and other fees owed to the 
government.101 Under REDD-plus the PES system could be extended to international 
buyers and made compatible with international measuring, reporting and verification 
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 Major donor institutions have set up programmes to reform public finance management in 
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rules. The State would retain a proactive intermediary role between international 
buyers and local providers (i.e. by buying environmental services on behalf of 
service users and marketing them to foreign donors and investors).102 These schemes 
have been rather effective in reducing and even reversing forest loss in some 
countries103 and in delivering funds to small stakeholders. However, they do not 
seem well-placed to address industrial drivers of deforestation unless used in 
combination with other tools. 
The applicability of financial instruments depends on preconditions relating to both 
the level of government capacity and the progression of the international legal 
framework. The National REDD-plus Fund provides the organisational structure for 
the progressive introduction of financial instruments without being bound to any 
particular mechanism (as the market-based approach would do) and without 
establishing rigid procedures and responsibilities that could encumber the 
development of the NFI (as would happen under budget support). Such progressive 
introduction is crucial to incorporate changes in the international legal framework 
(e.g. the establishment of a new carbon market and other trading mechanisms, the 
operation of international REDD-plus funds under the Green Climate Fund, the 
introduction of new guidelines and safeguards and so forth), to make sure more 
VRSKLVWLFDWHG LQVWUXPHQWV DUH DGRSWHG DV D FRXQWU\¶V EXUHDXFUDWLF FDSDFLW\ JURZV
and to apply lessons learned in implementation about what mechanisms work better 
in delivering support to fund beneficiaries.104 
7.4. Green finance for sustainable landscape governance: a proposal  
The multitude of diverse activities and actors involved in REDD-plus can only be 
effectively supported by a national financial infrastructure that exhibits the qualities 
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 Wunder, µThe Efficiency of Payments for Environmental Services in Tropical Conservation¶
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discussed in the previous section. A national REDD+ fund can, in principle, attract 
funding from various sources, use different financial instruments, combine results-
based and non-results-based funding, support small-scale and large-scale activities, 
and engage the private sector, civil society as well as government agencies. But to 
achieve that, this section suggests that a more complex NFI must be developed in 
three stages, using the national fund as a kingpin.  
Preliminary clarifications are needed before one ventures into conceptualising a 
financial framework for a programme whose inner workings are still unclear, whose 
international rules are under discussion, and whose application spans from countries 
with relatively high bureaucratic capacity and financial capability to others with 
scarce or no governance capacity (not to mention their wildly different traditions, 
socio-economic circumstances and drivers of environmental change). Specifically, 
one must be reminded of the fallacy of one-size-fits-all solutions105 and of the risk of 
advancing ideas that may be incompatible with the international framework once it is 
agreed. These risks are unavoidable when analysing ongoing policy processes, but 
should not be taken as a disqualification of all contributions to the development of 
theoretical analysis of governance structures.  
To address concerns about applicability, the proposed model combines concepts and 
ideas that emerged from country submissions to the UNFCCC COP. It is treated at a 
level of detail that leaves considerable leeway for changes to be made when taking 
into account national circumstances and priorities. It maps out a process for the 
incremental development of rules and institutions whose speed depends on capacity 
and internal political dynamics. Finally, it is an option that countries can implement 
in toto or in part as they deem appropriate.  
Step 1: The Governance Fund 
In the first stages of the trust fund operation disbursement of finance should focus on 
completing and providing adequate and predictable support for the policy reforms 
that lay the conditions for the implementation of the programme (using results-based 
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carbon payments) initiated during the readiness process, such as the tenure and 
spatial planning reforms discussed here. Phases one and two of international REDD-
plus implementation (readiness and advanced readiness) are largely supported on a 
non-results-based scale by multilateral institutions as well as bilaterally.106 Along 
these lines, this fund would not rely on payments for measured and verified emission 
reductions. Instead, resources could be provided partly upfront, e.g. following the 
application and review procedure mentioned above, and partly on condition that 
certain outcomes are met, such as the enactment of laws or the implementation of 
policies.107 The Governance Fund could also support the growth of PPPs as well as 
ex ante tax deductions for low-carbon activities.  
Regardless of whether resources are distributed upfront or based on outcomes, their 
generation remains grant-based in so far it rests on non-repayable public and private 
contributions. It is important to remark that grant-based finance is quantitatively 
limited and must thus be used strategically. However, readiness reforms require 
long-term support and it is thus crucial that lasting financial arrangements be 
established at the national level to continue supporting readiness and other grant-
based activities even if international policies change and after results-based 
instruments are introduced. Moreover, the advantage of this funding modality is that 
it would gradually shift the responsibility for managing readiness funding onto 
national entities, leaving to donors and multilateral financial institutions pre-funding 
screening and post-funding monitoring functions. This trend towards the devolution 
of responsibilities to lower levels of governance would increase the national 
ownership of the activities and increase the chances that they would be 
mainstreamed in national policy.  
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 Chapter 4 section 2.1. 
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 Output-based, outcome-based and impact-based metrics are three ways of measuring results. The 
first metric measures policy outputs (documents prepared, laws passed etc), the second measures 
social and environmental changes (area of forest protected, progress of tenure legalisation, livelihood 
improvements in the communities involved etc) and the latter measures the mitigation impact 
(emission reduction and removals). Wertz-.DQRXQQLNRII 0F1HLOO µ3HUIRUPDQFH LQGLFDWRUV DQG
REDD-SOXVLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ¶LQ$QJHOVHQHWDOAnalysing REDD+: Challenges and choices (CIFOR 
2012) 233. 
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Step 2: The Forest Carbon Fund 
The second step in the development of a NFI could be the creation of a funding 
window for asset-based instruments, which will be called the Forest Carbon Fund. 
The idea is to combine the financial rules of the carbon market with the 
organisational structure of a PES mechanism. Some of the existing PES schemes rely 
on a national trust fund which issues certificates for the provision of ecosystem 
services.108 If the national PES scheme is linked to REDD-plus, the carbon fund 
could issue certificates for verified carbon credits that are then sold as offsets to 
national and international buyers. This system may appear similar to the nested 
approach described above, but while in nested REDD-plus payments would likely be 
transferred directly from international carbon buyers to local service providers, under 
PES REDD-plus international buyers would contribute to the Forest Carbon Fund 
and be rewarded from a pool of carbon credits generated measuring the emissions 
reduced against a national baseline. This model can only be used for activities in 
which a provider is clearly identified and has not only the legal right (tenure 
VHFXULW\EXWDOVRWKHSRZHUWRSURYLGHWKHVHUYLFH0H[LFR¶V)RUHVW)XQGDQG&RVWD
5LFD¶VNational Forest Finance Fund use a similar logic. Channelling international 
support to national funds of such type does not appear to be too complex or 
controversial.  
&RPSDUHG WR WKH &'0 PRGHO 3(6 VFKHPHV ³KHGJH ULVNV´ RI OHDNDJH DQG
permanence, and they reduce transaction costs; fund intermediation also prevents 
private actors from making excessive speculative rents out of carbon price to 
opportunity cost differentials;109 government involvement in carbon fund 
management means that forest PES schemes can be more easily integrated with 
development policies, for instance in promoting development models with a carbon 
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 Costa Rica (n 101). 
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 The intermediation provided by the national fund would in fact ensure that payments be tailored to 
local opportunity costs rather than determined by international carbon prices: if the opportunity cost 
of avoided deforestation or reforestation activities in a certain area is lower than the price paid by 
international donors and investors for carbon offsets, the trust fund could reinvest the remaining 
funding to expand its operation, or use extra incentives for the achievement of co-benefits such as 
biodiversity protection or rural development. 
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reduction potential at landscape or regional scales;110 forest PES can also be used to 
promote other environmental services alongside carbon, as advocated by the COP;111 
the scheme also offers the flexibility of using other payment modalities alongside 
cash payments;112 and finally it can be used at different scales to tailor the drivers.113 
Carbon funding and funds for other ecosystem services (e.g. from national actors) 
could be pooled together to expand protection.  
Arguably, this model also has some disadvantages compared to the carbon market. 
One is that international funds do not reach local stakeholders directly, and the 
intermediation of the national carbon fund could create inefficiencies due to 
mismanagement, problems of state capture and corruption, or just plain inability to 
reach out to stakeholders. These problems are caused by the lack of adequate 
capacity and good practices in administration.  
For the private sector to be looking at investments in forest carbon as part of their 
portfolio activities, sufficient demand for carbon credits must be created in 
developed countries which is still a far-off prospect. In the present situation, the 
limited demand is keeping the price of carbon low and even if the new emission 
reduction targets are ambitious enough to raise prices in the international market, the 
opportunity costs of a REDD-plus activity will still be higher in many cases.114 The 
ensuing shortfall in private sector financing can be compensated if private sector 
participation is expanded beyond the carbon market.  
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 .DUVHQW\ DQG 2QJROR VXJJHVW WKDW ³ZHOO-WKRXJKW µDVVHWV-EXLOGLQJ¶ 3(6 FDQ EH LQVWUXPHQWV RI
change in relative prices, remunerating active contributions towards the maintenance of forest cover, 
and also a vehicle for financing the transformation of agricultural practices that would provide higher 
HDUQLQJV WR IDUPHUV´ ,Q RUGHU WRGR VR WKH\ VD\ WKDW 3(6 PXVW EH FRPELQHG ZLWK LQWHJUDWHG UXUDO
development programs while retaining their conditional dimension. Karsenty, Ongolo, µWhat room 
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)2532/ 
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factors such as the biodiversity importance of a certain area or its watershed functions. 
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 Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic use government tax credits and state subsidies to pay 
landholders for protecting forests. 
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 Mexico, Costa Rica and of the Dominican Republic are examples of large-scale PES schemes, but 
there are many small-scale PES schemes in operation throughout the developing world; see, 
generally, Dunn, Payments for Ecosystem Services (DEFRA 2011). 
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 Fosciµ%DODQFHVKHHWLQWKH5(''$UHJOREDOHVWLPDWHVPHDVXULQJWKHZURQJFRVWV"¶
Ecological Economics  196, at 198. 
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Step 3: The Sustainable Landscapes Fund 
The third step in the development of the NFI is to mainstream environmental 
sustainability in investments directed to the lucrative markets that are driving 
deforestation. This should be done at the national rather than international level 
mainly for practical reasons.115 A Sustainable Landscapes Fund would complete the 
transition to sustainable landscape governance by channelling investments in a wide 
range of low-carbon development activities, hence financial support from this fund 
should be directed to areas with significant human presence and the looming threat 
of large-scale drivers. 
The Sustainable Landscapes Fund would work at two levels: at small and mid-scale 
it would focus on the provision of subsidised credit at convenient conditions (i.e. 
long maturities, low interest rates and flexible repayment schedules) to activities that 
meet certain sustainability criteria. A demonstrable reduction in emissions compared 
to alternative land-use choices would be the main ± though potentially not the only ± 
requirement for the receipt of credit. As seen above, access to credit is a major 
problem for small producers with little or no collateral, and often small rural loans in 
developing countries have extremely high interest rates or repayment conditions 
which discourage risk-taking. Recent initiatives have begun to focus on the provision 
of credit for low-carbon activities. For instance, in 2010 Brazil launched D µ/RZ
&DUERQ $JULFXOWXUH 3ODQ DQG $YRLGHG 'HIRUHVWDWLRQ WR 5HGXFH 3RYHUW\ LQ %UD]LO¶
which provides financial assistance to the recipients of low-carbon rural credit in the 
form of non-reimbursable payments for the provision of environmental services, as 
well as technical assistance to develop low-carbon farming technologies.116 The Plan 
also included a R$1 billion subsidised credit line for small and medium rural 
producers for activities that reduce deforestation, increase sustainable agriculture and 
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 Establishing an international framework of incentives for foreign investments in these sectors 
would in fact be a legal and political nightmare. Certainly, it would be hard to establish such 
framework under strained UNFCCC negotiations, especially with counties running against the clock 
to conclude a binding agreement by 2015. Moreover, the subject would run into ideological criticisms 
by some countries who vehemently oppose foreign investments in these areas, especially by large 
PXOWLQDWLRQDOV DQG WKDW UHJDUG WKH DFTXLVLWLRQ RI ODQG D IRUP RI µFRORQLVDWLRQ¶ )LQDOO\ DQ
international framework of this kind would fail to recognise the deep differences between agricultural 
development models across countries and may superimpose a particular model of investment. 
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 Inter-American Development Bank, Low-Carbon Agriculture And Avoided Deforestation To 
Reduce Poverty In Brazil (IDB 2010) Doc Br-X1028. 
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livestock production, expand the area of replanted forests and encourage the 
recovery of degraded areas.117 
The Sustainable Landscapes Fund could also work at larger scales to draw foreign 
direct investments into export-oriented rural and forestry activities that meet 
sustainability criteria. The idea that private investments are central to the 
sustainability agenda has long been recognised in the international community.118 
,QYHVWRUV¶ UHWXUQV ZRXOG WKXV FRPH SULPDULO\ IURP ORZ-carbon forestry and 
agricultural enterprises, with REDD-plus funding used to increase profitability, 
reduce risk or both. Foreign investments could benefit from risk-transfers measures 
such as guarantees that limit losses in case of unsuccessful investments, or 
insurances against specific risks connected to the activity (e.g. operational, market, 
regulatory or reputational). 7KLVRSWLRQZRXOGUHGXFH059UHTXLUHPHQWVDQG³DYRLG
WKHWKRUQ\LVVXHRIEDVHOLQHUHIHUHQFHVHWWLQJ´119 A similar idea was put forward by a 
team of international experts in 2012 as an alternative to REDD-plus.120  
Alternatively, the profitability of sustainable investments could be increased by 
SURYLGLQJ D µFDUERQ SUHPLXP¶ EDVHG RQ IXOO\ PHDVXUHG UHVXOWV 7KLV ZD\ WKH
mechanism would simply provide a separate funding channel that integrates the PES 
scheme with international investments. Attention should be paid on how the carbon 
premium is shared between investors and local producers, depending on whether the 
costs of switching to sustainable modes of production is borne by the first (e.g. 
through higher prices) or by the latter (i.e. through higher running costs vis-à-vis 
stable international prices). This option faces the same MRV challenges as the CDM 
approach because the provision of ex post results-based payments to international 
investors and/or domestic producers requires a detailed monitoring of emission 
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 The programme was financed with R£1 billion for the 2010-2011 harvest which increased to R$1.6 
billion in 2011-2012. IPAM, %UD]LO¶V ³/RZ-&DUERQ $JULFXOWXUH´ 3URJUDP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Implementation (IPAM 2012) <www.gcftaskforce.org/documents/brazil's_low-
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 UNDESA, Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development (UNDESA 2003) 9. 
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 Karsenty (n 98) 34. 
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 7KHLU SURSRVDO FDOOHG µ,QDUL¶ UHFRPPHQGHG HVWDEOLVKLQJ DQ DXWRQRPRXV QRQ-profit institutional 
framework to regulate financial flows. Munden et al, Inari: A proposal for financing sustainable land 
use at scale (Munden Project 2012) <www.fao.org/docrep/016/ap076e/ap076e.pdf> Accessed 12 
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reductions and sequestrations as well as the setting of accurate baselines.121 If 
investments are assessed on their overall sustainability as opposed to their carbon 
impact, the task of the national monitoring authority would be particularly 
challenging. Sustainability criteria would have to be developed and ad hoc 
arrangements made to provide extra premiums for non-carbon benefits.  
This form of PPP could concentrate on areas where long-term investments create a 
win-win-win outcome for investors, local partners and the environment, such as 
agricultural intensification, agroforestry, non-timber forest products or small-scale 
sustainable forest management. Besides the provision of incentives, further support 
could come from the Governance Fund to collect and disseminate information 
related to sustainable activities across geographical areas, and build local 
entrepreneurial capacity. Such information could also be used to create a registry of 
activities that seek capital investments, matching local entrepreneurship with 
national and international investors. Where there is a substantial discrepancy 
between the size of the producer and that of the investor, intermediary services could 
be provided to either aggregate fragmented funding sources or to micro-manage 
large investment funds (which would be distributed to smallholders).122 An example 
of the services that can be provided by public sector partners to the private sector is 
given E\ WKH :RUOG %DQN¶V )RUHVW ,QYHVWPHQW 3URJUDPPH 7Ke FIP is channelling 
climate finance to support large-scale private investments as grants, concessional 
loans and guarantees.123 Furthermore, it is providing financial advisory services to 
private partners and making sure that such projects fit in the framework of a broader 
low-carbon development strategy.124 This way, private sector actors may perceive 
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 Incidentally, if payments are accorded based on the international price of carbon, some investors 
could benefit from incongruously high profits, which may be perhaps ethically questionable but 
which would not affect the financial viability of the programme. 
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 Munden et al (n 120) 3-4. 
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 See CIF, Incentivizing the Involvement of the Private Sector in REDD+: A review of early 
experiences and lessons learned in the Forest Investment Program (World Bank 2013). 
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 As characterised in the national Forest Investment Plan prepared by governments with support 
from the FIP and inputs from the private sector and civil society. For further information, see chapter 
4 section 3. 
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REDD-plus as a business opportunity or an instrument to help manage regulatory 
risks.125 
By focusing on foreign investments, this last step of the funding process spans 
beyond REDD-plus and dovetails with rapidly changing economic dynamics. Over 
the last few decades, most developing countries have made policy and regulatory 
choices to attract foreign investments, and with the recent liberalisation of land 
markets this trend has spread to agriculture; yet this policy is currently challenged by 
some developing countries that adopted protectionist policies in the agricultural 
sector.126 These political dynamics must be taken into account as they are likely to 
affect international investments. Moreover, it is unclear whether investments in 
sustainable production models will be competitive in a global context in which the 
priority seems to lie with increasing agricultural supply to meet booming demand.127 
Lack of information about profits and risks is likely to hurt private sector 
engagement in low-carbon activities in the short term, particularly vis-à-vis the 
uncertain returns of sustainable activities. Additional regulations in importing 
markets such as mandatory certification and labelling schemes help create demand 
for sustainably sourced products.128  
Despite the challenges, this model has great potential. Its main advantage is that it 
could help bridge the financial gap affecting REDD-plus. By leveraging private 
capital from outside the carbon market and harvesting the revenue-generating 
potential, the Sustainable Landscape Fund reduces the opportunity cost of REDD-
plus and has the potential of multiplying the impact of COP-mandated climate funds. 
Moreover, this option targets investors interested in stable and profitable investments 
whereas carbon market is likely to attract speculators interested in high-risk volatile 
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commodities.129 Long-term non-speculative investments may provide lower but 
more secure returns for large investors such as pension funds130 since agricultural 
and forest commodities are in a positive investment trend given the predicted rise in 
global demand.131 Furthermore, this option would use tools and procedures that are 
familiar to investors and would fit into existing investment strategies, such as those 
used to hedge risks connected to annual price variability (e.g. futures contracts).  
Fig. 2: The organisational structure of the National Financial Infrastructure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
The present chapter has argued that the establishment of a NFI with ad hoc rules, 
procedures and organisational arrangements is central to the operation of REDD-
plus, and has shown that developing countries are converging on the use of national 
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 There is a risk of seeing developed nations as channelling their financial commitments through 
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131
 Chapter 2 section 1. 
National REDD-plus 
Trust Fund 
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- Disburse PES payments 
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funds. Extensive experience with national funds suggests that these can be an 
effective NFI provided that they are transparent, autonomous, non-bureaucratic and 
subjected to high fiduciary standards. More importantly, they must be able to 
distribute payments in forms and at scales that are suitable to the recipients¶ needs.  
Various financial instruments are compatible with the national REDD-plus fund 
option; these can be combined using the roadmap laid out in the last section. Grant 
payments in the first stage could support governance reforms. A fund-based PES 
scheme could deliver results-based payments while conventional micro-credit can 
tackle small-scale drivers. Finally, to contrast the industrial drivers of forest loss 
risk-transfer incentives should be used to attract private sector investments in low-
carbon activities alongside positive asset-based incentives. The Sustainable 
Landscape Fund would lay the ground to extend sustainability finance beyond 
REDD-plus to other sectors that are crucial to achieve sustainable landscape 
governance and to make the landscape an integral part of a low-carbon economy.132  
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8 
Conclusions 
Climate change and deforestation are among the most pressing environmental 
challenges of the twenty-first century. The first dramatically demonstrates the scale 
of the human impact on the biosphere. The second epitomises our apparently 
insatiable need to exploit, transform and impoverish the natural world and the 
consequent loss of those ecosystem services that we rely upon for our well-being. It 
has become clear that these two problems are interconnected in many ways. This 
thesis has considered how forest loss is contributing to a warming world and it has 
sought to identify some of the measures to reverse the current trend. In a world soon 
to be inhabited by 11 billion people, all legitimately aspiring to reach Western living 
standards, the rationale of activities leading to forest loss cannot be reversed. But, 
with the right technological, legal and policy developments, its environmental impact 
can be changed.  
REDD-plus is the first global effort aimed to address these two problems. It intends 
to create a multi-level governance system that challenges the economic rationality of 
environmental degradation, achieves a balanced trade-off with development, and 
improves the capacity of State and non-state actors to govern the commons 
effectively and efficiently. These objectives are shared by the majority of MEAs and 
other international environmental instruments. However, REDD-plus¶ incentive-
based approach offers a fresh perspective and new insights on these important issues. 
This chapter draws some conclusions on two overlapping but distinct matters. 
Section 8.1 sums up the lessons learned in this thesis about pattern of international 
law-making emerging under REDD-plus, which is based on the interplay between 
incentive-based soft law and bottom-up best practices; it pinpoints its novel 
characteristics and discusses its (demonstrated and expected) effectiveness compared 
to traditional prescriptive regulatory instruments. Section 8.2 explores how these 
patterns can be combined in a consistent framework of multi-level governance, 
clarifying the role of State, sub-national and supra-national actors in the development 
and implementation of incentive-based regulations in a domestic context. Building 
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on these observations, section 8.3 takes stock of the present situation and assesses 
options for the development of REDD-plus, providing recommendations for 
international legal scholars and policy makers. It finally considers the possible 
repercussions of this legal experiment not only on the future of the climate 
negotiations, but on the direction of international environmental rule-making as a 
whole. 
8.1. An emerging model of international governance 
This thesis has shown that the international governance model introduced with 
REDD-plus has departed from ideas of centralised, top-down global environmental 
governance still popular among scholars.1 While moderately successful in the past, 
top-down governance seems unable to address the more ambitious, politically 
demanding and economically complex environmental problem of this century. The 
failed attempt to conclude a global forest treaty and the current impasse in the 
climate change regime highlight the limits of this model. REDD-SOXV¶ LQFHQWLYH-
based ethos is a new development in a trend WRZDUGV µVRIWHU¶ OHJDO DSSURDFKHV. 
Instead of creating legally-binding obligations and sanctions for non-compliance, the 
programme introduces aspirational goals, guiding principles and cooperative tools 
that foster voluntary action.  
µ3RVLWLYH incentives¶ create political support for climate change mitigation and 
facilitate the transition to sustainability in forest landscapes. Developing countries 
are under no obligation to reduce emissions but, using results-based payments, they 
are encouraged to find more efficient forest and land management practices. µPolicy 
DSSURDFKHV¶define the goals and principles for action. The COP establishes technical 
requirements (forest monitoring), basic institutional and organisational requirements 
(focal points and national strategies) and vague minimum standards (the safeguards). 
On top of that, readiness activities create a cooperative platform for technical and 
financial support between developing countries, developed countries and specialised 
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 6HHHJ3DOPHU µ1HZ:D\V WR0DNH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO(QYLURQPHQWDO/DZ¶ 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Journal of International Law 259; Cruickshank, Schneeberger, Smith, A Pocket Guide to Sustainable 
Development Governance (2nd ed., Commonwealth Secretariat 2012) 34-61. 
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multilateral organisations. This creates a process of international law-making based 
on the interplay between soft-law and bottom-up best practices which privileges 
flexibility over harmonisation, fosters national ownership of governance reforms and 
encourages progressive improvement through transparent and participative 
international assessment. 
Neither financial incentives nor policy and technical assistance are new to 
international environmental law, but the scale at which they are being used in 
REDD-plus and their relative importance vis-á-vis the absence of legally binding 
obligations is unprecedented. This new pattern of cooperation in international 
environmental law is still at the early stages and it is thus difficult to assess its 
effectiveness. Moreover, as centralised forms of global governance exist only in 
theory, speculating on the validity of one approach over another is of little use. This 
does not mean that international legal scholars should desist from this pursuit: to the 
contrary, the conceptualisation of soft, incentive-based and bottom-up legal 
approaches proposed in this research should hopefully encourage international legal 
scholars to dedicate more attention to the rapidly evolving nature of these regulatory 
patterns, analyse their impact and guide their further development. 
In this light, bearing in mind the partiality and provisionality of the assessment at 
this stage, this research has identified some clear advantages in using the soft 
approach epitomised by REDD-plus: 
(i) Political advantage  
The difficulties encountered by past international efforts to regulate forest 
PDQDJHPHQW ZDV RIWHQ GXH WR WKH GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV¶ UHVLVWDQFH WR D SHUFHLYHG
µSRVW-coloQLDO¶ LQIOXHQFH RQ HFRQRPLF VHFWRUV FHQWUDO WR QDWLRQDO GHYHORSPHQW
(agriculture, food, timber); hence detailed prescriptions on domestic policy would 
have sat uncomfortably with the voluntary nature of the programme. Fostering 
perceptions that economic incentives are not used to dictate domestic policy is 
essential to avoid the re-ignition of old political conflicts. By taking a soft, non-
prescriptive approach, REDD-plus faces less political resistance to measures that 
influence sensitive domestic governance issues.  
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(ii) Legal advantage  
The focus on framework financial rules and broad guidelines for implementation 
reduced the intrinsic complexity of REDD-plus and allowed negotiations to progress 
faster. Flexibility is built into the programme to allow a gradual emergence of 
detailed guidance and best practices through a learning-by-doing approach. 
Participant countries are expected to abide by certain standards or follow certain 
procedures (e.g. on baseline setting, measuring and reporting, transparency, 
stakeholder participation, policy integration, multi-level coordination and so forth), 
but these are expressed in generic, non-binding form. This avoids dissuading country 
participation while allowing progressive improvement of standards and procedures 
in light of experience. This law-making model expands the framework approach that 
has been widely used in international environmental law by creating a framework 
(for forest protection and sustainable management) within a framework (the 
UNFCCC).  
(iii) Methodological advantage  
0DQ\REVHUYHUVQRWHGWKDW WKHUHFDQQRWEHD µRQH-size-fits-DOO¶DSSURDFK WR5(''-
plus implementation2 and the COP made clear that developing countries must be free 
to decide what options are most suited to their national circumstances and 
capabilities.3 International processes do influence the development of domestic 
policies but lower-level actors have considerable freedom to develop locally-
appropriate approaches. This PLQLPLVHV SUREOHPV RI µEOXHSULQW WKLQNLQJ¶ WKDW KDYH 
tainted international cooperation:4  the idea that a particular policy is intrinsically 
effective and must be applied across the developing world, regardless of national 
circumstances.5  
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 Chapter 7 (n 109). 
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 UNFCCC COP Decision 1/CP.16 (2010) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, paragraph 74. This is 
consistent with, inter alia: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (adopted 14 June 1992) 
31 ILM 874, principle 11. 
4
 The history of international development aid is rife of cases where blueprint policy solutions failed. 
1RWH IRU H[DPSOH WKH SUREOHPV RI WKH :RUOG %DQN¶V Vtructural adjustment programmes: Schatz, 
µ6WUXFWXUDO$GMXVWPHQW LQ$IULFD$)DLOLQJ*UDGH6R)DU¶ -RXUQDORI0RGHUQ$IULFDQ
Studies 679. 
5
 1DJHQGUD2VWURPµPolycentric governance of multifunctional forested landscapes¶ (2012) 6(2) Int. 
J. of the Commons 104. 
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At the same time, the establishment of permanent platforms to exchange information 
(between countries, experts, NGOs and stakeholders) and develop best practices, the 
constructive and transparent assessment of government action by legitimate bodies 
(e.g. the multi-stakeholder steering committees of readiness institutions) and the 
gradual improvement of best practices (e.g. through the review of readiness 
documents) create a common understanding of the problems and increase the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of environmental programmes. Multilateral 
organisations such as the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP have developed 
considerable expertise on issues of environmental governance and rural development 
and have contributed greatly to the development of REDD-plus.  
(iv) Politico-economic advantage 
There are strong domestic challenges to changes in environmental management that 
are bound to alter the socio-economic status quo. The case of the palm oil 
moratorium in Indonesia shows that domestic opposition from powerful interests can 
greatly limit the impact of even the most high-profile international environmental 
initiatives. ,Q RUGHU WR EH VXFFHVVIXO GRPHVWLF SROLFLHV PXVW EH µRZQHG¶ E\
government and non-governmental stakeholders. Plans that are superimposed by 
international institutions fail to meet the needs of local actors and are seen as 
impositions. By contrast, policies that are negotiated domestically and developed 
with extensive stakeholder participation have more legitimacy and a better chance of 
success. Emphasis on participation and equitable benefit-sharing in the safeguards 
and in the readiness process can change the political economy in favour of REDD-
plus. 
(v) Economic advantage 
The readiness process can also contribute to the achievement of sustainable 
development through a stepwise process of policy development, assessment and 
improvement. Fostering a transition to low-carbon development would reduce 
dependency on international payments, solving in part REDD-SOXV¶ ILQDQFLDO JDS
Although in the short term pursuing public sector reforms would increase the 
SURJUDPPH¶V LPSOHPHQWDWLRQFRVWV WKHVH DUH OLNHO\ to be compensated by the fact 
that a more capable State can reduce other cost categories by, e.g. identifying 
lucrative alternatives to deforestation, improving the design of REDD-plus activities, 
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promoting economies of scale in implementation, capping profits, reducing conflict 
and so forth.6  
The above observations lend force to the argument that legally-binding agreements 
are not intrinsically more effective than non-legally-binding ones.7 It is here 
submitted that REDD-SOXV¶success will depend not so much on its legal force but 
rather on whether it is supported with adequate and predictable resources: if 
economic incentives replace regulatory µdisincentives¶ HJ PHFKDQLVPV IRU QRQ-
compliance) as motors of implementation, the legal force of the instrument is 
relatively unimportant. Developing countries have shown in the past that their 
commitment to genuine governance reform is often just nominal, and that the influx 
of adequate and predictable incentives is crucial to success. Such incentives must in 
fact be sufficient to (i) maintain the political will to undertake demanding policy 
reforms, (ii) overcome the technical and administrative challenges faced in the 
transition towards low forest emissions, and (iii) support local stakeholders in such 
transition while maintaining livelihoods and encouraging development.  
At the moment, REDD-plus resources are neither adequate nor predictable. By 
separating public sector governance from actions expected to deliver environmental 
results, µSKDVHG LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ¶ ignores that governance reforms happen very 
slowly and require long-term support.8 The current division in phases bears influence 
on the way participant countries, organisations and observers frame their idea of 
REDD-plus, think about their participation in the programme and plan their 
activities. This is counterproductive in many ways: it gives a sense that public 
policies and measures are confined to the initial stages (readiness) rather than being 
part of a long-term adaptive process of learning and improvement; it suggests that 
funding will come from different sources in every phase whereas both market and 
non-market finance, results-based and non-results-based funding will coexist in all 
                                                 
6
 For a categorisation and analysis of costs in REDD-plus, see White, Minang, Estimating the 
opportunity costs of REDD+: A training manual (version 1.3, World Bank 2011). 
7
 0DF.HQ]LH µ/HVVRQV IURP )RUHVWU\ RU ,QWHUQDWLRQDO (QYLURQPHQWDO /DZ¶  (2) RECIEL 
114, at 122. 
8
 Evans, Rauch, µBureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-1DWLRQDO$QDO\VLVRIWKH(IIHFWVRI³:HEHULDQ´
State Structures on Economic Growth¶ (1999) 64(5) American Sociological Review 748; Wertz-
.DQRXQQLNRII0F1HLOOµ3HUIRUPDQFHLQGLFDWRUV and REDD-SOXVLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ¶LQ$QJHOVHQHWDO
Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices (CIFOR 2012) 233. 
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phases (albeit in different proportion); it conveys an idea that in the long-term 
funding will come in large part from the sale of carbon offsets despite the problems 
affecting carbon finance; and it fails to differentiate between the types of results-
based payments or indeed capture the evolution of the financial framework towards 
more integrated models of sustainable development finance. 
The adequacy of support is also a problem since REDD-plus will likely be 
underfunded. Positive incentives cannot change the economic rationale of 
environmental degradation unless they are used as investment capital to promote a 
transition towards alternative forms of development. %XWµVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW¶
has remained a vague background concept in REDD-plus discussion and practice. 
Although developing countries are encouraged to mainstream REDD-plus activities 
into national development, a systematic application of the principle requires shifting 
from mere payments for emission reductions to integrated forms of sustainable 
development finance. 
Problems of adequacy and predictability of support can be solved by reimagining the 
progression of REDD-plus countries from the current situation of unsustainable 
forest governance to the desired situation of sustainable forest landscapes. In the 
current phase (1a/1b), REDD-plus is developing and implementing national and 
subnational strategies, policies and measures in a context of international legal 
uncertainty. It is at this stage that monitoring and enforcement capacities should be 
strengthened, tenure laws passed and reforms started, spatial planning processes 
reviewed and the appropriate financial intermediation established. Support for the 
implementation of governance reforms can be provided by the Governance Fund 
using grant-based or output-based payments.9 It should be refinanced with 
conspicuous public-sector funding at long intervals (e.g. 5-year programmes) so as to 
ensure predictability. 
When sufficient progress is made, developing countries can begin experimenting 
with large-scale results-based activities such as PES programmes or other forms of 
payments for emission reductions (phase 2). This phase could mark the beginning of 
outcome-based or impact-based payments, but transactions would still be carried out 
                                                 
9
 See chapter 7 (n 111). 
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between GHYHORSHG FRXQWULHV¶ governments and/or non-profit operators (e.g. 
foundations, NGOs and other charitable organisations) on one side and centralised 
financial recipients on the other. Funds could be disbursed through the Forest Carbon 
Fund but no private international offsetting would be allowed at this stage. Private 
sector participation could be sought with companies operating in the recipient 
country, for instance by making certain companies eligible to receive PES 
incentives. Alternatively, the government could focus on public-private-partnerships 
and share the results-based incentives it receives with its private-sector partner. 
After a sufficiently strong public governance system is in place, countries can 
introduce private governance mechanisms based on access to international markets. 
If carbon markets are in operation and accept forest credits, offsetting would be the 
most immediate form of international financing (phase 3a). Nested implementation 
would allow direct financing at project-level; alternatively, the Forest Carbon Fund 
FRXOG DFW DV D µFDUERQ EDQN¶ WKDW SRROs funding and redistributes credits after 
verification. Finally, international investments in primary commodities could be 
channelled to sustainable practices using the mechanisms described in chapter 7 
(phase 3b). 
Table 7: A revised interpretation of the phased approach 
# Function Main funding 
source 
Conditionality Implementing 
agency 
1a Preparation of public 
governance reforms 
Current system Grants; Output-based Governance Fund 
1b Implementation of  public 
governance reforms 
Consolidated public 
sector finance (e.g. 
GCF) 
Output-based; 
Outcome-based 
Governance Fund 
2 Publicly managed 
emission reduction 
programmes (e.g. 
national PES, PPP) 
Public and private 
funding; bond market 
Outcome-based; 
Impact-based 
Forest Carbon 
Fund 
3a Offset-based emission 
reduction activities 
Carbon market Impact-based Forest Carbon 
Fund 
3b Sustainable rural 
development activities 
Commodity markets Impact-based Sustainability Fund 
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Investing in governance support (phases 1a and 1b) is a no-lose option for REDD-
plus. First, public governance reforms advance change in a UNFCCC context 
characterised by slow and fragmented regulatory development. Second, they raise 
awareness about forests and REDD-plus within developing countries, increasing the 
perceived legitimacy of future results-based activities and fostering the 
internalisation of responsibilities and interests. Third, they lay the ground for the 
solution of other development and environmental problems in an integrated fashion, 
improving synergies and tackling the root causes of issues such as biodiversity loss, 
habitat loss and rural poverty.10  
A further advantage is that governance reforms may survive a collapse of climate 
negotiations. After the Warsaw COP, the possibility that the negotiations for a post-
Kyoto treaty will founder or that they will not be ambitious enough to generate 
sufficient demand for forest emission reductions is still high. Climate negotiations 
are progressing slowly and crucial issues, such as quantified emission reduction and 
limitation targets, have not been properly discussed. This thesis has assumed that 
some form of agreement will indeed be concluded in the coming years, albeit 
accepting that such agreement may not change the substantial lack of ambition 
showed by the major polluters, or the challenges faced by REDD-plus (primarily the 
financial gap). Under this hypothetical scenario, it is theoretically possible that the 
various elements of a FRPSUHKHQVLYHFOLPDWHFKDQJHOHJDOUHJLPHZLOOEHµXQSDFNHG¶
and pushed forward as separate international initiatives despite the obvious technical 
and political challenges these efforts will face. Were this to happen to REDD-plus, 
the proposed measures to establish a domestic governance framework could still 
have long-lasting effects on forest emissions because (a) capable and transparent 
governments are by definition more likely to take a long-term perspective in the 
management of natural resources which preserves the services provided by 
ecosystems for the benefit of their population, and (b) individuals and communities 
can better protect their local environment if they are empowered through 
                                                 
10
 The synthesis of various environmental and development objectives may progress faster at the 
domestic level than it does at the international level, where issues of cross-regime coordination are 
rather cumbersome and scarcely effective. For an overview see Young (ed.), Regime Interaction in 
international Law: Facing Fragmentation (CUP 2012). 
242 
 
mechanisms of participation and government accountability.11 In most cases, gains 
made in terms of community empowerment, accountability, bureaucratic capacity 
and transparency are not easily reversed. 
8.2. A possible skeletal structure for domestic governance  
After analysing the international level, the research has suggested three areas of 
policy that can act as catalysts for domestic governance reform using the landscape 
as a physical and conceptual space to achieve sustainable development. Tenure 
security empowers stakeholders, improves participation and legitimacy, reduces 
illegality and provides a basis for the functioning of incentive instruments. Spatial 
planning can promote multi-sector integration, multi-level coordination and multi-
stakeholder participation, combining technical and political elements in decision-
making. Finally, sound financial intermediation (i.e. accountable, transparent and 
flexible) is key to the effective, efficient and equitable distribution of results-based 
and non-results-based incentives for environmental protection, and may lay the 
ground for attracting private sector investments in sustainable development from 
sources other than the carbon market.  
Measures to address tenure, planning and finance are inter-dependent: taken 
together, they form a skeletal system of governance which creates the conditions for 
multi-sectoral, multi-level and multi-stakeholder programme implementation. Figure 
3 shows REDD-SOXV¶ results-based payments and other sources of sustainability 
finance as the tip of a pyramid in which the policy catalysts are the building blocks. 
The progression is made explicit by the arrows beside the governance pyramid which 
indicate changes from the current situation of unsustainable governance to an ideal 
situation of sustainability across the landscape. Yet progress is non-linear: each 
catalyst interweaves with the others12 and neither the progression through phases nor 
                                                 
11
 This goes a long way to meeting the two requirements for addressing the supply-side of drivers: 
making production more efficient and distributing benefits equitably. 
12
 For instance, although planning builds upon secure tenure rights, the early stages of the process (i.e. 
field mapping, introduction of participatory practices) are likely to be beneficial for tenure reforms as 
well. Similarly, the establishment of a sound financial infrastructure can channel international 
resources to ongoing tenure and planning work, and so forth. 
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that from policy approaches to positive incentives are rigidly separated. It would thus 
be advisable to establish dedicated work streams under readiness for the three areas 
simultaneously. Although advances are slow and unpredictable, efforts should aim to 
ensure progress towards achieving a minimum level of governance quality for when 
REDD-plus comes into force in 2020 as part of a post-Kyoto instrument (provided 
that UNFCCC Parties comply with the timetable set out in the Durban Platform). 
This would enable developing countries to make the most out of large-scale results-
based payments.  
These are not necessarily the only areas of public governance where reform may be 
needed, but it is here submitted that they deserve priority consideration in addressing 
the drivers of forest loss. Plainly, developing countries must be free to set their own 
policy priorities and implement reforms that are most suited to their development 
strategy. Yet despite the different national circumstances and administrative 
traditions of each country, the considered policy areas have near universal relevance. 
Tenure systems change, but the importance of tenure security does not; some 
countries do not have a fully-fledged spatial planning policy but the need to 
harmonise and coordinate land uses remains; developing countries may be reluctant 
to financialize their rural economies, but access to economic support for sustainable 
activities in forest areas is an important issue across the tropics. 
Fig. 3: Policy catalysts for sustainable forest landscapes under REDD-plus 
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The centrality of these areas of policy is somewhat confirmed by the recently 
published Land Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF), a tool developed to 
KHOSFRXQWULHV³GLDJQRVHDQGEHQFKPDUNODQGJRYHUQDQFHDQGSULRULtize reforms 
DQG PRQLWRU SURJUHVV RYHU WLPH´13 The LGAF identifies five areas of governance 
that broadly overlap with the proposed policy catalysts and, even though it places 
emphasis on different issues,14 it also pinpoints many of the problems and priorities 
that are addressed in this thesis.  
The policy catalysts have also been considered in REDD-plus discussions, albeit 
marginally. Tenure was identified early on as an important barrier to 
implementation, for the security of property rights was deemed essential to the 
functioning of carbon offsetting under a CDM-like system. National-level planning 
became an important theme with the affirmation of large-scale readiness activities, 
but very little attention has been given to its spatial dimension. Finally, the creation 
of a national financial architecture has become a popular issue only very recently, 
with UN-REDD and other multilateral agencies providing assistance in setting up 
institutional and procedural arrangements, the World Bank looking at jurisdictional-
level arrangements, UNEP at institutions to catalyse private sector finance and the 
Warsaw COP issuing a decision on coordination of support at the national level. 
International support through the decentralised system of cooperation, information 
exchange and technical assistance used in readiness would certainly improve the 
outcome of domestic governance reform. But even if left to their own devices, 
developing countries will have to take some measures to clarify tenure, improve 
spatial coordination of activities and create a system to manage REDD-plus finance. 
This is either explicitly required by the COP (e.g. in the Cancun safeguards) or 
logically necessary to the implementation of the programme.  
                                                 
13
 Deininger, Selod, Burns, The land governance assessment framework: identifying and monitoring 
good practice in the land sector (World Bank 2012) 1. 
14
 For instance, taxation matters and issues relating to the management of public lands are not 
discussed extensively here for they are less relevant to this discussion. Moreover, the document flags 
an additional area of governance, land valuation, which is not directly considered in this research. 
This is justified with the fact that valuation matters are scarcely applicable to most forest lands since 
very often private ownership of such lands is precluded or highly restricted, and even where permitted 
it has not resulted in a thriving market ± hence making the issue of valuation rather marginal. 
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Part II of this thesis has sought to remove many uncertainties over the role of the 
State in the development and implementation of incentive-based environmental 
regulation. It has shown that government action is needed but that it should not be 
based on command-and-control (C&C) ± i.e. the State ought not to be seen merely as 
a source of top-down regulation and as the sole entity responsible for law 
enforcement. Instead, the policy catalysts suggest structural adjustments which 
would align, regulate and harmonise the positions and relations of governments and 
non-governmental stakeholders. ,QRWKHUZRUGVWKH6WDWH¶VVXJJHVWHGUROHLVRQHRI
coordination and influence (C&I): first, as a proactive facilitator and arbiter of 
stakeholder relations through regulations that clarify rights, roles, responsibilities 
and mechanisms for cooperation and dialogue (coordination function); secondly, as 
the maker of rules and conditions for the distribution of incentives as a way of 
engender compliance with policy objectives (influence function). 
It follows that, in this particular context, 5KRGHV¶ VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW PDUNHW-based 
governance systems tend to µhollow out¶ the State is untrue.15 Under REDD-plus the 
State has gone through a process of demolition and reconstruction. It has 
relinquished its ambition to control the forests and seeks instead to exert influence 
through a mix of regulatory approaches and financial incentives distributed to 
stakeholders.16 But the transfer of power from the central government to local 
stakeholders is only apparent, since in most cases developing States had very little 
control over forests to begin with. Hence the shift from government to governance 
simply aligns de jure and de facto situations. In some cases, States establish a system 
of governance where there was previously none, and so in practice they acquire 
authority over previously ungoverned areas. 
Another much-cited theory better describes the process underway with REDD-plus. 
$FFRUGLQJWR3HFNDQG7LFNHOO¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIWKH6WDWHDVDSURDFWLYHSURSRQHQWRI
market-based forms of governance,17 in the current neoliberal paradigm central 
authorities are not marginalised by market forces, but they readjust their role and 
                                                 
15
 5KRGHVµ7KH+ROORZLQJ2XWRIWKH6WDWH¶3ROLWLFDO4XDUWHUO\ 
16
 3HWHUV 3LHUUH µ*RYHUQDQFH ZLWKRXW *RYHUQPHQW" 5HWKLQNLQJ 3XEOLF $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶  --
PART 223, at 226. 
17
 3HFN7LFNHOOµ1HROLEHUDOL]LQJ6SDFH¶ Antipode 380, at 384. 
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tasks to support market logics as a means of government. REDD-plus is certainly 
founded upon neoliberal principles of rational-choice theory, privatisation of natural 
resources, and market transactions; and yet developing countries are crafting a 
hybrid form of environmental governance in which the State retains more control 
over decisions concerning development and environmental protection. Markets are 
seen as a source of funding but not as a source of legitimate decisions. At the same 
time, the government does not enjoy the same authority as the old controlling State 
for power is shared with subnational and supranational stakeholders. REDD-plus can 
thus be characterised as a µglobal public-private partnership¶ in which States (and, to 
some extent, international organisations) partner up with a range of private actors 
(businesses, NGOS, communities etc.) to conjure an effective system of governance 
for forest landscapes. As Rosenau states, in fact, JRYHUQDQFH LV ³D PRUH
encompassing phenomenon than government. It embraces governmental institutions, 
but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms whereby those 
persons and organisations within its purview move ahead, satisfy their needs and 
IXOILOWKHLUZDQWV´18  
There is a risk that some governments will try to recentralise forest control under 
REDD-plus, attracted by prospects of financial gain and equally scared by the idea 
that a distribution of incentives to local stakeholders would drive local empowerment 
that could generate internal challenges to their dominant role. For this reason, the 
REDD-plus safeguards and the best practices learned in the readiness process should 
be applied and monitored consistently over time. Over the long term, however, the 
choice of governance over government is justified not only with considerations about 
equity and democratic values, but also to reduce implementation costs, increase 
political legitimacy and improve the quality of decisions consistent with the 
overarching sustainable development objective. As developing countries lack 
coercive fiat in the management of their vast forest expanses, the fair and equitable 
involvement of stakeholders becomes a conditio sine qua non to the exercise of 
authority.  
                                                 
18
 Rosenau, µ*RYHUQDQFH RUGHU DQG FKDQJH LQ ZRUOGSROLWLFV¶ LQ5RVHQDX&]HPSLHO Governance 
without government (CUP 1992). 
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Clarifying the role of the State in multi-level environmental programmes based on 
incentives helps dissipate ambiguity in international lawmaking. At one end of the 
spectrum, arguments that put too much emphasis on the use of incentives are 
evidently flawed: markets cannot be a substitute for government action and public 
governance reforms in risk-prone countries cannot be avoided by simply devolving 
policy delivery to scarcely regulated market actors. At the other end of the spectrum, 
tendencies to centralise functions and powers at government level are bound to be 
ineffective and must take into account the need for inclusive participation in 
decision-making and power-sharing among governmental and non-governmental 
stakeholders.  
These observations contribute to piercing the ideological veil that still characterises 
the discourse around the role of market and State in environmental regulation: 
arguments that characterise them as soldiers on opposite sides of the regulatory 
battlefield are no longer credible. International legal scholars should investigate the 
appropriateness of regulatory choices in shaping a balanced or hybrid approach 
which recognises that public policy is the result of the complex interaction between 
State and non-State actors through a variety of regulatory and incentive instruments. 
Doing so may help refocus the debate from ideology-prone epistemic schools of 
thought towards more pragmatic discussions about stakeholder roles and functions, 
and the regulatory instruments needed to achieve an effective governance mix. 
8.3. Concluding remarks 
On balance, the thesis provides a somewhat optimistic view of the potential 
contribution of REDD-plus which contrasts with many critical perspectives available 
in the literature. It must be remembered that, even after the adoption of the so-called 
Warsaw framework on REDD-plus, there still is plenty of uncertainty regarding what 
shape the programme will take. There is no single interpretation of what REDD-plus 
will look like and it is in fact clear that the programme will encompass a host of 
approaches - market-based and non-market based, scaled at project, programme and 
policy level, managed by private and public actors and so forth. In this respect,  the 
vague wording of the UNFCCC COP decisions calling for a plurality of approaches 
from a variety of funding sources may not just be the product of scarce analytical 
248 
 
and practical understanding of the programme or merely the result of a lack of 
agreement by the Parties, but a strategic choice to design a broad and flexible 
framework. 
Looking forward, optimism is justified in so far REDD-plus takes responsibility for 
engendering a broad process of public governance reform. Of course, simply stating 
that under REDD-plus any such process should logically take place to improve 
effectiveness and that it can take place using the current mechanism of international 
cooperation does not mean that it will take place. REDD-plus is a high-risk, high-
return legal experiment. If taken as a finished product, the programme is certainly 
disappointing for an international lawyer. Its language is vague, its legal framework 
incomplete, its provisions lack binding force and monitoring and reporting 
requirements are inconsistent. Its incentive-based ethos is marred by the lack of 
resources, and seems vulnerable to blackmail by recipient nations: as soon as 
payments stop, deforestation will certainly resume. The fact that the programme is 
being developed amidst legal uncertainty and low ambitions in the climate change 
negotiations is only a partial excuse. As it presently is, REDD-plus does not stand 
many chances to substantially reduce forest emissions. 
But if seen as an ongoing process, REDD-plus holds some promise. It has drawn 
from decades of experience in international environmental law, and domestic and 
local conservation initiatives and it has finally put governance and sustainability at 
the centre of concern. The ability it has shown to mature and expand its range of 
operation, to progressively encompass themes that were initially deemed political 
taboos, to develop best practices and standards and progressively improve them, and 
to engage multiple stakeholders (from NGOs, the private sector, local communities, 
indigenous peoples and ± more recently ± farmers, timber industries and other 
commodity producers) gives reasons for optimism. One can only hope that this 
development will continue, through trial-and-error and through cooperation and 
political confrontation, to smooth the SURJUDPPH¶Vmany rough edges.  
To this end, this research advances some recommendations for scholars and policy-
makers, looking at the lessons learned from REDD-plus and other relevant 
instruments and initiatives. First of all, there is a need to further study the 
effectiveness, and contextually identify areas for the improvement of: (a) the 
international and domestic regulatory mechanisms that promote sustainable 
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development through a combination of public policies and results-based incentives; 
and (b) the supporting decision-making processes that enhance North-South as well 
as South-South cooperation (e.g. looking at current readiness practice). Such 
investigation must be multi-disciplinary to reflect that complex nature of 
environmental management problems, and it must rest on a solid evidence base built 
from the bottom up (e.g. using a grounded theory or comparative methodologies). 
Despite the need for further studies, this research sheds light on a number of issues. 
The analysis of the drivers supports the idea that addressing environmental, social 
and economic challenges in an integrated fashion and using ambitious deliverables 
geared towards a profound transformation of natural resource governance is likely to 
be a more effective strategy than one focusing on narrowly defined, and apparently 
less ambitious, legal provisions. A long-term perspective is thus needed whereby in 
order to achieve transformative change investments in governance capacity must be 
front-loaded; in the case of REDD-plus, this means that developed countries must be 
ready to provide adequate and predictable support for public sector reforms as an 
investment into sustainability, even if they do not yield immediate environmental 
benefits. The results-based principle must thus be applied judiciously, developing 
goals and methodologies that are appropriate for the various phases of programme 
implementation. 
Moreover, the thesis shows that in order to achieve sustainable development, 
scholars and policy-makers must develop mechanisms to enhance the mutual 
supportiveness of different environmental, human rights and development 
instruments. In particular, mutual supportiveness must be ensured both at the 
international level (e.g. though consistent and cross-referenced provisions, platforms 
for cross-regime cooperation, common monitoring and reporting obligations and so 
forth) and at the domestic level (e.g. through transversal measures that facilitate the 
harmonised implementation of various instruments, such as the creation of 
coordination bodies, the use of policy tools such as spatial planning, the recognition 
and protection of stakeholder rights, and the use of incentives). The path leading 
REDD-plus into the landscape epitomises the raising awareness of the need to adopt 
a more integrated approach and can provide a conceptual basis for the coordination 
of so far distinct legal initiatives. 
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A further lesson from this research is that forest loss (and by extension poor 
environmental management) is as much driven by a short-term economic logic as it 
is caused by poor management in the public sector. The thesis has suggested three 
policy catalysts for domestic governance reform laying out detailed yet flexible 
recommendations for government intervention; while still rudimental, the policy 
catalysts highlight the essential functions of a good governance framework: (1) the 
definition of the positions and the protection of the rights of the actors participating 
in the governance process; (2) the creation of solid mechanisms to ensure dialogue 
and the facilitation of the negotiation of trade-offs between competing interests; and 
(3) the establishment of a system that delivers financial and technical support for the 
transition to sustainable development. Building on this analysis, legal researchers 
should set out measures for governance reform on a country-by-country basis, and 
help solidify best practices for fair and effective stakeholder participation consistent 
with the emerging role of the State as Coordinator and Influencer. On top of that, 
international policy-makers must identify early on the political and politico-
economic hurdles to the implementation of such reform and commit the necessary 
political and financial capital to generate forward momentum for change. 
Unsurprisingly, the effectiveness of REDD-plus will depend on the correct 
realisation of abstract ideas of sustainability, the application of good governance 
principles, and the rational division of competences between actors operating at 
different levels. Most importantly, and most worryingly, success will also depend on 
the advancement of the climate change regime. Although public sector reforms 
initiated under REDD-plus should be beneficial regardless of the fate of the 
UNFCCC regime, a rapid and drastic reduction in deforestation can hardly be 
envisaged outside this context. Moreover, even if successful, REDD-SOXV¶
contribution to avoiding dangerous climate change would certainly be insufficient on 
its own. However, the completion of the REDD-plus rulebook at the latest COP has 
contributed, if marginally, to the positive continuation of the negotiations. In this 
sense, from being a source of disagreement in international law, forests have become 
a vehicle for consensus thanks to the soft approach introduced by REDD-plus. 
This legal experiment may well influence the future development of international 
environmental law. If it succeeds, instruments based on positive economic incentives 
and results-based payments may become the norm in international environmental 
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law-making. If it fails, other innovative sources of finance and forms of cooperation 
will have to emerge. In either case, the emphasis on issues such as public 
governance, participation, decentralisation DQG WKH HFRQRPLF YDOXDWLRQ RI QDWXUH¶V
services is likely to remain as REDD-plus has shown that neither pure market 
approaches nor pure governmental approaches to multi-level environmental 
governance are effective.  
Over the past few decades, we have entered an era of unprecedented human 
influence on the natural environment. Such is the extent of our impact that scientists 
KDYH FDOOHG WKLV HUD WKH µDQWKURSRFHQH¶19 The scale and complexity of these new 
environmental challenges demand that the tools and approaches we use to solve them 
evolve with the same rapidity as the circumstances we face. Law and policy, it 
seems, are under constant pressure to change, adapt and improve to catch up with 
problems moving at unprecedented speed. REDD-plus follows the process of rapid 
evolution that has marked the history of environmental law. It continues the shift 
towards soft-governance mechanisms, whereby old ideas of centralised authority 
(both in the international legal system and at the domestic level) are replaced by a 
system of governance based on a mix of prescriptive and incentive instruments. The 
next few years will tell if this is the right avenue to manage global environmental 
change and achieve sustainable development.  
                                                 
19
 See, e.g., Ehlers, Craft, Earth System Science in the Anthropocene (Springer 2006). 
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Annex A: Readiness preparation in 35 countries with highest 
deforestation  
Table 8. Deforestation rates and readiness in developing countries 
# Country 
Annual net change rate 
(2005-10) ~ R-PP^ 
National 
REDD+ 
strategy^ 
Investment 
Plan^ 1000ha/yr %/yr 
1 Brazil -2194 -0.42   X 
2 Indonesia -685 -0.71 X X X 
3 Nigeria -410 -4.00 X   
4 Tanzania -403 -1.16 X X  
5 Zimbabwe -327 -1.97    
6 
Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
-311 -0.20 X X X 
7 Myanmar -310 -0.95    
8 Bolivia  -308 -0.53    
9 Venezuela  -288 -0.61    
10 Argentina -240 -0.80 X   
11 Cameroon -220 -1.07 X   
12 Mozambique -211 -0.53 X   
13 Ecuador -198 -1.89    
14 Paraguay -179 -0.99    
15 Zambia -167 -0.33    
16 Mexico -155 -0.24 X  X 
17 Peru -150 -0.22 X   
18 Papua New Guinea -142 -0.49 X   
19 Ethiopia -141 -1.11 X   
20 Cambodia -127 -1.22 X   
21 Angola -125 -0.21    
22 Honduras -120 -2.16 X   
23 Botswana -118 -1.01    
24 Ghana -115 -2.19 X  X 
25 Colombia -101 -0.17 X   
26 Uganda -88 -2.72 X   
27 Malaysia -87 -0.42    
28 Chad -79 -0.67    
29 Mali -79 -0.62    
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30 Lao P. D. R. -78 -0.49 X   
31 Namibia -74 -0.99    
32 Nicaragua -70 -2.11    
33 Burkina Faso -60 -1.03   X 
34 Madagascar -57 -0.45 X   
35 Guatemala -56 -1.47 X   
# 
Total annual net 
change -8473 
- - - - 
# World net change -5581 - - - - 
# World net losses -10229 - - - - 
Source: FAO, Global Forest Resource Assessment 2010 (FAO 2010)  
~ µ1HW¶ GHIRUHVWDWLRQ LV WKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ WKHGHIRUHVWHG DUHD DQG WKH DUHD of natural or man-
made forest regrowth; it can be expressed in absolute terms (hectares) or in terms of relative change 
(percentage points). 
^ Documents published as of December 2013 
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Annex B: Public governance in the sampled countries  
World Governance Indicators 2010 (table 9) 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators are a measure of governance used by the 
World Bank. It includes six aggregate criteria: voice and accountability (includes 
political freedom, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media); 
political stability and absence of violence/terrorism; government effectiveness 
(includes the quality of public services, civil service, policy formulation and 
implementation); regulatory quality (ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations); rule of law (extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society); and control of corruption (extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain).1 Each criteria is based on hundreds 
of indicators obtained from different sources, including survey respondents, NGOs, 
commercial business information providers, and public sector organizations.2 The six 
criteria are assessed in percentile terms and split in six tiers: 0 to 10 = extremely 
poor performance; 11 to 25 = poor performance; 26 to 50 = bad performance; 51 to 
75 = mediocre performance; 76 to 90 = good performance; 91 to 100 = very good 
performance.3 
World Development Indicators 2013 (table 10) 
The World Development Indicators (WDI) is the primary World Bank collection of 
development data compiled from officially-recognized international sources, and 
including over 800 indicators for each assessed country.4 The index considers two 
DUHDVHDFKFRPSULVLQJILYHJRDOV7KHILUVWDUHDVµ3ROLFLHVIRUVRFLDOLQFOXVLRQDQG
HTXLW\¶ DQG LQFOXGHV WKH IROORZLQJ JRDOV D JHQGHU HTXDOLW\ E HTXLW\ RI SXEOLF
                                                 
1
 :RUOG %DQN µWorldwide Governance Indicators¶ World Bank (2013) 
<http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators> Accessed 8 February 
2014. 
2
 Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi, The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical 
Issues (World Bank 2010) 2. 
3
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUSretation: the World Bank does not explicitly define each tier. 
4
 µWorld Development Indicators 2013¶ World Bank 2013) <http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/5.9> 
Accessed 8 February 2014. 
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resource use, (c) building human resources, (d) social protection and labour, and (d) 
SROLFLHVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQVIRUHQYLURQPHQWDOVXVWDLQDELOLW\7KHVHFRQGDUHDLVµ3XEOLF
VHFWRUPDQDJHPHQWDQGLQVWLWXWLRQV¶DQGLQFOXGHVDSURSHUW\ULJKWVDQGUXOH-based 
governance, (b) quality of budgetary and financial management, (c) efficiency of 
revenue mobilization, (d) quality of public administration, and (e) transparency, 
accountability, and corruption in the public sector. The score reported below are the 
average of the individual scores for each goal. The rating scale ranges from grade 1 
to 6: 1 to 1.9 = Unsatisfactory for an extended period; 2 to 2.9 = Unsatisfactory; 3 to 
3.9 = Moderately Unsatisfactory; 4 to 4.9 = Moderately Satisfactory; 5 to 5.9 = 
Good; 6 = Good for an extended period. 
Corruption Perception Index 2013 (Table 11) 
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is a measure of the perceived levels of 
public-sector corruption in 183 countries. The CPI is compiled annually by the NGO 
Transparency International since 1995 and draws on assessments and business 
RSLQLRQ VXUYH\V FDUULHG RXW E\ LQGHSHQGHQW LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG UHODWLQJ WR µEULEHU\ RI
public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and 
questions that probe the strength and effectiveness of public-sector anti-corruption 
HIIRUWV¶5 In 2013, 177 countries were assessed using a scale that ranges from 0 
(highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). Countries are also ranked in descending order of 
corruption.6 
Global Integrity Indicators 2010 (Table 11) 
The Global Integrity Report and Global Integrity Index (GII) provide a quantitative 
DVVHVVPHQW RI µWKH DFFHVV WKDW FLWL]HQV DQG EXVLQHVVHV KDYH WR D FRXQWU\
V
government, their ability to monitor its behaviour, and their ability to seek redress 
and advocate for improved JRYHUQDQFH¶7 In order to do so, the research uses over 
300 indicators that are then aggregated to generate a country scorecard. The 
indicators are organized into six categories: civil society, public information and 
                                                 
5
 µCorruption Perceptions Index: Corruption around the world in 2013¶ (Transparency International 
2013) <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013> Accessed 8 February 2014. 
6
 For a critique of the CPI see: Ashaklock, Connor, Measuring Corruption (Ashgate 2007) 
7
 µGlobal Integrity Report: 2010 Integrity Indicators Data¶ Global Integrity 2011) 
<https://www.globalintegrity.org/downloads> Accessed 8 February 2014. 
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media, elections, government accountability, administration and civil service, 
oversight and regulation, and anti-corruption and rule of law.8 The GII indicators are 
scored on a scale from 0 to 100, and the final score of a country is the product of a 
simple average. Countries are grouped into five performance "tiers": very strong 
(90+), strong (80+), moderate (70+), weak (60+), and very weak (< 60). The index 
also uses the same ordinal VFDOH WR PHDVXUH WKH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WKH FRXQWU\¶V
legal framework for good governance and anti-corruption and its actual 
implementation and enforcement, called implementation gap; an implementation gap 
of 0-LVDVVHVVHGµVPDOO¶-µPRGHUDWH¶-µODUJH¶-µYHU\ODUJH¶DQG
RUPRUHLVµKXJH¶ 
International Country Risk Guide 2011 (Table 12) 
Commercial providers of business information offer an analysis of the challenges 
and dangers for international business operations. The International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) was created in 1980 by the Political Risk Group. It comprises three 
subcategories of risk - political, financial, and economic ± each having a separate 
index.9 Here we only consider the Political Risk index, which includes twelve 
variables: government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, 
internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, 
law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality. 
The index ranges from 0 to 100 and it is broken into categories: a country with a 0-
50 is considered to be at very high risk, in the 51-60 range it is high risk, 61-70 is 
moderate risk, 71-80 is low risk and 81-100 very low risk.10  
                                                 
8
 The GII considers 23 sub-categories: Civil Society Organizations, Media, Public Access to 
Information, Elections, Voting & Citizen Participation, Election Integrity, Political Financing, 
Government Accountability, Executive Accountability, Legislative Accountability, Judicial 
Accountability, Budget Processes, Administration and Civil Service, Civil Service Regulations, 
Whistle-blowing Measures, Procurement, Privatization, Oversight and Regulation, National 
Ombudsman, Supreme Audit Institution, Taxes and Customs, State-Owned Enterprises, Business 
Licensing and Regulation, Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law, Anti-Corruption Law, Anti-Corruption 
Agency, Rule of Law, Law Enforcement; ibid. 
9
 µInternational Country Risk Guide, January 2011¶ (PRS 2011) 
<http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_TableDef.aspx> Accessed 8 February 2014. 
10
 µInternational Country Risk Guide Methodology¶ PRS 2011) 
<www.prsgroup.com/PDFS/icrgmethodology.pdf> Accessed 8 February 2014. 
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Euromoney Country Risk 2010 (Table 12) 
The Euromoney Country Risk (ECR) assessment is prepared by an online 
community of economic and political experts. The overall score is an average of the 
following categories: political risk, economic performance, structural, debt 
indicators, credit rating, access to bank finance/capital markets.11 The assessment 
scale contains five tiers: score 80-100: stable and predictable (the political system is 
stable and the role of government transparent and predictable); score 65-79.9: stable 
but moderately unpredictable (the political system is stable but may be subjected to 
changes and is affected by corruption and lack of transparency); score 50-64.9: 
moderately stable and moderately unpredictable (the political system is usually 
stable but rather unpredictable, corrupt and not transparent); score 36-49.9: 
moderately unstable and unpredictable (the political system is opaque, corruption 
widespread, the government is to understand and changes in administration are 
common); score 0-35.9: unstable and unpredictable (the political system is usually 
unstable, changes in the administrative government frequent, and the rule of law 
absent).  
  
                                                 
11
 µEuromoney Country Risk Methodology¶ Euromoney Institutional Investors 2014) 
<www.euromoneycountryrisk.com/Methodology.aspx> Accessed 8 February 2014. 
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Table 9: Worldwide Governance Indicators 2010  
Country Name Control 
Corrupt. 
Gov. 
Effectiv. 
Political 
Stability  
Regulat. 
Quality 
Rule of 
Law 
Voice & 
Account. 
Angola 5/100 15/100 36/100 5/100 15/100 36/100 
Argentina 19 7 17 19 29 57 
Bolivia 27 43 30 22 16 45 
Botswana 79 67 89 74 70 64 
Brazil 56 50 48 55 52 61 
Cambodia 14 22 41 39 17 19 
Cameroon 7 19 27 21 17 18 
Chad 6 5 17 13 3 10 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 4 1 3 6 1 7 
Congo, Rep. 10 11 31 8 13 15 
Colombia 42 57 8 64 44 45 
Ecuador 28 37 27 15 12 38 
Ethiopia 32 40 7 14 31 12 
Guatemala 31 26 25 46 15 36 
Ghana 56 52 50 56 54 60 
Honduras 18 27 35 45 11 33 
Lao PDR 15 21 47 22 23 5 
Burkina Faso 38 30 26 48 42 37 
Malaysia 66 80 45 70 66 38 
Mali 25 16 4 36 30 31 
Madagascar 31 15 28 31 20 25 
Mexico 43 63 24 67 36 55 
Mozambique 33 30 59 35 34 43 
Myanmar 11 4 18 2 6 4 
Namibia 67 59 79 54 60 59 
Nicaragua 25 21 36 43 29 32 
Nigeria 11 16 3 25 10 27 
Papua New Guinea 15 25 26 32 23 47 
Paraguay 22 20 20 41 21 44 
Peru 43 49 20 68 33 54 
Tanzania 22 28 47 37 35 42 
Uganda 18 33 19 44 45 34 
Venezuela, RB 7 13 18 5 1 22 
Zambia 46 38 65 36 43 44 
Zimbabwe 5 11 22 2 2 7 
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Table 10: Institutional capacity: the World Development Indicators 2013 
Country name Social policy & 
Equity 
Public Sector 
capacity 
Angola 2.7 2.3 
Argentina - - 
Bolivia  3.8 3.2 
Botswana - - 
Brazil - - 
Burkina Faso 3.7 3.7 
Cambodia 3.5 2.8 
Cameroon 3 2.9 
Chad 2.5 2.2 
Colombia - - 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 2.8 2.2 
Ecuador -   
Ethiopia 3.7 3.4 
Ghana 4 3.7 
Guatemala - - 
Honduras 3.6 3.2 
Indonesia - - 
Lao P.D.R. 3.5 3.1 
Madagascar 2.9 2.6 
Malaysia - - 
Mali 3.2 3 
Mexico - - 
Mozambique 3.5 3.4 
Myanmar - - 
Namibia - - 
Nicaragua 3.8 3.2 
Nigeria 3.4 2.9 
Papua New Guinea 2.7 3 
Paraguay - - 
Peru - - 
Tanzania 3.7 3.3 
Uganda 3.7 3 
Venezuela  - - 
Zambia 3.3 3.2 
Zimbabwe 2.4 2.2 
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Table 11: Measures of corruption and transparency  
Country Name CPI 2013 GII 2010/2011 
(Score) (Ranking) Legal 
framework 
Implement. 
Gap 
Angola 23/100  153/177 84/100 43 
Argentina 34 106 97 20 
Bolivia  34 106 78 21 
Botswana 64 30 - - 
Brazil 42 72 76 18 
Burkina Faso 38 83 - - 
Cambodia 20 160 46 28 
Cameroon 25 144 69 30 
Chad 19 163 - - 
Colombia 36 94 68 41 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 22 154 44  - 
Ecuador 35 102 60 32 
Ethiopia 33 111 70 46 
Ghana 46 63 65 28 
Guatemala 38 83 90 47 
Honduras 26 140 - - 
Indonesia 32 114 74 35 
Lao P.D.R. 26 140 - - 
Madagascar 28 127 - - 
Malaysia 50 53 57 20 
Mali 2.8 118 - - 
Mexico 34 106 72 24 
Mozambique 30 119 59 31 
Myanmar 21 157 - - 
Namibia 48 57 - - 
Nicaragua 28 127 - - 
Nigeria 25 144 73 29 
Papua New Guinea 25 144 69  - 
Paraguay 24 150 - - 
Peru 38 83 81 23 
Tanzania 33 111 75 32 
Uganda 26 140 69 54 
Venezuela  20 160 61 44 
Zambia 38 83 - - 
Zimbabwe 21 157 59 33 
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Table 12: Political risk of doing business  
Country Name ICRG 2011 
ECR 2010 
Score Ranking# 
Angola 57.5/100 42/100 99/185 
Argentina 64.5 48 86 
Bolivia (Pl. State of) 59 46 89 
Botswana 74.5 40 102 
Brazil 69 70 46 
Burkina Faso 59 33 129 
Cambodia - 20 152 
Cameroon 59.5 29 141 
Chad - 8 176 
Colombia 62.5 64 48 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 55.5 34 148 
Ecuador 52.5 35 119 
Ethiopia 50.5 38 106 
Ghana 63.5 44 95 
Guatemala (2012) 62.5 38 109 
Honduras 60 37 114 
Indonesia 59 59 61 
Lao P.D.R. - 16 161 
Madagascar 57 32 132 
Malaysia 73.5 59 60 
Mali 58.5 46 131 
Mexico 70.5 69 43 
Mozambique 67.5 42 100 
Myanmar 46 23 149 
Namibia 79 51 77 
Nicaragua (2012) 62.5 35 120 
Nigeria 46 38 110 
Papua New Guinea 59 28 144 
Paraguay 55 50 79 
Peru 62.5 65 46 
Uganda 51 39 104 
United Republic of Tanzania 64 40 103 
Venezuela  46.5 45 92 
Zambia 63 37 111 
Zimbabwe 42.5 17 155 
263 
 
Annex C: Summary assessment of readiness documents 
Table 13: Assessment of nineteen Readiness Preparation Proposals 
  1^ 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Sum 
'ULYHUV¶DQDO\VLV                     
Contains a detailed analysis of the direct causes of deforestation  3* 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 3 0 1 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 37 
Contains a detailed analysis of the direct causes of forest 
degradation 
3 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 3 0 1 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 40 
Relates the causes of forest loss to the legal/policy framework 
and proposes targeted policy responses 
0 0 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 0 1 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 30 
Stakeholder participation                      
Identifies relevant stakeholders for REDD-plus 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 1 1 3 3 1 3 1 3 45 
Specifically considers how to engage local stakeholders 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 3 0 3 42 
Proposes a transparent process for stakeholder participation 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 1 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 40 
Proposes a process to ensure accountability for stakeholder input 0 1 1 3 1 3 0 3 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 20 
Proposes a grievance / dispute resolution mechanism 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 1 3 0 0 3 0 1 3 3 1 0 3 23 
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Land and forest tenure                     
Discusses the situation regarding land and forest tenure, 
including for indigenous peoples 
1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 1 0 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 1 1 36 
Considers the capacity of judicial and non-judicial systems to 
resolve conflicts and uphold rights 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 9 
Forest management                     
Discusses the ability of forest agencies to plan and implement 
forest management activities 
3 0 3 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 3 3 0 1 0 3 3 3 3 36 
Considers the role of non-government stakeholders, including 
communities, in forest management 
0 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 
 
3 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 39 
Government coordination 
 
    
      
         
Considers REDD-plus in the context of other sector policies, 
land use plans, and national development plans 
3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 3 1 49 
Proposes mechanisms to coordinate REDD-plus across sectors 3 3 1 3 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 1 3 37 
Proposes mechanisms to coordinate REDD-plus across levels of 
government 
3 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 3 1 3 1 1 35 
Forest law  
 
    
      
         
Discusses the current legal and policy framework and seek to 
promote consistency 
3 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 3 1 3 3 0 3 0 1 0 3 3 40 
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Discusses the ability of law enforcement bodies to effectively 
enforce forest laws  
1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 3 0 3 3 32 
Discusses efforts to combat corruption 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 8 
Political strategy 
 
    
      
         
Identifies the stakeholders with an interested in the forest and lays 
out a clear political strategy  
1 1 1 3 0 3 0 0 3 1 1 1 1 3 0 1 1 1 1 23 
REDD-plus revenue management & benefit sharing 
 
    
      
         
Proposes a transparent system to track and coordinate international 
financing of activities related to REDD-plus 
3 1 3 0 0 3 0 1 1 0 1 3 0 3 0 3 0 1 1 24 
Considers measures to promote fiscal transparency and 
accountability for REDD-plus revenue management 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1 1 15 
Proposes a participatory process to develop systems for REDD-
plus revenue distribution and benefit-sharing  
1 3 1 1 0 3 1 3 3 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 25 
Reviews lessons from past and/or existing systems for managing 
and distributing forest revenues 
3 0 1 1 0 1 0 3 0 1 1 3 0 3 1 3 0 0 1 22 
Monitoring and evaluation of REDD-plus  
 
    
      
         
Proposes to guarantee public access to information 3 0 3 3 0 3 1 1 3 1 3 3 0 3 1 1 1 1 1 32 
Proposes mechanisms for independent oversight of the 
implementation of REDD-plus activities 
1 3 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 11 
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Proposes mechanisms to monitor efforts to address governance 
challenges 
1 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 3 1 3 0 0 1 1 1 21 
Implementation costs and times 
 
    
      
         
Clearly presents cost-estimates for the various components  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 3 50 
Clearly indicates the times for the implementation of each 
component  
0 0 3 1 1 0 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 0 1 3 1 25 
^ 1 = Argentina; 2 = Cambodia; 3 = Cameroon; 4 = Colombia; 5 = Democratic Republic of Congo; 6 = Ethiopia; 7 =  Ghana; 8 = Guatemala; 9 = Honduras; 10 = 
Indonesia; 11 = Lao PDR; 12 = Madagascar; 13 =  Mexico; 14 = Mozambique; 15 = Nigeria; 16 = Papua New Guinea; 17 = Peru; 18 = Tanzania; 19 =  Uganda 
* The R-PPs are assessed using the following approximation: 3 = the issue is adequately addressed; 1 = the issue is inadequately addressed (e.g. it is mentioned but no 
solution is proposed); 0 = the issue is not addressed.  
~ This value can range from 0 (no document addresses the issue) to 57 (all documents adequately address the issue). Scores: equal to or higher than 45 = the issue is 
adequately addressed in the large majority of documents; equal to or higher than 35 = the issue is adequately addressed in some countries but not in others; equal to or higher 
than 20 = the issue has received consideration but most documents do not adequately address it; lower than 20 = the issue is inadequately considered or ignored in most 
countries. 
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Table 14: Assessment of six FIP Investment Plans  
Country name Good elements Less good elements 
Brazil x Good analysis of drivers;  
x Adequate consideration of investments outside the forest 
sector to reduce pressure;  
x Measures to promote inter-sectoral coordination,  
x Analysis of institutional capacity;  
x Analysis of existing legal and policy frameworks;  
x Good references to transformational impact;  
x Good monitoring and evaluation (M&E) section 
(institutional);  
x Thorough provisions on consultation;  
x Clear targets. 
x Inadequate political strategy;  
x Ambitious goals but vague roadmap for implementation (a lot 
LVPDUNHGDVµWREHGHFLGHG¶)  
x Plan limited to the µ&HUUDGR¶HFRV\VWHP; 
x Little mention of crime and illegality. 
Burkina Faso x Emphasis on decentralisation;  
x Proposes measure to harmonise and complete legal, policy and 
institutional frameworks;  
x Discusses need to capacity building at local and government 
levels;  
x Good section on results and indicators;  
x Combines policy and project action;  
x Good involvement of local stakeholders;  
x Adopts landscape approach. 
x Vague timetable;  
x Weak M&E;  
x Unclear role of private sector;  
x Insufficient analysis of non-carbon benefits;  
x Inadequate assessment of institutional risks;  
x Little mention of illegality and crime. 
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DRC x Large-scale pilot areas;  
x Good analysis of drivers (including economic dynamics);  
x Considers investments to address the underlying causes of 
forest loss (even if they do not generate emission reductions) 
at country and local levels;  
x Proposes measures to coordinate funding sources 
x Weak assessment of risks,  
x Weak monitoring and evaluation,  
x Limited to pilot areas, little contribution to national policy; 
x Vague on measures for financial transparency,  
x Vague on legal framework,  
x No comprehensive timetable for implementation. 
Ghana (draft) x Links to existing international environmental initiatives 
(FLEGT); 
x Analysis of existing legal framework (environment, fiscal);  
x Proposes coordination of funding sources;  
x Timetable for implementation. 
x Weak analysis of drivers and generic policy responses;  
x Weak analysis of institutional risks;  
x No specific interventions;  
x No fund mobilisation strategy;  
x No financial detail;  
x No political strategy;  
x Vague timetable. 
Indonesia x Cross-sectoral links and good integration in national policy;  
x Emphasis on local capacity building;  
x Seeks to have transformational impact (i.e. lasting change to 
the development model) and targets SMEs;  
x Recognises capacity problems in national institutions;  
x Proposes coordination of funding sources;  
x Considers social benefits. 
x Vague on transparency measure for financial management; 
x No mention of corruption;  
x Weak assessment of institutional risks, illegality, law 
enforcement; 
x Does not with issues of cross-level coordination and up-
scaling from local level;  
x Does not target industrial drivers. 
Mexico x Considers access to financial services for SMEs;  
x Good analysis of economic drivers, with link to social and 
x Does not address institutional capacity risk;  
x Weak analysis of and response to industrial drivers;  
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institutional causes;  
x Good portfolio of possible interventions;  
x Adequately considers policy harmonisation;  
x Adequately considers tenure risks;  
x Considers multi-sector integration 
x Inadequate on transparency;  
x Inadequate treatment of M&E. 
 
Table 15: Assessment of five national REDD-plus strategies 
Country name Good elements Less good elements 
DRC x Puts forward a political vision for the development of the 
country; 
x Identifies planning as central tool;  
x Fosters collaboration with academia and research institutes;  
x Considers interventions to harmonise laws and policies;  
x Links policy to the drivers;  
x Incorporates good governance principles;  
x Recognises tenure as a major source of conflict;  
x Analyses implementation across levels;  
x Adequately considers coordination of funding;  
x Proposes a transparent system for the management of finance 
(centralised). 
x Does not proposes a system to ensure government 
accountability;  
x Does not dedicate attention to governance and institutional 
capacity;  
x Weak M&E;  
x Vague and superficial political strategy;  
x Proposed activities are generic and framed in ambiguous terms 
(e.g. promote agricultural intensification);  
x Fails to draw a link between sectors;  
x Centralises implementation;  
x Does not advance a clear political strategy 
Guyana (draft) x Links the NRS to other national environmental strategies and x Does not advance a clear political vision;  
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programmes;  
x Seeks to promote participation through consultation;  
x Seeks to establish a legal assurance system to improve law 
enforcement and address crime;  
x Emphasises links and synergies with EU FLEGT;  
x Seeks multi-sector coordination;  
x Recognise capacity building needs at government level;  
x Considers multiple benefits. 
x No clear political strategy;  
x Does not propose a transparent revenue structure;  
x Does not advance credible policies;  
x Does not address the drivers;  
x Does not focus on local capacity building;  
x Does not have a timetable for activities. 
Indonesia x Contains short and medium-term goals;  
x Considers relationship with other programmes;  
x Considers subnational level;  
x Establishes articulated institutional framework;  
x Promotes inter-institutional coordination through clarity of 
mandates;  
x Consider key areas of policy (tenure, planning, law 
enforcement);  
x Adopts landscape approach (integration);  
x Extensive information on participation and safeguards 
information system. 
x Underdeveloped vision; general lack of details;  
x Inadequate system to ensure transparent financial 
management;  
x Vague policy proposals;  
x Lack a political strategy;  
x Lacks a specificity on inter-sector and multi-level 
coordination;  
x Does not consider institutional capacity; does not consider 
local capacity;  
x Clarity of mandates insufficient to avoid/address institutional 
fragmentation across sectors and levels Æ no coordination 
mechanisms. 
Philippines x Contains good timetable; 
x Builds on existing institutional and decision-making structures 
x Underdeveloped vision for development;  
x Builds on existing institutional and decision-making structures 
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(no duplication);  
x Adequately analyses interaction with existing legal and policy 
framework;  
x Considers drivers and matches policy approaches;  
x Proposes establishment of a REDD-specific legal framework;  
x Integrates REDD in sectoral plans;  
x Establishes national and subnational coordinating bodies;  
x Considers capacity building needs at national and local scales 
(danger of capture, inefficiency, fragmentation);  
x Does not propose transparent financial management system;  
x Does not propose detailed benefit-sharing arrangements;  
x Lacks a clear political strategy. 
Tanzania x Links drivers to policy failures;  
x Aims to coordinate responses and establish transparent 
financial management system;  
x Establishes ad hoc institutional structure;  
x Analyses existing legal and policy framework;  
x Considers multiple benefits. 
x Does not mention coordination of REDD institutions with 
government;  
x Inadequate provisions on participation; no mention of 
institutional risks;  
x Inadequate analysis of capacity building needs at national and 
local scales;  
x Lacks a clear political strategy. 
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